Coalitional Presidentialism Research Articles

Eleições presidenciais, federalismo e política social

Tem sido recorrente nas pesquisas sobre as instituições brasileiras argumentos sobre os impactos negativos do federalismo "robusto", da representação proporcional de lista aberta e de partidos pouco institucionalizados sobre a produção de políticas públicas. O artigo desenvolve um argumento alternativo, em bases comparativas, para dar conta do sucesso inesperado das iniciativas de política social do governo federal nos anos 1990 e 2000. São analisadas dimensões pouco exploradas no debate sobre as instituições políticas brasileiras, no que diz respeito ao papel das coalizões eleitorais, das dinâmicas partidárias e da competição vertical, entre esferas de governo, na formulação de políticas sociais. O trabalho conclui que a competição vertical e inter-partidária no presidencialismo de coalizão criaram incentivos para processos incrementais no desenvolvimento das políticas públicas, possibilitando a criação de programas sociais de caráter redistributivo e universalista.

Cooperação, liderança e impasse entre o Legislativo e o Executivo na produção legislativa do Congresso Nacional do Brasil

This article discusses the relationship between Brazil's Legislative and Executive Branches in lawmaking. It identifies elements in the lawmaking system in Brazil and strategic interactions between hierarchical channels (Constitutional, complementary, and ordinary legislation) in the context of coalition Presidentialism. The model was applied to bills submitted between 1999 and 2006 and generated data that run counter to the widespread perception of a sharp divide between the respective agendas of the two branches and the hypothesis of absolute predominance by the Executive. However, the prevailing government coalition predominated in all the lawmaking channels. Various types of interaction between the branches were suggested, according to patterns of conflict and leadership by the players (leadership, cooperation, and impasse), as generated by the bills' contents.

Organización y proceso legislativo en el presidencialismo brasileño

The comparative literature on political institutions usually treats parliamentary and presidential systems as polar cases, regarding, specifically, executive legislative relationship and the behavior of political parties inside legislatures. More recently, however, as an expanding body of analysis is trying to demonstrate, South America is presidential experiences have been, in a growing fashion, making use of coalition governments as means to stabilize the political process –something rather common in the European parliamentary context. The chapter analyses the consequences of this model –the so called coalition presidentialism.

Optimism, Pessimism, and Coalitional Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of Brazilian Democracy

Research on Brazil's political institutions has gone through several phases since democratisation in 1985. In the early years of democracy, pessimism prevailed with regard to governability. This view gave way in the mid‐1990s to a more optimistic view that stressed two innovations of the Constitution of 1988: enhanced presidential power and centralised legislative procedure. In recent years, a third phase of research has shifted attention to the crucial role of inter‐party alliances. These analytical approaches have converged into an emerging research programme on ‘coalitional presidentialism’, which places executive‐legislative relations at the centre stage of macropolitical analysis. This article reviews the three phases of the debate and reflects on future research agendas.