Coalition Of Leaders Research Articles

Dimensions of influence in nonprofit leadership coalitions: Contingencies for governance quality

We explore the relatedness between different types of governance coalitions and the level of organizational governance quality. We propose two dimensions of influence to classify nonprofit governance coalitions. We apply a mixed methodology, including a comparative case analysis of five organizations and a multi-level regression analysis of coalition metrics on formal positions held by individuals. Based on our observations we formulate eight theoretical propositions, which stress for high quality governance practices the importance of a ‘balance coalition’ between diffused and centralized influences, and between specific and holistic influences. Further, we conjecture the important role of formal leadership positions, such as CEOs and chairmen, in the structure of governance coalitions. Finally, several research paths to scrutinize our propositions in further research are suggested.

A Coterminous Collaborative Learning Model: Interconnectivity of Leadership and Learning

This qualitative ethnographic study examines a collaborative leadership model focused on learning and socially just practices within a change context of a wide educational partnership. The study analyzes a range of perspectives of novice teachers, mentor teachers, teacher educators and district superintendents on leadership and learning. The findings reveal the emergence of a coalition of leaders crossing borders at all levels of the educational system: local school level, district level and teacher education level who were involved in coterminous collaborative learning. Four categories of learning were identified as critical to leading a change in the educational system: learning in professional communities, learning from practice, learning through theory and research and learning from and with leaders. The implications of the study for policy makers as well as for practitioners are to adopt a holistic approach to the educational environment and plan a collaborative learning continuum from initial pre-service programs through professional development learning at all levels.

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands David W. Kupferman (bio) Marshall Islands The period under review for the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) has been one of unprecedented events, including the removal of a president and a potential constitutional crisis, the unsatisfactory resolution of numerous issues related to the Compact of Free Association with the United States, a variety of health issues and diplomatic forays that thrust the islands into the global spotlight, and a pair of international incidents that have painted the nation in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the world press. By far the most important event of the last twelve months was the stunning and historic vote of no confidence that ousted President and Iroij Litokwa Tomeing in October 2009. While Tomeing had survived two previous attempts to drive him out of office in October 2008 and April and seemed to have solidified his administration's legitimacy during the summer recess, tensions were high even before the regular session of the Nitijela (Parliament) convened in August. The Marshall Islands Journal reported prior to the meeting of the Nitijela that a motion of no confidence was planned but that there were no specifics as to what lay behind such an initiative, nor was information given about whether anyone in either political party was preparing to step in should the vote succeed (MIJ, 21 Aug 2009). Indeed, the rumors surrounding the proposed vote were so vague that the only compelling aspect of such a possibility was that the vote was being considered by a coalition of leaders from both the United Democratic Party (UDP) and Aelon Kein Ad (AKA); the prospects for this third vote of no-confidence against Tomeing in the first eighteen months of his administration (and only the fifth such vote in the nation's history) seemed to rest entirely on a blurring of political party ideology and a desire simply to remove him from office. As the Nitijela met through its regular sixty-day session, it seemed that the government's priority was the resolution of the land use agreement between the RMI government and Kwajalein landowners, the most prominent of whom is former President and Iroijlaplap Imata Kabua. While Kabua had been instrumental in Tomeing's rise to the presidency in 2008, continuing frustration over the lack of a land use agreement took center stage. In a letter to the editor of the Marshall Islands Journal, Kabua complained that his rights as a landowner had been stripped by the RMI government's [End Page 184] "refusal" to consult with the Kwajalein landowners during the renegotiation of the Compact of Free Association with the United States in 2003 (MIJ, 14 Aug 2009). Ironically, the president at the time, UDP party leader and Jabat Senator Kessai Note, had come to power by toppling Kabua in 1999 and had in turn been ousted by Tomeing (with Kabua's assistance) in 2007. But lack of movement on the land use agreement, even after the president and members of his cabinet met with Kwajalein landowners in September (MIJ, 18 Sept 2009), and compounded by the bad feelings left over from the most recent vote of no confidence led by Tomeing's own party in April 2009, seemed to render party politics irrelevant and made the Tomeing administration appear incapable of moving forward on this or any issue. After weeks of speculation, the motion of no confidence was finally put on the Nitijela agenda on Wednesday, 13 October 2009. The motion was filed by former President and Jabat Senator Kessai Note, along with AKA members Namu Senator Kaibuke Kabua and Lae Senator Rellong Lemari, and Ujae Senator Frederick Muller of the United People's Party (or UPP, which represented President Tomeing's short-lived attempt at coalition politics) (MIJ, 16 Oct 2009). On 21 October 2009, Litokwa Tomeing became the first president in the history of the republic to be ousted by a no-confidence motion, by a vote of 17 to 15 (only Arno Senator Gerald Zackios did not participate in the vote) (MIJ, 23 Oct 2009). The bickering two days prior to the vote, as well as a marathon three-and-a-half-hour debate right before the vote...

