Cognitive Science Of Religion Research Articles

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

AbstractCognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by‐product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE

AbstractMultiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.

The Prospects for Debunking Non-Theistic Belief

According to The Debunking Argument, evidence from the cognitive science of religion suggests that it is epistemically inappropriate to persist in believing in the theistic God. In this paper, I focus on a reply to this argument according to which the evidence from cognitive science says nothing about the epistemic propriety of belief in the theistic God, since God may have chosen to create human beliefs in God by means of precisely the systems identified by cognitive scientists. I argue that this reply can be extended to a variety of non-theistic contexts, and consequently that if the reply is sound, then the scope of The Debunking Argument is surprisingly limited.

What the Emergence of CSR Brought About?

Abstract The cognitive science of religion (CSR) is distinctive in its systematic methodology and its interdisciplinary nature. In the field of the study of religion, however, scholars are hardly receptive to CSR because of its “scientific” nature. The reason for this is that CSR is understood as distinct from other studies, nevertheless it has humanistic backgrounds. In order to investigate the intellectual backgrounds of CSR, the paper will describe the initial development of CSR by introducing researches and academic cooperation in the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Moreover, by examining academic contexts, what the emergence of CSR brought about to the study of religion will be clarified. CSR emerged as a result of the debate between modernist and postmodernist, connecting various views and resulting in a great shift in the intellectual landscape. This interdisciplinary role can be seen as the most important achievement of CSR.

How to Create a Religion

The aim of this paper is to suggest that it is worthwhile seeing what the various studies in the cognitive science of religion have taught us by engaging in a thought experiment in which we ask: "What would it take to create a religion on the basis of what we think that we now know about religiosity?" It will be an exercise in applied science by following a set of instructions.

The 7E Model of the Human Mind: Articulating a Plastic Self for the Cognitive Science of Religion

AbstractThis article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou’s concept of “plasticity,” the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious.

Luther H. Martin and Donald Wiebe, eds, <i>Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years</i>

Luther H. Martin and Donald Wiebe, eds, Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-Five Years (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), xi + 260 pp. $102.60 (hbk). ISBN: 978-1-35003-246- 0; $39.95 (pbk). ISBN: 978-1-35010-592-8; $102.60 (PDF eBook). ISBN: 978-1-35003-247-7.

Robert N. McCauley with E. Thomas Lawson,<i> Philosophical Foundations of the Cognitive Science of Religion: A Head Start</i>

Robert N. McCauley with E. Thomas Lawson, Philosophical Foundations of the Cognitive Science of Religion: A Head Start (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 184 pp. £85.00 (hbk). ISBN: 978-1-35003-031- 2. £28.99 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-35010-586-7. £91.80 (ePUB/kindle) ISBN: 978-1-35003-033-6. £91.80 (PDF) ISBN: 978-1-35003-032-9.

Is Religion a Necessary Condition for the Emergence of Knowledge? Some Explanatory Hypotheses

By using the general investigation framework offered by the cognitive science of religion (CSR), I analyse religion as a necessary condition for the evolutionary path of knowledge. The main argument is the of the birth of knowledge: in order to get to the meaning of the part, a sense context is needed; but a sense of the whole presupposes the sense (meaning) of the parts. Religion proposes solutions to escape this paradox, based on the imagination of sense (meaning) contexts, respectively closures of these contexts through meta-senses. What is important is the practical effectiveness of solutions proposed by religion, taking into account the costs of faith and the costs of the absence of religious belief. The hypothesis has the following consequences: religion is a necessary condition for the initial evolution of knowledge and the emergence of religion is determined by the evolution of knowledge. The continuation of the solving of paradox is a Bayesian one, using explorations: a sense of the whole allows cognitive arrangements of the parties, which in turn open the possibility of a rearrangement of the whole. The contribution of religion to the emergence of sense (meaning) could be governed by the rule: any map of the world is more useful than no map; any meaning (of life) is better than no meaning. The human mind fills the perceptual and cognitive gaps, some (religious) filling solutions being true vault keys of the entire cognitive construction called the world. Knowledge is conditioned by the existence of an organized context, as the cosmos created by religion by means of explanatory meta-theories supports knowledge by closing the cognitive context and using meaning networks. The proposed analysis is consistent with a redefinition of rationality from the perspective of evolution: the importance and relevance of knowledge is determined by its practical outcome - survival. In the context of useful fictions, it does not matter what God actually does, but what we have done by believing in God. Existence has provided a pragmatic verification of the cognitive solutions that underlie the survival strategies promoted by religions.

Towards better science and modesty in the Cognitive Science of Religion and Contemplative Science?

