Coalitional Presidentialism Research Articles

Coalition Governance under Separation of Powers: Shadowing by Committee in Coalitional Presidentialism

AbstractDo coalition parties in presidential systems shadow one another with an eye on reducing agency loss? Our knowledge of intra‐coalitional delegation under presidentialism remains limited to a few case studies. This article addresses that question using an original data set of committee chairs in eight multiparty presidential systems around the world. It shows that shadowing—the appointment of chairs from one coalition party to committees overseeing portfolios controlled by another coalition party—is a function of the degree of agency loss the coalition expects to a specific party, operationalized in terms of ideological distance as well as the salience of portfolios. However, the data also tentatively suggest that powerful committees reduce rather than increase the incidence of shadowing, which may be attributed to the risk of intraparty agency loss under separation of powers.

The Ideology of Brazilian Parties and Presidents: A Research Note on Coalitional Presidentialism Under Stress

ABSTRACTThis research note contributes updated and extended point estimates of the ideological positions of Brazilian political parties and novel estimates of the positions of all presidents since redemocratization in 1985. Presidents and parties are jointly responsible for the operability of Brazil’s version of coalitional presidentialism. Locating these key political actors in a unidimensional left–right space over time reveals rising challenges to the institutional matrix, particularly since 2013. Ideological polarization among parties has sharply increased, presidents have become more distant from Congress, and the political center has become increasingly vacated. Coalitional presidentialism is being subjected to unprecedented ideological stress as President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva begins his third term in office.

O espaço da politização na estrutura do Governo Federal brasileiro, 1999-2021

Abstract What was the extent of the Brazilian president’s politicization space within the structure of the federal public bureaucracy from 1999 to 2021? The extent of this space is related to the importance of politicization as a strategy for controlling the bureaucracy, monitoring partners, and political accommodation, following the logic of coalition presidentialism. Thus, this article sought to measure it using a descriptive methodology based on data collected from the Federal Government’s Painel Estatístico de Pessoal, encompassing positions and functions within the government throughout the period. By considering all possibilities of appointments and designations made by the president for high-level positions, this article presented an innovative approach compared to previous Brazilian Political Science studies assessing politicization in the federal government. This approach led to the conclusion that the extent of the politicization space did not substantially decrease despite the reduction in senior management and advisory positions (known in Brazil as Cargos de Direção e Assessoramento Superior - DAS), in addition to revealing a new pattern of politicization characterized by increased use of funções de confiança exclusively held by career public servants and the valorization of these servants even in DAS positions.

Be careful what you wish for: Portfolio allocation, presidential popularity, and electoral payoffs to parties in multiparty presidentialism

We know little about how coalitional strategy affects the electoral fates of political parties in presidential democracy. The literature on coalitions in parliamentary systems shows a negative impact of entering government, while the coattail effects literature on presidential systems suggests some benefits. Combining elements from both approaches, we argue that there is a conditional electoral effect of joining the cabinet under coalitional presidentialism. Even considering presidentialism’s heightened attribution of responsibility to a unipersonal executive, we find that coalition parties do indeed place a meaningful electoral wager whenever they choose to enter the president’s cabinet as identifiable allies. Leveraging data on Brazilian elections held at national and local levels over 24 years and employing an innovative measure of portfolio salience, we show that the payoff of this wager is contingent on control of the most highly-valued cabinet positions and on the popular approval of the president.

Crises da democracia e de governo: um ensaio de história constitucional brasileira em defesa da Constituição-Cidadã e da cidadania emancipada

The following essay discusses the crises of democracy and systems of government in Brazilian constitutional history over the course of two centuries from the perspective of defending the Citizens’ Constitution and emancipated citizenship. It undertakes a qualitative evaluation of the institutions, from criticism to the democratic deficit due to the lack of popular participation in the processes for developing the constitutions and the party-political processes established by the electoral systems. It analyzes the systems of government, the trajectory of the State from the imperial monarchy to the republic. Brazilian constitutional history undergoes a series of crises in democracy and government systems in the transitions between democratic and autocratic regimes, at the advent of the republic, in movements defending parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism as a substitution for the presidential system. In terms of Brazilians’ political status, there is a gradual universalization of electoral suffrage and a shift from the institutional position of subjects as subjects of the empire to citizens of the republic, with the dynamics of regulated citizenship, statehood, and the search for an emancipated citizenship. The essay closes with an analysis of the Citizens’ Constitution of 1988 and a reflection on the need for militant democracy in defense of its conquests on social rights and public policies, with the overcoming of the limitations derived from coalition presidentialism and the pressures caused by the emergence of authoritarian populism.

