Concept Of Consciousness Research Articles

Research on Heidegger's Fundamental Ethics

Based on Heidegger's idea of original ethics, this paper analyzes the state of how Da-sein has being-in-the-world, takes Heidegger's concept of conscience as an entry point, explores the difference between Heidegger's original ethics and traditional ethics, and reflects on what kind of ethics his thought is. From the perspective of ontology, Heidegger takes the being of human as the highest philosophical ontology, inquires deeply into the existence of Da-sein, and explores the relationship between Da-sein and Being. Through the diffusion of the understanding of Potentiality-of-Being of Da-sein, this paper gradually analyzes the basic construction of Da-sein being-in-the-world, under the definition of the structure Being-in is embedded in the world, the existence of Da-sein being-in-the-world unfolds. In the process of understanding the world, Da-sein is thrown into everyday life, losing himself and falling prey, but the true nature of Da-sein keeps calling him, Da-sein listens to the call of its conscience and makes a decision to face death and his true ones self. Starting from the process of alienation from the true self to the untrue self of Da-sein, we analyze Heidegger's basic concept of human-centeredness. What exactly constitutes the Being of Da-sein and how does the existence of Da-sein unfold. Even though many later scholars and Heidegger himself did not consider his thought to be a concept under the banner of ethics, and considered his thought to be contrary to traditional ethics. What is undeniable is that Heidegger's original ethics, with its in-depth exploration of the inner man, greatly expands the definition of universal morality and norms in traditional ethics.

Behind the “I”: Conscience and Consciousness

This paper intents to study the concepts CONSCIOUSNESS and CONSCIENCE from a linguistic point of view and identify their notional components. Concepts CONSCIENCE and CONSCIOUSNESS are topical nowadays. It is verified by the overwhelming interest in them among linguists, physicists, philosophers, psychologists, etc.; based on the current human advances in AI (artificial intelligence) and dissatisfaction with the dualistic separation of mind and body. Conscience and consciousness govern our decision-making process. The concepts CONSCIENCE and CONSCIOUSNESS are multifaceted and complex. The concept CONSCIENCE is commonly used in its moral sense, implies the inherent ability of any healthy human being to perceive principles of the right and wrong, the good and bad; the ability to control, monitor, evaluate and execute their actions. Principles of decency, integrity, fairness, honesty, kindness and probity are the components of conscience. The voice of conscience might suggest different principles of behavior to different groups of people. Conscience can be considered as an empty container that can be filled with any type of moral and ethical content. Human CONSCIOUSNESS is the greatest mystery in the world of all times and peoples. People know a lot about consciousness from their own life experience and could claim that their own conscious life experience is what they do not call into question. One has no idea what consciousness is about, what makes one conscious, why ‘people have consciousness’, compared to other living beings or if other creatures, besides human beings, also have consciousness. Consciousness is mainly equated with the wakefulness. This perspective of consciousness puts forward that consciousness is an all-encompassing state, a sort of a switch that illuminates the entire mental life of a being. Consciousness appears before conscience: in order for conscience to arise, it is necessary for consciousness to arise as a background or a screen on which all the phenomena, states and objects can arise. In order for a person to realize what is good and bad, to appeal to a set of moral and ethical standards, consciousness is necessary first. Thus, consciousness acts as a background for conscience. The concepts of CONSCIENCE and CONSCIOUSNESS are intersecting for several reasons. Both lexemes-names of the concepts were synonymous until the eighteenth century. Both concepts are the building blocks of the self-identification with the concept CONSCIENCE being the prerequisite for the ability to shape moral judgements. These basic universal concepts are of equally high significance, mutually dependent and intersecting, and cannot be considered without their internal interconnection.

