Conference On Security And Cooperation In Europe Research Articles

The Budapest memorandum: lessons and unfulfilled expectations on Ukraine’s path to joining NATO

The Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine (the official name is the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) was the result of negotiations on the disposal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its nuclear weapons were deployed or stored in four of the fifteen successor states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. This raised important questions of security and protection, as well as command and control; and Moscow and Washington agreed that Russia should be the sole nuclear successor to the Soviet Union. The United States recognized that it would have to offer security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to persuade them to hand over their Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. In coordination with London and Moscow, Washington drew up a package of security guarantees. These assurances were set out in the Budapest memorandums regarding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. France and China – the other nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT—have offered their own guarantees unilaterally.
 The Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine confirmed the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine (according to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975); to refrain from the threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, as well as from any use of weapons against Ukraine, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine in accordance with the Final Act of the CSCE. The memorandum also reiterated the positive and negative security guarantees provided to all non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT.
 This scientific article is devoted to the study of the significance of the Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine and its influence on the possibility of the country joining NATO. The historical context of the conclusion of the memorandum is studied, the key obligations are determined and the consequences of their violation are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the current security situation in Ukraine, in particular due to the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The article examines the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and suggests ways to resolve unfulfilled expectations and restore the international community’s trust in the commitments made within the framework of the memorandum.

Overcoming the Second Cold War: The Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Relaxation of East-West Tensions, 1983–1986

This article focuses on the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), held under the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the mid-1980s. By drawing on archival materials from the UK, France and the US, the article shows that the CDE, designed to discuss Confidence-Building Measures ranging from the Atlantic to the Urals, played an important role in overcoming the Second Cold War. Specifically, the article demonstrates that the CDE contributed in three ways. First, by becoming a sole-functioning arms control forum at its overture in January 1984, it de-escalated international tensions through dialogue. Second, by providing a first step in superpower arms talks in 1985, it underpinned US-Soviet cooperation. Third, by becoming the very first arms control agreement since the 1970s, it paved the way for subsequent arms control agreements, both nuclear and conventional. The article pays particular attention to the Western European countries, which played a vital role from its preparations in 1983 to the agreement in 1986. The findings make us reconsider the function of the oft-overlooked arms control framework in the process leading up to the end of the Cold War.

‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’ the Temptations and Horror of Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy

ABSTRACT 1 This article discusses non-conventional diplomatic tools. It does so by focussing on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and suggests that individuals and individual creativity to make use of non-conventional tools, in combination with attention to working conditions, impact the outcome. CSCE ventured in entirely new territory and promoted such novel concepts as the indivisibility of security, and the free flow of individuals, information, and ideas. As such it appealed to negotiatiors’ creativity; by contrast, MBFR was about reducing conventional forces in the given constellation of a divided Europe – it treated this division as a fact of life; as such it may have offered far less opportunities for individual diplomats’ creativity to fully blossom. Taken together a discussion of these tools also contribute to the structure – agency debate: they provide additional evidence that individual diplomats – though often simply seen as tools of their respective governments and merely acting within a certain constellation – and close attention to the conditions they have to work in, do matter, even when, of course, it is governments, not diplomats, that will have to sanction the results they achieve.

The USSR and Sweden During the Preparation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1969—1975)

In March 1969 in the Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Pact member states’ Political Consultative Committee a proposal was made to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was proposed. The Soviet Foreign Ministry undertook active efforts to implement this idea, including its promotion at the Nordic “direction”. Neutral Sweden was regarded by the Soviet political leadership as a country that could assist the USSR in the preparation and organization of the CSCE. It was considered that “the two sides’ positions in many cases are similar or close to each other”. On the basis of documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) the author of this article analyses Soviet-Swedish relations in the late 1960s — first half of 1970s with the preparation for and carrying out of the CSCE as a background.

