The perceived threat of hegemonism in Romania during the second détente

Abstract

The 1964 Romanian ‘Declaration of independence from Moscow’ signalled a change in Romania's foreign policy, widely argued to have been anti-Soviet after that date. Based on new archive materials, this article shows however that Romania's foreign policy should not be understood as anti-Soviet, but rather in terms of anti-hegemonism. Romania opposed and feared both the Soviet and American hegemonic tendencies, and their foreign policy decisions were very much influenced by these views. To exemplify the Romanian anti-hegemonic perceptions and policies, the article presents Romania's definitions on détente and the related Romanian goals in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 1973–75. It concludes that in terms of state politics and security threats, during the 1960s and 1970s, Romania saw the Cold War opposition not as an East–West, socialist–capitalist one, but rather as superpowers/great powers versus all the other powers. Furthermore, for Romania, détente represented a threat because it created the context for the hegemons to agree once again upon the fate of ‘the others’, negatively affecting their interests. The article also reveals the limits of the objectivist approach in dealing with different Cold War issues, and proposes a perceptual approach. It also opens further discussion of how leaders' perceptions influenced Romania's foreign policy decision making during that time.