Collective Sanctions Research Articles

The compliance you need for a cost you can afford: How to use individual and collective sanctions?

In many naturally occurring situations, actors ( agents) use individual sanctions or collective sanctions or both to obtain compliance from members of a group. Individual sanctions are sanctions applied to each individual based on that individual’s perceived behavior; collective sanctions are sanctions to all group members based on perceived behavior by some group members. Often, there are constraints on the amount of sanctions an agent may use. I use Heckathorn’s (1990) sequential decision model of group-mediated social control to analyze the power of an agent concerning compliance by group members under such constraints. Results show that whether positive or negative sanctions are considered, the amount of group compliance is an increasing but non-linear step function of the looseness of the constraints. Moreover, it appears that the most cost-effective use of power entails using only collective sanctions when lower levels of compliance are sought, only individual sanctions when higher levels of compliance are sought, and never mixing the two.

Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions

Just as economic sanctions appear to have become the coercive instrument of choice for the United Nations in the decade since the Gulf War, there has been increasing concern as to their effect — whether upon the civilian population within target states or upon the economic interests of historic trading partners. Such concerns have now found their way into policy-making within the United Nations and elsewhere, leading to the development of a new orthodoxy: the future of sanctions lies in their being made 'smart', 'targeted' and hedged with 'humanitarian exemptions'. This article seeks to outline the strands of this new policy initiative and evaluate its implications. It is argued that, given the continued uncertainty as to the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive tool, the argument for smartening sanctions seems to rest primarily upon the claim that they are necessarily more 'humane'. It seems, furthermore, that the framework within which this idea of 'humanity' is to be deployed is that of humanitarian law. This, however, leads to the central problem, namely, that given the broad discretion assumed by the Security Council in the choice of measures to be adopted under Chapter VII, the role of humanitarian arguments will invariably be confined to one of ameliorating adverse consequences, rather than of limiting the capacity to impose those measures in the first place. In such a guise, they act less as a constraint upon the capacity of the Security Council to impose sanctions, and more as a vehicle for justifying their deployment. The response of the United Nations to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is regarded by many as marking the dawn of a new era for the Organization as regards its role in maintaining international peace and security. A central feature of this apparent regeneration has been the deployment of economic sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. The use of sanctions has, of course, been a continuing feature of international relations for many centuries, and in one form or another they continue to be deployed on a unilateral basis for a variety of strategic ends. There is nothing new here. But the Gulf War does seem to have represented a turning point as regards the deployment of collective sanctions under auspices of the United Nations (and under its influence, other regional organizations). In the period prior to 1990, the Security

Use of Economic Sanctions under International Law: A Contemporary Assessment

SummaryThe growth in the use of collective economic sanctions in the post-Cold War epoch calls for a re-examination of the legal basis and constraints on the implementation of sanctions. This article is an attempt to explore, from a legal point of view, the problems and restrictions associated with sanctions, and to suggest the ways in which economic sanctions can be rendered more legitimate in terms of international legal requirements. It is argued that, in addition to the traditional treaty basis of collective sanctions, a breach of an erga omnes obligation is also a legitimate legal basis for economic sanctions. It is also contended that, in addition to traditional economic considerations, sanctions should be subject to other limitations such as respect for principles of international humanitarian law. After determining the restrictions on the implementation of sanctions, the author makes proposals for refining current practices in imposing economic sanctions. In conclusion, it is argued that collective sanctions have the potential of being used in a more humane and institutionally coherent way.

Organisational routines in the light of `old' evolutionary economics: Bringing politics back into the study of organisational learning

Research in organisational behaviour has largely focused on the cognitive features of organisational routines and learning to the neglect of their political determinants. This paper draws inspiration from J.R. Commons' theory of institutional change to develop a more integrated account giving due weight to the political dimension. The first section of the text develops the key analytical distinc- tion Commons makes between habit and custom. Habit, much as the notion of rou- tine, refers to repeated behaviour and to the individual learning processes that account for its emergence. Custom refers to the collective sanctions and pressures which channel such individual learning processes in socially acceptable directions. The paper shows how this distinction allows Commons to analyse the way repeated behaviour at the individual level is embedded in a wider group or social context. The second section of the text turns to Common's theory of dispute resolution. It is argued that his analysis contains the elements of a theory of organisational change, or of the processes which change routines, that involves a constant interplay between centralised intervention and the unplanned local emergence of practices and behaviours.

Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience

Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience

Collective Sanctions: an Alternative To Military Coercion ?

Collective Sanctions: an Alternative To Military Coercion ?

Women's organisations among the Kipsigis: change, variety and different participation

AbstractThe article argues that the great economic transformations which have occurred in Kipsigis society, particularly since the turn of this century, have fundamentally changed the ties women establish among themselves at the local level, outside the close family and the household. The ways in which women live and work together, as wives and mothers, have changed in a way which seriously undermines the collective sanctions of female solidarity across households. In this process of change women's indigenous ways of associating have developed other forms and new women's organisations have emerged with governmental and other ‘outside’ support. The article deals primarily with changes in the co-operative efforts in which Kipsigis women have traditionally engaged. Its focus is on women's neighbour-hood-level work groups, but it also examines other and more recent local-level groups and organisations that deal with different aspects of women's lives.