Konstytucyjne i pozakonstytucyjne uwarunkowania władzy prezydenta Brazylii

The study aims to analyze the key formal and extralegal elements affecting the functioning of the office of president in Brazil. The subject of consideration is the political position of the president resulting from the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of October 5, 1988, and the socioultural dependencies occurring in this country. The thesis of the article is the statement that the power of the President of Brazil results not only from the provisions of the Constitution but also from unconstitutional dependence on pressure groups, i.e. the bureaucratic state – estamento burocrático. It is stated that the features of the Brazilian presidential system are the ostensibility of formal structures and the presence of political patronage, the lack of permanent political divisions, coalitional presidentialism, and the interpenetration of politics and the media due to ownership relations.

The Ideology of Brazilian Parties and Presidents: Coalitional Presidentialism Under Stress

The Ideology of Brazilian Parties and Presidents: Coalitional Presidentialism Under Stress

Gendering Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil

Coalitional presidentialism is a power-sharing strategy deployed in multiparty presidentialist democracies that entails the distribution of cabinet positions to coalition partners to facilitate governability. This model of governance is increasingly common worldwide, gaining growing scholarly interest. The consequences of coalitional presidentialism for women’s cabinet representation, however, have received scant attention. In this article, we provide a gendered analysis of the Brazilian experience with coalitional presidentialism. Through the quantitative analysis of an original dataset of all ministerial appointments ( N = 597) under eight Brazilian presidents (1985–2019) and a descriptive assessment of the coalitional dynamics during that period, we evaluate the Brazilian experience with coalitional presidentialism through the lens of Feminist Institutionalism. We show that coalitional presidentialism restricts women's access to cabinet seats, with the demands of multiparty coalition formation and management often overriding presidential considerations about descriptive representation, and coalition parties rarely advancing women to fill portfolios allocated to them by the president.

Populist Constitutionalism in Brazil and Peru: Historical and Contextual Issues

Given populism's common practice in South America, the region provides a crucial case to identify populism as a prevalent strategy by different ideologies. The link between populism and constitutionalism is paramount because populist governments typically use constituent power and constitutional identity to reach political goals. This study aimed to provide a comparative constitutional analysis of the recent development of populism in Brazil and Peru. The first was the rhetoric and practices of Jair Bolsonaro's government in Brazil, whereas the second was Pedro Castillo's government in Peru regarding constitutional reforms and human rights issues. This comparison justified that Brazil and Peru are presidential republics where harsh political polarization shakes their societies. Bolsonaro and Castillo have anti-corruption discourses and support a new constituent process but present antagonistic economic views. This study was comparative in nature that used a qualitative approach, sourced from bibliographic and documentary research that included specialized literature on South American populism and constitutionalism and the government's plans and legislation. This study showed that both governments have difficulties executing their respective agendas on customs and constituent referendums due to governability problems and important features of the constitutional design, such as eternity clauses, judicial review, and constitutional rigidity. It concluded that the populist strategies of Bolsonaro and Castillo are different. Bolsonarism is antiliberal and promotes human rights regression, whereas Castillo's populism is conservative but democratic. In common, both face the coalitional presidentialism and constitutional protection mechanisms as constraints to putting their political goals entirely into practice.
 KEYWORDS: Authoritarianism, Constitutionalism, Fundamental Rights, Populism.

For whom the bell tolls: Party mediation effects on economic voting in a large democratic federation

AbstractThis article analyzes the effect of economic growth on executive elections in the context of a multilevel governance structure and how party ties across federal, state, and local levels affect the relationship, using data from Brazilian municipalities. We test the hypothesis that the president is the main politician accountable for economic performance, measured by local growth, and that party politics moderates the evaluation of the economic performance of state governors and the president. Our research shows that there is a high degree of interdependence between levels of government in the evaluation of economic performance. We highlight how party alliances strongly moderate the economic performance effects at the different levels. Using aggregate local level‐municipality panel data and fixed effects estimations, we show that the previous year's economic growth positively impacts the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in the presidential elections and that those effects are higher in states whose governors are allied to the president.Related ArticlesOndetti, Gabriel. 2008. “Up and Down with the Agrarian Question: Issue Attention and Land Reform in Contemporary Brazil.” Politics & Policy 36(4): 510–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00120.xSegatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 46(3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252Zimerman, Artur, and Flávio Pinheiro. 2020. “Appearances can be Deceptive: Political Polarization, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 48(2): 339–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345

Beyond coalition presidentialism: evidence of a subnational pressure in the Brazilian legislative

