Computer Metaphor Research Articles

Metaphorising and bayesian inference according to biology of cognition and enaction

The most accepted paradigm of brain function sustaining mathematical thinking is the “Brain as Computer” metaphor. Since the early 1970s, however, a new viewpoint based on the Biology of Cognition, created by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, has slowly positioned itself as a challenger to the computer metaphor. Here, we interpret the notion of metaphorising in mathematics in the context of Biology of Cognition. Specifically, we introduce the fundamental concept of Structural Coupling, which is the mechanism by which living systems create the “objects” populating their niche by exploiting correlations in the never-ending Perception ⟲ Action loop. Furthermore, we show that how a living system decides which action to perform is the outcome of a Bayesian Inference mechanism; therefore, randomness is fundamental to living systems and not just a consequence of the mere lack of sufficient information to compute the next action. Additionally, in Bayesian inference, the underlying conditional probability distribution P(action|perception) changes by the very execution of every Perception ⟲ Action loop, performing a biased random walk according to a Hebbian-like rule. With this rich set of concepts derived from cutting-edge biology, we show that Biology of Cognition is a good fit to understand mathematical metaphorisation.

A survey on computational metaphor processing techniques: from identification, interpretation, generation to application

A survey on computational metaphor processing techniques: from identification, interpretation, generation to application

Computing machines, body and mind: metaphorical origins of mechanistic computationalism

The article presents preliminary results of the conceptual analysis of the mechanistic profile of the computer metaphor. Mechanic reductionism is a special direction of computer metaphor rooted in various historical forms of word usage. Here we trace the stages of formation of the principles of transferring the properties of a mechanical computer to the properties of the human body and mind. We are also trying to identify the basic principles of semantic transfer, which have survived to this day in the discourse of modern computationalism. The reasons are analyzed due to which the metaphor «Human (body) is machine», traditional for the Modern Age, was transformed into a more complex version of «Mind is machine». What happened to the concepts of «mind» and «machine»? How have ideas about the properties of computational procedures changed? What keeps the counterintuitive computer metaphor viable today? The answers to this series of questions and theoretical ways of solving these problems are contained in this paper.

The Mind and the Brain: A Multiscale Interpretation of Cognitive Brain Functionality

Welcome to a special issue of Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience focused on The Mind and The Brain: A Multiscale Interpretation of Cognitive Brain Functionality. This special issue contains six articles that come from different disciplinary perspectives and methods that themselves span a range of spatiotemporal scales for analyzing cognition and behavior. At a time when the field of cognitive science is transitioning away from the computer metaphor of the mind and toward complex interactive frameworks (Spivey, 2023), these articles serve as waypoints for how to go about building those new theories. The articles include philosophical reviews of the processes that allow for self-organization to emerge in a multiscale cognitive system (Silberstein, 2023) and how best to model such multiscale processes (Favela, 2023). They include dense-sampling measures of postural movements (Corbin et al., 2023), time series analyses of music perception (Waddington & Balasubramaniam, 2023), and recurrence quantification analysis of spoken sentence comprehension (Nguyen & Spivey, 2023). And it all culminates in a big-picture perspective on how mental activity across any and all life forms may be best understood as emerging from collective action among sub-elements interacting to form self-organized metastable cognitive structures (Falandays et al., 2023).

Brain mechanisms of mental processing: from evoked and spontaneous brain activities to enactive brain activity.

Within the context of the computer metaphor, evoked brain activity acts as a primary carrier for the brain mechanisms of mental processing. However, many studies have found that evoked brain activity is not the major part of brain activity. Instead, spontaneous brain activity exhibits greater intensity and coevolves with evoked brain activity through continuous interaction. Spontaneous and evoked brain activities are similar but not identical. They are not separate parts, but always dynamically interact with each other. Therefore, the enactive cognition theory further states that the brain is characterized by unified and active patterns of activity. The brain adjusts its activity pattern by minimizing the error between expectation and stimulation, adapting to the ever-changing environment. Therefore, the dynamic regulation of brain activity in response to task situations is the core brain mechanism of mental processing. Beyond the evoked brain activity and spontaneous brain activity, the enactive brain activity provides a novel framework to completely describe brain activities during mental processing. It is necessary for upcoming researchers to introduce innovative indicators and paradigms for investigating enactive brain activity during mental processing.

