AbstractIn this paper, we have combined a game‐theoretic and an information‐theoretic notions to describe the selfish behavior of each user in a two‐user linear deterministic cognitive interference channel (LD‐CIC). The two‐user LD‐CIC is the simple case of the cognitive radio technology in the high SNR regime. This model is a solution to improve the spectral efficiency in software defined network (SDN) concept in 5G. In the two‐user LD‐CIC, the information bits of the primary/licensed transmitter is a‐priori provided at the cognitive/secondary/unlicensed transmitter. So that, the cognitive transmitter can cooperate and utilize the frequency spectrum to send the information bits of the both transmitters. In information‐theoretic approaches, full cooperation is assumed between transmitters for codebook and rate selection in this channel. This may not be a realistic assumption if transmitters are selfish and are willing to maximize their own benefit. In particular, we have defined the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) region on the capacity region of the two‐user LD‐CIC to capture the behavior of each transmitter when they compete even though one of them is informed of the other transmitter information bits. We have implemented a two‐phase Stackelberg game with the primary and cognitive transmitters acting as the leader in the first phase, and the follower in the second phase, respectively. In this implementation, both transmitters are assumed to be selfish and only interested in optimizing their own pay‐offs. The SE region is characterized as a subset of capacity region in which the transmitters cannot gain more transmission rate by individually deviating from the SE strategy. The achievability of the resultant region has been configured using a randomized Han‐Kobayashi scheme for all the channel gains. Also, we have compared the obtained SE region with the previous equilibrium regions such as Nash equilibrium (NE) region of the linear deterministic interference channel (LD‐IC). The results have shown that the SE points on the sum‐rate of the LD‐CIC capacity region are more than the NE points on the sum rate of the capacity region of LD‐IC, so the SE region of the LD‐CIC is Pareto superior to the NE region of LD‐IC.