Beyond coalition presidentialism: evidence of a subnational pressure in the Brazilian legislative

Abstract

In Brazil, literature tends to emphasize the political power of the federal executive in the legislative process. The objective of this paper is to revisit the position of prominent actors (federal Executive and party leaders), especially in fiscal matters. In order to do so, we will analyze processes in which the influence of state governments in Congress is visible, with an emphasis on fiscal measures adopted since the 1990s. We used process tracing and content analysis, based on several legislative documents (propositions, technical advice, votes, and technical notes) and 12 interviews of central actors in the process of renegotiating debts that took place in 2018. The subnational governments (governors and mayors) pressure parliamentarians to paralyze any proposal that involves a change in the tax collection system in federated entities. Beyond fiscal matters, the federalist structure has also affected intergovernmental relations in other areas of public policy, such as building the legal framework for basic sanitation. Our results indicate that the centralization of federal Executive power in Brazilian legislative process is not absolute. The articulation by the federal government was fundamental in the construction of agreements. There are incentives linked to an electoral aspect, partisan ideologies, and pressure groups that oppose changes to the rules of sanitation services as well as in many fiscal and budgetary matters.