Classical Phenomenology Research Articles

Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to.

Refiguring Continental Philosophy

Each year, the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) hosts an annual meeting attended by some 500 philosophers and scholars-primarily from North Americ but increasingly including scholars from Europe, Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere-working in the various traditions of so-called "continental" thought. At that meeting, over 150 blind-reviewed papers are delivered in areas that range from classical phenomenology and existentialism to hermeneutics, critical theory, deconstruction, feminism, race theory, and beyond. A small selection of these papers from the 2006 meeting, hosted by Villanova University, is published in this SPEP supplement to Philosophy Today. These papers are indicative of the ways in which continental philosophy is presently engaged in refiguring how it understands itself as regards its methodology, its topics and issues, its relation to other philosophical traditions and, more broadly, its relation to other scholarly disciplines. Indeed, "refiguring" itself must be understood in a multiplicity of ways. To "refigure" can mean to give new form or shape, to retrace or remark, to re-imagine or rethink, or to reconstitute an existing political or ethical space. All these meanings are represented in the papers selected for this volume. Whether it be a question of the form of phenomenology or hermeneutics, the constitution of life and embodiment, the shape of the relation between philosophy and psychoanalysis, the representation of the political, or the very form of thinking itself, these papers explore the ways in which philosophers in the continental tradition are providing new figures for future work. We would like to dedicate this volume to Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) who was a faithful friend to SPEP. David Pellauer's eloquent essay, "Remembering Paul Ricoeur," presented at a memorial session devoted to Ricoeur at the 2006 meeting bears witness too the importance of Ricoeur's life and work for this Society and for philosophy in general. Issues in Phenomenology The four essays that comprise this first section are all explorations in refiguring classical themes or positions within phenomenology. John O'Connor's essay, "Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl," reexamines the criticism of Husserl's priority of the ego in phenomenological analysis. O'Connor defends Husserl's position by appealing not to the later writings where one finds Husserl's analyses of intersubjectivity and historicity, but to the earlier writings where Husserl is concerned with avoiding psychologism. It is O'Connor's contention that in his early writings Husserl works out his anti-psychologism in relation to the ego in a way that reveals an anti-reductionist tendency in his philosophy concerning the ego. Husserl, in opposition to psychologism, wants to avoid the "category mistake" of simply changing the ideal into the real. In "Reduction or Subtraction: Marion, Badiou, and the Recuperation of Truth," Adam Miller examines two of a new generation of phenomenologists' positions on the classical theme of truth. Miller contends that both Marion and Badiou share the view that it is not possible to articulate a positive notion of truth within the horizon of being where the notion of truth is caught up in the endless play of immanently constituted meanings. Miller finds that both Marion and Badiou instead attempt to describe truth in relation to a certain remove from subjectivity (a knowable object connected to a knowing subject). For Marion truth is inseparable from what he calls the "saturated phenomenon," the givenness in the phenomenon that always exceeds its appearance. The issue of truth becomes a matter of rendering this immanent excess phenomenologically intelligible. For Badiou truth is linked to the event; i.e., to an immanent excess that is ontologically anterior to the correlated appearance of the world. The real contrast between the two thinkers emerges from the fact that Badiou does not attempt to render the excess intelligible by means of a strict phenomenology. …

Lagrangian velocity structure functions in Bolgiano turbulence

Single-particle Lagrangian velocity statistics in the Bolgiano–Obukhov regime of two-dimensional turbulent convection is investigated. At variance with flows displaying the classical K41 phenomenology, here the leading contribution to the Lagrangian velocity fluctuations is given by the largest eddies. This implies a linear behavior in time for a typical velocity fluctuation in the time interval t. The contribution to the Lagrangian velocity fluctuations of local eddies (i.e., with a characteristic time of order t), whose space/time scalings are ruled by the Bolgiano–Obukhov theory, is thus not detectable by standard Lagrangian statistical observables. To disentangle contributions arising from the large eddies from those of local eddies, a strategy based on exit-time statistics has successfully been exploited. Lagrangian velocity increments in Bolgiano convection thus provide a physically relevant example of a signal with more than smooth fluctuations.

