Competitive Authoritarian Regimes Research Articles

Shifting Power Dynamics? The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Policymaking for Mozambique’s Extractive Sector

In 2012 the Mozambican government announced the revision of the mining and petroleum laws in consultation with civil society organizations (CSOs). This followed the discovery of world class gas reserves in the Rovuma Basin, and growing demands for transparency, fair sharing of revenues and protection of national interests, from all quadrants. Given this, what was the role played by CSOs? Did they influence the process at all, or did the consultation serve as a tool to strengthen the regime’s interests and legitimacy? Building on Gramsci and African scholarship that conceptualizes the state and civil society as relational social forces that co-influence each other through shifting power balances, the study reveals that CSOs influenced the development of the mining and petroleum laws by performing four essential roles: expertise, agenda-setting, representative and monitoring. The government accommodated some of CSOs demands, even though the consultation process was not fully open. The findings build on a mix of interviews with members of CSOs and other qualitative sources (laws, news and reports) and underline the need to analyse state and civil society beyond dichotomous and homogenizing categories. They also contribute to a flourishing literature on the role of civil society in competitive authoritarian regimes.

The rise of digital authoritarianism: Evolving threats to media and Internet freedoms in Pakistan

Digital authoritarianism poses increasing challenges within both autocratic and democratic regimes. The evolving mechanisms of digital authoritarianism surpass national boundaries. Over the past decade they have advanced the interests of authoritarian states to undermine the freedoms of media and the Internet. In competitive authoritarian regimes, like Pakistan, digital authoritarianism has paved its way under democratic disguise. Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2020 indicates that the country ranks at 145 out of total 178 countries. Moreover, Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2020 survey reveals Pakistan among the worst ten countries in terms of Internet and digital media freedoms. Considering these facts, hence this study examines digital authoritarianism in the journalistic context. It explores evolving threats to media and internet freedoms due to the increasing authoritarian practices of Pakistan’s state authorities in digital realm. This is significant so as to unpack how the country’s authorities restrain media and Internet freedoms in the digital age. To achieve this aim, this study uses the qualitative method of online interviews and presents findings thematically.

Partisanship Versus Democracy: Voting in Turkey’s Competitive Authoritarian Elections

Do voters care about anti-democratic behavior by their leaders? While political pundits and academics often hope that they do, there has been little research that tests the effects that specific anti-democratic actions have on voters during elections. This is because there are few clear instances where violations of democratic norms are so visible to the average voter that one would expect it to have an effect, above and beyond traditional predictors of the vote. However, the recent elections in Turkey offer a unique opportunity to test the effect that nullifying an entire election (an unequivocal violation of democratic norms) has on voters. We do exactly that with a survey of voters following the election re-do. We find that even in such an extraordinary circumstance, voters rely on standard voting drivers like partisanship, rather than concern for the functioning of democracy itself. Ultimately, our findings have important implications for voting in competitive authoritarian regimes, as they fail to show that anti-democratic behavior is punished.

When local becomes general: Turkey's 31 March 2019 elections and its implications for dynamics of polarization and sustainability of competitive authoritarianism

ABSTRACT Following the snap general elections in 2018, Turkish voters again went to ballot-box to cast their verdict on local elections on 31 March 2019. While the electoral playing field remained heavily skewed to the benefit of the incumbent bloc as it has been during the recent rounds of electoral contestation, the opposition, for the first time, broke the winning series of the incumbent AKP and won nearly all the major metropolitan municipalities including Ankara and Istanbul. This article aims to delineate the dynamics of polarization/depolarization in a competitive authoritarian setting. Through an analysis of political and economic context and campaign discourses of main parties in recent local elections, this article argues that under a regime level cleavage, performance failure of incumbent enabled the opposition to initiate a depolarizing and inclusive campaign discourse while captivating its core constituency. Secondly, this article assesses the possible ramifications of recent electoral loss for the sustainability of competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey through an analysis of AKP’s politics of patronage and clientelism and party organization. Such an analysis demonstrates that despite its local character, the recent elections will have important ramifications for the sustainability of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.

Social coexistence and violence during Turkey’s authoritarian transition

ABSTRACT The recent authoritarian turn and democratic backsliding around the world have raised concerns over increased instability and violent conflicts. Turkey is a striking example of this authoritarian turn with the transition from a multiparty democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime. With seven in-depth case studies from Turkey, this special issue sheds light upon the changing dynamics of violence and social coexistence in countries that experience democratic decline from a transdisciplinary perspective. In this introductory article, we briefly trace the authoritarian transition and societal fault lines in Turkey, discuss the case studies presented in this special issue, and draw out our contribution to the literature.