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands David W. Kupferman (bio) Marshall Islands The period under review for the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) has been one of unprecedented events, including the removal of a president and a potential constitutional crisis, the unsatisfactory resolution of numerous issues related to the Compact of Free Association with the United States, a variety of health issues and diplomatic forays that thrust the islands into the global spotlight, and a pair of international incidents that have painted the nation in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the world press. By far the most important event of the last twelve months was the stunning and historic vote of no confidence that ousted President and Iroij Litokwa Tomeing in October 2009. While Tomeing had survived two previous attempts to drive him out of office in October 2008 and April and seemed to have solidified his administration's legitimacy during the summer recess, tensions were high even before the regular session of the Nitijela (Parliament) convened in August. The Marshall Islands Journal reported prior to the meeting of the Nitijela that a motion of no confidence was planned but that there were no specifics as to what lay behind such an initiative, nor was information given about whether anyone in either political party was preparing to step in should the vote succeed (MIJ, 21 Aug 2009). Indeed, the rumors surrounding the proposed vote were so vague that the only compelling aspect of such a possibility was that the vote was being considered by a coalition of leaders from both the United Democratic Party (UDP) and Aelon Kein Ad (AKA); the prospects for this third vote of no-confidence against Tomeing in the first eighteen months of his administration (and only the fifth such vote in the nation's history) seemed to rest entirely on a blurring of political party ideology and a desire simply to remove him from office. As the Nitijela met through its regular sixty-day session, it seemed that the government's priority was the resolution of the land use agreement between the RMI government and Kwajalein landowners, the most prominent of whom is former President and Iroijlaplap Imata Kabua. While Kabua had been instrumental in Tomeing's rise to the presidency in 2008, continuing frustration over the lack of a land use agreement took center stage. In a letter to the editor of the Marshall Islands Journal, Kabua complained that his rights as a landowner had been stripped by the RMI government's [End Page 184] "refusal" to consult with the Kwajalein landowners during the renegotiation of the Compact of Free Association with the United States in 2003 (MIJ, 14 Aug 2009). Ironically, the president at the time, UDP party leader and Jabat Senator Kessai Note, had come to power by toppling Kabua in 1999 and had in turn been ousted by Tomeing (with Kabua's assistance) in 2007. But lack of movement on the land use agreement, even after the president and members of his cabinet met with Kwajalein landowners in September (MIJ, 18 Sept 2009), and compounded by the bad feelings left over from the most recent vote of no confidence led by Tomeing's own party in April 2009, seemed to render party politics irrelevant and made the Tomeing administration appear incapable of moving forward on this or any issue. After weeks of speculation, the motion of no confidence was finally put on the Nitijela agenda on Wednesday, 13 October 2009. The motion was filed by former President and Jabat Senator Kessai Note, along with AKA members Namu Senator Kaibuke Kabua and Lae Senator Rellong Lemari, and Ujae Senator Frederick Muller of the United People's Party (or UPP, which represented President Tomeing's short-lived attempt at coalition politics) (MIJ, 16 Oct 2009). On 21 October 2009, Litokwa Tomeing became the first president in the history of the republic to be ousted by a no-confidence motion, by a vote of 17 to 15 (only Arno Senator Gerald Zackios did not participate in the vote) (MIJ, 23 Oct 2009). The bickering two days prior to the vote, as well as a marathon three-and-a-half-hour debate right before the vote...

