Classical First-order Logic Research Articles

A herbrandized functional interpretation of classical first-order logic

We introduce a new typed combinatory calculus with a type constructor that, to each type $$\sigma $$ , associates the star type $$\sigma ^*$$ of the nonempty finite subsets of elements of type $$\sigma $$ . We prove that this calculus enjoys the properties of strong normalization and confluence. With the aid of this star combinatory calculus, we define a functional interpretation of first-order predicate logic and prove a corresponding soundness theorem. It is seen that each theorem of classical first-order logic is connected with certain formulas which are tautological in character. As a corollary, we reprove Herbrand’s theorem on the extraction of terms from classically provable existential statements.

Quantifiers Defined by Parametric Extensions

This paper develops a metaphysically flexible theory of quantification broad enough to incorporate many distinct theories of objects. Quite different, mutually incompatible conceptions of the nature of objects and of reference find representation within it. Some conceptions yield classical first-order logic; some yield weaker logics. Yet others yield notions of validity that are proper extensions of classical logic.

On natural deduction in classical first-order logic: Curry–Howard correspondence, strong normalization and Herbrand's theorem

We present a new Curry–Howard correspondence for classical first-order natural deduction. We add to the lambda calculus an operator which represents, from the viewpoint of programming, a mechanism for raising and catching multiple exceptions, and from the viewpoint of logic, the excluded middle over arbitrary prenex formulas. The machinery will allow to extend the idea of learning – originally developed in Arithmetic – to pure logic. We prove that our typed calculus is strongly normalizing and show that proof terms for simply existential statements reduce to a list of individual terms forming an Herbrand disjunction. A by-product of our approach is a natural-deduction proof and a computational interpretation of Herbrand's Theorem.

Typed realizability for first-order classical analysis

We describe a realizability framework for classical first-order logic in which realizers live in (a model of) typed {\lambda}{\mu}-calculus. This allows a direct interpretation of classical proofs, avoiding the usual negative translation to intuitionistic logic. We prove that the usual terms of G\"odel's system T realize the axioms of Peano arithmetic, and that under some assumptions on the computational model, the bar recursion operator realizes the axiom of dependent choice. We also perform a proper analysis of relativization, which allows for less technical proofs of adequacy. Extraction of algorithms from proofs of {\Pi}02 formulas relies on a novel implementation of Friedman's trick exploiting the control possibilities of the language. This allows to have extracted programs with simpler types than in the case of negative translation followed by intuitionistic realizability.

On the Definitional Embeddability of the Combinatory Logic Theory into the First-Order Predicate Calculus

In this article we prove a theorem on the definitional embeddability of the combinatory logic into the first-order predicate calculus without equality. Since all efficiently computable functions can be represented in the combinatory logic, it immediately follows that they can be represented in the first-order classical predicate logic. So far mathematicians studied the computability theory as some applied theory. From our theorem it follows that the notion of computability is purely logical. This result will be of interest not only for logicians and mathematicians but also for philosophers who study foundations of logic and its relation to mathematics.

On the system CL12 of computability logic

Computability logic (see http://www.csc.villanova.edu/~japaridz/CL/) is a long-term project for redeveloping logic on the basis of a constructive game semantics, with games seen as abstract models of interactive computational problems. Among the fragments of this logic successfully axiomatized so far is CL12 --- a conservative extension of classical first-order logic, whose language augments that of classical logic with the so called choice sorts of quantifiers and connectives. This system has already found fruitful applications as a logical basis for constructive and complexity-oriented versions of Peano arithmetic, such as arithmetics for polynomial time computability, polynomial space computability, and beyond. The present paper introduces a third, indispensable complexity measure for interactive computations termed amplitude complexity, and establishes the adequacy of CL12 with respect to A-amplitude, S-space and T-time computability under certain minimal conditions on the triples (A,S,T) of function classes. This result very substantially broadens the potential application areas of CL12. The paper is self-contained, and targets readers with no prior familiarity with the subject.

A Logic for Trial and Error Classifiers

Trial and error classifiers, corresponding to concepts which change their extensions over time, are introduced and briefly philosophically motivated. A fragment of the language of classical first-order logic is given a new semantics, using $$\omega $$?-sequences of classical models, in order to interpret the basic predicates as classifiers of this kind. It turns out that we can use a natural deduction proof system which differs from classical logic only in the conditions for application of existential elimination. Soundness and completeness theorems are proved for this system.

