Against the backdrop of China's carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals, the use of virtual power plants for electricity economic dispatch has gradually become a research hotspot. The virtual power plant includes both supply and demand sides. If the inherent conflicts of interest between both parties cannot be effectively addressed, there are significant hidden dangers in the sustainable operation of the virtual power plant. On the basis of existing research, this article constructs a regional virtual power plant. With the goal of maximizing supply and demand utility, a two-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model was established between virtual power plant operators and users in the electricity market and carbon trading market mechanisms, and an incentive based hierarchical carbon price constraint was designed in the optimization model. In the model constructed in this article, the operator of a virtual power plant will consider environmental benefits based on expected returns, adjust the output of controllable units to change the electricity supply strategy, and formulate a pricing strategy. At the same time, users will adjust their electricity consumption strategy based on their own electricity consumption characteristics, and both will achieve a game equilibrium. Based on the optimization results, this article conducted a sensitivity analysis on the incentive coefficient of graded carbon prices and obtained the optimal incentive coefficient under the case conditions. The research results indicate that the model can coordinate and meet the interests and needs of both the power generation and consumption sides, and the implementation of incentive based hierarchical carbon pricing strategies has certain advantages compared to traditional carbon pricing strategies in different user types scenarios. The research conclusion of this article has good reference value for the sustainable green operation of virtual power plants.
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