The Role of Language in Object Transcendence

Of all the ways to speak of transcendence, the perception of objects as spatially and temporally transcendent to us would seem to be one of the more mundane. So allow me to make the case right at the start as to why understanding how Hans-Georg Gadamer explains our perceptual awareness of objects is interesting and relevant. First, there is the general point that to fully appreciate Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics we need to take seriously its place within the phenomenological tradition; the nature of perception has been a central theme from the beginnings of phenomenology, and the nature of our awareness of objects as transcendent has been a central theme of the nature of perception. That things are experienced as irreducible to the way they are experienced-experienced as having being beyond their appearance-is our most common encounter with transcendence. When we think of transcendence as moving out from us or as going beyond something-that is, when we think of it as best captured through spatial metaphors-it is because we are drawing on this most familiar sense of transcendence, the transcendence of spatial-temporal objects. Gadamer inherits from classical phenomenology the view that perception is directly of the objects of perception; perception is not mediated through ideas or representations, rather "consciousness is," as he puts it, "according to its own essential structure, already with objects."1 Since there is disagreement among phenomenologists about how object perception should be best characterized, it is worth knowing where Gadamer stands on the issue; however, since he did not write anything extensive or detailed about the nature of perception, knowing where he stands will take some interpretive reconstruction. Second, Hubert Dreyfus has joined a debate around John McDowell's denial of the possibility of a non-conceptual awareness of objects. Two things make this debate relevant to Gadamerians. First, McDowell appeals to Gadamer to help respond to a pressing concern with his view. If we start from McDowell's view that human perception is the actualization of conceptual capacities, how can we explain the continuities between the way mature humans perceive the world and the way beings that lack those conceptual capacities, such as infants or non-human animals, perceive the world?2 McDowell relies on Gadamer's distinction between an environment and a world: animals exist in an environment, driven by solving problems related to their biological imperatives; humans live in a world toward which we are conceptually oriented to allow for reflection and action in ways not simply reducible to biological imperatives. Dreyfus thinks that McDowell under-appreciates the resources the phenomenological tradition provides for a richer understanding of the meaningfulness of embodied, skillfully coping, non-conceptual actions.3 He argues that Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty provide the tools for understanding the origins and the nature of the perceptual transcendence of objects. Separately, Dreyfus has criticized Gadamer for not taking "a stand on Heidegger's claim that there is a level of everyday practice (the Vorhabe) beneath our theoretical presuppositions and assumptions (the Vorsicht),"4 and this objection connects to his objection against McDowell. So Gadamer has been drafted into the debate on the side of the Sellarsian McDowell, while Dreyfus presents his response as phenomenology's response to McDowell. By laying out Gadamer's actual views about the way we are aware of objects as transcendent, we can better position him with respect to the issues at stake between Dreyfus and McDowell on the possibility of non-conceptual perception. The general question I want to address is this: How does Gadamer articulate object transcendence?5 The four key claims that he makes are: (1) that the body is first and foremost an opening to the world and is incapable of being fully objectified; (2) that the way the world is disclosed spatially according to our bodies parallels the way the world is disclosed conceptually through language; (3) that the bodily disclosure of objects is not prior (temporally or logically) to the linguistic disclosure of objects; and (4) that there is in the perception of objects a double transcendence, a spatial-temporal transcendence that reveals the object as surpassing any particular appearance of it, and a linguistic/conceptual transcendence revealing it as not just an individual object, but an object disclosable though language, and, as such, conceptually relatable to other objects. …

