Commonsense View Research Articles

Cast into doubt: Free will and the justification for punishment.

Criminal punishment is justified on either retributive or consequential grounds. The retributive justification is premised on a common-sense view of free will: offenders can freely choose to commit crimes and so deserve blame for their actions. The consequentialist justification, in contrast, is not necessarily premised on the free will concept, but rather justifies punishment when it is the most cost-effective way of preventing crime. Science elucidating the mechanistic causes of human behavior has thrown the notion of free will into doubt, leading some to predict a shift in public support away from retribution towards consequentialism. Past research shows that free will doubt weakens support for retribution, but less is known about its effects on support for consequentialism, or about whether these effects differ across the crime severity spectrum. In this study, we explore the effects of free will doubt on support for retribution and consequentialism in response to three different categories of crime - drug crime, property crime, and violent crime - which have been shown to evoke varying levels of emotion. We find clear inconsistencies across the crime spectrum. For high affect crime, free will doubt weakens support for retribution via blame, and increases support for consequentialism. For low affect crime, free will doubt weakens support for retribution to an even greater extent, yet also decreases support for consequentialism via blame. These findings suggest that, as science reveals the mechanistic causes of criminal behavior, support for criminal punishment will decrease, especially with respect to less serious crimes.

Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role.

How to Be an Analytic Existential Thomist

How to Be an Analytic Existential Thomist Turner C. Nevitt SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS'S metaphysics of existence was a central focus of the twentieth-century Thomistic revival and remains a defining interest of the school of Existential Thomism.1 The Thomistic revival flourished mostly among Catholic intellectuals outside the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy. But just as the revival began to wane among Catholic intellectuals, analytic philosophers [End Page 321] started taking more interest in Aquinas. That interest has continued to grow over the past fifty years, giving rise more recently to the school of Analytic Thomism.2 Yet in spite of an enthusiasm for other aspects of Aquinas's thought, interested analytic philosophers have been hesitant about his view of existence; indeed, some of them have been positively scornful of it. Anthony Kenny, for example, calls Aquinas's view of existence "sophistry and illusion"3 and "thoroughly confused."4 This negative assessment of Aquinas's view of existence is due in large part to a positive assessment of the rival view of existence developed by Frege, Russell, and Quine.5 That positive assessment is near universal among contemporary analytic philosophers. But a growing number of analytic philosophers have come to question this mainstream consensus, and to propose alternative views of existence more like Aquinas's [End Page 322] own.6 This recent development suggests the possibility of a Thomism that is both analytic and existential. Some Existential Thomists have been pessimistic about such a possibility, suggesting that Continental philosophy (especially phenomenology) would be a better partner.7 But there is reason to be more optimistic: analytic philosophers have already shown their openness to views of existence like that of Aquinas. This article explores the strategies available for defending Aquinas's view of existence in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. Not all of these strategies can be accepted by Thomists, but some of them certainly can be, and those that [End Page 323] are unacceptable can be supplemented by other acceptable strategies. The article unfolds as follows. Section I traces the basic outlines of the mainstream view of existence prevalent among contemporary analytic philosophers. Section II summarizes some of the best reasons to question that view. Section III traces the basic outlines of Aquinas's alternative view of existence. Sections IV and V address the main contemporary analytic objections to Aquinas's view. Section VI considers strategies for defending the meaningfulness of Aquinas's view of existence. Section VII considers one strategy for defending the truth of his view, and section VIII proposes a better strategy. By the end of the article I hope to have allayed at least some of the doubts about the possibility of developing an Analytic Existential Thomism. I. The Frege-Russell-Quine View of Existence The mainstream view of existence among contemporary analytic philosophers was developed and defended in different forms by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and W. V. Quine.8 [End Page 324] Their view can be explained most easily by contrasting it with what Colin McGinn calls the "naïve view,"9 which I prefer to call the commonsense view. According to the commonsense view, existence is similar to other properties we ascribe to individuals or objects.10 Given this similarity, statements of existence (both singular and plural) are similar to other statements that ascribe properties to individuals or objects. "Socrates is wise," for example, ascribes a property to a single individual, that is, wisdom to Socrates. "Tame tigers are harmless" ascribes a property to multiple individuals, that is, harmlessness to tame tigers. According to the commonsense view, statements of existence are similar. "Socrates exists" ascribes a property to a single individual, that is, existence to Socrates. "Tame tigers exist" ascribes a property to multiple individuals, that is, existence to tame tigers. That is the commonsense view of existence. According to the Frege-Russell-Quine view, however, existence is not similar to other properties we ascribe to individuals or objects. Indeed, existence is not a property of individuals or objects at all. Accordingly, statements of existence (both singular and plural) are not similar to other statements that ascribe properties to individuals or objects. Instead, existence is...

