Recent revival of interest in pursuing a constructive dialogue between phenomenologists and cognitive scientists testifies, if need be, that the methodologies based on first person approaches, i.e., rigorous and trained reflection on experience, and objective or third person approaches, based on external observation, can be correlated. The question of how exactly this correlation is to be achieved has received a number of responses.1 One view, neurophenomenology, proposed by F. Varela, stipulates that the disciplines based on first and third person methodologies should enter in a relation of mutual constraint and enlightenment.2 This relation is especially productive in cases of conflict between views espoused by phenomenologists and natural scientists, in that it allows the disciplines to throw a critical light on each other and also to stimulate their respective developments. Another view, heteropheonomenology, defended by Dennett, claims that first-person reports should be transformed into raw data for science, i.e., for third person analysis.3 This view has received critical reception from the phenomenological camp, to the effect that it is a naive and possibly un-scientific strategy which does not integrate but ultimately effaces the first person perspective of phenomenological analysis from objective study.4 In the heterophenomenological framework, the scientist who interprets the subjective reports in view of turning them into data is herself not trained in the phenomenological method and relies on her own first-person experience and/or upon unbracketed preexisting beliefs which tend to be derived from the so-called folk psychology. Finally, there have recently been developments towards having a phenomenologically enlightened experimental science or front-loaded phenomenology. In this perspective, phenomenological contributions should be used directly in conducting empirical research. The novelty of this perspective lies in that it moves from the unidirectional influence of the natural sciences on phenomenology, as evidenced notably in the work of Merleau-Ponty as well as Sartre, to a bi-directional relation between the two disciplines, where phenomenology itself has a say in how natural science progresses. In this essay, I propose to examine recent studies on neonate imitation in light of this complex dialogue between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. The contention that I will defend is that imitation studies provide a concrete example of how to conduct the dialogue of mutual constraint and enlightenment between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. This claim will critically bear on Dennett's heterophenomenological proposal; it will also permit me to hypothesize about front loading phenomenology into experimental research on imitation. Experimental research into infantile imitation of facial and manual gestures of adults has been conducted over the last thirty years by a team of researchers in many parts of the world. In the United States, imitation has been most extensively studied by Andrew Meltzoff and his associates. They have conclusively demonstrated that infants are able to imitate simple facial gestures of adults, such as tongue protrusion and mouth opening, literally from birth on.5 The infants do not imitate in a reflex like fashion, i.e., they do not automatically produce a fully fledged copy of what they see the adult perform. They initially experiment with the relevant body part (e.g., the tongue) to gradually arrive at the gesture matching the one displayed by the adult. Infantile imitation cannot therefore be explained in terms of a simple releasing mechanism but seems to mobilize a more complex cognitive system.6 This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that infants not only imitate what they see the adult do on-line, but can also imitate from memory. For example, in a specially designed experiment to test delayed imitation, infants observed two facial gestures of mouth opening and tongue protrusion; they were prevented from mimicking the facial display by having a pacifier inserted in their mouth during the experiment. …