Conditions Of Consciousness Research Articles

Mark Twain, Memory, and the Failures of Historicism

I want to begin with the rather simple statement that Mark Twain’s autobiographies—and here I am referring mostly to Life on the Mississippi and the text we now call the Autobiography—hold open the past as a resource for slowing down time. In itself this isn’t a highly provocative claim; I imagine that many would agree that we find in Twain’s work a desire to hold off futurity. I think, too, that it is fair to say that his continual return to the materials of the past is in part motivated by modernity’s culture of planned obsolescence. Obsolescence becomes an issue when the speed of “progress” requires a diminishing of the present in addition to the past. Temporality, under modernity, is organized into the past, present, and a horizon of expectation known as the future. The future increasingly encroaches on the present by directing our thinking and desires forward; Twain well understood the risks and anxiety of this minimized present through the market logic of investment. Planned obsolesce exploits such anxieties through the introduction of looming future dates of expiration. While ancient, dead forms of culture were of no interest to Twain, those still-working elements of the past had some attraction. The ability to use these elements, to repeat certain experiences, to laugh twice at the same joke: these are what he understands to be threatened by obsolescence.1 While we recognize the extent to which narrative has broken down in his Autobiography—it is precisely this feature that has made this text’s reputation— we might not immediately link this formal feature to Twain’s anxious response to modernity. If we carefully consider how individual moments of breakdown are framed and what they might contribute to any possible larger narrative structure and authorial strategy, we expose what I would like to suggest we recognize as narrative leftovers or remainders. These originate in, and are signifiers of, a failure to fall into line with the requirements of a certain temporal

Whether or not to be afraid of demons? The theory at the time of posttheory

The article shows an attempt to answer the elementary question: the status of the theory of text interpretation in contemporary literary studies. This problem has already been analyzed from many perspectives, but today the most important issue seems to be theory remaining in its present form (which resembles a demon within the meaning of A. Compagnon – a kind of fi ction). According to the author, a solution is the general consensus about the fi ctional nature of theoretical assumptions, but the condition of consciousness, that the fi ctional nature of theory is – on constructivistic way – operative.

건설현장 근로자의 안전의식과 안전교육 활성화 방안

This research is the descriptive survey research targeting construction workers for searching a vitalization method on safety education by understanding the real condition of the sense of safety consciousness and the condition of safety education. The collected data of 147 workers are analyzed by using arithmetic mean, t-test, and ANOVA Analysis of Variance through SPSS PC program. This research investigated the real condition of safety consciousness, recognition on safety education, and the differences of safety consciousness depend on the general characteristic of subject. According to the result of the study, development of standardized safety consciousness assessment tool and institutionalization of safety education program is needed.

Implications of rare neurological disorders and perceptual errors in natural and synthetic consciousness

Recent theories on natural and synthetic consciousness overlook the geometric structure necessary for awareness of 3-dimensional space, as strikingly illustrated by left-neglect disorder. Furthermore, awareness of 3-dimensional space entails some surprisingly tenacious optical illusions, as demonstrated by an experiment in the text. Awareness of linear time is also crucial and complex. As a consequence, synthetic consciousness cannot be realized by simply intercomnecting a large number of electronic circuits constructed from ordinary chips and transistors. Since consciousness is a subjective experience, there is no sufficient condition for consciousness that can be experimentally confirmed. The most we can hope for is agreement on the necessary conditions for consciousness. Toward that end, this paper reviews some relevant clinical phenomena.

Pre-objective Depth in Merleau-Ponty and Jackson Pollock

Abstract Pollock’s drip technique generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world. Consequently, Pollock’s art can be understood to explore or investigate the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. His painting—here I consider Number 1, 1949—motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds in three stages. First, I review key features of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-objective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis of Paul Cézanne’s technique. Second, I consider Pollock’s technique and some critical responses to it, while analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual effects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, in view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention.