School Program for Screening Students at Risk for Diabetes

Accurate height and weight and BMI assessment by the school nurse is the first step in identifying students at risk for developing type 2 diabetes or other health consequences. Additional screening for children at or above the 95th percentile for BMI identifies those students most at risk. MAP affiliate sites indicate that when this assessment and communication is done in a private, sensitive, and caring manner--with emphasis on the health of the child-parents/ guardians are receptive to the information. School nurses, with the knowledge and skills provided by the S.C.O.P.E. program, alert parents/guardians to address their children's health risks and contact their health care providers. School nurses are also taught how they can provide guidance for school leadership and community coalitions to incorporate effective changes to food and physical activity offerings to students. The S.C.O.P.E. program can enhance the role of the school nurse in the global fight against childhood obesity so school-age children are healthy and ready to learn.

Engaging the Community in Coalition Efforts to Address Childhood Asthma

For health improvement efforts to effectively address community needs, community members must be engaged in planning and implementing public health initiatives. For Allies Against Asthma's coalitions, the community included not only the subpopulation of individuals who suffer disproportionately from asthma but also the individuals and institutions that surround them. Through a quantitative self-assessment survey, informal discussion among coalition leadership, and interviews with key informants, data relevant to community engagement identified a number of important ways the Allies coalitions approached community involvement. Respondents' comments made clear that the way the coalitions conduct their work is often as important as what they do. Across coalitions, factors that were identified as important for community involvement included (a) establishing a commitment to community involvement, (b) building trust, (c) making participation feasible and comfortable, (d) responding to community identified needs, (e) providing leadership development opportunities, and (f) building a shared commitment to desired outcomes.

Forging Collective Capacity for Urban Redevelopment: “Power To,”“Power Over,” or Both?

This paper explores the dynamic of cooperation between economic and political elites in a public‐private partnership that was created to guide the redevelopment of downtown Santa Cruz, California, following the devastating Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989. While the public‐private partnership was instrumental in the success of post‐earthquake reconstruction of the central business district, the consensus and cooperation between progressive political leaders and local business elites in this “partnership” were often more apparent than real. This occurred not only because of the longstanding tensions between the local pro‐growth coalition and progressive political leadership of the city but also because the public‐private partnership became a mechanism for potential regime transformation. Thus, the “collective capacity” needed to proceed with post‐earthquake redevelopment of the central business district was “forged” in two senses: It was created to effect necessary redevelopment, but it was also counterfeit. Political elites sought to limit both the scope and the duration of the partnership to check the increasing power of economic elites in the aftermath of the earthquake. Although regime theory acknowledges the relationship between “power over” and “power to,” I argue that its emphasis on the latter overlooks critical sources of conflict in the creation and implementation of local urban development policy. Consequently, I further argue that an analysis of both conceptions of power is necessary to understand not only how local development policies are enacted but “who benefits” from them.

The Effects of Leadership and Governance Processes on Member Participation in Community Health Coalitions

This study examines the effects of coalition leadership and governance on member participation in voluntary community health coalitions. Path modeling was used to explore how leadership and governance processes in coalitions affect existing member costs, benefits, and levels of participation. It was hypothesized that the effects of coalition decision making and leadership variables would be indirect by working through their effects on participants' perceived influence over coalition decision making and on overall consensus around the coalition vision. Results of the analysis indicate that open and collaborative decision making and empowering leadership do have indirect, positive effects on the level of participation by way of vision consensus and participation benefits. Participation costs, however, show no significant direct effect on the level of participation. Perceived personal influence appears to be primarily an outcome of participation rather than an antecedent.

Leadership coalitions and change: the role of states in the European Union

The role of states in the European Union has not diminished over the history of the organization's institutional development. On the contrary: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, member-state influence over Union affairs actually seems to have grown. This is attributable both to the weakening of the supranational elements and to the expansion of intergovernmental activity in key policy areas. Added to this, the growth in the number of EU member states, and the diversity that now exists in an EU of 25, have reinforced the network of relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, between member states. Consequently, the EU has both centripetal and centrifugal forces at work, with member states drawn together in a continuing formal integration process and driven towards building tactical associations among themselves. This article discusses the relationship between the formal and the informal layers of integration in Europe, and points to the changing constellations and coalitions among the current member states. Special attention is given to the cleavages that emerged between the EU governments over the negotiations on treaty reform, from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty on the European Constitution. With regard to the power structure within the EU, the article outlines the perspectives of a ‘Big Three’ core coalition as successor to the Franco-German motor.