Performing Waste, Wasting Performance: The Ecology of Fluxus

Performing Waste, Wasting PerformanceThe Ecology of Fluxus Aurelie Matheron (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution Fig 1. Photograph courtesy of Liz Ligon. Copyright 2012 Liz Ligon. Never had a salad provoked so many reactions as on April 22, 2012, when Fluxus artist Alison Knowles reenacted her iconic 1962 Make a Salad score event on the High Line, near Chelsea Market in New York. The performance was straightforward; after chopping up, tossing, and throwing the ingredients—such as iceberg and romaine lettuce, frisée, onions—onto a tarpaulin, the artist served the salad to the audience. According to New Yorker reporter Betty Morais, the performance lasted three hours, as the salad making was accompanied by the musical notes of the knives and forks that clashed. The somewhat impatient [End Page 102] and disconcerted audience was immersed in an aesthetic experience that confronted the senses with more than visual or even gastronomic impressions alone. Make a Salad is not only one of Knowles's most famous pieces; it is also one of the most emblematic works of the avant-garde Fluxus movement. In the early 1960s, Fluxus offered a radical alternative to the bourgeois commodification of art by replacing the emphasis on artistic products with a focus on process. Insisting on the moment of production, such as the chopping of lettuce, rather than the final product, Fluxus performances foreground what the spectator does not see—the process of making and also of discarding. Using waste (shredded paper, fabric, feces, etc.) to draw attention to the side effects of mass consumption, these performances open up an artistic alternative to capitalism in which what has been discarded matters again. This article argues that Knowles's Fluxus performance Make a Salad mobilizes waste to propose an ecological network as an alternative to the capitalist economy. Foregrounding supposedly insignificant matter—lettuce—as part of an aesthetic experience, it contributes to current discussions on materiality that seek to understand how the nonhuman and nonorganic also participate in the arrangement of social relationships between people and their environment. Art is part of this environment, and Knowles's performance helps to think about how art unsettles established hierarchies between human and matter to form a balanced ecological network. Informed by the actor-network theory of Bruno Latour and by the political ecology of things of Jane Bennett, I understand ecology as a network of human and nonhuman actants who create and sustain their shared house (eco- meaning "house" in Greek) through constant interaction. Exploring how Knowles uses waste, this article seeks to demonstrate that instead of using waste per se, Make a Salad performs waste and retools residual excess in an ephemeral art that will not leave any trace. Make a Salad challenges the artist to give visibility, if not agency, to what has been devalued as impure or unworthy of aesthetic consideration. Starting with how Make a Salad fits into the aesthetics of waste proposed by the 1963 Fluxus Manifesto, I nevertheless want to depart from the commonsensical idea that Knowles's performance is just an illustration of Fluxus. Knowles's understanding of waste challenges Fluxus's politics and aesthetics of waste, thereby creating another model of sociality that is rooted in her own ecology. [End Page 103] Fluxus's Aesthetics and Politics of Waste Fluxus's understanding of waste stands in contrast to our commonsensical view on leftovers and remnants as excessive and unaesthetic. As Stephanie Foote recalls, modern Western society's conception of waste has been defined by negative terms such as "surplus, pollution, contagion, disgust, damage, toxicity, circulation, destruction, contamination."1 According to that view, waste symbolizes a dirty excess marginalized by capitalistic economy for the well-being of society, an excess that has been devalued as impure. Fluxus, by contrast, performs waste to reverse this devaluation of waste. "Purge the world of bourgeois sickness!" begs George Maciunas in the 1963 Fluxus Manifesto, comparing bourgeois art to a kind of "dysentery" that should be evacuated through new aesthetic practices to insure the well-being of the social order. Whereas the bourgeois art economy viewed artworks as marketable commodities, Maciunas promotes an antiart that fully involves spectators in experiences with food, animals, and...