Conscience and the continuum of constitutionalism: John Calvin on civil government

Abstract This article examines John Calvin’s theology on its own terms with the aim of appreciating the normative basis and implications of his political theory. Although the claim that Calvin’s account of civil government falls within the category of political ‘theology’ is less controversial, the normative implications of his theological ontology for political actors are more commonly contested. Calvin seminally wrote ‘on Civil Government’ in Book IV, Chapter xx of the Institutes of the Christian Religion. In contrast, his accounts of conscience and natural law are far less systemized.1 This article contends that this reticence is not due to lack of importance but rather, due to its foundational nature. Indeed, the opening statement of the Institutes is indicative of the coherence of the Reformer’s thoughts wherein any emerging polity is composed of what this article refers to as the ‘spheres-of-influence’ scheme—a normative system originating inward from the vertical relationship every human agent has with the divine, and then extending horizontally outwards to bind the collective in a common system of values. Such an ontology is predicated on the concepts of conscience and the divine image, which renders all persons, who possess this natural repository of moral knowledge, accountable to transcendent standards of virtue. It follows that when we overlay this ‘continuum’2 onto a constitutional framework, we place the priority, not on the individual rights of the citizen, but on the responsibilities of all political actors whereby others precede the self and the common good prevails over self-interest.

Professional responsibility, nurses, and conscientious objection: A framework for ethical evaluation.

Conscientious objections (CO) can be disruptive in a variety of ways and may disadvantage patients and colleagues who must step-in to assume care. Nevertheless, nurses have a right and responsibility to object to participation in interventions that would seriously harm their sense of integrity. This is an ethical problem of balancing risks and responsibilities related to patient care. Here we explore the problem and propose a nonlinear framework for exploring the authenticity of a claim of CO from the perspective of the nurse and of those who must evaluate such claims. We synthesized the framework using Rest's Four Component Model of moral reasoning along with tenets of the International Council of Nursing's (ICN) Code of Ethics for Nurses and insights from relevant ethics and nursing ethics literature. The resulting framework facilitates evaluating potential consequences of a given CO for all involved. We propose that the framework can also serve as an aid for nurse educators as they prepare students for practice. Gaining clarity about the sense in which the concept of conscience provides a defensible foundation for objecting to legally, or otherwise ethically, permissible actions, in any given case is critical to arriving at an ethical and reasonable plan of action.

신시론의 실존주의와 김수영

The poets of “New Poetry” published the first volume of “New Poetry” in April 1948, and in October of the same year they participated in the special edition of Sartre's existentialism in “Shincheonji”. However, there is no trace of Kim Sooyoung's official activities as a member of the same poetry association until “New City and Citizens' Chorus” was published in 1949. In the early days of the New Poetry Theory, Kim Sooyoung seems to have concentrated on studying poetry theory rather than on external activities. Because he had no basis in poetry theory, he had no personal relationship with the modernist poets, and his pride was hurt. However, Kim Sooyoung did not show such an expression until the mid and late 1960s. However, about 10 years after Park Inhwan's death, he criticized Park Inhwan's criticism and at the same time expressed his critical attitude toward the past modernist activities to the outside world. This seems to be connected with the period when Kim Sooyoung first realized the “dimension of criticism”.
 Kim Sooyoung was deeply concerned with the concept of conscience, one of the central themes of Heidegger's existentialism. Park Inhwan and the New Poetry poets, on the other hand, focused on Sartre's existentialism. In particular, Heidegger's existentialism had a great influence on Kim Sooyoung's poetic worldview and became the basis for his original poetic theory called “Whole Body Poetics. Ten years after Park In-hwan's death, Kim Soo-young acquired the “level of criticism,” and on this basis he criticized the “difficult poetry” of Park In-hwan and New Poetry. Park Inhwan and the New Poetry Theory insisted on the social responsibility of literature, but Kim Sooyoung criticized this position of the New Poetry Theory. However, since Park Inhwan died in 1956, the question remains whether it is justified for Kim Sooyoung to blame Park Inhwan for the literary trend of the 1960s ten years later. Therefore, this paper will reveal new facts about Park Inhwan's cultural and artistic activities after his death. In addition, this paper points out that it is not possible to evaluate Park Inhwan properly due to the lack of data.