Collective Sanctions and Compliance Norms: A Formal Theory of Group-Mediated Social Control

The link between external sanctions and intragroup normative control is examined to distinguish the conditions under which the two control systems augment or weaken one another. I construct a dynamic rational choice model that incorporates essential features of the sanction/norm link. The analysis suggests that much social control that appears to result from the sanctions of individuals derives instead from a form of group-mediated control termed compliance norms. In other contexts, intragroup control acts in opposition to external sanctions, resulting in aform of control termed opposition norms. According to the formal analysis, group responses to sanctions depend on the strength of sanctions, monitoring capacities, and the efficacy and cost of intragroup control.

Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem

This article examines the relationship between the first- and second-order free-rider problems in collective sanction systems, with special emphasis on the relative robustness of cooperation in the first and second levels. The results indicate that second-order cooperation exhibits surprising robustness relative to first-order cooperation. The implication is that hypocrisy, though universally maligned, may play a crucial transitional role both in the emergence of collective action and in the continuity of collective action under adverse circumstances.

Collective Sanctions and the Creation of Prisoner's Dilemma Norms

Social psychologists, sociologists, and economists have all proposed theories of norm emergence. In general, they views norm emergence as depending on three factors: (i) actors' preferences regarding their own behavior (inclinations); (ii) actors' preferences regarding the behavior of others (regulatory interests); and (iii) measures for enforcing norms (enforcement resources), such as access to sanctions and information. Whereas most studies of norm emergence have focused on inclinations or enforcement resources, this article analyzes the role of regulatory interests in norm emergence. Specifically, it analyzes systems of collective sanctions in which, when and individual violates or complies with a rule, not merely the individual but other memgers of that person's group as well are collectively punished of rewarded by an external agent. These collective sanctions give individuals an incentive to regulate one another's behavior. This paper demonstrates that when a group is subjected to collective sanctio...

A Translation and Critical Review of Yu Kil-Chun's On Neutrality

A Translation and Critical Review of Yu Kil-Chun's On Neutrality In Kwan Hwang I. The Translation* In general there are two kinds ofneutrality practiced in international relations: simple neutrality, in time of war, and perpetual (or permanent) neutrality. Simple neutrality is the condition of a state which, in time of war, takes no part in the hostilities. In time of war between two states, the neighboring states can declare a neutral zone beyond which the belligerents cannot cross, and let the two belligerents settle the war between themselves, within their own territorial boundaries. If a neutral state cannot maintain its neutrality, due to its weakness, its neighboring states may offer joint defense for its neutrality. This practice of offering joint defense under extraordinary circumstances is sanctioned by customary international law. Perpetual (or permanent) neutrality, on the other hand, is the status of institutionalized neutrality for a small, weak state whose strategicgeopolitical location may become a security threat to its neighboring states, ifit is not able to maintain its own independence, due to rivalries among the greater powers. Thus, perpetual neutrality is a special international status which is usually brought about by international agreements or conventions between the state-to-be neutralized and a group of other states, in order to collectively protect and guarantee the independence of the neutral state (permanently), both in time ofwar and in time ofpeace. Ifthe neutrality of a state is violated, it is expected that the guarantor states would apply a collective sanction against the violator, in order to preserve the neutrality. At present Belgium and Bulgaria, in Europe, are examples of such neutrality, and several islands in the Black Sea region are designated as neutral zones. As a rule international law recognizes only a sovereign, independent state as eligible to acquire the neutral status. For example, I HWANG Belgium is such a country. However, Bulgaria has established a status of neutrality (autonomy) under the suzerainty of Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), to which it still sends tribute. Several islands in the Black Sea region, which are under the control of other states, also enjoy the status of neutrality. Such practice of informal neutrality is protected by international law. Today, geopolitically speaking, our country (Korea) is situated in the most strategic area in Asia, as Belgium is in Europe. Politically Korea is much like Bulgaria, under Turkey's suzerainty, as it sends tribute to China. But unlike Bulgaria, Korea has established numerous diplomatic and trade relations with other countries as an independent and equal state. However, our country is not similar to Belgium in that it is still under suzerain-vassal relationship with China. In any case, the international political status of our country is similar to that of Belgium and Bulgaria put together. While the perpetual neutrality of Belgium was established by the greater European powers to create a state of equilibrium in Europe as a policy of mutual security, the Bulgarian neutrality (autonomy) came into being as a result ofthe European policy to halt the southward expansionism of the Russian Empire. Viewed in this context, the neutrality of our country of Asia would also serve as a deterrent to the Russian southward movement, and as an instrument for guaranteeing the security ofall the great powers involved in Asia. Russia has vast territory and a large army; she never ceases to expand her domain by swallowing up small countries in Central Asia and enslaving their people on the pretext ofprotecting them. Although it is a well-known fact that, in general, the great powers have a penchant for dominating and absorbing the lesser powers, Russia is most notorious for its flagrant violations of the international code of behavior, for its barbarism, and for its never-ending pursuit of territorial expansion and Russification. Using the religious conflicts among the believers as a pretext, Russia went to war with Turkey and occupied Moldavia and Walachia, expanding its territory into the European sphere of influence. At this juncture the major European powers, namely Great Britain and France, together with other countries, offered joint assistance to Turkey, in order to stop the Russian aggression. Unable to resist the European pressure, and realizing the difficulties of fighting in...