Détente między Zachodem a Wschodem. Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie z perspektywy Polski

The purpose of this article is to analyse the policy of détente between the West and the East at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from Poland’s perspective. The article begins with a synthetic theoretical and historical introduction concerning the formation of a new international order, particularly in Europe. The state of research on the CSCE in Poland is also outlined in a synthetic way. Then the analysis of Poland's role in the CSCE forum is presented in the context of the multifaceted negotiation processes in a chronological and problematic arrangement from the perspective of the theory of international roles. Endo-, and especially exogenous, connections concerning Poland’s functioning in the Eastern Bloc, including the hegemonic position of the USSR in it, were taken into account. Particular focus is placed on the implications of the CSCE Final Act for Poland. The article is based on Polish and English-language sources.

From Helsinki to “Mars”

Abstract After the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, the Soviet Union sought to compel the West to accept its vision for détente. This meant, on the one hand, the acceptance of the political and social status quo within the Soviet bloc and, on the other hand, the “completion” of the existing political détente with “military détente”—namely, East-West arms control agreements that preserved or augmented existing Warsaw Pact advantages. To this end, the KGB and its Soviet-bloc partners undertook two parallel campaigns of active measures, “Synonym” and “Mars.” Despite tactical successes, both campaigns failed to achieve their goals. The United States, supported by other Western governments, continued to pressure the Eastern-bloc governments on human rights violations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continued to modernize its forces in Europe, most importantly with the stationing of U.S. Euromissiles in 1983 in accordance with NATO's dual-track decision of December 1979.

Діяльність Комісії прав людини Світового Конгресу Вільних Українців (1970-1980-ті роки)

На основі архівних документів та опублікованих спогадів проаналізовано діяльність Комісії прав людини Світового Конгресу Вільних Українців (СКВУ), спрямовану на привернення уваги до порушення прав людини в Українській РСР у 1970-х – 1980-х роках. З цією метою простежено причини утворення цієї структурної одиниці СКВУ, її склад і напрямки роботи. Встановлено, що основні зусилля Комісії прав людини були спрямовані на інформування світової громадськості про факти недотримання прав людини в УРСР шляхом публікації відповідних матеріалів, організації масових заходів (маніфестацій, прес-конференцій), скеровування звернень до міжнародних правозахисних організацій та державних діячів країн Заходу з проханнями встати на захист переслідуваних українських дисидентів.

Human rights dimension in Helsinki 1975: Canadian concern the situation in the Soviet Union

During the 1960s and 1970s, Western countries, including Canada, became increasingly aware of and responded to human rights abuses abroad. The ideological, military and economic Cold War with the Soviet Union has intensified Ottawa’s focus on human rights abuses in the country. For many Canadian observers, the communist system inherently repressed a number of human rights, including the freedoms of religion, movement, and property ownership. This concern was manifested during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act of the CSCE was signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the heads of government of the states of Europe and of Canada and the United States. Helsinki Final Act contained far-reaching agreements on political borders, trade, and human rights norms, has often been described as the “high point of détente”. It is intended to establish the basis for the development of future relations between their countries and peoples. Among other the participants promised to respect fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. Also pledges were given to make it easier for families to unite across borders and visit one another. However, Canadian Government made less likely to press human rights concerns than might have been expected. Ottawa often felt that more could be gained in its relationship with the Soviet Union by overlooking human rights violations. Such an approach was not uniformly supported in Parliament or in nongovernmental circles, which led to ongoing negotiations about the proper place of human rights concerns in Soviet-Canadian relations throughout this period. Despite uneven attention by Canadian Government, the growing prominence of human rights issues helped to ensure their enduring salience in the years that followed.