The mind without, the world within

The current debate between internalists and externalists is in many ways quite complex.Not only are the termsuseddifferently in the context of epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics, but a bewildering proliferation of new versions of internalism and externalism have emerged in recent discussions. Consequently, it makes very little sense these days to ask in general whether somebody is an internalist or an externalist, since the answer will depend on the specific kind of internalism or externalism one has in mind. In the present volume, the focus will be on the internalism–externalism debate as it is played out in the context of philosophy of mind. Thus, the internalism in question is the one that, roughly speaking, amounts to the view that a subject’s beliefs and experiences are wholly constituted by what goes on inside the mind of that subject, so that matters in the subject’s natural and cultural environment have no bearing on their content. Externalism, by contrast, is then the rejection of that view. More specifically, however, the centre of attention will be on phenomenological conceptions of the mind-world relation, and the central question asked will be whether classical phenomenology—the philosophical tradition inaugurated by Husserl and continued by such thinkers as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—is internalist or externalist in orientation. What is the rationale behind compiling a special issue on this topic right now? There are several different reasons. • One is that the very attempt to apply what must be considered a foreign conceptual framework on phenomenological theories of intentionality can be quite

Intentionality, Auto-Affection, and the Penuriousness of Excess—A Reformed Viewpoint

The essay refutes the pre-eminence given by the influential French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion to the notion of saturation. Since Marion has misunderstood the key phenomenological concept of 'intentionality,' viewing the notion of directedness as a simple form of actively extromissive aiming, his rejection of the compatibility of intentionality and affective intensity does not hold. Since intentionality, understood adequately in a Husserlian sense, does not exclude passivity and receptivity, it is pointless to claim that a theory of 'saturation' somehow goes 'beyond' classic phenomenology by allowing for things of such great magnitude that no human 'aiming' could structure their constitution. By means of references to Eckhart's ontology, to Klee's modernism, and to Christian theology of the Reformed kind, the paper presents a theory of affective constitution that dismantles the forced and false opposition that Marion sets up between minimalism and saturation.

What things do: philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design

Contents Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction: To the Things Themselves 1. The Death of Things 2. The Thing About the Philosophy of Technology 3. Toward a Philosophy of Artifacts Part I: Philosophy Beyond Things 1. Technology and the Self 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Technology and Mass-Rule 1.3 Human Beings and Mass Production 1.4 Mass Existence 1.5 The Neutrality of Technology 1.6 Conclusion 2. The Thing about Technology 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology 2.3 To Be or Not to Be-That Is the Question 2.4 Heidegger and Things 2.5 Conclusion Part II: Philosophy from Things 3. Postphenomenology 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Empirical Research into Technology 3.3 Beyond Classical Phenomenology 3.4 Toward a Postphenomenology of Things 4. A Material Hermeneutic 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Relations Between Human Beings and Artifacts 4.3 Mediation and Meaning 4.4 Artifacts, Culture, and Science 4.5 Conclusion 5. The Acts of Artifacts 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Latour's Amodern Ontology 5.3 Technical Mediation 5.4 Actor-Network Theory and Postphenomenology 5.5 Mediation of Action 5.6 Conclusion 6. Devices and the Good Life 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Device Paradigm 6.3 Technology and the Good Life 6.4 Beyond Alienation 6.5 Mediated Engagement 6.6 Conclusion: The Mediation of Action and Experience Part III: Philosophy for Things 7. Artifacts in Design 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Materiality of Things 7.3 Toward a Material Aesthetics 7.4 Durable Designs 7.5 Conclusion

Spin Dynamics in a Dissipative Environment: From Quantal to Classical

We address the problem of spin dynamics in the presence of a thermal bath, by solving exactly the appropriate quantum master equations with continued-fraction methods. The crossover region between the quantum and classical domains is studied by increasing the spin value , and the asymptote for the classical absorption spectra is eventually recovered. Along with the recognized relevance of the coupling strength, we show the critical role played by the structure of the system-environment interaction in the emergence of classical phenomenology.