St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Temperance and Aristotle

St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatise on Temperance and Aristotle Leo Elders S.V.D. For some decades now, one can witness a renewed interest in the non-Aristotelian sources of the thought of St. Thomas, and in particular in his debt to the Fathers of the Church and neo-Platonist sources.1 Fully acknowledging the importance of these studies and St. Thomas's real indebtedness to these sources, the editors of a recent volume underscore—and rightfully so—that, "for this reason, Aquinas's theological use of Aristotle requires renewed attention, lest the study of Aquinas's theology become one-sided."2 It is in this same spirit that I will survey and analyze, after a brief introduction into temperance in the Greco-Roman world, the use of Aristotle in St. Thomas's treatise on temperance in the secunda secundae of his Summa theologiae [ST]. What a close reading of these questions and the use of Aristotle's arguments therein, and in particular from his Nicomachean Ethics [EN], will show, I hope, is the extent to which Aristotle is Aquinas's principal philosophical interlocutor. [End Page 465] Temperance in Ancient Greece and Rome In ancient Greece, the words sōphrōn (σώφρων) and sōphrosynē (σωφροσύνη) signified reservation and restraint in one's conduct and knowing one's place. To behave oneself in a temperate way is the opposite of being passionate.3 In particular, the young should be trained to adopt this attitude of self-restraint. In the Charmides of Plato, sōphrosynē is the beginning of spiritual health, and in the Republic, Plato formulates his doctrine of the four cardinal virtues as corresponding respectively to the mind and the three appetitive parts of the soul4. Aristotle treats temperance extensively in EN 3.10 as a virtue that has its seat in the irrational part of the soul and makes us attain the mean with regard to bodily pleasures. However, he excludes from this need of restraining our desires the delight we find in objects of vision and of hearing, and part also of the delight in odor. Natural appetites may go wrong in the direction of excess, which is a sort of self-indulgence. Here, the virtue of temperance should intervene. A temperate person moderates his desires. Temperance is a disposition of the appetitive part of the soul that makes it obey reason. If one possesses this virtue, his desires will be moderate and there will be no need to repress them. Reaching "the mean" is to desire in the right degree, the right time, the right manner, and so on.5 Aristotle endorses the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad.6 He confirms, therefore, the commonsense view of moderation and a generally accepted distinction between the different kinds of pleasure. The position of Epicurus on pleasure must be understood as a recommendation to seek moderate pleasures of taste, sex, vision, and hearing. He wrote about himself the following words: "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from these pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."7 But, as J. M. Rist observes, Epicurus writes elsewhere that he [End Page 466] is not talking so much about the sensual pleasures as about freedom from bodily pain and mental affliction: sober reasoning brings us the happy life.8 Epicureanism became a missionary doctrine that spread through the Roman Empire in spite of the strong opposition it met from the Academy, the Peripatetics, and Stoicism, in particular from Chrysippus.9 The beginning of its decline was brought about by its denial of afterlife.10 As to the ethical doctrine of the Stoa, the four main moral virtues were strongly confirmed by Chrysippus: he considered them expressions of one and the same reason11 that unfolds itself into four directions, the four cardinal virtues. With regard to choosing desirable things, this central reason and activity of the hêgemonikon12 becomes sōphrosynē, self-control, which brings all our movements and impulses into conformity with reason. It is the expression of the harmony of the soul. For the Stoics, the connection between the virtues is so strong...

The epistemic costs of compromise in bioethics.

