Introduction Melvin I. Urofsky As all of you who have been following the news—whether in old-fashioned news papers (as I do) or on some electronic device —know, many colleges founded before the Civil War, such as Harvard and Georgetown, or even afterwards, such as Washington and Lee, have been reexamining the role of slavery in their early history. It is not that these schools have been unaware that slavery played a part—historians have long known that the value of chattel slaves funded many things other than the plantations south of Mason and Dixon’s line. Rather, it is the demand from students that universities openly face up to these facts and, if possible, do something to atone for it, that is driving schools to take a look into the darker recesses of their past. This is the context in which Paul Finkelman’s new book, Supreme Injustice, arrives. Now the president ofGratz College in Philadelphia, Paul has long been one of the leading historians of slavery, especially the role it has played in the American court system. In his new book, he examines the role ofthe three most important Justices that sat on the high court in the years before the Civil War—Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, and ChiefJustice Roger Taney. What is the newest, and perhaps most startling part of this book, is the extent to which Marshall, the Great Chief Justice, owned and sold slaves. Because of the importance of these findings, as well as Finkelman’s argument that the three men could have changed the Court’s slavery jurisprudence, you will find two reviews of his work in this issue. First, Grier Stephenson looks at the entire book and the treatment of all three Justices in his “Judicial Bookshelf.” Because Finkelman’s findings about John Marshall are so new and surprising, we invited Charles Hobson, the editor ofthe John Marshall Papers, to look in particular at the chapter dealing with Mar shall. We have also invited Dr. Finkelman to respond in the next issue if he chooses to do so. In most histories of American jurispru dence, including mine, the place we usually start is at Runnymede with King John signing the Magna Carta. The reason is simple— 207 208 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY Magna Carta started what will be called the “British Constitution,” which in fact is not a single document, but a series of laws passed during the ensuing centuries. When the U.S. Supreme Court first began hearing cases, there were many references to English law— after all, that was basically the only law those early Justices knew. Over the decades, as we built up our own body oflaw, one might have expected that there would be fewer references to the British Constitution and especially to Magna Carta. Derek A. Webb, former Supreme Court Fellow and associate in the Supreme Court and Appellate and Commercial Litigation and Disputes practice groups at the law firm Sidley Austin, however, suggests that Magna Carta has played a far larger role in Supreme Court cases than previously expected, and that role has continued right down to the present. There has always been some debate over exactly what the barons at Runnymede meant by “due process of law,” a debate that has been going on in American courts for decades. On the 800th anniversary of the Great Charter in 2015, Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer took opposite sides in a case, with both of them citing Magna Carta as justification. Mr. Webb lists the cases and I think you will agree that we did not expect that many. I have mentioned a number of times that the field of constitution history is not a large one, and I have always been happy to be part of a discipline where most of us know each other. The article by Adam Winkler is another example of what my son has called “dealing with the usual suspects.” During several periods in American history there has been criticism of the courts, and especially of the high court, for its treatment of corporations, and especially of ascribing rights to them normally associated with natural persons. Adam...