Community leadership cycles and the consolidation of neighbourhood coalitions in the new local governance

The success of the new patterns of local governance depends on engaging communities in a range of partnerships at various geographic scales and administrative levels. In practice, this usually falls to a handful of community leaders in any given locality. Our research on area regeneration partnerships in the UK reveals a community leadership cycle, which proceeds through five phases. The first phase consists of the emergence of a first generation of leaders early on in a partnership, in the second phase their position in the partnership is consolidated and loyalty to the partnership developed, followed by a third phase of the cultivation of a second generation of leaders. Then comes a fourth phase in which the new generation of leaders raise their voices to challenge the established patterns of representation in the partnership. In the final phase, individual leaders exit from the partnership. This community leadership cycle is part of building multi-sector leadership coalitions in the neighbourhoods through strategies combining loyalty, voice and exit.

Toward a Theory of Policy Leadership: Three Propositions

This paper formulates a theory of policy leadership based on propositions that relate to the conditions under which rival leadership coalitions engage in a contest for authority over the system-wide direction of the policy process and differentiate themselves according to distinctive styles in respect of which the demand shifts due to the endogenous accumulation of disappointment over distinct phases of a process of paradigmatic policy change. It both draws from concepts familiar to policy theorists and the work of economic revisionists who have sought to make the expressive dimension of phenomena such as leadership more amenable to deductive analysis.

Business Leadership Coalitions and Public-Private Partnerships in American Cities: A Business Perspective on Regime Theory

This article strives to deepen our understanding of the nature and role of businesses and Business Leadership Coalitions (BLCs) in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and in the formation and operation of urban governance regimes in major American cities. Our research reveals a greater heterogeneity and diversity of engagement and partnering types than is generally recognized in traditional regime typologies. An engagement portfolio framework for analyzing civic activism is proposed to encompass the diverse motives, activities, and partnering configurations exhibited by businesses. The findings suggest the need for changes in regime theory frameworks to capture the full richness and realities of business sector participation in PPPs.

Long-term bandwagoning and short-term balancing: the lessons of coalition behaviour from 1792 to 1815

Recent literature in International Relations has argued that the absence of ‘balancing’ behaviour by European states during the Napoleonic Wars from 1798 to 1815 calls into question current explanations for the presence or absence of such behaviour in international relations. This literature has argued that: (1) Napoleonic France presented a significant threat to the stability of the international system; (2) European states did not balance against this threat from 1798 to 1813, and subsequently balanced only after Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812; (3) members of the system possessed adequate power to balance successfully against this threat; and (4) since European states engaged in co-opting, rewarding, avoiding, or bandwagoning behaviour towards the French threats to the system, a new explanation for the absence of balancing behaviour is required. Each of these four points can be refuted by: taking a longer time perspective of the international system during the period in question, expanding state motives to include interests other than security, using a long cycle model of coalition leadership by a global leader, recognizing the constraints faced by European states in their choices of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour under threats from France, and taking into account the role of innovation and change in a period of global war.

Business Leadership Coalitions

Business Leadership Coalitions

Policy Coalitions in the U.S. Congress: A Spatial Duration Modeling Approach

This paper applies spatial duration models to the analysis of cosponsorship coalitions in the U.S. House of Representatives. This approach provides a unique and simultaneous statistical analysis of ideological space (specifically, coalition formation) and geographical space. Typically, duration models are associated with temporal longitudinal data, but recently have been adapted to the spatial domain (Pellegrini and Reader 1996). In this paper, spatial duration models are further adapted to examine ideological space including a consideration of unobserved sources of spatial variation (or omitted variable bias).We examine two features of cosponsorship coalitions, breadth and clustering. Breadth is defined as the ideological distance between the two most extreme members of the coalition which is an important “signal” to the rest of Congress regarding the scope and broad appeal of the proposed legislation. In contrast, clustering refers to the distance between individual members of a coalition and reveals the tendency, or not, of ideologically similar members of Congress to support various bills. To examine breadth and clustering, we employ spatial duration models of cosponsorship that permit a multivariate analysis incorporating both the characteristics of members of Congress and the geographical regions they represent.Results indicate that cosponsorship coalition patterns are primarily determined by the content of the legislation, not the actions of the coalition leadership. While the leadership characteristics of sponsors have a limited effect on cosponsorship breadth, the size of the coalition is the primary determinent. Leadership characteristics also have little effect on cosponsorship clustering. Rather, clustering is due to members' policy preferences, as measured by distance to the coalition leader. In addition, the duration analysis results suggest that geographical proximity between members of Congress “overcomes” ideological distance. Finally, the spatial duration approach is noted as a fruitful methodology for examining explicitly spatial patterns in both ideological or geographical space.