Bioethicists sometimes defend compromise positions, particularly when they enter debates on applied topics that have traditionally been highly polarised, such as those regarding abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. However, defending compromise positions is often regarded with a degree of disdain. Many are intuitively attracted to the view that it is almost always problematic to defend compromise positions, in the sense that we have a significant moral reason not to do so. In this paper, we consider whether this common sense view can be given a principled basis. We first show how existing explanations for the problematic nature of compromise fall short of vindicating the common sense view, before offering our own explanation, which, we claim, comes closer to vindicating that view. We argue that defending a compromise will typically have two epistemic costs: it will corrupt attempts to use the claims of ethicists as testimonial evidence, and it will undermine standards that are important to making epistemic progress in ethics. We end by suggesting that the epistemic costs of compromise could be reduced by introducing a stronger separation between ethical debate aimed at fulfilling the epistemic role of ethics, and ethical debate that aims to directly produce good policy or practice.

Can Physics Make Us Free?

A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions; you have no choice but to do what you are destined to do. Although this way of thinking has intuitive appeal, and a long history, it has recently began to gain critical attention. A number of arguments have been raised in defense of the idea that our will could be genuinely free even if the universe is governed by deterministic laws of physics. Determinism and free will have been argued to be compatible before, of course, but these recent arguments seem to take a new step in that they are relying on a more profound and concrete view on the central elements of the issue, the fundamental laws of physics and the nature of causal explanation in particular. The basic idea of this approach is reviewed in here, and it is shown how a careful analysis of physics and causal explanation can indeed enhance our understanding of the issue. Although it cannot be concluded that the problem of free will would now be completely solved (or dissolved), it is clear that these recent developments can bring significant advancement to the debate.

Cultivated cure, regenerated affliction

In this think piece, I interrogate the notion of cure in order to address the idea of disease. My intention is to show how emerging biotechnological modalities that cultivate an idea of ‘cure as regeneration’ dislocate expert knowledge, descriptions of disease, and its representation into contested new terrains. In approaching disease from the vantage point of the ‘cultivated cure’ I seek to trouble our commonsense view of afflictions. Drawing on ethnographic data from a longitudinal project engaged in mapping stem cell technologies in India, I conceptualize how ‘cure as regeneration’ reanimates the figures of disease and medical knowledge. I take up Veena Das’s challenging query: is it necessary to define terms – illness, disease, diagnosis, health – that defy neat characterization?

Common sense principles governing potable water recycling in the southwestern US: Examining subjectivity of water stewards using Q methodology

The potential to supplement potable water supplies with highly treated municipal wastewater, or sewage, is of increasing interest to water planners in many parts of the world. Most of the current social science focuses on public acceptance, however there is a relative lack of research that explores the subjectivity of people who are involved with water recycling or water planning. This study draws on Gramscian theories of governance and Q Methodology to analyze common sense principles that are held by water stewards who currently govern potable water reuse in the southwestern United States. Two competing perspectives emerged from the analyses, which I label neosanitarian and ecosanitarian. Drawing upon tenets established in the Progressive Era, neosanitarians believe that use of recycled water is an appropriate way to expand urban drinking water supplies. Drawing upon tenets established in ecology, ecosanitarians are not opposed to potable water recycling, however they are also interested in radical alternatives to the sanitary status quo. For example, neosanitarians favor advanced wastewater treatment, while ecosanitarians prefer composting toilets and preventative actions. Differences between the common sense views pivot on ideas about the most appropriate technology but also reflect contested visions of ideal society.

Williamson on Counterpossibles

A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.

Different ways of dealing with tensions

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to propose a nuanced understanding of the diverse practices social enterprises engage in to fulfil their commitments of delivering social/environmental goods and/or services while earning income to sustain their activities.Design/methodology/approachThis research paper is based on an empirical investigation which used an ethnographic approach to study the social economy in two distinct city regions in the north of England.FindingsAgainst a common-sense view of social enterprises being able to balance (with ease) social and economic goals, this paper suggests, based on empirical insights, that such a harmonious rendition tends to neglect the messiness at the heart of such organisations. Heeding ongoing reflections, explanations and negotiations as key ingredients in keeping social enterprises “balanced”, this paper argues that negotiating tensions is a constantly dynamic process.Originality/valueUsing an ethnographic approach, this paper offers insights into the complexities and tensions social enterprises constantly deal with and it shows these tensions must be constantly renegotiated.