European Political Cooperation: An Application of Political Reliability Theory to Integration

European Political Cooperation (EPC) denotes the foreign policy integration among members of the European Economic Community (EEC). The extent of political cooperative integration is analyzed by focusing upon the 'political reliability' or probability that EPC events reflect a consistent pattern of integration rather than merely an increasing frequency of interaction. A positive theory of EPC is built from first assumptions about unobservable integrative and disintegrative forces. Observable, politically cooperative events (e.g., European Council meetings, summit meetings, joint declarations, collective sanctions) are the consequence of the system of unobservable political forces which drive EPC activity. Two fundamental variables-political reliability and political interaction force-uniquely determine the EPC event process. Empirical tests strongly support the theory and demonstrate that by the mid1970s the forces of integration acting on the EPC system prevailed over the forces of disintegration. Two underlying processes may contribute to European foreign policy integration, however. The first is governed by a constant (Poisson) force, the other by a strong interaction force. These two subprocesses resemble interactions within the Political Committee of EPC and within the COREU telecommunications network.

European Political Cooperation: An Application of Political Reliability Theory to Integration

European Political Cooperation (EPC) denotes the foreign policy integration among members of the European Economic Community (EEC). The extent of cooperative integration is analyzed by focusing upon the political or probability that EPC events reflect a consistent pattern of integration rather than merely an increasing frequency of interaction. A positive theory of EPC is built from first assumptions about unobservable integrative and disintegrative forces. Observable, politically cooperative events (e.g., European Council meetings, summit meetings, joint declarations, collective sanctions) are the consequence of the system of unobservable forces which drive EPC activity. Two fundamental variables -- reliability and interaction force -- uniquely determine the EPC event process. Empirical tests strongly support the theory and demonstrate that by the mid-1970s the forces of integration acting on the EPC system prevailed over the forces of disintegration. Two underlying processes may contribute to European foreign policy integration, however. The first is governed by a constant (Poisson) force, the other by a strong interaction force. These two subprocesses resemble interactions within the Political Committee of EPC and within the COREU telecommunications network.

Attitudes of Ontario Secondary School Teachers toward Aspects of Professional Negotiations and Sanctions

A Collective Action Scale was administered to samples of Ontario secondary school teachers in 1974 and 1977 in an effort to determine shifting teacher attitudes toward collective bargaining and sanctions. Although teacher attitudes toward collective bargaining have become slightly more favorable, the study showed a significant drop in the support of teachers for the use of sanctions, especially the strike. The only significant predictors of teacher militancy, as indicated by teacher attitudes toward the use of sanctions, were sex and length of residency in Ontario. Despite the findings, it should be noted that the majority of teachers would still strike if basic teacher interests were severely threatened.

Varieties of Gossip in a Spanish Rural Community

Since publication of Gluckman's groundbreaking paper in I963, anthropologists interpreting gossip have split into two camps. The first camp, following Gluckman, is functionalist and approaches the subject from the perspective of methodological holism. It views gossip as a spontaneous collective sanction, as public opinion enforcing conformity to community norms. For Gluckman and his followers, gossip is a group-binding, boundary-maintaining mechanism (Gluck

Retirement to the porch in rural Appalachia.

Successful retirement in old age depends on the existence of a set of social arrangements in which a person has accumulated a considerable longtime social standing that justifies his claims for support from the community. In a small, rural Appalachian settlement, the pattern of retirement to the porch illustrates how claims by old men for social attention and care are anchored in the interests of others and are vested with significance for the entire community. While the use of the porch to facilitate the assertion of such claims on others may be more evident in small settlements, it is suggested that comparable strategies to afford successful retirement can occur in urbanized areas. These may be more difficult to develop and maintain, since collective sanctions to enforce the performances of relevant juniors are weakened or are transferred to formal facilities that render common services, not personal recognition, to old people.

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF WAGE STRIKES IN FOUR U.K. INDUSTRIES, 1962–1970

A strike is not the only available collective sanction open to a dissatisfied workforce, which may have recourse to alternative forms of militant action such as the go‐slow or overtime ban. Nevertheless, despite their well known limitations, strike statistics constitute the only available quantitative barometer of overt and organised industrial conflict. In order to explain the incidence of strike action at an aggregative level a number of studies have been carried out in recent years which test quantitative relationships via the use of multiple regression techniques and which postulate an economic interpretation of strike activity. The advantage of the quantitative approach as a method of analysis and insight into the relationships involved is that it “replaces improvised ad hoc explanations of strike activity with a behavioural model which….does yield refutable implications”. That is, in terms of providing more solid and systematic empirical knowledge, its performance is testable and, by amendments and refinements, capable of improvement.