Dissension over Iraq in 2003 challenged the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN. It also highlighted long-standing problems that previous UN institutional reform efforts had failed to resolve. Kofi Annan has been a reforming secretary-general, but even he acknowledged in September 2003 that the core UN institutions needed radical (1) The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was the response: (2) wide-ranging, certainly; radical, up to a point; and with at least some of its core recommendations regarding peacebuilding and protection likely implemented at the UN summit in September 2005. However, other recommendations of the High-Level Panel have proved to be problematical. These include key ideas about the composition of the Security Council and about the reform of other UN bodies. This is not surprising. The key question on UN reform has always been not or what but how. (3) Indeed, there have been many previous reports and recommendations, by outside bodies and by the secretary-general. (4) The high principles and values are well established. They include peace, justice, freedom, equity, sustainability, and solidarity. Earlier reports have also made many specific proposals--for example, about membership of the Security Council, the need for stronger institutions to manage the world economy, and voting rights for developing countries on the boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Actual reform has often been slow, however, especially where changes to the core institutions are required. For example, Kofi Annan made wide-ranging recommendations when he first came to office, in a document called Renewing the UN: A Programme for Reform. (5) Some of the ideas, described in the document as Track 1 changes, could be pursued internally and included setting up cabinet-style decisionmaking and creating a UN Development Group of Funds and Programs. Others, described as Track 2, dealt with governance arrangements, such as relations with the UN specialized agencies, and made far less progress. (6) Why should this be? Research on collective action offers not only an explanation of why countries might or might not collaborate in particular reforms, but also a way of thinking about actions and processes that might provide a greater incentive for collaboration on UN reform. In fact, an eight-step program can be proposed. We need to start with the theory. (7) At the heart of this is the idea that successful cooperation happens only when certain conditions are met. Researchers in different disciplines have discussed the conditions and have studied cases as varied as villages in India, business associations in New York, and communities of guppy fish. There is also a tradition of analysis using game theory. Sometimes, in these various pieces of research, the actors are all equal--villagers, for example, cooperating in the management of shared forest or grazing land. More often, and more usefully, because of the parallels in the real world, there are disparities in power: there may be one rich landowner, acting as a local superpower, or a shark in the tank with the guppy fish. Some of the research conclusions are unsurprising. Trust turns out to be central--the medium within which exchange takes place, the key ingredient of social capital, and the means by which transaction costs are kept as low as possible. For example, among diamond traders in New York, social networks are so dense that legal contracts are simply unnecessary. There is an important corollary, however: the group has to be small enough that knowledge can be shared. Trust is harder to achieve in large groups and is more likely to require formal institutions for dispute settlement. More generally, the likelihood of cooperation increases when the prevailing culture provides strong reinforcement: noncooperators are simply frozen out. Why, for example, do people not steal the tea bags provided in the office kitchen? …
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