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND A POSTSTRUCTURALIST READING OF BEING AND TIME (SECTIONS 54–60)

The article builds on Husserl’s “trivial” observations from the manuscript Reason — Science. Reason and Morality — Reason and Metaphysics on the topic of conscience, to then question the neglect of the topic of misguided conscience or self-deception in Heidegger’s model of conscience from §§ 54–60 of Being and Time. In Heidegger’s conception of conscience (as a silent call appealing to the authenticity of Dasein) we will not find a number of points important to the Husserlian understanding of conscience: neither the unrevealed horizons of prior life, nor the relativity of intersubjective contexts, nor a misguided (and doubting) conscience, still less a search for (presumed) evidence. That said, the way Heidegger axiomatically sets up the original culpability of Dasein creates a number of dead ends or blind spots in this model. It is to these that Mark Richir addresses in his interpretation (or, more precisely, two alternative interpretations), speaking of the “original symbolic mishap” that befell Dasein, and then of the “symbolic tautology” in which it has become a prisoner. Richir’s critique is not aimed at “overcoming” Heidegger’s model of conscience, but at demonstrating a transcendental illusion — probably inevitable for one who is guided by “authenticity” and the “inner voice.” This is a kind of critical phenomenology of “authenticity”, which manages to avoid the closedness of phenomenology in itself by “grafting” in it poststructuralism. This is why both the first and the second interpretation by the Belgian phenomenologist focus on the problem of symbolic structures: “original symbolic mishap” in the first case and “symbolic tautology” in the second.

The Rights of God's Stewards: Property, Conscience, and the Great Awakening in Canterbury, Connecticut

Abstract The struggle for religious liberty in Canterbury, CT, was fought over property. When the Great Awakening divided church against town, evangelical “Separates” withdrew from the establishment and launched a campaign against ecclesiastical taxation, using concepts of conscience, stewardship, and property rights to defend estates and create a voluntary religious economy.

Gandhi’s Concept of Conscience/Antarātmā Revisited: Exploring His Cardinal Principle in Trilingual Texts

This article explores the nature and genealogy of Mohandas K. Gandhi’s concept of conscience/antarātmā (inner soul/spirit), the cardinal principle of his religious politics. Much previous scholarship, solely relying upon English materials, has explained the nature of Gandhi’s concept of conscience in relation to Western and Christian Protestant traditions. By chronologically examining his lifelong discourse on conscience expressed in English and antarātmā in Gujarati and Hindi writings, this article shows that: (1) Gandhi developed a distinct variant of hybrid thought that was essentially different from the prevalent negative conception of “guilty conscience” in the modern West by integrating ideas of conscience and ātmā/ātman; (2) since the notion of ātmā was intimately related to the ascetic bodily discipline (brahmacarya), Gandhi identified the essence of his satyāgraha campaign as ātmabaḷ (the force of ātmā) and believed that taking the vow of brahmacarya could enhance one’s vital energy (vīrya); and (3) as Gandhi reached his last years, and the most controversial phase of his intellectual evolution, he developed a new understanding of an inner voice/antarno avāj whose nature was “mystical” (gūḍh), and thereby difficult even for him to articulate in any language.

Қазақ мәтіндеріндегі «ұят» ұғымының өрнектелуі

This article considers the meaning of the concepts of Honor, Shame, and Conscience based on a deep, comprehensive analysis of Kazakh texts. An extensive analysis of the difference between the concepts of honor, shame, and conscience is given, the connection with the concept of conscience as the third definition in Shakarim’s teaching on conscience, the role of conscience and shame in Kazakh proverbs and the works of great Kazakhstani personalities are determined, and an assessment of the past, present and future of the concept is given. “Ar” means “conscience” in English and it is “sovest” in Russian, “Uyat” is translated as “shame” and “styd”, respectively. The article deals with the fact that the concept of uzhdan is given as a meta-concept of Shakarim, that is, conscience, examines for accuracy and inaccuracy. It proves that the concept of “uyat” in the Kazakh understanding is “conscience”, and not “shame”, as in Russian or English. Since it is impossible to form a social culture without the concept of conscience, the ways of the best application of this concept are shown.