Fenomenologia e Hermenêutica das tradições

Summary This paper tries to analyse the historical and present contribution of phenomenology to the hermeneutics of traditions. This attempt is achieved by retracing, in main lines, the history of phenomenological movement, his birth, constitution and evolution. In this proposal, it is showed how, by his both internal and external critics, classic phenomenology is moved to open itself to other contemporary trends of thought, namely hermeneutics and philosophy of language, and, in dialogue with these and with the human sciences, to transform itself in a more fruitful way. This is truth, first of all, in respect of Husserl’s·thought, which evolves from static phenomenology, centered in the analysis of the noetic-noematic intentional correlation from the point of view of a transcendental idealism, to genetic and historical phenomenology, based on the “Ur-Impression” of the living-present, as the founding phenomenon-event of all meaning’s constitution. A decisive point is made by Heidegger in stressing the hermeneutic, discursive and historical character of all ontological understanding. This allows emphasizing the question of the sense formation (Sinnbildung), which precedes and enables all symbolic and signic institution of meaning (Sinnstiftung), therefore providing a guiding line for search on the topic of the historical constitution of language and traditions.

Individuation als Sein und Leben. Zur Revision eines Prinzips

Die traditionelle Bestimmung der Individuierung im philosophischen Sinne verläuft seit Aristoteles über die ousiologische Differenz als Kategorialisierung des Erscheinenden durch Sprache und Urteil. Demgegenüber ist der klassisch phänomenologische Individuierungsprozess an die innerzeitliche Lokalisierung im Bewusstseinsfeld (oder Dasein) gebunden, wodurch die reine Differenz von Erscheinen/Erscheinendem zum transzendentalen Faktum der Individuierung wird. Ungedacht bleibt dabei jedoch auch hier der originäre Bezug zum absoluten Leben diesseits jeglichen Seins. Wird daher die radikale Reziprozität von Leben/Individuum als Ur-Individuierung im Sinne einer ausschließlich intensiven »affektiven Differenz« bestimmt, so ergibt sich eine Affinität zur christologischen Inkarnation. In jeder Bestimmung oder Setzung seitens philosophischen Denkens wird diese von der Philosophie selbst nicht geschaffene Faktizität vorausgesetzt, so dass der philosophische Vollzug als Selbstvollzug je individuierter Natur letztlich seinerseits in einer solch christologisch fundierten Individuierung begründet ist.

Influence of a non-ionic surfactant on the UV–vis absorption features of regioregular head-to-tail poly(3-hexylthiophene) in water-based dispersions

The use of a non-ionic surfactant for preparing a stable aqueous dispersion of regioregular head-to-tail poly(3-hexylthiophene) (R-P3HT) is described. The spectral features of a THF solution of R-P3HT dispersed in water are investigated by means of UV–vis absorption spectroscopy. A clear difference between the classical solvatochromic phenomenology and the behaviour of the realized polymer/THF/water/surfactant system is observed, pointing to interactions between the polymeric alkylic side chains and the surfactant hydrophobic tail. From a technological point of view, the presented water-based dispersions, reducing use of toxic organic solvents, may be an interesting and environmentally friendly approach to the processing of conjugated polymers.

Descriptive Phenomenology and the Problem of Consciousness

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of (intentional) consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades (Fisette and Poirier 2000). Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1995), Owen Flanagan (1977), Colin McGinn (1991) and David Chalmers (1996), have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenological tradition. They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences.

A Fenomenologia Científica de Bachelard

Abstract The scientific phenornenology of Bachelard is constituted as an original reflection about the production of the scientific work, in their subjective (the scientist’s Psychology/Psychoanalysis) and objective (the phenomenon while measure) slopes. Inspired for a softer or a soft-headed phenomenology, the French author wanted to reformulate. some concepts and manners of seeing of the German classic phenomenology. Critical of the husserlian phenomenology of the concept of Meinung, Bachelard enrolled his epistemological labor inside of the history of the applied phenomenology to the sciences. In spite. of, he defends the lost «husserlian purity», independently of the denial of the idealism of the absolute conscience. The main theory is the one of the “Applied Rationalism” to the science and the consequent passing of thc psychologism but, and at the same time, of the mathesis universalis. The “discursive idealism of Bachelard didn’t ignore the specific disparity of the several scientific practices, on the contrary, he examined them the light of what called «phenomenontechnique».

