Coercive Threats Research Articles

Response options: Future of Indian air power vision 2020

Instead of further clarifying and illuminating the role of air power in national security, the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo air campaign raised a new debate about whether or not air power alone could achieve certain national security, objectives. This paper argues that air power will be increasingly used for power projection, deterrence, coercion and in more innovative roles even by those possessing modest air forces. It is clear that most regional and global players have learnt the lessons of the conflicts mentioned above and are busy adapting them to their specific needs and. circumstances. This paper intends to examine the likely roles of Indian air power and the size and shape of the Indian Air Force to meet the national security needs of 2020. The vital roles of air power in future warfare include, (a) To avoid being surprised, (b) Deterrence through Punishment, (c) Information Dominance (d) Escalation Control and finally (e) Quick Victory or Conflict Termination on Our. Terms. This would be possible only if her air power is intimately linked to the process of formulating national security options and is used effectively to gain and maintain information dominance. To do this, the paper suggests that that the Indian Air Force be expanded toa sixty combat‐squadron force. AWACs, air refuelling tankers, Cruise Missiles, UAV/ UCAVs would also have to be inducted. In short, a modern high‐tech air arm is unavoidable if India wishes to face coercive threats in the future. It will, however, be possible if India also builds a robust aerospace industry capable of designing and developing state‐of‐the‐art equipment and aircraft.

Practicing Coercion

When do coercive threats succeed or fail? Does success depend on a uniform set of necessary conditions or do core prerequisites vary depending on context? If prerequisites vary, are some combinations more likely than others to lead to success or provoke challenges? The evidence to date is far from definitive. Critics cite proof from comparative case studies that rational deterrence has failed as a strategy and theory, whereas proponents have compiled an equally impressive body of material to support the same theory. Because each side offers compelling reasons to accept its respective, often contradictory, interpretations of events in relevant crises, the debate over deterrence is not likely to be resolved solely with reference to historical records. This article reevaluates the “crucial” evidence put forward by Lebow and Stein in what has become the most widely cited critique of rational deterrence theory. Viewed through the prism of necessity and sufficiency, their data produce stronger support for the theory's core hypotheses than corresponding evidence compiled by proponents. The author develops this argument further by applying Boolean logic and set theory to data compiled by Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. Boolean minimization techniques are used to derive models from competing interpretations of behavior in these cases, which are then compared and evaluated in terms of the theory's predictions.

Classroom Discipline That Promotes Self-Control

In this article the authors distill principles of effective classroom discipline from the extensive literature on parent–child interaction and on motivation of behavior. Although there are many books and articles on classroom management, there is little empirical research on the topic, and even less that stresses management that aims to preserve children's perceptions of autonomy and to foster self-control. Research and theory make many recommendations regarding autonomy, control, internalization, and so forth, but they tend to be abstract. Based on that literature, the authors suggest a concrete approach to discipline that they call persistent persuasion. Persistent persuasion involves the adult continually restating a command until the child complies, but without increasing the level of power or using coercive threats so that the development of self-control is not undermined.

Games of coercion and power part II

This paper analyses the concept of coercion, understood as a special type of social power. Coercion uses threats to force the victim to obey the dominating agent, that is, to elicit an intentional response from the subordinate person. The typical decision environment is described and the effect of threats on utility distributions is analysed. Some causal aspects of threats are also discussed. The strategies of coercive threats are expressed in a game theoretical form. A paradox is revealed: the coercer can only seldom make his threat convincing to his intended victim. It is difficult to show that a rational agent (the coercer) would indeed realize his threat when he meets resistence. Different coercive state policies are then discussed in relation to this paradox and a solution is suggested. Finally, Steven Lukes' ideas concerning power are criticized.

Games of coercion and power part I

This paper analyses the concept of coercion, understood as a special type of social power. Coercion uses threats to force the victim to obey the dominating agent, that is, to elicit an intentional response from the subordinate person. The typical decision environment is described and the effect of threats on utility distributions is analysed. Some causal aspects of threats are also discussed. The strategies of coercive threats are expressed in a game theoretical form. A paradox is revealed: the coercer can only seldom make his threat convincing to his intended victim. It is difficult to show that a rational agent (the coercer) would indeed realize his threat when he meets resistence. Different coercive state policies are then discussed in relation to this paradox and a solution is suggested. Finally, Steven Lukes' ideas concerning power are criticized.