Does International Law Need a Conscience? Evaluating the India–South Africa Proposal to Suspend TRIPS Obligations and the COVID-19 Vaccines

Abstract There is undoubtedly a consensus within the international community that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is an undesirable state of affairs. However, states are self-interested actors and in the absence of constraints imposed by international economic law this pursuit of rational self-interest is likely to result in an outcome that is unjust on a global scale. The recent proposal by India and South Africa to suspend TRIPS obligations for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic has been rejected within the WTO. This proposal constitutes a recognition of the inadequacies surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme. Yet, the immersion of intellectual property law within international investment law together with the proliferation of free trade agreements containing TRIPS-plus obligations would likely have made such a proposal unworkable. We argue that the fundamental problem is that the TRIPS Agreement lacks a defined concept of conscience that governs both its operation and interpretation. Such a principle exists in the common law within the field of private law. The principle, in its various doctrinal iterations, navigates the tensions between different parties while serving an underlying purpose of justice within the common law. It has much to offer international intellectual property law.

«Ар-ұят» ұғымының философиялық мәні

The concept of conscience is one of the moral and cultural components of self-expression of the individual. This phenomenon is closely related to the peculiarities of the existential state of a person in the world. In this study the semantic components of the concept of «conscience» is considered, offering an associative model of human life. A philosophical approach to the concept of «conscience» has shown that it is a fundamental value of human life. The philosophical meaning of the concept of «conscience» is analyzed.

Limitation of the Positive Law according to Thomas Aquinas' Concept of Conscience

Limitation of the Positive Law according to Thomas Aquinas' Concept of Conscience

Edmund Spenser’s View of Christendom: New Legal and Theological Contexts for A View of the Present State of Ireland

Abstract This paper considers how Spenser’s conception of conscience and universal law and justice in A View of the Present State of Ireland can be understood within the context of jurist Christopher St. German’s early sixteenth-century tract on equity and the common law and his subsequent tracts on the reformation of Church corruption. The paper attempts to re-situate Spenser’s engagement with legal and political theory within the context of English legal education as it had developed throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Ultimately, it shows that Spenser’s engagement with law, theology and politics reflected a commitment to a new Protestant conception of transnational Christendom as well as a re-conception of England as a Protestant nation within that transnational entity.

The Phenomenon of Conscience in Social Work

The Phenomenon of Conscience in Social Work

Prawda o człowieku jako fundament kultury politycznej. Główne idee Tadeusza Stycznia

Celem autora jest przedstawienie i krytyczna analiza głównych idei polskiego personalisty Tadeusza Stycznia na temat prawdy, która jest aksjologiczną podstawą kultury politycznej. Jest nią odkryta w sumieniu prawda o osobowej godności każdego człowieka. Artykuł składa się z trzech głównych części. W pierwszej autor przedstawił koncepcję sumienia Stycznia (sumienie jako sąd prawodawczy, normatywny i powinnościowy). W części drugiej poruszono kwestię prawdy odkrytej w sumieniu (prawdy o ludzkiej godności i wyjątkowości ludzkiej egzystencji). W trzeciej części skoncentrowano się na zagadnieniu kultury politycznej w myśli Stycznia i jej istotnych elementów (etos polegający na afirmacji osoby, czynne współuczestnictwo w trosce o dobro każdego człowieka, respekt dla podmiotowości ludzkiej wyrażającej się w autonomii sumienia, służba państwa na rzecz ochrony życia wszystkich obywateli i zabezpieczenie praw mniejszości).

Lydia Maria Child on German philosophy and American slavery

ABSTRACT As editor of the National Anti-Slavery Standard in the early 1840s, Lydia Maria Child was responsible for keeping the abolitionist movement in the United States informed of relevant news. She also used her editorial position to philosophize. Her column entitled “Letters from New York” is particularly philosophical, including considerations of infinity, free will, time, nature, art, and history. She especially turned to German philosophers and intellectuals such as Kant, Schiller, Bettina von Arnim, Karoline von Günderrode, Jean Paul, Herder, and Hegel in an attempt to guide her readers to a rejection of slavery for the right philosophical reasons. I consider the influence of German philosophy on three particular themes in her writings: a Romantic-Spinozistic view of humans and nature; a Kantian conception of conscience; and a Hegelian description of the philosophy of history.

Kant's Conception of Conscience

In this paper I provide a detailed account of Kant’s conception of conscience in order to answer a significant question that has recently arisen in the secondary literature: How should we understand Kant’s insistence on the infallibility of conscience? Som e commentators have tried to make sense of the claim by suggesting that conscience is a special kind of moral judgment, while others have argued that it is a kind of feeling. My contention is that neither option is helpful in comprehending why and how Kant develops his ideas about conscience in this specific and peculiar way. I argue that the appropriate way to understand this conception is to establish its broader significance for Kant’s moral philosophy, together with his understanding of human moral agen cy.