Coalitions against NBC‐armed regional aggressors: How are they formed, maintained, and led?

The United States faces serious challenges in forming, maintaining, and leading an international military coalition for purposes of intervening to defeat and reverse an act of regional aggression by a state armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. This article assesses how and why such coalitions might prove important to the United States in prosecuting such conflicts. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the NBC threat is likely to make the challenges more manageable, not less so. While forming coalitions against NBC‐armed aggressors will be easier than is generally assumed, leading such coalitions will be more difficult. A set of military and political measures are identified that, if implemented, will ease future tasks of coalition formation, maintenance, and leadership.

‘Fighting one's own friends is hateful work’: Coalition troubles, January – October 1922

In the aftermath of the 1918 election Law believed ‘Lloyd George can be Prime Minister for life if he wants’. In the event, the government survived only four turbulent years. Although 1922 was to be a critical year for the Coalition, the year began auspiciously. For all the problems during 1921, by December the fortunes and confidence of the coalition leadership were greater than for some time. A week after signing the Irish Treaty, the government claimed something of a diplomatic triumph with the four-power treaty in Washington covering Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Thereafter progress was also swiftly made with regard to naval disarmament (finally signed on 6 February 1922). Two days after the Pacific agreement, the Commons debate on the Irish Treaty provided the government with its first notable parliamentary success for some months. For the moment even Law broke the ominous silence he had maintained throughout the negotiations to declare his approval. While in the longer term the Irish Treaty was to prove both ‘Lloyd George's greatest achievement, but … also the greatest single cause of his overthrow’, in December 1921 it had undoubtedly restored the government's fortunes and renewed its sense of policy direction. Moreover, although relations with France had been gravely aggravated by the unilateral Angora agreement with the Turks in November 1921 and even more by French obstructionism at Washington, even Anglo-French relations provided some substance for hope. The ‘conversations’ with Briand in London from 18–22 December thus set in motion a process which led, via Cannes and Genoa, to an attempt to resolve Anglo-French differences over German reparations. With Ireland settled, Washington still hailed a triumph and plans already in progress for a conference offering the prospect of European peace and the restoration of prosperity, the scene was set for an attempt to engineer indirectly that which could not be achieved by direct calls for ‘fusion’. Encouraged by McCurdy's grossly over-optimistic assessments of the prospects, some time before Christmas Lloyd George decided that circumstances were propitious for another coalition election. At a dinner held by Birkenhead after the Irish Treaty debate, the subject was discussed for the first time by the Coalition leaders.

Ecumenists and Entrepreneurs: A Study of Coalition Leadership

This paper is a sociological study of leadership in a Canadian social (religious) movement. Specifically, it is a study of a leadership coalition between ecumenists and entrepreneurs in the church union movement (1904-25) that produced the United Church of Canada. What is demonstrated is that representatives of two groups with dissimilar ideologies collaborated to achieve a common goal — a national organizational merger.

Britain Debates Justice: an Analysis of the Reparations Issue of 1918

It has been noticed by various observers that in the election campaign of 1918, which focused on the issue of “reparations” versus “indemnities,” the debate was dominated not by discussions of the practical issues of international relations, national interests, or economic possibilities, but rather by abstract moral arguments about “justice” — a “just peace” and a “just punishment” for Germany. It has not been noticed, however, that these arguments about justice were very largely carried over into international politics from the sphere of domestic criminal law, to such an extent that positions expressed vis-à-vis the Prison Acts of 1908 foreshadowed the positions expressed in foreign affairs in 1918.When, only three days after the Armistice, a parliamentary election was announced for December 14, there was little expectation that the terms of the treaty would be part of the electoral battle. It quickly became apparent, however, that despite the pre-Armistice agreement limiting German responsibility to reparations for damage done to Belgium and to the civilian population of Allied countries, there was a widespread public desire to force Germany to pay an indemnity for the entire cost of the war. Although Labour and the Asquithian Liberals refused to abandon their commitment to “reparations but no indemnity,” the Coalition leadership succumbed, though hesitantly, to popular pressure. Despite the private convictions of both David Lloyd George and Bonar Law that an indemnity would be unwise and harmful, the Coalition committed itself, before the campaign closed, to demanding the “entire cost of the War.”