Collective Dilemmas Research Articles

Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity: From Empirical to Formal Analysis

Theorists of cooperation argue that reciprocity combined with cooperative initiatives can allow cooperation to emerge between self-interested actors caught in collective goods dilemmas and lacking binding authority. Cooperation among the world's great powers is a key testing ground for such theories. Using U.S.-Chinese relations as a focus, this article develops a formal, decision-theoretic, model of great-power relations. The model is based on the empirical evidence from the Three-Way Street study of the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle during the Cold War. The empirical results are used to construct stylized conditions that restrict the model in ways corresponding to our best empirical knowledge of great-power relations. These restrictions allow the model to be simplified (becoming decision-theoretic rather than game-theoretic), without losing empirical realism. The restrictions also allow the model to be generalized in several ways; it allows for graduated play along a scale of cooperation-conflict and for limited (partial) reciprocity in response to movements along that scale. Payoffs are defined along a scale of severity (relative incentives to defect vs. cooperate) in games of Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken, Deadlock, or Harmony. The model implies that limited reciprocity is surprisingly effective in creating the conditions for cooperation to emerge, under a range of payoff structures and realistic discounting of future outcomes.

A Grammar of Institutions

The institutional grammar introduced here is based on a view that institutions are enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations. The syntax of the grammar identifies components of institutions and sorts them into three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. We introduce the grammar, outline methods for operationalizing the syntax, apply the syntax to an analysis of cooperation in collective dilemma situations, and discuss the pragmatics of the grammar for analyses of behavior within complex institutional settings.

The poverty of green and Shapiro

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in many respects outright false. Their mistake is common enough: they misclassify a variety of collective dilemmas as prisoner's dilemmas. Because they misunderstand the theory of rational choice, Green and Shapiro allege that it is refuted by empirical findings that, in fact, support it.

Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas through Delegation

In 1988 Congress established the Independent Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and gave it nearly complete authority to determine which domestic military bases would be closed. I analyze both the structure of the base-closing process and the procedural requirements imposed on the commission, and find that two factors explain the extensive delegation of power (which was unusual). First, legislators reduced the costs of any potential adverse commission activity by insisting that the process be nonarbitrary and by restricting the commission's authority to a narrow jurisdiction. Second, legislators lowered the risk of political retribution by insulating themselves from the commission's actions, providing a mechanism that allowed them to demonstrate concern for affected constituents and insuring that the public would accept the commission's decision as legitimate.

Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas

We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an alternative: intervention by rational agents, whom we call leaders. We show that leadership is more significant for initiating cooperation than for sustaining it. In addition, we identify two features of organizations that are critical in determining a leader's ability to initiate and sustain cooperation by structuring the incentives of his followers: the leader's capabilities (information and strategy sets) and reward structure (payoff function).

A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action

Collective action usually depends on a "critical mass" that behaves differently from typical group members. Sometimes the critical mass provides some level of the good for others who do nothing, while at other times the critical mass pays the start-up costs and induces widespread collective action. Formal analysis supplemented by simulations shows that the first scenario is most likely when the production function relating inputs of resource contributions to outputs of a collective good is decelerating (characterized by diminishing marginal returns), whereas the second scenario is most likely when the production function is accelerating (characterized by increasing marginal returns). Decelerating production functions yield either surpluses of contributors or order effects in which contributions are maximized if the least interested contribute first, thus generating strategic gaming and competition among potential contributors. The start-up costs in accelerating production functions create severe feasibility problems for collective action, and contractual or conventional resolutions to collective dilemmas are most appropriate when the production function is accelerating.

Urban form and automobile externalities: A collective dilemma model

Urban form and automobile externalities: A collective dilemma model

Rules, Collective Needs, and Individual Action

An observational and survey study is undertaken to observe how members of a townhouse cooperative seek to reduce collective choice dilemmas. So long as individuals perceive that it is costless to take from the collectivity while someone else is contributing, such dilemmas will arise. At the cooperative we find that a sense of ownership, an understanding of a governmental subsidy, and a willingness to accept rules affect the resolution of such dilemmas. Our findings are used tp show the relevance of both social-psychological theories of fate control and equity theories toward understanding problems of collective choice.

New collective dilemma: Tri‐Party negotiations in public education

New collective dilemma: Tri‐Party negotiations in public education

Predisposition and Behaviour in a Collective Dilemma

Three studies examined subjects' self-predicted and actual cooperation in a 10-person collective dilemma game. The first study examined the behaviour of subjects who were provided with full information about the nature of their social interdependency and their “dilemma.” Contrary to Kelley and Grzelak's (1972) prediction, the overall degree of cooperation was low (30%). However, subjects classified as “cooperators” on the basis of their pregame self-predictions were more cooperative than those classified as “non-cooperators” (p < .005). The second study provided false feed back, indicating that the majority of the players were cooperating. “Cooperators” were more cooperative than their counterparts in the first study, (p < .05), while “noncooperators” were as uncooperative as before. This led to the conclusion that the lack of cooperation in the free play situation did not stem from misperception or suspicion of the other players' motivation, but rather from the individualistic predispositions of some of the players. The third study provided further evidence about the stability of the individualistic predispositions.

Book Review: Labor-Management Relations: The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education

Book Review: Labor-Management Relations: The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education

The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education.

The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education.