Donald W. Loveland, Richard E. Hodel, and S. G. Sterrett: Three Views of Logic: Mathematics, Philosophy and Computer Science

This is a textbook based on an interdisciplinary (advanced undergraduate level) course that was originally taught by the three authors at Duke. It is intended for many different disciplines. Even though it covers mathematical and philosophical topics, it occasionally still feels like a textbook whose origins lie more in computer science than in the other disciplines. This isn’t even surprising, for an interdisciplinary focus on logic easily draws one towards computer science and artificial intelligence. In three parts, each written by one of the authors, a three-chapter overview is given of the topics of proof-theory, computability-theory and philosophical logic. Yet, rather than a juxtaposition of logical, mathematical, computational, and philosophical subjects, this textbook isn’t merely intended as an illustration of how logic is relevant for many different disciplines, but forms the basis for a different kind of introduction to logic. This reviewer surely applauds the intent to teach logic to philosophers more like we would teach it to computer scientists—with an emphasis on what it allows us to achieve, but also to teach it to computer scientists more like we would (or ought to) teach it to philosophers—with more attention to the diversity in logic than to the dominant background role of classical logic. While Part 1 is concerned with proof-theory, with chapters on classical propositional logic, first-order logic, and Prolog, it also double-tasks as an introduction to formal logic. Thus, chapter 1 reviews the language and semantics of propositional logic, and even goes on to prove two basic meta-theoretical results by

A HENKIN-STYLE PROOF OF COMPLETENESS FOR FIRST-ORDER ALGEBRAIZABLE LOGICS

AbstractThis paper considers Henkin’s proof of completeness of classical first-order logic and extends its scope to the realm of algebraizable logics in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi. Given a propositional logic L (for which we only need to assume that it has an algebraic semantics and a suitable disjunction) we axiomatize two natural first-order extensions L∀m and L∀ and prove that the former is complete with respect to all models over algebras from , while the latter is complete with respect to all models over relatively finitely subdirectly irreducible algebras. While the first completeness result is relatively straightforward, the second requires non-trivial modifications of Henkin’s proof by making use of the disjunction connective. As a byproduct, we also obtain a form of Skolemization provided that the algebraic semantics admits regular completions. The relatively modest assumptions on the propositional side allow for a wide generalization of previous approaches by Rasiowa, Sikorski, Hájek, Horn, and others and help to illuminate the “essentially first-order” steps in the classical Henkin’s proof.

Paradox and Logical Revision. A Short Introduction

Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic,orsome extension thereof, provides the right extension of thelogical consequence relation. However, together with nai¨vebut intuitive principles about semantic notions such astruth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity andother nai¨ve logical properties, classical logic quickly leadsto inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since thepublication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth (Kripke1975), an increasingly popular diagnosis has been torestore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by restrictingsome classical rules. Our modest aim in this note is tobriefly introduce the main strands of the current debate onparadox and logical revision, and point to some of thepotential challenges revisionary approaches might face,with reference to the nine contributions to the presentvolume.

Semantical Completeness of First-Order Predicate Logic and the Weak Fan Theorem

Within a weak system $${{{\sf WKVS}}}$$WKVS of intuitionistic analysis one may prove, using the Weak Fan Theorem as an additional axiom, a completeness theorem for intuitionistic first-order predicate logic relative to validity in generalized Beth models as well as a completeness theorem for classical first-order predicate logic relative to validity in intuitionistic structures. Conversely, each of these theorems implies over $${{{\sf WKVS}}}$$WKVS the Weak Fan Theorem.

LoCo—A Logic for Configuration Problems

In this work, we present LoCo, a fragment of classical first-order logic carefully tailored for expressing technical product configuration problems. The core feature of LoCo is that the number of components used in configurations does not have to be finitely bounded explicitly, but instead is bounded implicitly through the axioms. Computing configurations is equivalent to the task of model finding. We present the language, related algorithms, and complexity results as well as a prototypical implementation via answer set programming.

A multi-focused proof system isomorphic to expansion proofs

The sequent calculus is often criticized for requiring proofs to contain large amounts of low-level syntactic details that can obscure the essence of a given proof. Because each inference rule introduces only a single connective, sequent proofs can separate closely related steps---such as instantiating a block of quantifiers---by irrelevant noise. Moreover, the sequential nature of sequent proofs forces proof steps that are syntactically non-interfering and permutable to nevertheless be written in some arbitrary order. The sequent calculus thus lacks a notion of canonicity: proofs that should be considered essentially the same may not have a common syntactic form. To fix this problem, many researchers have proposed replacing the sequent calculus with proof structures that are more parallel or geometric. Proof-nets, matings, and atomic flows are examples of such revolutionary formalisms. We propose, instead, an evolutionary approach to recover canonicity within the sequent calculus, which we illustrate for classical first-order logic. The essential element of our approach is the use of a multi-focused sequent calculus as the means for abstracting away low-level details from classical cut-free sequent proofs. We show that, among the multi-focused proofs, the maximally multi-focused proofs that collect together all possible parallel foci are canonical. Moreover, if we start with a certain focused sequent proof system, such proofs are isomorphic to expansion proofs---a well known, minimalistic, and parallel generalization of Herbrand disjunctions---for classical first-order logic. This technique appears to be a systematic way to recover the "essence of proof" from within sequent calculus proofs.