The evolution of consciousness

There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews what is known about the conditions for consciousness within the human mind/brain, understood in both structural (neural) terms and functional terms (in terms of human information processing), and concludes that ‘random variations in the genome’ provide no explanatory mechanism for why some neural activities (but not others) are accompanied by consciousness. The paper then evaluates the many functional advantages that have been proposed for various forms of phenomenal consciousness once they emerge, and concludes that, on close examination, phenomenal experiences themselves do not carry out the information processing functions attributed to them, which challenges the Darwinian requirement that they could only have persisted (once emergent) it they enhanced reproductive fitness. The paper turns finally to what can be said about wider distribution of consciousness in non-humans, contrasting discontinuity theories with continuity theories. Discontinuity theories argue for a critical functional transition that ‘switches on consciousness’ while continuity theories argue for a gradual transition in consciousness from unrecognisable to recognisable. All theories accept that there is an intimate, natural relationship of conscious experiences with their associated material forms. Consequently, as the material forms evolve, their associated experiences co-evolve—suggesting an indirect mechanism by which the emergence of species-specific forms of consciousness can be influenced by Darwinian evolution. It also allows a non-reductive understanding of human consciousness within the social sciences.

Then, and Then Again

Then, and Then Again Joseph A. Amato (bio) “Life cannot be understood other than through stories we tell about it—we are led to say an examined life is a narrated life.” - Paul Ricoeur “Historical, contingent truths can never be proofs of rational, necessary truths.” - Gotthold Ephraim Lessing Historians are in a strange situation: to narrate is not to explain and to explain is not to narrate. Yet we do not narrate without explaining, and we do not explain without narrating. A chronological succession, once incorporated into a narrative, constitutes, if only implicitly, an explanatory order of relations. When we write history, we conflate the then that first means next with the then that in its second definition signifies thus, therefore, or hence. Click for larger view View full resolution Crimean Conference: Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Marshal Joseph Stalin, February 1945. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division [reproduction number, LC-USZ62-7449]. But our division between the empirical (the next of fact) and theoretical (the therefore of connections and succession) is both a necessary and good thing. Indeed, a good narrative, whatever the paths of its artifice, must walk between the certitude of facts and the illumination of ideas—open equally to what time presents and what constructive intelligence can connect and order. Events are the clocks of human life. They place us in and make us part of time. Events—the death of a parent, the declaration of war, a scientific breakthrough—defy systematic analysis. Narratives never comprehend the ineffable singularity and causal power of events. Events both compound and eliminate the perplexities of life, mind, and society. Works of history move between the poles of narrative and explanation. The then of explanation—thus and therefore—never fully comprehends the pure and simple then of a story, and vice versa. For the then of story arises out of unique events. The then of explanation seeks laws and patterns and wants to make events regular and explainable. The reality of events calls forth both narrative and explanation, the division of which gives rise to different forms of truth. This delivers us to the heart of history, which, by my lights, is first devoted to recognizing great changes and seminal events. Yet the act of recognition requires what we can never complete, for it necessitates explanations of origins, forms, and consequences. To put this in other terms, we recognize but cannot explain human mortality; the conditions, possibilities, limits, and significance of human experience; or the mix of actors, groups, institutions, forces, processes, interconnections, influences, and consequences that attend every great change or seminal event. Events, which shatter and fragment societies, institutions, laws, and customs, leave their interpretation and reinterpretation to historians. If historians are to offer more than random and aimless chronologies, they must by hook or crook supply explanations that establish connections, reasons, and purposes. If there are not laws, there at least must be agents—be they humans, institutions, or gods—that give form, purpose, and direction to things. However, explanations postulated are explanations challenged. Unexpected, unprecedented, and even entirely unimagined things happen, though not at predictable times and in regular forms. Time instead opens surprising, and thus contradicting, doors. Before us occur phenomena too glorious and too hideous either to explain or to leave unexplained. Inevitably, the totally unanticipated, unwanted, and even cataclysmic happens, or to use the metaphorical title of a recent and popular work, “a black swan” appears.1 And, might I add for an age that has not seen a great war or depression or the unraveling of Western democracy for fifty years, from time to time a double black swan appears. Historian and writer Henry Adams deemed ignorance of events and their progression a condition of contemporary consciousness. In his classic Education (1918) he proposes that the modern person doesn’t grasp the consequences of accelerating revolutions in science, technology, and society. Furthermore, Adams argues that the contemporary world has by its own advance deprived itself of symbols, myths, and religions. The only symbol left for the contemporary mind is the dynamo, a pitiless engine of accumulating human powers over nature and the world. If there is truth...