The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War by Morgan Michael Cotey (review)

SEER, 97, 3, JULY 2019 588 Morgan, Michael Cotey. The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War. America in the World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ and Oxford, 2018. xi + 396 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $35.00: £27.00. The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War is a truly international history of the process that led to the signing oftheHelsinkiAccordsin1975anditsaftermath.TheHelsinkiAccordswerethe outcome of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and in the book, Michael Cotey Morgan analyses the process which was initiated by Leonid Brezhnev, negotiated for almost three years by hundreds of diplomats, and finally signed by thirty-five European, Soviet, and North American heads of state. The Final Act debunks the many myths and simplifications about the Helsinki agreement that have surrounded it ever since 1975 and is an extremely valuable contribution to the current reevaluation of the late Cold War. The book is organized chronologically around three main questions: ‘Why was the CSCE created in the first place? Why did the Final Act take the shape that it did? And how did it influence the Cold War?’ (p. 4). Morgan argues that while the CSCE’s significance was underestimated at the time, the Final Act proved very consequential for Europe and its place in the international system, and the 1975 Helsinki Summit should therefore claim its prominence as the successor to the 1815 Congress of Vienna or the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. This emphasis on the importance of the CSCE and the resulting European order also elevates the West and the role some key Western actors, such as Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou and Richard Nixon, played in the process, but Leonid Brezhnev is also in the midst of the narrative, which takes into account the context of the Cold War. One of the most astonishing things about the Helsinki process is how many diverse actors were involved. The dominant actors were the United States and the Soviet Union, but the dividing Iron Curtain did not govern the process. Morgan does a great job of showing how the hundreds of diplomats involved in negotiating the process could advance and retreat at different points in time; indeed it comes out very clearly how diplomatic the process actually was. The preparatory talks took longer than anyone had suspected, with delegations arriving in Geneva in September 1973 and completing their work in July 1975. Chapter four, ‘The Meaning of Security’, discusses the workload, bureaucracy, tactics and personalities, and brings out ‘the mixture of tedium and exhilaration that characterized life at the CSCE’ (p. 114). The Western media was not very interested in the preparatory talks but, as instructed from above, the Soviet and Eastern bloc media discussed the overall process in a positive light, criticizing the ‘Western governments for demanding too much’ (p. 112). The Soviet delegation in Geneva was by far the largest, with Anatolii REVIEWS 589 Kovalev leading a team of experienced negotiators who proved themselves to be invested in improved East-West relations. The major negotiators from the Western side often sent junior diplomats, mainly to signal that they ‘would be prepared to walk away if the Soviets refused to compromise’ (p. 113). By focusing on all the different actors involved, Morgan debunks the myth of the Helsinki Process being solely a bilateral, superpower project. Even if the process and the outcome of the Helsinki agreement greatly influenced the way the Cold War developed, giving the West an upper hand on pretty much ‘every significant point’ (p. 5), no actor was too small to have a voice in the process; no political culture was by default out of the loop. Of course there were dominant actors, but the detailed descriptions of the actual negotiations make it clear that this was a diplomatic project. Morgan also takes into account the parallel structure of established Cold War organizations, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was not obvious to especially the Western leaders to leave disarmament off the agenda for Helsinki, but in the end, Nixon and Brezhnev reached a compromise which the other leaders accepted even if some felt like it had been a...

An Overview on Different Dimensions of OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. It employs around 3,460 people, mostly in its field operations but also in its secretariat in Vienna, Austria and its institutions. It has its origins in the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki, Finland.

“Neither too much nor too little” France, the USSR and the Helsinki CSCE

In the early 1970s, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the cornerstone of French foreign policy regarding East-West relations. It was considered by Paris as the best way to maintain dialogue with Moscow as well as an instrument to reach the Gaullist goal of overcoming the European status quo. This double objective explains why the French adopted an ambiguous attitude during the CSCE: even though their goal was to challenge the Brezhnev doctrine and initiate a process to meet the aspirations of peoples under Soviet domination, they knew that this would be a lengthy process. For them, it was necessary to avoid provoking the Soviets by putting forward expressively liberal proposals. The French leaders of the 1970s saw the CSCE as the multilateral prolongation of the Gaullist policy of ‘détente, entente, cooperation’.

HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND UNIVERSAL VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The author analyzes the evolution of human rights and fundamental freedoms in domestic political life of individual states and in international relations as well over the latest two centuries. The article traces the role of struggle for liberal political human rights and civilian freedoms in the dismantling of the feudal-absolutist regimes as well as the challenges of radical left-wing (communist) and far right-wing (national-socialistic) threats to be met by the supporters of liberal political rights and civil freedoms in the interwar period. The list of human rights and fundamental freedoms had constantly been updating in the postwar period, including by the efforts of the UNO and other international organizations, and fixing in different international documents. The author emphasizes the import role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in transforming the issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms into the essential element of public diplomacy of contemporary states. He traces the process of the increasing utilization of liberal political rights and civilian freedoms, which are usually the effective tools for domestic democratic transformation, within the framework of diplomatic practice of European and North-American states, aimed at ensuring their political and economic interests on the world stage. In this regard the author addresses the attempts of Western countries to legalize "humanitarian"interventions in circumvention of the UN Security Council. The article emphasizes the necessity to replenish the understanding of universal human rights and freedoms by the values, developed both by the international community within the framework of implementing the Millennium Development Goals and by various countries and peoples, which in sum constitute the modern international civilizational baggage.

The Impact of the German Question on Polish Attitudes toward CSCE, 1964–1975

In Polish political thought and foreign policy during the four-plus decades of Communist rule in Poland, the German question played a central role. Many aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were connected with the German question, but it would be a simplification to construe the Polish regime's interest in the conference only in the context of the German problem. Polish leaders saw CSCE also as a chance for introducing changes in East-West relations and for extending Poland's leeway for maneuver in international relations. This article shows how Polish Communist leaders thought about these issues and traces the diplomatic activity aimed at promoting the Polish point of view and securing the country's (and regime’s) priorities.

Where east met west: Helsinki and the staging of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

ABSTRACT:The final phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 is widely regarded as the high point of détente. This article discusses the staging and legacy of the CSCE from the perspective of its host city, Helsinki. The article examines how the Finnish initiative to host the conference became enmeshed with Helsinki's municipal politics and how the CSCE's and Finland's neutrality were used by the Helsinki authorities to project an attractive image of their city. The article further highlights the Helsinki Summit as a public spectacle with which a large number of local residents engaged.

Review of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 40 years after Helsinki

The paper deals with the genesis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the important pan-European forum for addressing security issues during the Cold War era, and, secondly, analyses the dynamics of institutional changes that led to establishment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As an active factor in the process of d?tente and the easing of tensions between the then USSR and the United States, the CSCE was the place in which were flowing all initiatives related to overcoming the security problems in bipolar Europe. The paper provides a brief of negotiation process that produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, an international political document that laid down the basic principles of interstate relations and political commitments in a number of areas, from military-political security, to economic and environmental co-operation and human rights. The author concludes that the role of the OSCE is likely to stagnate in the 21st century, for it will not be sufficiently capable to influence Euro-Atlantic and Euroasian affairs, and to maintain its function as an important consultative and negotiating mechanism, as well as a platform for regional security and cooperation.

Britain, European security and freer movement: the development of Britain's CSCE policy 1969–1972

Britain's participation in the process towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), between the Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal in 1969 and the opening of the CSCE in 1972, has been insufficiently studied. The British analysis of European security in the late 1960s and early 1970s informed Britain's response to calls for a conference and led them to believe that the CSCE was not the right forum for advancing their security goals. British and Western interests would also not be served by rejecting negotiations or participating in a conference held on Soviet terms. This prompted the British to contribute constructively to preparing a conference and to transforming Warsaw Pact appeals into the basis for genuine discussions. In the run up to the CSCE, British objectives settled on defending Western unity, securing the propaganda advantage, and achieving some small but meaningful steps to improve European security.