Nine insights from internet engineering that help us understand brain network communication

Philosophers have long recognized the value of metaphor as a tool that opens new avenues of investigation. By seeing brains as having the goal of representation, the computer metaphor in its various guises has helped systems neuroscience approach a wide array of neuronal behaviors at small and large scales. Here I advocate a complementary metaphor, the internet. Adopting this metaphor shifts our focus from computing to communication, and from seeing neuronal signals as localized representational elements to seeing neuronal signals as traveling messages. In doing so, we can take advantage of a comparison with the internet's robust and efficient routing strategies to understand how the brain might meet the challenges of network communication. I lay out nine engineering strategies that help the internet solve routing challenges similar to those faced by brain networks. The internet metaphor helps us by reframing neuronal activity across the brain as, in part, a manifestation of routing, which may, in different parts of the system, resemble the internet more, less, or not at all. I describe suggestive evidence consistent with the brain's use of internet-like routing strategies and conclude that, even if empirical data do not directly implicate internet-like routing, the metaphor is valuable as a reference point for those investigating the difficult problem of network communication in the brain and in particular the problem of routing.

Рецензия на книгу П.Н. Барышникова «Вычислительные модели разума: От кода к смыслу» (М.: ЛЕНАНД, 2022. 320 с.)

The cognitive revolution of the mid-20th century allowed scientists to return consciousness into respectable scientific research, thereby bypassing the eliminativist approaches of behav­iorism and physicalism. Machine functionalism adopted the computer metaphor and became the philosophical foundation for this new scientific trend. In the second half of the 20th cen­tury, many significant data were obtained by the efforts of cognitive scientists on how men­tal processes are arranged, but the methodological boundaries of computational theories and the ontological status of mental states remained a serious problem. This complex issue is closely analyzed by P.N. Baryshnikov in his book “Computational models of the mind: From code to meaning”. Moving along the historical line of development of cognitive sci­ence and related philosophical conceptions, the author demonstrates that computational the­ories are not able to explain the semantic aspect of mental states, although they have heuris­tic potential for creating artificial intelligent systems that implement some of the cognitive functions of the human mind.

Mind as Machine: The Influence of Mechanism on the Conceptual Foundations of the Computer Metaphor

This article will focus on the mechanistic origins of the computer metaphor, which forms the conceptual framework for the methodology of the cognitive sciences, some areas of artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind. The connection between the history of computing technology, epistemology and the philosophy of mind is expressed through the metaphorical dictionaries of the philosophical discourse of a particular era. The conceptual clarification of this connection and the substantiation of the mechanistic components of the computer metaphor is the main goal of this article. The statement is substantiated that the invention of mechanical computing devices, having a long history in the European engineering tradition, formed the prerequisites for the emergence of machine functionalism in the modern philosophy of mind. The idea of multiple implementation stems from the principle that a formal symbol system prescribes rules for the use of rational abstractions through the physical architecture of a computational engine. The article considers the reasons for the conceptual shift and reveals the semantic foundations for the metaphorical transfer of the properties of abstract objects from the theory of automata to the field of modern philosophy of mind. The criticism and ways of protecting the philosophical program of machine functionalism are analyzed by changing the content of the metaphor “Mind as machine”. The reasons for the stability of the information-computer approach in cognitive sciences are also disclosed and explained.

Loving robots changing love: Towards a practical deficiency-love

Robots are today made not only to assist us in menial tasks and routine labour but also provide companionship and love. This has generated much academic and public interest, and people have asked whether robots can love, whether human–robot relationships are possible, and whether humans can develop loving affection for robots. These are all important questions, but I approach the issues from another perspective: can robots made for love change our very understanding of love? By treating love as a cultural and malleable phenomenon, I explore the possibility of it being changed a) to accommodate robots, and b) as a consequence of how robots love us. The first regards the quest to understand what love is and our current tendency to understand phenomena in light of the computer or computational metaphor of human beings. The second involves an examination of how robots are produced to love, and what this form of love might lead to in the wild. Rather than asking if robots can live up to human ideals, I ask if humans will live down – or it might be up – to robot ideals. Using Abraham Maslow’s distinction between being love and deficiency love as an example, I argue that love robots might take us to a place where deficiency love and a growing expectancy of one-sided worship changes the content of love as a cultural phenomenon.

“Computer metaphor”, interhemispheral asymmetry and species (spontaneous) knowledge of Homo sapiens

The purpose of this article is to supplement the discussion in the field of research and modeling of the process of cognition first with data from neuropsychology and interhemispheric asymmetry, and second with reflections on species’ (spontaneous) knowledge of Homo sapiens. I. The data of neuropsychology and interhemispheric asymmetry signify two differently directed and complementary ways of processing information and regulating the functions inherent in the brain. One of these methods is analytical computer-like information processing, which is necessary for voluntary learning, the other method provides holistic-simultaneous, imaginative, unconscious, and involuntary processing. The duality of cognitive strategies is clearly manifested in the psychological analysis of syndromes in the case of brain lesions, as well as various conditions in healthy people (for example, in the case of bilingualism). II. Biological existence, which is the basis for all other layers of life, is provided by species-specific behavior and knowledge. Presumably species knowledge manifests itself as 1 — Constant involuntary assessment of the surrounding world and adequate reactions to changes in the world: from ordinary reactions (step aside, add a step, etc.) to the ability to react without hesitation in dangerous situations. 2 — The ability to understand connections between phenomena without scientific calculations. The entire history of mankind speaks of the existence of such an ability. People survived without science and created science along the way. 3 — Deep knowledge (often without the ability to logically explain) of what is natural and useful for us as representatives of the Homo Sapiens species, and of what is unnatural and harmful. There are reasons to assume that species knowledge is the basis that determines the common behavior of people of different eras and cultures in everything related to the continuation of the family and the cultivation of a new generation. Species knowledge merges together in the process of development with the knowledge gained during training.