The Importance of Subnational Elections and Subnational Politics in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of PAN from Mexico

Rekabetçi otoriter rejimlerden çıkışta en etkili stratejilerden biri “seçim ittifaklarıdır”. Fakat seçim ittifaklarına göre uzun vadede sonuç alınan bir strateji daha vardır, o da ulusaltı siyaseti demokratikleştirmektir. Buna göre muhalefet ulusaltı seçimlerde elde ettiği yönetsel birimi (eyalet veya belediye) demokratikleştirir ve de buralarda başarılı bir performans sergilerse bu başarı çevre birimlere de yayılma eğilimi gösterecektir. Ortaya çıkan bu demokratik anklavlar nihai noktada ulusal siyaseti de dönüştürecek ve otoriter rejime son verecektir. Çalışmada bu strateji Meksika’dan PAN örneği üzerinden incelenecektir. Yetmiş yıllık PRI iktidarına 2000 yılında son veren PAN diğer muhalefet partilerinin aksine stratejisini ulusaltı siyaset üzerinden kurmuş ve yaklaşık on iki yıllık bir sürede iktidarı elde etmiştir. PAN’ın zaferinin nedenlerine eğilen çalışmanın bulguları şu şekildedir; PAN ulusaltı yönetsel birimleri elde ederek, ulusal düzeyde tanınırlık kazanmış ve eş zamanda maddi kaynaklara erişmiştir; yönettiği birimlerde sivil ve siyasal özgürlükleri güçlendirmiş ve demokratik anklavlar yaratmıştır; seçmenin siyasal davranışını dönüştürmüş ve “katılımcı yurttaşlık” kültürünü güçlendirmiştir; ve son olarak eyalet parlamentolarının kurumsallaşmasını sağlamış ve böylece ülkede yasama-yürütme ilişkilerine demokratik bir model sunmuştur.

The Performance of Opposition Parties in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Three Case Studies from the Western Balkans

This article investigates opposition to the competitive authoritarian regimes in Montenegro (1997–2020), North Macedonia (2006–2017), and Serbia (2012–). In each of the three countries, opposition parties face or have faced the challenge of competing on an electoral playing field that is structurally skewed in favour of the incumbent. The articles explore the question in which circumstances opposition parties have been able to contest the dominant parties. In doing so, it focuses on three dimensions, namely the relationship between spatial party competition, different levels of opposition cohesion or fragmentation, as well as extra-institutional strategies of contestation. The country comparison illustrates that party systems with cross-cutting cleavages tend to produce divided patterns of contestation (Montenegro and Serbia), whereas reinforcing cleavages facilitate the coordination among different types of opposition actors (North Macedonia). Finally, large protests, rather than boycotts, prior to elections have been important factors in facilitating opposition cohesion and signalling broad support (Montenegro and North Macedonia).

Concept of Competitive Authoritarianism and Its Criticism in Scientific Literature

The concept of competitive authoritarianism by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way has become one of the compelling responses to the decline of the transition paradigm that used to hold optimistic expectations about democratization of political regimes that combined elements of democracy and authoritarianism. According to Levitsky and Way’s logic, the presence of an authoritarian component does not allow one to characterize such mixed regimes as democratic, and in this sense, competitive authoritarianism is still authoritarianism. At the same time, it differs from other forms of authoritarian regimes due to the non-illusory ability of the opposition to compete for the executive power. The concept of competitive authoritarianism has been widely used in the study of political regimes, but the resulting important need for a deeper understanding of its assumptions has given rise to a number of critical evaluations among the researchers. The main criticism of the opponents regards the operationalization of the concept of “competitive authoritarianism”, the historical limitations of its usage, as well as Levitsky and Way’s idea that competitive authoritarian regimes are predetermined to democratize if they maintain broad and close ties with the West that are regarded as some kind of frozen objective reality. The article attempts to bring together the critical arguments that have been expressed in the research literature against the concept of competitive authoritarianism, and thereby contribute to a more balanced reception of this concept in the domestic scientific discourse. According to the author’s conclusion, the main flaws of the concept are related to the interpretation of the reasons for the vulnerability/stability of competitive authoritarian regimes. The focus on the role of the West and the regime’s ability to control the political process ignores a number of other significant factors, including the ability of the opposition to counter the current government with some real alternative, which is especially important in the Russian context, where the absence of such an alternative is one of the key reasons for the exceptional stability of the authoritarian regime.