Tacit metarepresentation and affective sense of personal identity. An approach to understanding severe psychiatric disorders of adolescence and young adulthood

The results of present-day research in the field of "Dissociation Paradigm", regarding the capacity of the human mind to perceive, learn, and store information that in appearance passes as unnoticed, support the constructivist hypothesis of the active, selective and constructive condition of consciousness, in addition to the existence of a tacit dimension of knowledge that operates in functional relationship with the former. Unconscious mental states are intrinsically intentional. This is to say that they imply a semantic or cognitive connotation that is capable of affecting phenomenical experience and therefore behavior. In addition, the precocious existence of a tacit metarepresentational system in normally developed children has been proven, which is essential for guaranteeing the deployment of the process of functional coevolution between affectivity and consciousness, by which the experience of personal identity is acquired. These discoveries allow the inference of a "tacit affective metarepresentational recurrence", the organizational foundation on which a unified, sustainable, and continuous sense of the experience of personal identity is structured, and also allow us to hypothesize a "tacit metarepresentational mourning", a specific type of grief which is the chief foundation of the majority of psychopathological disorders. This concept may represent a potential explanation of the severe mental disorders of adolescence and young adulthood. The hypothesis of the present work is that, in the ambiguous context of Postmodern Culture, the prolongation of the adolescent period, facilitated by the welfare state, hinders the dealing with the aforementioned mourning, leading to an increment of depressive states and suicidal behavior among young people.

Clinical study on effects of perioperative low temperature to regaining consciousness of the severe traumatic patients with general anesthesia

Objective The explore the effects of perioperative low temperature to regaining consciousness of the severe traumatic patients with general anesthesia. Methods 60 cases of severe traumatic surgery patients, with stochastic double blind method, were divide into two groupg, 30 cases in control group adopted conventional processing,30 cases of heat preservation group took the positive low temperature preventive measures, the conditions of awakening time, shiver during consciousness time, dysphoria and hypotension were observed in the awakening period after general anesthesia. Results There was no significant difference between the body temperature at each time point of heat preservation group and that at the anesthesia beginning(P＞ 0.05), but when compared to that in the control group,there was significant difference (P＜ 0.05); in the control group, 7 cases of consciousness were found in 30 minutes after anesthesia, 16 cases found in 30 to 60 minutes, 7 cases in more than 60 minutes. While in the heat preservation group, 7 cases of consciousness were found in 30 minutes after anesthesia, 22 cases found in 30 to 60 minutes, 1case in more than 60 minutes. There was no significant difference in consciousness conditions 30 minutes after anesthesia(P＞ 0.05), there was significant difference in those of 30 to 60 minutes after anesthesia(P＜ 0.05), and there was very significant difference in those of 60 minutes after anesthesia(P ＜ 0.01). The data of shiver after consciousness (18 cases in control, 7 in heat preservation group), dysphoria (12 in control, 3 in heat preservation group) and hypotension (17 in control, 5 in heat preservation group) after anesthesia in these two groups had very significant differences(P＜ 0.01). Conclusion The perioperative low temperature can make great damage to severe traumatic patients, it will improve the general anesthesia quality, reduce the complications during conscious period,and raise the survival rate of the patients to make active measures for preventing the perioperative low temperature. Key words: Perioperative; Low temperature; Severe traumatic; General anesthesia; Anesthesia awakening period

Conscious Modulation in Normal Sleep

The phenomenological relationship between consciousness and sleep are reviewed. Consciousness has a self- reflexive component, and while sleeping that is not working as in awakenings. The necessity of some change in narrow concepts of conscious as to be aware and self reflective as well of some aspects of Altered State of Consciousness are ex- plained. In fact, in rapid eye movements (REM) sleep is the sleep stage in which some perception of consciousness is found self-perception in REM sleep is a common phenomenon, but to be aware of that is called lucid dreams. Also sleep paralysis produce some activation of self-awareness. The lack of continuity between cortical areas in delta sleep stages could explain the loss of consciousness is such sleep stage, which support the idea of cortical continuity as a necessary condition for to achieve this integrative process. A ques- tion that emerges after update the knowledge about sleep and consciousness is what is the minimum degree of connec- tivity and activity of the central nervous system for to be conscious? New paradigms in neurosciences like connectome and enactivation, removes reductionist approaches to the main - body issue. Enactive approach could be used as a paradigm to understand cognitive activity in three neurophysiology stages. As a proposal, it can be figured out as follows: (A) In wakefulness, the enactive phenomenon has priority to start whatever action is necessary. A biofeedback to make corrections in order to improve the motor programs, mind theory or any other active strategies; (B) In REM sleep in which there is not external stimuli. Those are generated from the sensorial nuclei in the brainstem which generates internal electrical activity that follows sensorial pathways (i.e., PGO waves) with visual and emotional targets (i.e., occipital visual cortex and amygdale complex) and probably without enactivation, but inner generating stimulation so the brain cortex is activated mainly by brainstem without any anticipatory top-down events; and (C) In delta sleep, in which there are no enactivation and no sensorial inputs, but also there is no interconnectivity in the brain cortex, which is a necessary condition for consciousness and memory. New technical tools as functional magnetic resonance, trans-cranial magnetic stimulation, and magnetic electroencephalo- graphy have open new approaches for develop feasible hypotheses in this field.