Article Towards better science and modesty in the Cognitive Science of Religion and Contemplative Science? was published on September 1, 2019 in the journal Verkündigung und Forschung (volume 64, issue 2).

Measuring Counterintuitiveness in Supernatural Agent Dream Imagery.

The present article tests counterintuitiveness theory and methodology in relation to religious dream imagery using data on religious dream content. The endeavor adopts a “fractionated” or “piecemeal” approach where supernatural agent (SA) cognition is held to be a pivotal building block of purportedly religious dreaming. Such supernaturalistic conceptualizations manifest in a cognitive environment of dream simulation processes, threat detection, and violation of basic conceptual categorization characterized by counterintuitiveness. By addressing SA cognitions as constituents of allegedly religious dream imagery, additional theorizing and supporting data are presented in a growing body of research in the cognitive science of religion (e.g., Barrett et al., 2009;Hornbeck and Barrett, 2013;Barrett, 2017) and on religious dreaming (McNamara and Bulkeley, 2015;McNamara, 2016). The aim of the article is partly to map and align contemporary theorizing regarding counterintuitiveness and CI schemes with empirical qualification of the prosaic hypothesis about the predominance of supernaturalism in allegedly religious dreaming. This is done by (1) exploring the crucial topic of the pervasiveness of cognitive counterintuitiveness; (2) testing Barrett’s counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme (CI scheme) for counterintuitiveness in the context of religious dreaming by assessing intercoder reliability; and (3) exploring the prevalence and base rate frequency of counterintuitiveness in dream reports. This undertaking aims to contribute to the methodology and understanding of religious dream cognition, as well as to establish the cross-cultural base rates of counterintuitiveness in dreams for future research.

Do Thor and Odin Have Bodies? Superperception and Divine Intervention among the Old Norse Gods

In Old Norse mythology, gods like Freyja, Odin, and Thor are usually characterized as human-like creatures: they walk and ride animals, eat, grow old, and even die. Was there more to conceptions of Old Norse gods than those anthropomorphic representations? This article presents evidence that the gods of early Scandinavia were sometimes thought of as superperceiving and able to act in ways that defied the limitations of a physical body. It engages with and challenges theological correctness, a prominent theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion, to elucidate the sources of Old Norse religion and the cognitive and contextual foundations of the representations of gods encountered there. Following an examination of the mechanisms through which Old Norse gods’ superperception and disembodied action were narrativized and rationalized, the article concludes with a discussion of the consequences of non-anthropomorphic representations of the gods for understanding Scandinavian worshippers’ everyday religious life.

Jonathan Edwards, Petitionary Prayer, and the Cognitive Science of Religion

ABSTRACTThe contemporary field of cognitive science proposes that religion (1) is a natural evolutionary development and (2) involves a two-system model of reasoning that, in a Christian context, moves from basic beliefs in God to a theological elaboration of those beliefs. The transition from natural religion to theology can lead to tensions, if not contradictions in thinking. An examination of the writings of Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) on petitionary prayer uncovers this difficulty, both among his Northampton parishioners and Edwards himself. Pastors and theologians would do well to appreciate the implications of cognitive science in consideration of their own formulations.

Possible Selves, Body Schemas, and Sādhana: Using Cognitive Science and Neuroscience in the Study of Medieval Vaiṣṇava Sahajiyā Hindu Tantric Texts

In recent decades, historians of religions have turned to, and developed, entirely new methodologies for the study of religion and human consciousness. Foremost among these are a collection of approaches often termed the “cognitive science of religion” (CSR), typically drawing on cognitive science, neuroscience, linguistics, and contemporary metaphor theory. Although we are still “early” in this enterprise, I hope to show how a meaningful dialogue between religious studies and contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science can help us to better understand some intriguing mystical texts and practices from a tradition of medieval South Asian Hinduism. Known collectively as the Vaiṣṇava Sahajiyās, these followers of transgressive and antinomian Tantric Yoga provide excellent examples for exploring the nature of religion, ritual, consciousness, embodiment, identity, gender, emotions and sexuality. This paper will show how the study of these rich materials from seventeenth through eighteenth century Bengal in northeastern South Asia can be enhanced using insights from the philosopher Shaun Gallagher and the neurologist Patrick McNamara.

