Power and Independence of Federal Reserve Peter Conti-Brown Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 368 pp. Why should president and Congress defer to Federal Reserve on monetary policy? One of typical justifications for central bank independence is that politicians are liable to artificially juice economy, especially before elections, boosting economic activity through an expanded money supply in short run but causing inflation in medium to long run. This conflict of interests necessitates insulating central banks from political pressure. It is what Peter Conti-Brown calls justification of Fed independence. Like Ulysses tied to mast, Fed should be shielded from siren calls of Congress and other elected officials and left free to follow former Fed chairman William McChesney Martin's ideal of taking away the punch bowl when party is really heating up, that is to temper money growth in economic expansion--a move short-term-minded politicians might oppose. Conti-Brown's Power and Independence of Federal Reserve is at heart an attempt to challenge Ulysses/punch-bowl justification for Fed's independence. In Conti-Brown's conception, while Ulysses/punch-bowl reasoning might accurately explain general need for insularity from politics in conduct of monetary policy, it does not explain extent and particularities of Federal Reserve's specific power and independence. That's because Fed, by practice and statute, does more than attempt to manage nominal income and inflation--Fed policymakers are also recession fighters, bankers, financial regulators, bank supervisors, and protectors of financial stability. It's worth asking at this point: Is Conti-Brown, in posing a justification of Fed independence that he himself knocks down, simply attacking a straw man? Even if phrase is of Conti-Brown's own invention, it nevertheless captures a common perception of Fed--namely, that its role in managing money specifically validates its unique autonomy compared to other government agencies. Conti-Brown chose not to write an institutional or legal history of Fed. Instead, he identifies a few key aspects of Fed's structure and practical operation, which he then explores in detail. Conti-Brown attempts to use these selective inquiries to elucidate his main point: that general need for central banks to conduct monetary policy independently from political pressure does not justify degree to which Fed is insulated from political oversight. He divides book into four sections: (1) The Federal Reserve Is a 'They' Not an 'It'; (2) The Five Hundred Hats of Federal Reserve; (3) The Sirens of Federal Reserve; and (4) The Democratic Demands of Fed Governance. In first section, Conti-Brown argues that none of laws that codified Fed's structure embodied any coherent logic regarding need to separate monetary policy from politics. Fed's structure is more a historical accident than intelligent design. According to Conti-Brown, 1913 Federal Reserve Act (which established Fed and remains most important law shaping its structure) contained elements of influential German-American banker Paul Warburg's support for a powerful, privately managed central bank, Senator Carter Glass's preference for a decentralized set of regional banks, and President Woodrow Wilson's faith in technocratic expertise. end result, a mix between a fully centralized and a regional system governed by a mix of public and private agents, represented this contingent melding of ideas. In second section, Conti-Brown discusses Fed activities that extend beyond its regulation of money supply--the main thrust being that Fed's oversight of financial system occurs with just as much independence as its monetary policymaking, even though Ulysses/punch-bowl independence justification does not apply to it. …