Community Development Block Grant Research Articles

The Consequences of Shifting Control: Federal and State Distribution of Small Cities CDBG Funds in Four Southern States

Following the shift of the Small Cities Community Development Block Grant program in 1982 from federal to state control, four southern states-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina-adopted policies intended to reduce, if not eliminate, the federal emphasis on housing rehabilitation and other activities that benefit lower income groups. These states now emphasize public works projects, which benefit a broader spectrum of the population, as well as policies designed to spread funds broadly across communities. As a result, the share of funds going to smaller communities has increased substantially. States also appear to be allocating fewer funds to poorer communities than did federal officials, although to date the difference is not substantial.

Devolution of the Small Cities CDBG Program in Mississippi

In 1982 responsibility for HUD's Small Cities Community Development Block Grant program was transferred to state governments as part of President Reagan's New Federalism initiatives. Devolution was designed to (1) implement a new vision of American federalism, (2) shift control over a significant source of financial resources for nonmetropolitan areas, and (3) end the bypassing of state government officials in community development decisionmaking. This article uses the eleven year (1975–1985) history of Small Cities CDBG awards in Mississippi to assess the consequences of the program's devolution. Changes in the pattern of state CDBG awards indicate that the program's devolution produced a policy redirection that channeled CDBG funds to a larger number of the smallest municipalities and permitted more local discretion in project design. As a result, HUD no longer dictated community development policy to small cities. Instead, community development priorities in Mississippi emerged out of an award process that involved interaction among state and local officials.

Community Development Block Grants

This paper summarizes the decentralization policy effects found in an eight-year longitudinal study of the community development block grant program in the United States of America. The effects studied were categorized as programmatic, institutional, and benefits. Attention is also given to the methodological and measurement issues associated with a study of a decentralized program which has operated within a context of shifting federal policies about the appropriate level of federal oversight of the program. The point of emphasis is that analysis of policy effects requires a sufficiently long observation period to be able to discern the continuities and discontinuities from previous policy or lack of a policy. Furthermore, longitudinal policy analysis is also likely to require alteration and refinement of measurement techniques as the research progresses.

Urban Response to Federal Program Flexibility

Categorical programs, considered the backbone of "creative federalism" in the 1960s, are no longer in vogue in the 1980s. The increasing prominence of block grants in our federal grant system merits a closer look at the likely policy consequences following program consolidation. Our longitudinal study of the Community Development Block Grant in two large cities suggests that the increased level of local discretion resulted in less emphasis on the redistributive needs of low-income residents. Moreover, decisions with respect to the block grant inevitably become part of the local political process, and in these two cities, were influenced by mayoral preferences.

Decentralization, Redistribution and Community Development: A Reassessment of the Small Cities CDBG Program

The proper balance between federal initiative and state control in policy administration has always been a volatile issue in American politics. The Reagan admin­ istration is actively pursuing a program that it hopes will reduce the size and scope of the national government, decentralize program and policy administration, and revitalize state government. I An initial step toward decentralization came with the Omnibus Budget Recon­ ciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA81), which consolidated more than 50 categorical grants into nine block grants. Under the block grant approach, most of these grant programs will now be under administrative control of state governments rather than federal agencies. While the administrative direction of the Reagan approach is clear, the policy implications have yet to be systematically analyzed. This paper is an analysis of changes in one particular block grant altered by OBRA81, the small cities portion of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Following Morgan and England's recent article in PAR,2 we are primarily concerned with the question of redistribution. Particular attention is focused on the proposition that decentralization weakens the redistributive character of policy allocation. The specific empirical question addressed is: have shifts in funding priorities developed with the change from Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to state administration of the small cities program? We also analyze the use of single purpose and multipurpose grants by both HUD and the states. Finally, changes are assessed within the context of CDBG as a developing state program. The data consist of cross-sectional samples of states admin­ istering the program for one or two years.

The Evolution of Community Development Policy

Abstract Urban renewal, the centerpiece of urban development policy from 1949 until its replacement by the Community Development Block Grant in 1974, already had fallen upon hard times by the mid-1960s. Although many cities could point to successful projects that had brought new life to decaying downtown areas, other communities were dotted with vacant lots and unfulfilled plans that never attracted the anticipated private investment. Moreover, the destruction of lower-income neighborhoods adjacent to downtown redevelopment areas led to bitterness between local officials and displaced and threatened dwellers.1

