Abstract

Britain's participation in the process towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), between the Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal in 1969 and the opening of the CSCE in 1972, has been insufficiently studied. The British analysis of European security in the late 1960s and early 1970s informed Britain's response to calls for a conference and led them to believe that the CSCE was not the right forum for advancing their security goals. British and Western interests would also not be served by rejecting negotiations or participating in a conference held on Soviet terms. This prompted the British to contribute constructively to preparing a conference and to transforming Warsaw Pact appeals into the basis for genuine discussions. In the run up to the CSCE, British objectives settled on defending Western unity, securing the propaganda advantage, and achieving some small but meaningful steps to improve European security.

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