In Brazil, literature tends to emphasize the political power of the federal executive in the legislative process. The objective of this paper is to revisit the position of prominent actors (federal Executive and party leaders), especially in fiscal matters. In order to do so, we will analyze processes in which the influence of state governments in Congress is visible, with an emphasis on fiscal measures adopted since the 1990s. We used process tracing and content analysis, based on several legislative documents (propositions, technical advice, votes, and technical notes) and 12 interviews of central actors in the process of renegotiating debts that took place in 2018. The subnational governments (governors and mayors) pressure parliamentarians to paralyze any proposal that involves a change in the tax collection system in federated entities. Beyond fiscal matters, the federalist structure has also affected intergovernmental relations in other areas of public policy, such as building the legal framework for basic sanitation. Our results indicate that the centralization of federal Executive power in Brazilian legislative process is not absolute. The articulation by the federal government was fundamental in the construction of agreements. There are incentives linked to an electoral aspect, partisan ideologies, and pressure groups that oppose changes to the rules of sanitation services as well as in many fiscal and budgetary matters.

Legislative resistance to illiberalism in a system of coalitional presidentialism: will it work in Brazil?

ABSTRACT Illiberal governments typically attempt to undermine representative democracy by adhering to a single comprehensive doctrine sustained through a majoritarian account of legitimacy that is suspicious of the rationality of liberal constitutional democracies. But perhaps there is hope for a system of coalitional presidentialism, such as Brazil. It has been argued that coalitional presidentialism may be in a better position to resist an illiberal project to erode democracy because of its centripetal and conservative forces, which might constitute a firewall against the concentration of powers in the executive branch. The legislature can either slow the pace of authoritarian measures or subject the government to relevant political defeats, raising the chances of democratic reconstruction. Should we expect success for legislative resistance to illiberal populism? What can the Brazilian experience under the first eighteen months of Bolsonaro's government teach us about it? Even though it might be too early for a conclusive assessment of these matters, we try to offer in the following sections a moderately optimistic response to the first question based on our assessment of the second.

Presidents and the multiparty system in Brazil: is coalitional presidentialism doomed to fail? President Dilma Rousseff’s constitutional occupational accident and new challenges under Bolsonaro’s government

Taking as central threads the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016 and Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency so far, the article analyses and assesses the Brazilian institutional design in the light of Juan Linz’s assumption that presidential regimes with multiple parties are a fatal combination. The recent impeachment episodes might be viewed as evidence to that effect. The institutional set-up of the Brazilian constitutional and political system seems to result – as Linz predicted – in a biased use of the traditional political machinery which exists in multiparty presidentialism. But is it actually the set-up itself that is the trigger, or do the political dynamics and the actors involved in this set-up undermine the system? Considering more recent theories, this article takes a more encompassing view of Brazilian coalitional presidentialism and its overall resilience. Adopting a broader framework for our analysis, we distinguish between endemic, structural and non-structural deficits in the presidential and multiparty system in Brazil in relation to the operation of impeachment procedures. This helps us to identify the overall value and effect of constitutional corrective mechanisms and practices which try to address the problems of multiparty presidentialism in Brazil and sheds, we believe, a somewhat more optimistic light on the development of democracy in Brazil.

Book review: Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems

Book review: Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems

O extrativismo político, econômico e social na Amazônia: o legado de exploração e marginalização democrática do povo amazônico

O presente artigo busca trazer para a academia a existência e as origens do extrativismo político, econômico e social na Região Amazônica, relacionando-o com a marginalização de minorias na Cidade de Manaus, de modo a abordar, como problema de pesquisa, se é correto afirmar que se vive uma democracia plena no Brasil, fazendo a interseção entre autores que tratam do tema, abordando os conceitos de democracia, instituições extrativistas e inclusivas, e o presidencialismo de coalizão, buscando relacioná-los dentro de um contexto histórico nacional e regional amazônico. Dessa forma, por meio de uma pesquisa bibliográfica de natureza básica e utilizando-se o método indutivo de caráter qualitativo, pôde-se constatar, ao final, que as instituições extrativistas persistem até os dias de hoje, num círculo vicioso de exploração que demonstra não haver uma democracia plena no Brasil.

REPÚBLICA E CONSTITUIÇÃO DE 1988: OU CONSTITUIÇÃO SEM REPÚBLICA?

O texto percorre a história constitucional brasileira para demonstrar qual o ideário republicano que permeia a construção da história do nosso constitucionalismo. Indaga-se a efetiva existência de práticas republicanas na Constituição de 1988, a partir da história constitucional, bem como alguns problemas que inviabilizam a caracterização da República na Constituição de 1988. Dentre tais problemas, situa-se a reforma política, a cultura de golpe de estado e o presidencialismo de coalizão. Através de um método histórico-conceitual e jurídico-reflexivo, a conclusão é que ainda temos um projeto republicano inacabado.