Social critique in the totally socialized society

The article examines Adorno’s conviction that a critique of concepts inevitably entails a critique of society. Some commentators, notably Cook, read Adorno’s idea of the seamless transition from conceptual to social critique as dependent on the use of normative concepts. According to this ‘Marxist’ reading, a critique of unfaithful concepts provokes a persuasive and constructive critique of society for failing to fulfil concepts. This line of argument creates problems. Adorno’s inquiries into society’s resistance to decipherment imply that the progression from conceptual to social critique via normative concepts leads to advocating misguided, potentially dangerous social standards. In response to this dilemma, the article proposes an alternative interpretation of the transition from conceptual to social critique. The focus shifts from normative concepts to Adorno’s examinations of society as a condition of false consciousness and suffering. From this perspective, conceptual critique entails a convincing — albeit no longer constructive — critique of society.

Of Bodies, Families, and Communities: Refiguring the 1918 Influenza Pandemic

Spanish influenza of 1918 has been called a forgotten pandemic, lost in the archives amidst records of the War, the armistice, and the new era of modernity ushered in by these cata- clysmic events. was not Spanish flu did not keep pace with the war in terms of destruction of life. Estimates of the flu's death toll hover around fifty million people in a single year, while World War I was responsible for about eight and a half million casualties. 1 was the war had such a powerful hold on cultural memory. As Paul Fussell (quoting Vernon Scannell's poem, The War) observes in War and Modern Memory, 'The war was called invades the mind . . .' and war detaches itself from its normal location in chronology and its accepted set of causes and effects to become in another sense—all-encompassing, all- pervading, both internal and external at once, the essential condition of consciousness in the twentieth century. 2 Great Influenza, it seems, made for a less compelling story. Alfred W. Crosby points out its conspicuous absence from modern history textbooks and from the oeuvres of the great American writers in the 1920s. John Dos Passos, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway—none of these authors treated the flu in any detail in their work. 3 It is especially puzzling, says Crosby dryly, that among those Americans who let the pandemic slip their minds were many members of group of supposedly hypersensitive young people who were to create some of the greatest masterpieces of American literature, i.e. 'the lost genera- tion' for so many of whom World War I, the other great killer of the era, was the central experience of their lives. 4 In his account, by the end of the decade, the pandemic seemed destined to become a mere footnote in literary history.

<em>Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction</em>, by Jill L. Matus