Extension of Critical Programs of the Computational Theory of Mind

Technological advances in computer science have secured the computer metaphor status of a heuristic methodological tool used to answer the question about the nature of mind. Nevertheless, some philosophers strongly support opposite opinions. Anti-computationalism in the philosophy of mind is a methodological program that uses extremely heterogeneous grounds for argumentation, deserving analysis and discussion. This article provides an overview and interpretation of the traditional criticism of the computational theory of mind (computationalism); its basic theses have been formed in Western philosophy in the last quarter of the 20th century. The main goal is to reveal the content of the arguments of typical anti-computationalist programs and expand their application to the framework of the semantic problems of the Classic Computational Theory of Mind. The main fault of the symbolic ap-proach in the classical computationalism is the absence of a full-fledged theory of semantic properties. The relevance of considering these seemingly outdated problems is justified by the fact that the problem of meaning (and general problems of semantics) remains in the core of the latest developments in various areas of AI and the principles of human-computer interaction.

The Computer Metaphor. Anchoring the Fear of Human Obsolescence(s) since the 20th Century

This article shows how fundamental debates on both human obsolescence in the form of vanishing human exceptionalism and of technological unem- ployment were anchored to the emerging technology of artificial intelligence (AI). Through this anchoring, these debates became tangible and they were discussed beyond scientific circles by the wider public too. Thus the technol­ ogy on the one hand and the scientific and social debates on human obsoles­ cence on the other hand entered into a phase of co­evolution. We will first discuss the computer metaphor since it not only prepared the idea of AI but also was the culture medium for the connection between the technology and the obsolescence debates. In the second half of the article, we then discuss this connection in the context of human exceptionalism, followed by the context of technological unemployment. Next to prominent examples from Anglo-American AI research as well as cybernetics and psychology we look at German-language examples. That the spread of the anchoring of debate to technology goes beyond scientific circles is made clear by looking at science fiction and broadsheet newspapers and magazines.

Applications of cybernetics to psychological theory: Historical and conceptual explorations

This article outlines links between cybernetics and psychology through the black box metaphor using a tripartite narrative. The first part explores first-order cybernetic approaches to opening the black box. These developments run parallel to the decline of radical behaviorism and advancements in information processing theory and neuropsychology. We then describe how cybernetics migrates towards a second-order approach (expanding and questioning features of first-order inquiry), understanding applications of rule-based tools to sociocultural phenomena and dynamic mental models, inspiring radical constructivism, and also accepting social constructivism. Psychology, however, enters the cognitive revolution, adhering to the computer metaphor of first-order cyberneticians to streamline human consciousness. The article concludes by outlining how second-order cybernetic approaches emerging in the 1990s may provide cues to psychologists to adopt mixed methods, and bioecological models in the information age, uniting understandings of observable human activity, inner perceptions, and physiological processes across contexts to understand consciousness.

Computational Metaphor Identification in Communities of Blogs

This poster presents a computational analysis of conceptual metaphors in a community of political blogs. Like sentiment analysis or opinion extraction, computational metaphor identification can provide a means of understanding the particular framings or conceptualizations used in a community. This poster includes an overview of the implementation and a summary of results.

Life as an Intelligence Test: Intelligence, Education, and Behavioral Genetics.

Using the large datasets available with new gene sequencing and biobank projects, behavioral geneticists are developing tools that attempt to predict individual intelligence based on genetics. These predictive tools are meant to enable a 'precision education' that will transform society. These technological developments have not changed the fundamental aims of a program with a long history. Behavioral genetics is continuous with previous attempts to match personal characteristics to heredity, such as sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, and threatens racial and other forms of bias. From these older paradigms, it inherits an understanding of intelligence as informational processing shaped by mechanistic and computational metaphors as well as a view of society and education organized around competition. Because of these influences, these models misdescribe fundamental aspects of human engagement with the world and disregard other concepts of intelligence, which creates problems for the precision education that researchers hope to construct using genetic knowledge.

The Networked Computer Metaphor: A Novel Tool for Psychiatric Trainees to Enhance Utility of the Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Illness.