Appearances can be Deceptive: Political Polarization, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil

What can we infer about the effect of polarized politics on the Brazilian policy‐making process? We attempt to answer this question by analyzing the country's political landscape and focusing on one specific policy issue concerning agrarian policies, an area that is exposed to much ideological conflict for both the left and right wing. We show how the mechanism has worked in this case to mitigate the polarization effects. Two political groups monopolized national elections over the past two decades sharing very different positions concerning ideological preferences. In this article, we recognize polarization between the two leading parties, but argue that the Brazilian political system features the dynamics of coalitional presidentialism that mitigates party preferences. We analyze funding data for small farmers and rural settlements for the period 1995‐2016, arriving at the conclusion that the agrarian policy of the competing parties resembled one another, despite political polarization.Related ArticlesOndetti, Gabriel. 2008. “Up and Down with the Agrarian Question: Issue Attention and Land Reform in Contemporary Brazil.” Politics & Policy 36 (4): 510‐541. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00120.xSegatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.”Politics & Policy 46 (3): 416‐441. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252Wolff, Michael Jerome. 2019. “Sharing Authority: The Politics and Practice of Community Policing in the Brazilian Slum.” Politics & Policy 47 (4): 748‐774. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12322

Mudanças intraministeriais e gestão da coalizão: Brasil, de 1990 a 2014

Resumo Este artigo analisa as mudanças na estrutura interna dos ministérios no Poder Executivo brasileiro entre os anos de 1990 e 2014. O argumento geral é de que, no presidencialismo de coalizão, o presidente se posiciona em uma complexa rede de delegação em que enfrenta diversos custos de agência e, para lidar com isso, dispõe de uma caixa de ferramentas a serem usadas. A literatura aponta para algumas dessas ferramentas, porém, pouco explora o poder administrativo, relacionado à dimensão estrutural dos ministérios. Nesse sentido, o artigo visa contribuir com esse debate ao endereçar a seguinte questão: quais fatores influenciaram as mudanças estruturais nos ministérios do Executivo brasileiro nos anos de 1990 a 2014? Em outras palavras, o poder administrativo é um recurso empregado pelo presidente para lidar com os custos de agência decorrentes de sua relação com os partidos da coalizão? Caso contrário, quais outros fatores podem influenciar a decisão do presidente para utilizar tal poder? O estudo longitudinal é de caráter explicativo e adota uma abordagem quantitativa de pesquisa. Os resultados mostraram que o presidente utiliza com cautela seu poder administrativo de redesenho ministerial, fortalecendo as estruturas dos ministérios mais salientes para a sua agenda e dos ministérios mais institucionalizados.

The Relevance of the Voluntary Transfers of Federal Resources for the Consolidation of the Government’s Support Base in the Brazilian Congress

The literature on coalition presidentialism in Brazil considers the allocation of federal resources to the electoral bases of parliamentarians as an available tool for the Presidency to obtain support for initiatives of its interest in the National Congress. This article aims to verify the relationship between the transfer of these resources, the voluntary transfers, and the support to the Government. Two groups of deputies were separated to find out this behavior: those that vote following the Government’s orientation and those that systematically vote against it. From each group a sample of 50 deputies was selected, from which the percentage of votes obtained in the 2014 elections in each municipality was inferred. The four municipalities in which a deputy reaches proportionately more votes belong to his electoral base. Crossing this base of municipalities with data on voluntary transfers from the Federal Government, statistical tests found that the volume of federal voluntary resources received by a given municipality is related to the supportive alignment of the mayor and the governor with the Federal Government and also with the institutional capacity of the municipality administration. However, the volume of transfers received cannot be explained by virtue of whether or not the municipality is the electoral base of a federal deputy aligned or facing opposition to the Federal Executive.

O impacto do arranjo institucional brasileiro no controle político sobre a burocracia

Resumo Este artigo tem por objetivo discutir quais características do sistema político brasileiro dificultam o controle político da burocracia e, consequentemente, prejudicam a accountability no país. Por meio de revisão da literatura sobre o tema e debate teórico, investiga-se em que medida as instituições do presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro facilitam ou dificultam o controle burocrático, o que pode impactar o resultado das políticas públicas. Inicialmente, parte-se de uma revisão da literatura comparada sobre o tema, seguindo para a análise do arranjo institucional brasileiro e seu impacto nas estratégias de nomeações e monitoramento de Ministros no Gabinete. Conclui-se que, apesar da centralidade do Poder Executivo no sistema político brasileiro, há constrangimentos informais à Presidência da República que podem dificultar a coordenação de políticas. Nesse sentido, a estrutura federativa e o sistema multipartidário atuam como agravantes nesse cenário e levam o Executivo a adotar variadas estratégias informais de controle sobre a burocracia. Essas estratégias, apesar de contribuírem para a gestão do Gabinete, podem ter impactos negativos nos resultados das políticas, somados à falta de transparência dos mecanismos de controle utilizados.