Abstract
Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic,orsome extension thereof, provides the right extension of thelogical consequence relation. However, together with nai¨vebut intuitive principles about semantic notions such astruth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity andother nai¨ve logical properties, classical logic quickly leadsto inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since thepublication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth (Kripke1975), an increasingly popular diagnosis has been torestore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by restrictingsome classical rules. Our modest aim in this note is tobriefly introduce the main strands of the current debate onparadox and logical revision, and point to some of thepotential challenges revisionary approaches might face,with reference to the nine contributions to the presentvolume.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