Algorithmic introduction of quantified cuts

We describe a method for inverting Gentzen's cut-elimination in classical first-order logic. Our algorithm is based on first computing a compressed representation of the terms present in the cut-free proof and then cut-formulas that realize such a compression. Finally, a proof using these cut-formulas is constructed. Concerning asymptotic complexity, this method allows an exponential compression of quantifier complexity (the number of quantifier-inferences) of proofs.

GLIVENKO AND KURODA FOR SIMPLE TYPE THEORY

AbstractGlivenko’s theorem states that an arbitrary propositional formula is classically provable if and only if its double negation is intuitionistically provable. The result does not extend to full first-order predicate logic, but does extend to first-order predicate logic without the universal quantifier. A recent paper by Zdanowski shows that Glivenko’s theorem also holds for second-order propositional logic without the universal quantifier. We prove that Glivenko’s theorem extends to some versions of simple type theory without the universal quantifier. Moreover, we prove that Kuroda’s negative translation, which is known to embed classical first-order logic into intuitionistic first-order logic, extends to the same versions of simple type theory. We also prove that the Glivenko property fails for simple type theory once a weak form of functional extensionality is included.

A semantic study of the first-order predicate logic with uncertainty involved

In this paper, we provide a semantic study of the first-order predicate logic for situations involving uncertainty. We introduce the concepts of uncertain predicate proposition, uncertain predicate formula, uncertain interpretation and degree of truth in the framework of uncertainty theory. Compared with classical predicate formula taking true value in $$\{0,1\}$$ { 0 , 1 } , the degree of truth of uncertain predicate formula may take any value in the unit interval $$[0,1]$$ [ 0 , 1 ] . We also show that the uncertain first-order predicate logic is consistent with the classical first-order predicate logic on some laws of the degree of truth.

Exhibiting interpretational and representational validity

A natural language argument may be valid in at least two nonequivalent senses: it may be interpretationally or representationally valid (Etchemendy in The concept of logical consequence. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990). Interpretational and representational validity can both be formally exhibited by classical first-order logic. However, as these two notions of informal validity differ extensionally and first-order logic fixes one determinate extension for the notion of formal validity (or consequence), some arguments must be formalized by unrelated nonequivalent formalizations in order to formally account for their interpretational or representational validity, respectively. As a consequence, arguments must be formalized subject to different criteria of adequate formalization depending on which variant of informal validity is to be revealed. This paper develops different criteria that formalizations of an argument have to satisfy in order to exhibit the latter’s interpretational or representational validity.

First-Order Dialogical Games and Tableaux

We present a new proof of soundness/completeness of tableaux with respect to dialogical games in Classical First-Order Logic. As far as we know it is the first thorough result for dialogical games where finiteness of plays is guaranteed by means of what we call repetition ranks.

A general first-order solution to the ramification problem with cycles

We provide a solution to the ramification problem that integrates findings of different axiomatic approaches to ramification from the last ten to fifteen years. For the first time, we present a solution that: (1) is independent of a particular time structure, (2) is formulated in classical first-order logic, (3) treats cycles – a notoriously difficult aspect – properly, and (4) is assessed against a state-transition semantics via a formal correctness proof.This is achieved as follows: We introduce indirect effect laws that enable us to specify ramifications that are triggered by activation of a formula rather than just an atomic effect. We characterise the intended models of these indirect effect laws by a state-transition semantics. Afterwards, we show how to compile a class of indirect effect laws into first-order effect axioms that then solve the ramification and frame problems. We finally prove the resulting effect axioms sound and complete with respect to the semantics defined earlier.

A Graph Calculus for Predicate Logic

We introduce a refutation graph calculus for classical first-order predicate logic, which is an extension of previous ones for binary relations. One reduces logical consequence to establishing that a constructed graph has empty extension, i. e. it represents bottom. Our calculus establishes that a graph has empty extension by converting it to a normal form, which is expanded to other graphs until we can recognize conflicting situations (equivalent to a formula and its negation).