Defeating Populists: The Case of 2019 Istanbul Elections

ABSTRACT How can populist competitive authoritarian regimes be defeated through elections? In this article, we focus on the 2019 municipal campaign strategy of the opposition Istanbul candidate Ekrem İmamoglu as a case study of a successful challenge to a populist competitive authoritarian regime. We argue that such regimes may be prone to defeat when their opponents use what we call an ‘inverted populist’ strategy. This strategy involves three key elements: adopting an indirect and gradualist approach that avoids direct confrontation with the populist leader and the popular values s/he represents, redefining the ‘the people’ by including previously excluded groups, and promising redistribution to disadvantaged groups.

Latin America Erupts: When Does Competitive Authoritarianism Take Root?

:Democratically elected as Bolivia's first indigenous president in 2005, Evo Morales eroded democracy and began a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the 2010s. By November 2020, however, both Morales and his successor, the right-wing president Jeanine Áñez, had fallen after failing to consolidate authoritarian rule. Why do some aspiring authoritarians succeed while many fail? A comparison of Bolivia to Brazil and Venezuela illuminates the challenges of both eroding democracy and institutionalizing new competitive authoritarian regimes. Aspiring autocrats must mobilize and control civil society in both stages of autocratization—a challenge that led to the fall of both Morales and Áñez.

Pressuring MPs to act: parliament, organized interests and policymaking in Uganda and Tanzania

ABSTRACT What motivates MPs to challenge executive policy priorities? When and why do they support seemingly more “pro-poor” measures? This article presents a novel framework to answer these questions, adapting its analysis to the context of competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa. Recent literature tends to focus on whether heightened electoral pressure encourages more pro-poor policy interventions, for instance, leading to improved health services. While not dismissing the significance of voter demands, this article refocuses attention on the largely overlooked role of organized interests in shaping legislative action. More specifically, it examines how the distribution of power across more “mass-based” groups as well as within the ruling elite jointly influence policy outcomes, including pro-poor policies consonant with voter preferences. The argument is two-fold: one, mass-based groups – unions, farmers’ associations and the like – can help galvanize MPs to demand more pro-poor policy; two, elite divisions, especially within the ruling party, help create the opening for activists to lobby effectively. Using a process-tracing methodology, the article demonstrates this theory through two case studies of semi-successful legislative interventions in Uganda and one failed attempt in Tanzania. For evidence, it draws on a mix of elite interviews, party and parliamentary reports, and press reviews.

State-sponsored trade unions after democratic transitions

ABSTRACT New democracies inherit a variety of institutions from prior authoritarian regimes, including political parties, militaries and entrenched oligarchies. While these authoritarian legacies have generally been well-researched, one set of institutions has received relatively little attention: state-backed trade unions that lose official sponsorship after democratizing transitions. In most new democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes, these “legacy unions” have remained the dominant workers’ organizations despite few internal reforms. Previous research on the causes and consequences of legacy union dominance has rested on case studies of post-transition countries and small-N comparisons. In this article, we offer a global perspective on the fates of legacy unions by introducing new data about the relative importance of legacy unions in post-Third Wave democracies. We show that most legacy unions survive democratic transitions and remain dominant in new democracies, although with significant regional variation. Our data and analyses suggest that these trade unions are authoritarian legacies which continue to influence labour politics in new democracies. Dominant legacy unions are associated with lower labour movement fragmentation and better-protected labour rights in new democracies.

Linkage to the West and Electoral Manipulation

The relationship between linkage to the West and the survival of political regimes has gained increasing attention in recent years. Despite this attention, one aspect of this linkage remains poorly understood, and that is the effect of linkage to the West on electoral manipulation. Scholars have suggested that linkage to the West raises the cost of government abuse because it increases the probability of Western governments taking action in response to reported abuse. This assumption then suggests that incumbents should choose the forms of repression more wisely. Consequently, in cases of the higher level of linkage to the West incumbents are less likely to use the more visible forms of repression and manipulation. I test the aforementioned assumptions on time series, cross-national data set with observations of 147 elections in competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2010. I find that extensive international relations to the West have only minimal and statistically non-significant effect on visible forms of repression and manipulation. These results contribute to our understanding of international linkage as they show that linkage to the West does not provide sufficient protection to opposition leaders and groups.

Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism

After decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.

The New Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarianism—in which the coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and serious incumbent abuse yields electoral competition that is real but unfair—is alive and well, nearly two decades after the concept was introduced in the Journal of Democracy. This is surprising, because the Western liberal hegemony of the 1990s, which led many full autocracies to become competitive authoritarian, has waned. Competitive politics persists because many autocrats lack the coercive and organizational capacity to consolidate hegemonic rule, and because the alternatives to multiparty elections lack legitimacy across the globe. Recently, new competitive authoritarian regimes have emerged in countries with strong democratic institutions, raising concerns about the diffusion of competitive authoritarianism to the West.