Reviewed by: Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction Sally Shuttleworth (bio) Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction, by Jill L. Matus; pp. x + 247. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, £59.00, £29.99 paper, $93.00, $50.00 paper. At a time when claims for emotional damage echo through our law courts and the antics of celebrities appear designed to trivialise the very notion of trauma, it is instructive to note that it was that explicit engine of modernity, the stream train, that first brought together lawyers, insurance companies, and medics in the nineteenth century, as a new diagnosis of "railway shock" came into being (86). The fact that railway companies were initially only held liable for physical injuries opened the way for the development of theories of psychological injury. Jill L. Matus builds on earlier work on railway shock to offer a fine reading of Charles Dickens's story "The Signalman" (1866), which, [End Page 551] together with The Mystery of Edwin Drood (1870), she places in the broader context of theories of memories and their aftermath. Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction makes a major contribution to the growing body of literature on the interrelations of nineteenth-century psychology and the novel. In addition to the one on Dickens, it offers insightful chapters on North and South (1855), which is treated as a "condition of consciousness" novel (61), and psychic shock in George Eliot's "The Lifted Veil" (1859) and Daniel Deronda (1876), concluding with an analysis of dissociation and multiple selves in, perhaps inevitably, The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886). As the foregoing list suggests, the texts explored are canonical, and it is to Matus's credit that with so much written on these works she can still produce readings that are fresh and interesting, although—as with virtually all critical works—there are gaps and omissions, alternate paths that might have been taken. Matus explores the ways in which many of her literary texts used the gothic language of haunting to articulate forms of unconscious experience and internal conflict. Her own text has in a sense its own double, being haunted by an alternate work that would have had a far snappier title, "Trauma in Victorian Fiction." Her adoption of the lengthier, more cumbersome form results from her decision to consider Victorian culture's treatment of emotional shock on its own terms and not according to ahistoric post-Freudian concepts of trauma. At issue is the theoretical model employed by Cathy Caruth and others, which emphasises "unprocessed memory as the key element of trauma" (60), a formulation about which Matus is perhaps rightly sceptical. Instead, she turns to a complex network of ideas regarding emotions, memory, and the unconscious that she sees as better explaining psychic shock in the Victorian period. At the heart of her work is the excitement generated by the new science of physiological psychology developed by Alexander Bain, William Carpenter, G. H. Lewes, and others, which brought into close union the workings of body and mind, generating new understandings of unconscious processes and the physiological impact of emotions. The text offers a welcome corrective to Ian Hacking's otherwise magisterial volume, Rewriting the Soul (1995). As Matus notes, in focusing on Jean-Martin Charcot and his formulations of trauma and multiple personality disorder, Hacking ignores the extensive sciences of memory to be found in English psychological discourse at that time. Matus opens up what she sees as a richer history in which emotions, memory, and the unconscious are closely interwoven. The text, however, remains to some degree trapped by the model it wishes to refute, returning constantly to the idea of trauma, whether to suggest, as in her analysis of Daniel Deronda, that the novel and surrounding discourse "helped to produce the way we understand trauma today" or to argue in conclusion that Victorian culture did not produce a fully formulated theory of trauma since it "neither wanted nor needed it" (143, 186). This preoccupation with trauma produces its own limitations. Matus notes that her focus is on ideas of emotional aftermath in ordinary, rather than pathologized, states of...

On Double Consciousness

What are the historical origins of the Du Boisian notion of consciousness? What explains the enduring existential resonance of the notion in various literatures on the black diaspora, particularly in what Paul Gilroy has rendered poignant as the Black Atlantic? There are unmistakable echoes of the notion of double consciousness in the wider vocabulary of postmodern and postcolonial criticism, particularly in concepts such as ambivalence or, increasingly, the religious and cultural identity of the modern Muslim. What relations might we, today, draw across these existential and historical dispersals in the senses of the Afro modern? With no aspirations to the exhaustive, I intend to accomplish the following through these and similar questions: a) explore the double roots of double consciousness in the histories of capitalist racial slavery and colonial modernity; b) examine the motives for current practices of characterizing identities by the psychological and cultural conditions of double consciousness; and c) ask in what ways the identities so characterized may or may not be compatible with key features of sociality and transnational conviviality that could be marked as democratically progressive and universal.

Actual Conditions of Children's Play and Parents' Consciousness in Urban

Actual Conditions of Children's Play and Parents' Consciousness in Urban

Actual Condition of Residents' Consciousness of Safety and Required Level of Houses

Actual Condition of Residents' Consciousness of Safety and Required Level of Houses

Conscious and subconscious attitudes towards English influence in the Nordic countries: evidence for two levels of language ideology

The article reports on how the present-day influence from English is perceived and assessed in seven Nordic communities. The focus is on comparison, between the seven communities, and between two data sets obtained under different conditions of consciousness. The comparisons show that the populations reproduce the “purism level” of their own community's official language policy in their consciously offered responses to questions in a telephone survey, while the purism–laissez-faire ranking of the communities is turned upside down in a subconsciously offered data set obtained in a speaker evaluation experiment based on the matched-guise technique. In the same way, analyses of how the evaluative reactions correlate with social-group divisions show reproduction and non-reproduction of the stereotypically expected correlations, in the conscious and subconscious conditions respectively.