What moral character is and is not.

I defend the common-sense view that moral character is the sum of one's moral habits and dispositions in response to Louise Mitchell who maintains that moral character is a potency. I do so by applying Aristotle's threefold division of things that exist in the soul-namely, potency, habit, and emotion-and also by examining how Aristotle speaks about character and how the average person speaks about character. In addition, I show why humans are the only animals that have the potential to develop character, and how this potential lies in the rational faculties of our soul.

Hotspots vs. harmspots: Shifting the focus from counts to harm in the criminology of place

The prevailing pattern in much of the social sciences, including geography and criminology, relies on count data. “Hotspots” — geospatial areas with disproportionally more crime than the rest of the city — are usually identified by the number of events in these areas. Yet no attention is given to their severity, or any other weighting system of harm, despite the common-sense view that not all crimes are created equal. To illustrate the value of focusing on harm in addition to count data, we turn to a spatial analysis of crime by observing crime concentrations (hotspots) against harm concentrations (harmspots), across fifteen councils in the United Kingdom. The definition of “harm” is based on the Sentencing Guidelines for England and Wales, as each crime category (n = 415) attracts a different severity weight. Both “hotspots” and “harmspots” are defined as being at least 2 standard deviations from the mean distribution within each city: This procedure creates comparable datasets. The data suggest that half of all crime events are concentrated within 3% of all street segments in the selected councils, yet harm is even more heavily concentrated, with half of all harm located in just 1% of each council [OR = 3.49; 95% CI 3.268–3.728]. The intra-unit variance was also reduced by approximately half — from 0.75% to 0.45%. We discuss the implications of using harm, in addition to counts, for research and policy by arguing that a shift in focus is required both for the development of theories and for cost-effective prevention strategies.

Building Skill in Videogames: A Play of Bodies, Controllers and Game-Guides

In his now-seminal book, Pilgrim in the Microworld (1983), David Sudnow details his process of learning to play the game Breakout on the Atari 2600. Sudnow develops an account of his graduation from a novice (having never played a videogame prior, and middle-aged at time of writing) to being able to fluidly perform the various configurative processes involved in an acclimated Breakout player’s repertoire.

The Unity of the Virtues Reconsidered. Competing Accounts in Philosophy and Positive Psychology

In this paper, I show that the conception of a virtue in positive psychology is a mishmash of two competing accounts of what virtues are: a Common Sense View and an Aristotelian View. Distinguishing the strengths and weaknesses of these two frameworks leads also to a reconsideration of an old debate, namely, that concerning the Unity of the Virtues (UV) thesis. Such thesis is rejected by positive psychologist, as well as by some philosophers among the virtue-ethical field, on the basis, I argue, of a lack of accuracy in defining the very meaning of the concept of what virtues are, before examining the issues at stake. In the first part of the paper, I show (i) to what extent the conceptions of virtue employed by the different voices diverge and (ii) the consequences of this divergence for the UV problem. Then, I go on by arguing for one of the two competing accounts, namely, the Aristotelian View, over the other, that is, the Common Sense View. Finally, I show to which of CSV theses positive psychologists are committed, so to explain their rejection of the UV thesis, and to highlight their need for a clearer account of what a virtue is.