Increasing Accountability Using Data Journalism: Challenges for the Pakistani Journalists

ABSTRACT A distinct era of data-driven reporting is on rise – a period when software, algorithms, programming, and data-processing techniques are being used by media organizations, especially in many developed countries of the world. Amid the increased practice of data journalism, it is imperative to analyse how journalists can use it for holding the power holders accountable, particularly in authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes where democratic norms are often abused and access to information is constrained. Drawing on the new institutionalism theory, thus this study aims to analyse the ability of Pakistan’s journalists to practice data journalism and to explore challenges that they face in the practice of data-driven reporting. To address this aim, this study uses the qualitative methods of document review and in-depth interviews (face-to-face). This study uses thematic analysis to offer insights into the gathered data.

Democracy in Croatia: From stagnant 1990s to rapid change 2000–2011

This article analyses democracy in post-communist Croatia 1990–1999 and 2000–2011. During the first decade, political stagnation occurred under a competitive authoritarian regime. This ended abruptly and there was a critical juncture, during which a free and fair election marked the start of Croatian democracy in 2000. I first propose a causal chain to explain the election results, suggesting that the occurrence of the election, combined with other necessary factors, revealed the population’s underlying preference for democracy. Internally, this preference then served as a positive feedback mechanism throughout Croatia’s rapid increase in democracy as it became a candidate for European Union membership and finalized accession negotiations. Externally, the European Union influenced democratic progress, particularly via conditionality policies. This historical comparative analysis aims to explain which factors allowed for a rapid increase in democratic quality, positioning the 2000 election results as the main influence.

Dividing Lines: Understanding the Creation and Replication of Fragmentations Among NGOs in Hybrid Regimes

Few would underestimate the role of nondemocratic governments in controlling and steering NGOs. However, this article highlights that in hybrid regimes, the rules for NGO–government and interorganizational relations are not simply dictated from above but actively shaped and sustained by NGOs themselves. Building on data from two policy fields in competitive authoritarian Armenia, this article illustrates that the government sent ambiguous signals to NGOs, thereby cultivating divisions between them. It then shows that, surprisingly, NGOs themselves amplified these divisions. They did so by (1) avoiding confrontation with the government, (2) claiming ownership of their own policy initiatives or ties to government, and (3) distancing themselves from other NGOs. The article explains this behavior by focusing on the institutional environment and perceived uncertainty. In view of a worldwide trend toward increasingly contradictory policy environments for civil society, the approach and findings of this article are of relevance beyond Armenia and beyond competitive authoritarian regimes.

The Political Role of Business Magnates in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract This contribution examines the role of business magnates (“oligarchs”) in political transitions away from competitive authoritarianism and towards either full authoritarianism or democracy. Based on 65 cases of competitive authoritarian regimes named in the academic literature, 24 historical cases with politically active business magnates are identified for further investigation. The analysis shows that in about half of those cases business magnates do not have a distinct impact on political regime change, as they are tightly integrated into the ruling elites. If they do have an impact, they hamper democratization at an early stage, making a transition to full democracy a rare exception. At the same time, a backlash led by the ruling elites against manipulation through business magnates makes a transition to full autocracy more likely than in competitive authoritarian regimes without influential business magnates.

Turkey’s tamed civil society: Containment and appropriation under a competitive authoritarian regime

ABSTRACTUnder the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, Turkey’s civil society has enlarged both in size and diversity of civic engagement. This development is puzzling since Turkey’s weak democratic credentials do not allow an enabling political and legal setting for civil society’s expansion. This study argues that the expansion can be explained through a particular dilemma of rulers in competitive-authoritarian (CA) regimes. The AKP is caught between the conflicting interests of appropriating and containing civil society. While the government needs to cherish civil society to sustain CA regime, it also needs to repress it, as civil society is the only arena where dissenting social forces can still carve pockets of resistance and challenge the dominant paradigms of the regime. Based on extensive fieldwork, this study discusses the patterns of containment and appropriation that have led to the steady expansion of civil society under pressure. The AKP’s dilemma has also rendered Turkey’s civil society ‘tamed’, namely politicized, disabled and segregated. The study broadens the understanding of relations between civil society and the state in CA regimes by offering essential insights into how these regimes are sustained, entrenched and also contested through and within civil society.