Moral conscience’s fall from grace: an investigation into conceptual history

ABSTRACT This article investigates the question why even the existence of “moral conscience” became regarded with serious doubts among radical eighteenth-century French philosophes La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire, from the vantage point of conceptual history. The philosophes’ stance of regarding moral conscience only as a name for certain acquired prejudices both fails to engage with the conception of moral conscience upheld by their theistic opponents and stands in a sharp contrast to the moral thought of Protestant reformation, which – less than two centuries earlier – had elevated moral conscience to a position of an infallible moral authority. The article argues, however, that, in spite of the opposition between these two conceptions of conscience, they might be connected, and that the former might have even been a consequence of the latter. It will be shown that the pre-Reformation conception of moral conscience, crystallized in Aquinas, presents it being based on our natural attraction to “the human good”. However, as this conception was not created by medieval theologians, but was inherited from non-theistic ancient philosophy, in principle it would have been as compatible with the deistic and atheistic worldviews of the philosophes as the other ancient philosophical concepts, such as “the human good” and “human nature”, that the philosophes continued using in their original, teleological senses. Having presented a brief overview of the history of moral conscience, the article proceeds to show how the Protestant reformers removed the attraction to the human good from moral conscience while making its normative guidance infallible. The article will suggest that, due to the prevalence of this, exclusively theological, conception of moral conscience in the intellectual environment shaped by Protestantism, several British thinkers of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who could not endorse the theological aspects of moral conscience, gradually reduced it into a mere acquired “sentiment”. As their philosophy was a major influence on the philosophes, the article concludes that the loss of a rational justification for moral conscience in the works of the British philosophers could have also been what motivated the philosophes to question moral conscience.

Liberal Relativism’s Challenge to Conscience Rights

Abstract I argue that within contemporary liberal theory and case law is a relativistic conception of conscience, a conception which has the effect of obscuring the significance of conscience and downplaying the importance of conscience rights. The article focuses in particular on the right to conscientious objection. After outlining a representative cohort of cases from within contemporary liberalism concerning conscientious objection I analyse Cardinal Ratzinger’s (Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI) ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique for its cogency as a response to these cases. I contend that although the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique is almost always understood in a univocal manner it is in fact comprised of two logically distinct arguments. One of these is found fundamentally flawed while the other is deemed promising yet in need of supplementation and defence. This I attempt via an analysis of the understanding of conscience present within contemporary liberal case law and theory. I go on to claim that contemporary liberalism, in part due to its problematic understanding of conscience, is often insufficiently respectful of an important principle of conscience rights protection when it dismisses claims of conscientious objection. The final part of the article is an attempt at explaining the paradox of a liberalism which readily justifies significant restrictions on conscience rights. I end by concluding that one version of the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique, suitably clarified and supplemented, is basically sound and poses a very serious challenge to contemporary liberalism.

Kamu Personelinin Belirtilmiş Dindarlık Düzeyleri ile Görev Motivasyonları İlişkisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Today, the necessity of conducting public administration in a flexible, accountable, effective and efficient manner has emerged as a general requirement. For this reason, the motivation levels of the public personnel that fulfill the public service are important. In the focal point of all the theories about motivation, no matter what methods and tools are used, it is seen that there is a need to ensure the internal satisfaction of the employee. In this case, the concepts of conscience and belief, which shape the inner life of the person, are in question. Piety in the sense of the level of application of the belief system that the person belongs to to his life carries the potential to shape human life. Since the working life is an important part of daily life, it is possible that the level of piety may have an impact on the motivation of the person. The relationship between the level of motivation and the level of piety and the force and direction of this relationship were tried to be determined. In this way, it is aimed to increase the motivation of public employees in public personnel management. The study, samples from public institutions located in the city of Nevsehir in Turkey as to the personnel of selected institutions, was conducted with survey method. The data obtained from the study were analyzed with SPSS statistical program and it was determined that there was a positive but weak relationship between the level of piety and motivation