Staying in the Game: the Reaction of Nonprofit Organizations To Federal Cutbacks

_N v 'ONPROFIT organizations comprise America's (Cornuelle 1965; Etzioni 1972; Levitt 1973; Nielsen 1979; Orlans 1980), is, that vast array of institutions and associations whose common characteristics are they are private, do not operate for profit, and are devoted to serving the general welfare not simply the welfare of their members or supporters (Nielsen 1979: 1). The interaction of the Third Sector with the other two sectors government and the economy exemplifies the flexibility, adaptability, and complexity of American pluralism (Nielsen 1979: 6). As consequence of block grant programs created the early 1970s, such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) grant and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a collection of private and semi-public groups and agencies [nonprofits] moved into full partnership with the national, state, and local administering federal (Kettl 1981: 366). By 1980, private nonprofit organizations received larger share of their total revenues from the federal government than from all private giving: $40.4 billion vs. $25.5 billion (Salamon and Abramson 1982: xvii). The need to better understand the dynamics of the linkages between the public and private sectors was recognized by Salamon his recent research on governmental-nonprofit interactions (1981, 1982). He noted in almost every policy sphere, Federal operations now involve complex collage of widely assorted tools [including subcontracts] mobilizing diverse collection of different types of actors to perform host of different roles frequently confusing combinations (Salamon 1981: 259). This has resulted program structure characterized by authority parceled chunks among number of different actors (public and private) which complicates the task of coordination and taxes the integrative institutions of governments (Salamon 1981: 262). Yet, as Salamon laments, there has been a virtual absence of systematic comparative work analyzing different tools or examining the changing forms of action as whole (1981: 263).

Response: Still Looking!

We are sorry that Mr. Chambliss did not like our article. As far as we can tell from his less than lucid letter, Mr. Chambliss' criticisms are based on his personal experiences with burdensome federal mandates. He is certainly entitled to feel as burdened as he wishes. Nevertheless, we believe that our conclusions-based on survey responses from 440 Community Development Block Grant administrators-are more reliable than the impressions of one assistant director of community development.

Implementing Urban Housing Rehabilitation Programs: A Comparison of the Federal and State Experiences

Recent changes in federal housing rehabilitation policy have shifted the emphasis from single-family to multi-family units and from direct federal delivery of housing services to state and local administration. To discover the implications of this shift, this study compares the implementation of a state home improvement loan program with the financing and administration approach adopted by the federal Section 312 and Community Development Block Grant loan programs prior to 1983. A survey of borrowers who participated in the state and federal rehabilitation loan programs reveals that both types of programs assist the “incumbent up grader,” both increased the value of property, both achieved high levels of borrower satisfaction, and both concentrated on the single-family unit. Differences, however, did arise between the federal and state programs in that the state program borrowers were encouraged to conduct preventive maintenance, while the federal programs advanced social goals of serving a greater number of low-income homeowners with larger loan amounts at lower interest rates. This comparison study does not support the federal withdrawal from providing direct single-family rehabilitation loans because it can supplement the bond-market orientation of the state approach with a social targeting function.

An Expansion and Application of Kaufman's Model of Red Tape: the Case of Community Development Block Grants

HE GROWTH of government generally in the United States and the federal government in particular has led to a surge of Government growth is evident in the level and scope of intergovernmental aid and in a variety of regulatory activities. Along with this expanded government role has come detailed guidelines for expected and unexpected activities, procedures for decision-making and implementation of decisions, and forms to be filled out to keep records of all these activities. The sum total of these guidelines, procedures, and forms often is called red tape. But these are among the basic ingredients of Weber's notion of a bureaucracy. Perhaps then tape refers to excessive, unwieldy or slow administrative procedures. Individuals who deal with bureaucracies develop their own criteria for Therefore, tape may be understood best as a problem of individual perceptions rather than one of identifying objective measures for it. In this paper, tape refers to guidelines, procedures, forms, and government intervention that are perceived as excessive, unwieldy, or pointless in relationship to decision-making or implementation of decisions. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of tape and to evaluate the phenomenon in a Nixon-era New Federalism program Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). We (a) explain four sets of factors political culture, federalism, Congress, and the bureaucracy -that may cause perceptions of tape; (b) analyze the CDBG program for evidence of these factors; (c) measure local government officials' perceptions of tape in the CDBG program; and (d) attempt to explain the reasons for these perceptions.

An Expansion and Application of Kaufman's Model of Red Tape: The Case of Community Development Block Grants

An Expansion and Application of Kaufman's Model of Red Tape: The Case of Community Development Block Grants

The Small Cities Block Grant Program: An Assessment of Programmatic Change under State Control

In response to President Reagan's Program for Economic Recovery, on August 13, 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. This act consolidated over 50 categorical programs into nine block grants: four in health services, three in social services, one in education, and one in community development. While the act fell short of Reagan's initial proposal of consolidating over 90 categorical programs into four block grants, the act did facilitate the president's long-term goal of moving toward a state-oriented federalism. That is, under the block grant approach many programs will now be under the administrative control of state governments rather than the federal government. For example, state governments may now assume administrative responsibility for the small cities portion of the Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG). By mid-1982, 36 states had accepted jurisdiction of the Small Cities program.' Created under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, the small cities CDBG program is limited to cities of less than 50,000 population and now receives 30 percent of total CDBG funds. Prior to the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, small cities CDBG grants were allocated by HUD on the basis of applications from nonentitlement communities (i.e., discretionary funding). As part of the overall thrust toward greater decentralization, the legislation authorizing state assumption of this program imposes few restrictions on what states may do. The law requires states to give maximum feasible priority to meeting the two basic objectives of the 1974 Community Development Act-benefitting low and moderate income families and preventing slums and blight.2 Regardless of this provision, such a change provides significant latitude for the small cities block grant program to reflect the preferences and priorities of state and local officials.