What is nature conservation for the Portuguese public? Understanding the commonsensical image of nature to engage the general public in conservation efforts and to improve the communication between science and society

Abstract The protection of nature and biodiversity has been gaining importance in public opinion. Nevertheless, the implementation of conservation policies has experienced some public resistance, along with low levels of public involvement. This lack of public interest in and support to conservation may be related to citizens’ images of nature. In this article, we examine the commonsensical image of nature and its conservation according to two dimensions: cognitive beliefs and normative ethics. This image of nature was examined through a series of focus-group discussions with members of the general public in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area – Portugal and reflects the commonsensical perceptions of what nature conservation is. The results suggest that, although the participants were not familiar with scientific terminology, they hold rich, mental and social representations about nature and biodiversity. We present a conceptual framework that reflects participants’ overall image of nature as the basis of human life and, above all, as a source of multiple goods that ensure human beings’ survival, which characterizes the common-sense view of nature as largely anthropocentric. Our work provides policy-makers, planners and managers with a framework that reflects lay people’s perceptions of nature and biodiversity conservation that are instrumental in identifying conservation priorities, appropriate goals and suitable measures while ensuring communication between science and society.

Problematising vocational education and training in schools: using student narratives to interrupt neoliberal ideology

ABSTRACTIn Australia, like many western countries, there has been a convergence of education policy around a set of utilitarian and economistic approaches to vocational education and training in schools. Such approaches are based on the assumption that there is a direct relationship between national economic growth, productivity and human capital development resulting in the persuasive political argument that schools should be more closely aligned to the needs of the economy to better prepare ‘job ready’ workers. These common sense views resonate strongly in school communities where the problem of youth unemployment is most acute and students are deemed to be ‘at risk’, ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘disengaged’. This article starts from a different place by rejecting the fatalism and determinism of neoliberal ideology based on the assumption that students must simply ‘adapt’ to a precarious labour market. Whilst schools have a responsibility to prepare students for the world of work there is also a moral and political obligation to educate them extraordinarily well as democratic citizens. In conclusion, we draw on the experiences of young people themselves to identify a range of pedagogical conditions that need to be created and more widely sustained to support their career aspirations and life chances.

Peter Kivy, The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature

Inês Morais In 2010 I published in the journal Disputatio a review of Peter Kivy’s book The Performance of Reading (1). The book promised a revisionary account of the activity of reading literature, one that clashes with current common-sense views. It is prudent to listen to com

Islamism and terror: A great jihad against the common sense

What implies the conversion to fundamentalist Islam? What are the repercussions and implications of ‘political Islam’ in specific contexts? The relation between Islam, democracy and violence is often represented in a reductive or simplistic way. In order to contribute to a reasoned debate on these pressing questions, this essay covers some key dynamics stemming from long-term ethnographic observation regarding the conversion to neo Salafism among Arab Bedouin citizens in southern Israel, placing them in the context of contemporary developments of Islamic political thought. The ethnographic sensitivity, combined with the voices of some eminent Islamic intellectuals, allows to go beyond both the rhetoric of cultural complexity and the common-sense view that Islamic terrorism would be a kind of ‘anti imperialism of the losers’, arguments employed often to contest emerging neo-orientalist discourses. In this sense, the essay states the need to shed light on coordinates and interpretative categories that are not placed in an essentially different but in often unexpected ways.

Do those diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease lose their souls? Whitehead and Stengers on persons, propositions and the soul

In this article, I use the work of Alfred North Whitehead and Isabelle Stengers to challenge the biomedical and commonsense view that those diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease suffer an irreparable and inevitable loss of self and that this loss is inextricably tied to a decline in linguistic capability which itself bears immediate witness to a deterioration in the brain. Through an analysis of Whitehead's (1933, 1938) provocative conceptualization of the soul, and Stengers' (2005) reading of this, I suggest that it is possible to dislocate language from its supposed position as that which produces and fully expresses human experience. This involves a challenge to the ‘linguistic turn’ as to be found in much contemporary social theory, philosophy and social psychology. The discussion of Whitehead’s (and Stengers') ideas regarding the soul involves a reading of Whitehead's notions of ‘propositions’, ‘contrasts’ and the ‘social environment’. Through these analyses, I seek to relocate the problem of language and identity and its relation to Alzheimer's disease. I go beyond any reduction of the problem either to its social component, where the self is seen as a resolutely human ‘person’, or to its natural element, where Alzheimer's disease is seen solely as a problem located within the brain. Instead, I try to think the natural and social together. My aim is not to explain away the problem but to suggest a more productive way of thinking about those diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, and ourselves.