From the Margins to the Center: A Critical Examination of the Identity Constructions of Bosnian Adolescent Refugees in New York City

This article explores the role of culture and social networks as relations of difference in refugee experiences by challenging the assumptions in mainstream psychology that objectify the experiences of refugees and act as gatekeepers to their subjectivity. The deterministic bent of existing psychological theories legitimates an essentialist paradigm by failing to critically examine the various ways refugees themselves experience and negotiate cultural processes. A critical lens illuminates the discursive functioning of mainstream psychology by questioning power relations and placing a premium on individual agency. Through an exploration of the identities of adolescent refugees schooled in the United States, this article discusses refugees' conditions of consciousness in terms of how they participate in an increasingly heterogeneous world and balance their own ethnoscapes.

La querelle des têtes tranchées : Les médecins, la guillotine et l'anatomie de la conscience au lendemain de la Terreur

Résumé Dans la France révolutionnaire, au sortir de la Terreur, une controverse divise les anatomistes pour savoir si les têtes tranchées continuent à penser et à sentir pendant quelques instants après l’exécution. Des mouvements du visage ont en effet été observés après la décapitation. De quoi sont-ils le signe ? Qu’est-ce qui survit dans la tête ? L’irritabilité seulement, ou bien aussi la sensibilité, et la conscience ? Avec l’expérience passive que constitue la guillotine, se pose ainsi de façon dramatique le problème du mode d’existence biologique de l’unité de la conscience. À la thèse d’une localisation cérébrale des conditions organiques de la sensibilité et de la conscience défendue par Samuel Thomas Sömmerring s’oppose une redéfinition organique du moi comme résultante harmonique des vies particulières de chaque fibre de l’organisme par Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis.

Poster 57: Persistent Vegetative State: New Approaches in Complex Treatment

Setting: Not provided. Patients: 15 patients with a diagnosed vegetative condition were observed and treated. The level of consciousness, according to Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), was 7 to 9 points. The reasons for the comas that led to the vegetative state were craniocerebral trauma in 9 cases and cerebral stroke in 6 cases. Case Descriptions: All patients had complete evaluations, including neurovisualization (computed tomography, magnetic resonance tomography of the brain), defining the parameters of brain blood flow (transcranial Doppler), electroencephalography, study of brain-evoked potentials (somatosensory, cognitive), transcranial magnetic stimulation, and neuropsychologic testing. For 2 to 3 months, patients received complex rehabilitation (eg, medical treatment, kinesiotherapy, massage, verticalization, selective vibrostimulation of feet in the regime of cyclogram of walking, programmed electrostimulation, logopedic exercises). According to the GCS, patients’ levels increased by 1 to 2 points. In the following 2 months, to basic rehabilitation, we added walking training on the Lokomat system and monitored hemodynamic indices. The Lokomat allows one to reproduce normal walking as closely as possible by using biomechanic indices and contributes to the formation of complex polysystematic synchronized reactions of the organism. The inclusive criteria for each patient were readiness for walking, training for the ability to keep systolic pressure between 80 and 90mmHg, and to keep diastolic blood pressure not lower than 50mmHg for 7 to 10 minutes in the vertical position on the verticalizator. Training was held 5 times a week, for 10 to 20 minutes, the course 10 to 20 procedures. Prime speed was 1.5km/h; maximum speed was 2km/h. Assessment/Results: There was an increase in the level of the consciousness (GCS, minimally conscious state [MCS]): in 3 patients with craniocerebral insult at the end of the fourth month of observation, we noticed signs of “the condition of little consciousness” (according to the MCS) in the form of prolonged fixation, stable reaction of eyes, stable behavioral reactions on the corresponding polymodal stimuli, and the level of consciousness, which increased up to 12 to 13 points. 2 patients with craniocerebral trauma had the locked-in syndrome. 4 patients with craniocerebral trauma improved to the level of psycho-organic syndrome (15 points). 1 stroke patient after the fourth month improved to the level of akinetic mutism, with speech understanding (11 points). 3 patients from the stroke group at the end of the fifth month also showed an increase in consciousness, up 12 to 14 points and, according to the MCS, up to the “condition of little consciousness.” 1 patient from the stroke group showed no change in rehabilitation status during treatment. Discussion: There was improvement of posutral control (restoration of the correct position and increase of the strength of spine, neck and shoulder muscles). The spasticity decrease (measured by the Ashworth Scale) allowed for an increase in movement amplitudes of the lower-extremity joints. Hemodynamic indices stabilized. The amplitude of the sensory component (peak 2) in the investigation of cognitive indices increased. Conclusions: The inclusion of robotic training for walking allowed patients with stroke and craniocerebral trauma to increase their levels of consciousness. This method should be tested in further clinical investigations.