Community Development Dynamics: National Goals and Local Priorities

The dynamism of US federalism has been the object of considerable scrutiny among scholars in recent years as federal aid to states and localities increased dramatically. Among the various forms of aid that emerged over the past decade were block grants designed to give greater autonomy to local decisionmakers. However, it is possible to undermine that process goal by aggressive federal administration of the funds. In this paper, the question posed is: ‘whose policy preferences—national or community—have the greater effect’? Data from the field network evaluation study of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program by the Brookings Institution for the period 1974–1980 are used to examine local decisionmaking during the Ford and Carter administrations. Analysis of the decisionmaking process indicates the domination of local, as opposed to national, actors over the content of local CDBG programs. Findings concerning program choices and beneficiaries show the exercise of considerable local autonomy, at the same time that localities are responding to the preferences of the national government. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the future of community development processes and programs, given the preference of the Reagan Administration for greater local flexibility.

Changing Strategies in Urban Revitalization Impacts of the Community Development Block Grant

Over the past Jew decades there has been considerable interest in neighborhood preservation as an important approach for dealing with urban decline. This research note examines the attention given to preservation under two major federal programs and shows how it got started and nurtured under one, urban renewal, and how it matured to a major strategy under another, CDBG. Some problems and limitations of the approach, as practiced under CDBG, are also covered.

Group Influence versus Decision-Making Rules

Using data from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this analysis compares the impact of decision-making rules (embodying citywide funding priorities) on Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) allocational decisions with the impact of support exerted on behalf of neighborhood-specific priorities. It is found that in addition to the amount of funding requested and the constraints imposed by ongoing projects, both the city's funding guidelines (a decision-making rule) and influence on behalf of neighborhood concerns that is channeled through neighborhood advisory councils have an impact on allocational decisions. Rules constrain the decision-making process: if political pressure on behalf of neighborhood concerns exists, it must be built into the process and procedures must be created that allow group input.

EVALUATING A COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM: A CITIZENS GROUP PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACTA citizens advisory group evaluation of a Community Development Block Grant program is compared with similar responses from city staff and city council members. All three groups provided quite positive assessments with the citizens group evaluations closer to staff responses than to council members. Objective indicators of program targeting also reveal that projects and funds have been committed to those areas of greatest need. An argument is made that citizen groups which are closely involved with certain urban programs may be able to provide useful evaluations of program performance.

The Impact of Neighborhoods and Neighborhood Organizations on Community Development Block Grants

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 marked a major change of direction for federal urban policies in America. The primary object of the Community Development Block Grant Program was the development of viable urban communities by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income. This study examined ten cities over a three-year period from 1979 to 1982, to determine the impact of CDBG. The findings suggest that greater involvement of neighborhood groups increases CDBG impacts.

Direct Household Assistance and Block Grants

This paper has three purposes. Most of the paper summarizes the background, rationale, and proposals on housing assistance developed by the President's Commission on Housing–a Housing Payment Program to help low‐income citizens pay housing costs in the existing housing market and a Housing Component for the Community Development Block Grant Program, A second purpose is to review some of the range of opinion on the Commission as it developed its proposals. Finally, I want to suggest that the credibility and potential support for the proposals are undermined currently by their being advanced in a climate of budget cutting for housing programs.

Bureaucratic Enfranchisement under the Community Development Block Grant Program

Bureaucratic enfranchisement refers to the formal representation of a constituency within the policy implementation process. The focus of this paper is on the participation of lower income people in policymaking under the federal Community Development Block Gram (CDBG) program. A scheme for measuring bureaucratic enfranchisement disaggregates the term into the dimensions of mode, representation field, and scope. Participation in nine cities is assessed according to these dimensions. The conclusion is that the extent of bureaucratic-enfranchisement is quite variable and dependent on the discretion of local officials. The ability of communities to influence government decisions is most significantly limited by the narrow scope of governmental power relative to the private sector in the United States.

Introduction: Federal Decentralization and Its Diverse Effects on the Community Development Block Grant

The intergovernmental partnership between the federal and local governments has evolved since the 1970s with three major trends: an expansion of local control over federally funded programs, consolidations of numerous categorical grants into block grants, and a dispersion of many federal programs from the most distressed inner cities to suburban and sunbelt localities. Recent policies of the Reagan administration have accelerated this transfer of program responsibility by adding nine block grants under state administration and by relaxing federal regulations and enforcement policies. The case studies in this issue of Publius focus on how local governments have reacted to these trends as they have implemented one very broad federal program, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). The 1974 act merged seven categorical grants (urban renewal, model cities, water and sewer facilities, open spaces, neighborhood facilities, rehabilitation loans, and public facilities loans) into one block grant with fewer regulatory constraints and with considerable local discretion over program priorities. Permissible uses of the grant are broadly stated and multiple. They include capital and operating activities for housing, neighborhood conservation, commercial, and economic development; completion of urban renewal projects, public works, and social services; and planning, management, and administration.