Where the Gods Dwell: a Research Report

AbstractAre the places that superhuman beings purportedly act and dwell randomly or arbitrarily distributed? Inspired by theoretical work in cognitive science of religion, descriptions of superhuman beings (e.g., ancestors, demons, ghosts, gods, spirits) were solicited from informants in 20 countries on five continents, resulting in 108 usable descriptions, including information about these beings’ properties, their dwelling location, and whether they were the target of rituals. Whether superhuman beings are the subject of religious and ritual practices appeared to co-vary in relation to both features of physical geography and cognitive factors. Good gods were more likely the focus of religious practices than evil gods, and where the gods are thought to dwell mattered. If either the being was thought to dwell in a dangerous place or a resource rich place, it was more likely to have practices directed at it.

Wine, Brains, and Snakes

The present contribution, concerning the ancient Roman cult of Bona Dea, explores the interplay between intuitive healing beliefs, morality, disgust, and coercive control of sexual behaviours. In order to preliminarily investigate cultural variations concerning sex and gender issues in past societies (a somewhat neglected topic in current cognitive studies), this article engages the socio-sexual organization of Roman culture which underpinned the cult devotion, explaining the evolutionary rationale of the underlying mythography as a mate-guarding strategy and the cult itself as a relief valve and a temporary compensation for subordinate women. The essential components of the cult (i.e., wine and snakes) are further analysed via evolutionary psychology and the cognitive science of religion. The final paragraph tackles the problematic scholarly reconstruction of the cult's promise of an afterlife for its worshippers, arguing that a phylogenetic analysis of Graeco-Roman mythographies might help contextualizing this issue.

Theory, Method and Implicit Religion

An essay reviewing Theory in a Time of Excess: Beyond Reflection and Explanation in Religious Studies Scholarship and its relevance to the study of implicit religion. The edited volume presents a collection of papers from the 2015 North American Association for the Study of Religion (NAASR) conference that explore how the methods and theories used within the study of religion can be made more critical and rigorous. Perspectives from anthropology, literary theory, the cognitive science of religion and philosophy are discussed. Readers are encouraged to systematically rethink their approaches to the study of religion(s) and the use of a broad range of critical methodologies and theoretical frameworks is advocated. It is suggested that these insights and criticisms are particularly relevant to the study of implicit religion and that the use of more critical approaches is required to advance our understanding of implicit religiosity.

Positive Thinking

Following the ideas of a Cognitive Optimum Position, this paper aims to illustrate how cognitive science of religion can be fruitfully applied to understand the appeal of certain metaphysical beliefs within modern New Age religiosity. By diving into the popular DVD version of Rhonda Byrne’s The Secret, this paper seeks is to uncover the cognitive mechanism and systematic biases involved when New Age sympathizers engage in ritual practices and beliefs related to positive thinking and the Law of Attraction. We propose to view the visualization rituals highlighted in The Secret as “internalized” similarity magic, possibly triggering the adaptive principle appearance equals reality. We further argue that the mind-over-matter belief promoted throughout The Secret—that thoughts affect or interact with physical reality—in certain cases are strengthened by a human bias to see a mental-physical causal relationship, a causation heuristic. The cognitive processes behind the general metaphysical belief that thoughts can affect reality are elaborated further by the concept core knowledge confusion. Finally we suggest that together with an illusion of control over uncertain future events, an optimism bias may incite people to engage in continual ritual practice.

Davidsonian semantic theory and cognitive science of religion

This article investigates the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Donald Davidson’s semantic holism (DSH) harmonize. We first characterize CSR, philosophical semantics (and more specifically DSH). We then note a prima facie tension between CSR and DSH’s view of First-Person Authority (that we know what is meant when we speak in a way that we do not when others speak). If CSR is correct that the causes of religious belief are located in cognitive processes in the mind/brain, then religious insiders might have no idea what they are talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of knowing what they ‘really’ mean. The article argues that the resolution to this problem is to take seriously DSH’s rejection of semantic bifurcation, specifically rejecting the idea that religious and non-religious language can be sharply distinguished. We conclude by supporting the following claims: (i) common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes need semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, cultural, environmental etc.).Keywords: cognitive science of religion, cognitive theory, holism, semantics, philosophy of language, religious studies, theory of religion.

Evolutionary theory on the move: New perspectives on evolution in the cognitive science of religion

This article discusses the use of evolutionary theory in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), with special attention to critical issues and new developments. In the first part of the article, I will discuss the definition of evolution and describe the Modern Synthesis (or neo-Darwinian theory). In the next part, I will consider various evolutionary perspectives in CSR, including evolutionary psychology, sexual selection, gene-culture co-evolution, and cultural evolution. In the final part, I will turn to the problems with the Modern Synthesis and present a new approach based on network theory, with potential applications to the study of biological and cultural systems. Keywords: cognitive science of religion, evolution, modern synthesis, cultural evolution, gene regulatory networks, evo-devo, deep learning.