President Of Commission Research Articles

European unemployment insurance. From undercurrent to paradigm shift

The need for the European Union to get involved in unemployment insurance has frequently been debated in the past decade, starting from exploratory discussions and eventually becoming a political commitment by the European Commission President. This article looks back at the origins of the idea of an EU-level unemployment benefit scheme and explains the political dynamics of the concept’s evolution. Following the 2009 Great Recession and the subsequent eurozone debt crisis, a new movement for a reinforced social dimension has been pushing the EU beyond its previous red lines. The case for counter-cyclical social stabilisation at EU level is now a touchstone for a materially meaningful EU social dimension. The COVID-19 crisis triggered a giant leap to a greater EU budgetary capacity, including financial support for job-saving schemes. This article argues that these new instruments will not suffice without also creating an EU safety net for those whose jobs cannot be saved in a period of economic downturn.

European minimum wage: A Swedish perspective on EU’s competence in social policy in the wake of the proposed directive on adequate minimum wages in the EU

The question of whether there can, may, and should be a lowest price for work performed by a human can be discussed from different perspectives. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has unambiguously made it clear that the EU must take measures with regard to minimum wages. On October 28 2020, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive on adequate minimum wages in the European Union. The article is structured as follows. It begins with a brief description of the history of the proposal and a short presentation of its material content. This is followed by a discussion of the chosen legal basis in the Treaty and of whether the EU has the competence to adopt the proposal. I shall then analyse how it can be determined whether Sweden has transferred competence to the EU to adopt legislation regarding minimum wages. The article concludes with some comments on future developments as a result of the proposal for a Directive on adequate minimum wage in the European Union.

Why the European Parliament lost the Spitzenkandidaten-process

ABSTRACT Research has demonstrated how the European Parliament has expanded its powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions by strategically exploiting powers it already holds and appealing to its contribution to democratic legitimacy. However, established theories are challenged by the failure of the EP to secure the election of a so-called Spitzenkandidat to the post of European Commission President in 2019. Was this failure an incidental set-back or does it point to a structural limit to the EP’s ability to expand its powers? Exploring the latter option, this article proposes that the 2019 events warrant the revision of the EP-centred parliamentarisation thesis that dominates our understanding of EU inter-institutional politics. Instead, it develops an alternative theory that departs from the conception of the EU as a demoi-cracy. Using the events in 2014 and 2019, the article constructs analytical narratives for both theoretical positions. Reading the 2019 case through the demoi-cratic perspective suggests that national leaders are unlikely to allow the EP to reclaim the Spitzenkandidaten-process. More generally, it follows from this perspective that the EP can only successfully get the member states to share powers, not to cede them.

Communicating uncertainty in times of crisis. The legitimization of EU's response to COVID-19 pandemic through the discourse used by the President of the European Commission

Communicating uncertainty in times of crisis. The legitimization of EU's response to COVID-19 pandemic through the discourse used by the President of the European Commission

Communicating COVID-19 on Twitter at supranational and national levels: The European Union and Portugal with “the ball in their court”

This article focuses on COVID-19 communication on Twitter at supranational and national levels, namely by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the Portuguese prime minister, António Costa. A mixed method approach, based on content, discourse, and rhetorical analysis, was employed. The results show that von der Leyen’ tweets focused mainly on measures to combat COVID-19 while Costa’s tweets focused mainly on responsibility. In both cases, economic support and recovery was the second most frequently mentioned theme, while frames relating to solutions, causal relations, moral judgments, and problems were also emphasized. Von der Leyen tended to highlight the importance of vaccination while Costa tended to highlight scientific expertise. Ethos was employed by the two leaders mainly through references to responsibility/fulfilment of duty. Pathos was employed to inspire mainly both positive emotional responses, such as impulse to action, feelings of support, desire for unity, and confidence/optimism/calm, and negative emotional responses, such as anxiety/apprehension/concern and disappointment. Logos was employed mainly through reference to numbers and science, use of stylistic devices, and exemplification.