Beyond containment? The first Bush administration's sceptical approach to the CSCE

This article analyses the first Bush administration's policy toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), finding that as with Soviet-American relations and US policy toward Eastern Europe, the administration diverged from the foreign policy of its predecessor. Whereas previously the CSCE had been a forum to encourage progress on human rights, promote reform in Eastern Europe, and encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union, under Bush it became a tool to manage the transformation of Europe and preserve the Atlantic alliance. This new approach was guided by uncertainty about the CSCE's usefulness as a multilateral forum, scepticism about Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, and a preference for stability.

欧州政治協力（EPC）の進展とイギリス

The purpose of EPC, launched in 1970, was to coordinate foreign policies among the Member States of the European Community by ensuring mutual understanding on the international problems through regular exchange of information and consultations, strengthening their solidarity by harmonizing their views….The question is why the need to strengthen their solidarity through mutual understanding among the Six arose in the midst of détente? Moreover, why did it happen almost simultaneously with the achievement of British accession to the EC? The reasons can be considered along the two aspects: the way EPC was taking shape under the circumstances of détente, and the way British diplomatic attitude was involved in the formation and the progress of EPC.It is obvious that both aspects were closely interrelated, and promoted by the two different forces of détente, between the two Superpowers, and between the East and the West on the European continent. Because of American indifference toward the problems of Europe, the UK and the Six became active in the formation of European détente where they put emphasis on the Western value of the freedom of movement, against the Eastern insistence on the status quo. As a result, EPC became a driving force in promoting European détente.In contrast to the general understanding of British negative attitude toward supranational European integration, this study presents a different view that the UK is a positive and active participant rather than an observer in the process of European integration in the sphere of Foreign Policy as an intergovernmental character.First, in order to discuss the formation of EPC, the failure of French attempt, early in 60s, to pursue European political framework excluding the UK, is surveyed, while Atlantic attitude of British policies are examined. Secondly, the process of convergence among the UK, France and West Germany, early in 70s, in terms of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is examined. The process indicates the formation of Western approach, through which the importance of EPC as a vehicle of the European détente policy became eminent as compared to NATO. Finally, the process of the confirmation of EPC leading to the Single European Act is surveyed. In the process, British positive approach toward the establishment of European Foreign Policy is examined by analyzing its proposal for the Policy.

The unintended consequences of the Helsinki Final Act: A path emergence theory perspective

This article examines the unintended consequences of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act − a political agreement among the 35 participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The primary objective of this article is to explain the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime in terms of path emergence. ‘Path emergence’ is presented as a conceptual apparatus to explain the emergent properties exhibited within a complex adaptive system. The path emergence theory highlights four explanatory metaphors: morphogenetic fields, self-organized criticality, social resonance, and co-evolution. These metaphors serve as conceptual linchpins for the case analysis of the unintended consequences of the CSCE security regime. This article suggests that the CSCE embedded within it the properties of path emergence, which in turn contributed to the end of the Cold War in Europe.

The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the second détente

The 1964 Romanian ‘Declaration of independence from Moscow’ signalled a change in Romania's foreign policy, widely argued to have been anti-Soviet after that date. Based on new archive materials, this article shows however that Romania's foreign policy should not be understood as anti-Soviet, but rather in terms of anti-hegemonism. Romania opposed and feared both the Soviet and American hegemonic tendencies, and their foreign policy decisions were very much influenced by these views. To exemplify the Romanian anti-hegemonic perceptions and policies, the article presents Romania's definitions on détente and the related Romanian goals in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 1973–75. It concludes that in terms of state politics and security threats, during the 1960s and 1970s, Romania saw the Cold War opposition not as an East–West, socialist–capitalist one, but rather as superpowers/great powers versus all the other powers. Furthermore, for Romania, détente represented a threat because it created the context for the hegemons to agree once again upon the fate of ‘the others’, negatively affecting their interests. The article also reveals the limits of the objectivist approach in dealing with different Cold War issues, and proposes a perceptual approach. It also opens further discussion of how leaders' perceptions influenced Romania's foreign policy decision making during that time.