Abstract
This paper analyses the concept of coercion, understood as a special type of social power. Coercion uses threats to force the victim to obey the dominating agent, that is, to elicit an intentional response from the subordinate person. The typical decision environment is described and the effect of threats on utility distributions is analysed. Some causal aspects of threats are also discussed. The strategies of coercive threats are expressed in a game theoretical form. A paradox is revealed: the coercer can only seldom make his threat convincing to his intended victim. It is difficult to show that a rational agent (the coercer) would indeed realize his threat when he meets resistence. Different coercive state policies are then discussed in relation to this paradox and a solution is suggested. Finally, Steven Lukes' ideas concerning power are criticized.
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