Fostering Tech Sovereignty with a Level Playing Field on State Aid and Foreign Subsidies

In her 2021 State of the European Union Address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed ‘the importance of investing in our European tech sovereignty’ and continued by appealing that ‘[w]e have to double down to shape our digital transformation according to our own rules’. Availability of semiconductors (also referred to as microchips or simply as chips) is essential for industry and national security alike. Without microchips there is no tech sovereignty. Given the currently fragile state of global supply chains, expanding fabrication capacity within the EU is high on the political agenda. At the same time, ensuring fair competition is of paramount importance. While tech sovereignty must be matched by sufficient State funding, it still needs to be awarded in compliance with EU State aid rules. These rules must not work as an impediment to tech sovereignty. Furthermore, the rules of the game must be the same for everyone. This regulatory objective is most evident in the draft Distortive Foreign Subsidies Regulation. Keywords: twin transition; ICPEI; supply chain; sovereignty; EU Chips Act; foreign subsidies

The Legal Aspects of Artificial Intelligence based on the EU Experience

In the digital era, technological advances have brought innovative opportunities. Artificial intelligence is a real instrument to provide automatic routine tasks in different fields (healthcare, education, the justice system, foreign and security policies, etc.). AI is evolving very fast. More precisely, robots as re-programmable multi-purpose devices designed for the handling of materials and tools for the processing of parts or specialized devices utilizing varying programmed movements to complete a variety of tasks.1 Regardless of opportunities, artificial intelligence may pose some risks and challenges for us. Because of the nature of AI ethical and legal questions can be pondered especially in terms of protecting human rights. The power of artificial intelligence means using it more effectively in the process of analyzing big data than a human being. On the one hand, it causes loss of traditional jobs and, on the other hand, it promotes the creation of digital equivalents of workers with automatic routine task capabilities. “Artificial intelligence must serve people, and therefore artificial intelligence must always comply with people’s rights,” said Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission.2 The EU has a clear vision of the development of the legal framework for AI. In the light of the above, the article aims to explore the legal aspects of artificial intelligence based on the European experience. Furthermore, it is essential in the context of Georgia’s European integration. Analyzing legal approaches of the EU will promote an approximation of the Georgian legislation to the EU standards in this field. Also, it will facilitate to define AI’s role in the effective digital transformation of public and private sectors in Georgia.

The institutional architecture of the European Union: emerging and unresolved questions

ABSTRACT This review article discusses three books that analyse in depth recent trends in the institutional architecture of the European Union. The three books focus, respectively, on the relations between legislatives and executive at the supranational level and within the member states, the self-empowerment strategies of the European Parliament, and the leadership performance of the President of the European Commission. Against this background, the review article makes some points on the state of the art of the institutional system of the EU twelve years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The multiple crises that have affected the EU over the last decade have somewhat affected the functioning of its institutions. Meanwhile, any analysis of the European institutional system should fully consider the composite nature of the European constitution and the peculiar interplay of formal and informal institutional change that has marked its evolution.

Against All Odds: Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen, Anngret Kramp-Karrenbauer and the German Paradox of Female CDU Leadership

ABSTRACT Despite its traditional adherence to gender roles limiting women’s responsibilities to Kinder, Küche, Kirche, the Christian Democratic Party itself has been ruled by three powerful females since 2018: Chancellor Angela Merkel, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, and CDU General-Secretary Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Despite occasional waves of conservative-hardliner resistance, all three women have helped to modernise the German gender regime while opening new doors for future women leaders across the party spectrum. Having exited the political stage after the 2021 elections, the Chancellor played a significant role in advancing the political fortunes of German women, beginning with von der Leyen, who now enjoys supranational prominence as EU Commission President, and Kramp-Karrenbauer, ostensibly descending the national power ladder despite her earlier successes. These diverging trajectories raise new questions as to the conditions under which we might expect women to prove ‘effective’ leaders. This article explores biographical parallels, stylistic differences, and the changing political landscape that may have facilitated or impeded each woman’s ability to transfer the leadership skills she acquired at one level to the mastering of challenges at another. It concludes with reflections on Merkel’s legacy in relation to ‘gender and politics’.

Assessing policies for the implementation of new technological interventions to combat COVID-19

The second panelist will discuss policy and politics, incl. the role expert bodies and instruments of the European Union, assessing the role of the European Commission and the exchange frameworks with Member-States. In the context of elaboration on how optimal strategies for assessing the impact of new health technology and for evidence-informed policymaking, the role the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) will be discussed in more detail, as the independent expert group and multi-disciplinary body appointed by the President of the European Commission to advises on all policies where ethical, societal and fundamental rights issues intersect with the development of science and new technologies. Furthermore, broad long-term implications for globalisation and the relation of the EU to third countries will be examined, as will the significance of such measures for the European Union's Global Health Agenda, and the implications for future decision-making and policies in developing countries too.

Introduction to “Psychology, Global Threats, Social Challenge, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: European Perspectives”

Introduction to “Psychology, Global Threats, Social Challenge, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: European Perspectives”

Coping With Turbulence: EU Negotiations on the 2030 and 2050 Climate Targets

This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal’s (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU’s climate agenda.

Fiscal Integration in an Experimental Union: How Path-Breaking Was the EU's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic?

Fiscal Integration in an Experimental Union: How Path-Breaking Was the EU's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic?