The biopsychosocial (BPS) model proposed by George Engel posited that a disease developed through a complex interaction of biological, psychological and social factors. This popular model, despite its limitations, continues to influence the practice and treatment of illness and service delivery worldwide. We propose the networked computer metaphor as a novel and pragmatic tool to help psychiatric trainees appreciate and enhance the utility of the BPS model as it pertains to psychiatric disorders. We also propose that the application of this metaphor would help provide some clues to answer the question of achieving the goal envisioned by Engel of providing holistic and comprehensive patient-centered care. We also discuss the utility of this metaphor from trainee, teacher and patient perspectives and describe various examples of the application of this metaphor so as to deepen our understanding of the BPS model. We discuss the criticisms of this model, summarize the applications of this metaphor and outline future directions for research.

How do scientists criticize the computer metaphor of the brain?

AbstractThe central metaphor in cognitive science is the computer metaphor of the brain. In previous work, we reconstructed the metaphor in a novel way, guided by the assumption that it functions as an explanatory hypothesis. We developed an argumentative pattern for justifying scientific explanations in which this metaphor functions as a standpoint supported by argumentation containing abduction and analogy. In this paper, we use the argumentative pattern as a heuristic to reconstruct recent scientific criticisms against the computer metaphor. The pattern generates expectations about the nature of these criticisms, and we show those expectations to be met in most respects. We then discuss the extent to which our findings render the reconstruction offered by the argumentative pattern feasible. A central question emerging from our analysis is whether the computer metaphor can be adequately characterized as an explanatory hypothesis based on abduction. We suggest some possibilities for future lines of inquiry in this respect.

Deep Origins of Innovation (Part I/III): Creation of Novelty

The phenomenon Innovation is the subject of broad scholarly attention. From the 1960s on, from many points of view and in many perspectives, scholars created with their views, theories and models of innovation the body of knowledge we call the Concept of Innovation. Each with its own definition, creating quite a heterogeneity in the definitions, as well as a great diversity in the resulting views on innovations. Looking for a common ground in the Concept of Innovation, going to the deep roots of the concept by exploring the Nature of Innovation, this article focusses on the deep Origins of Innovation. Origins that can be found in human behaviour. Exploring brains and behaviour—by using a Computational Metaphor—a model of the mental processes resulting in novelty is presented in a narrative form. The model unfolds the mental processes that are fundamental to the creation of Novelty executed by Homo Creativus that shape the Affairs of Man over time. This working paper is the first of three working papers into the Deep Origin of Innovation. It is based on the case study ’Origins of Innovation, Ancient (R)evolutions in Perpective.’

Detection of deception through saccadic movements in the psychological assessment and symptom monitoring of Covid-19

From the theory of the model of the mind's point of view, which indicates that in syllogisms there will be more eye movements from front to back between the terms of the premises that question some of Ford's predictions? (Espino & Santamaría, 1998) During the blinking process, sometimes the superior and inferior eyelids tend to completely or incompletely close. It intervenes notably in the comfort of vision when we perform surrounding vision tasks. Carrying out tasks such as conferences, paper, and electronic versions, it's linked to an increase in dry eye symptoms, therefore, among other factors, of altered blinking. (Rodríguez Montiel, 2015). This article intended to verify the phenomena of lying, deception, and self-deception that are directly related to psychological problems and their treatments (Porcel Medina & Gonzalez Fernandez, 2005). Among its defining features is the adoption of computational metaphor as a source of inspiration for the modeling of the structures and processes of the mind, and methodological functionalism, which legitimizes the study of mental processes and states (the "software") regardless of its physical installation base (the "hardware"). It is a computerized model of the human special abilities for reasoning and problem-solving skills. However, it is another modern language used in artificial intelligence (AI) and the logical extension that is based on first-order predicate calculus that includes an inference engine that uses backward chaining. It is a non-procedural language, which indicates that the instructions do not have to necessarily be executed in the order that they have been entered. (Pino Diez & Gómez Gómez, 2001) It is concluded that the specific causes of this ocular muscular activity constitute a true enigma located in the adjacent area of the midbrain. (García Alcolea, 2009).
 The article will be based according to the title, authors, year of publication, abstract, citations, and bibliographic references since it is an experimental design project.

Illusions of Linguistics and Illusions of Modern Synthesis: Two Parallel Stories

Metaphors involve immense explanatory power and positive impact predominantly in the scientific education and popularization. Still the use of metaphors in science might be a double-edged sword. Introduction of the computer metaphor to many scientific fields in the last century resulted in reductionist approaches, oversimplifications and mechanistic explanations in science as well as in humanities. In this short commentary we developed further the computer metaphor by prof. Noble and the illusions this metaphor led to in genetics, linguistics and consequently DNA linguistics.