Abstract
Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role.
Highlights
Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mindindependent particulars
Several early phenomenologists argued that we have such objective experiences
If Duncker is on the right track, we can answer this question in part by drawing on what we know about perceptual constancy
Summary
Common sense has it that perceiving an object depends on a number of factors: the perceiver is in the right position with respect to it, she is not too far or too close to the object, the illumination is right etc. Evans (1980, 261ff) envisaged that these conditions are collected in a rudimentary theory of perception. If the light is too bright (dim), x won’t be perceived If some of these conditions are not satisfied, the object will not be perceived. If we were perceptually aware of the limits of our perception, we could experience our perception of an object depending and transgressing them. In the perceptual processes described in (A) and (B) we experience changes in the factors mentioned in the folk theory of perception. In an extended perceiving – my seeing the tower while I approach it – we experience the change of an intervening factor – here, the distance between us and the tower – as well as the constant size of the object to which we attend in perception. If a perceptual system enables the perceiver to experience changes in relations between the perceiver and the object of perception (the intervening factors) and thereby to experience that the existence and character of her experience depends on the holding of these relations, the perceiver can experience objects as being independent of his actual perceptions.
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