A conference for the future

When, on 15th October 2020, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech and an article published in several newspapers, launched the idea of a New European Bauhaus, it surprised politicians, cultural agents and citizens in general. After all, we are not used to having a leader at the highest level, putting forward a cultural, artistic, and architectural issue as a central policy motivation. Moreover, it drew on a century-old institution, the Bauhaus, undoubtedly one of the pillars of modern culture, where artists, architects, and designers in Weimar, Dessau, and already in decline, in Berlin, created a fundamental experience that was formative for modernity in the 20th century. In its time, the Bauhaus was in a continuous state of permanent and heated controversy. Now, a century on, it is also subject to the scrutiny of what is known as “politically correctness,” and to petitions and calls for “cancellation.”

Modernização por expropriação: a ditadura civil-militar no Vale do rio Pindaré-MA

This article focuses on the strategies of criminalization of farmers, squatters, residents in the Pindare river valley in Maranhao, as a form of expropriation, from torture. The sources used were a dossier of the Police Of Political and Social Order of Maranhao, documents of a collection left by priest Victor Asselin, first president of the Pastoral Commission of the Land of Maranhao and memories of Manoel da Conceicao Santos, one of the main leaders of the farmers of the region.

The good, the bad and the sofa: Order of protocol among EU leaders in the context of the Union's external representation

ABSTRACT The joint visit by European Council President Michel and Commission President von der Leyen to Turkey in April 2021 sparked a heated discussion on the EU's diplomatic protocol rules. The reason: the seating arrangements provided when the two met with Turkish President Erdoğan. Michel and Erdoğan sat on chairs, while von der Leyen was given a sofa, implying a lower rank. This triggered a diplomatic incident between the EU and Turkey and increased intra-institutional tensions in Brussels. This article analyses EU protocol rules and explains the order of precedence of its leaders in foreign policy. It argues that EU protocol rules lay out a clearer hierarchy for its leaders than what was implied in the aftermath of the incident. However, the rank that the Commission President holds when he/she is representing the EU externally together with the European Council President requires clarification since their respective foreign policy competencies are different.

The abandonment of the Spitzenkandidaten System: (Un)sustainable democracy in the EU?

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens.
 Received: 03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021

'Business as usual': The Treaty of Lisbon and transnational party manifestos

The Treaty of Lisbon was a milestone in the enduring process of empowerment of the European Parliament and its connections to the European Commission. This latest reform of the Treaties, in force since December 2009, placed the only supranational institution whose members are directly elected by all citizens of the EU (since 1979) on an equal footing with the Council as a co-legislator in around thirty additional policy areas. The Treaty of Lisbon also strengthened the European Parliament in terms of the annual and multiannual budgetary decisions, and it granted it the right to elect the President of the European Commission according to the results of the European elections. This article examines various possible effects of this major boost of the European Parliament, along with links to the European Commission in the manifestos issued by five European parties: the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), European Free Alliance (EFA), European Green Party (European Greens or EGP), European People’s Party (EPP), and Party of European Socialists (PES). It studies variations from 2004 onwards in the scope of the programmatic proposals regarding EU domains of power, the footprint in the manifestos of the transnational party organisations themselves, and eventually also of their candidates for the presidency of the European Commission. To do so, the twenty manifestos issued by the abovementioned parties for the 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019 European elections were content analysed. The results point to the lasting distance between these transnational parties and the European elections, despite the reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament over time.

Comments: Carbon Tariffs - Fair Incentives for Change?

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.

Speaking social Europe: A paradigmatic shift in the European Commission Presidents’ social policy discourse?

This article presents an original analysis of the social policy discourse at the European Union level by focusing on the language used by European Commission Presidents when addressing social issues. Through an empirical analysis based on a semi-supervised machine learning approach, we consider the entire corpus of speeches made by Barroso and Juncker from 2010 to 2018 and we classify all sentences according to three possible variants of social policy language: social-retrenchment, social-investment and rights-based language. We argue that the focus on these languages allows us to understand whether the ‘fiscal consolidation discipline’ narrative, which dominated in the aftermath of the Great Recession, has been challenged over the years by the recourse to alternative ‘social policy images’. The results confirm a significant shift in the overall configuration of social policy discourse between Barroso and Juncker. This shift has been mainly characterized by an increase in the use of rights-based language and a decrease in the use of social-retrenchment language, which however has not been completely abandoned. Therefore, the recalibration of EC’s speeches on social policy has not been abrupt but has instead been incremental. The article concludes by discussing preliminary interpretations of the observed trends and their potential implications in terms of ‘discursive legacy’ in the post-pandemic era.