Studies of non-classical shock wave phenomena

Most of our physical intuition regarding compressible flows and shock wave dynamics is based on experience with perfect gases in the context of an ideal fluid description. While this model is often a good approximation, there are some hydrodynamic systems in which shocks can exhibit behavior that lies outside of the classical phenomenology. Here, we present numerical simulations of a variety of such exotic shock wave effects, including “anomalous” behavior in so-called Bethe-Zel'dovich-Thompson fluids, shock “splitting,” the D'yakov-Kontorovich instability, and the influence of nonlinear heat transfer on shock structure in strong point explosions.

Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka expands the phenomenological study of meanings (sense-bestowal) into an onto-genetic inquiry by grounding it in a phenomenology of life, including the emotional dimension. This phenomenology of life is informed by the empirical sciences and its doctrines parallel the new scientific paradigm of open dynamic systems. Embedded in the dynamics of the real individuation of life forms, human consciousness emerges at a unique station in the evolutionary process. Tymieniecka treats the constitution of sense as a function of life, and thus the transcendental constitutive function of the cognitive, objectifying intentionality of consciousness, the purview of classical phenomenology, is viewed as a project that is limited in its scope. According to the phenomenology of life, meaning-genesis is exhibited throughout the various stages of structurization in the evolution of life. This paper highlights the transformative function of the “Imaginatio Creatrix,” which is the dynamic process at the human station of evolution that accounts for humanity’s inventive capacities necessary for the construction of a human world. The Imaginatio Creatrix transforms the more primitive stirrings of the human “soul” into subliminal passions of human existential significance. The enactive theory of the mind corroborates Tymieniecka’s rejection of Husserl’s doctrine of passive synthesis. However, Tymieniecka’s study of the creative function offers a key for further advancement in enactive theory. Three sense-bestowing functions of the Imaginatio Creatrix account for the human expansion of life: the Aesthetic/Poetic sense, the Objectifying Sense, and the Moral Sense. The Moral Sense, for Tymieniecka, is not the product of reasoning powers, but rather the fruit of subliminal passions that acquire their moral aspect through trans-actions guided by the “benevolent sentiment.”

Existentialism and the Return to Religion

There are some good reasons to think that future historians will characterize twentieth century century of secularism. As century began, Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead, made some years earlier, was still reverberating. Three years into century, Bertrand Russell's famous essay, A Free Man's Worship, was published.1 The essay is widely interpreted a powerful renunciation of religion in favor of an ethical humanism. Then came existentialism. Despite its religious beginnings in Kierkegaard and Buber, existentialism established itself in twentieth century a thoroughly secular philosophy. As David Cooper puts it, existentialism as defined by Sartre, made notion of a religious existentialist a virtual contradiction..2 While existentialism is no longer an influential philosophy, its secular messages have been well absorbed. However, it remains to be seen whether secular trend will continue into new millennium. According to some observers, it is too hasty to assume that it will. Indeed, Gianni Vattimo claims that end of twentieth century has witnessed a to religion.3 Given standard view of existentialism, it may be taken for granted that if there is a return to religion then it cannot be via existentialism. The trouble is that philosophy has habit of demonstrating that what is taken for granted turns out to be otherwise. At least, wish to demonstrate that this is so in case of existentialism. Specifically, aim of this essay is to show that philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is essentially an existentialist philosophy and if so, then, far from being a dead end, existentialism could well be main route for a return to religion. Levinas' account of subjectivity is discussed in Section I. In Section II, defend claim that Levinas' philosophy of subjectivity is essentially existentialist. In Section III, religiousness of that philosophy is explored. In his various writings, Levinas employs term l'Autrui, often translated the Other, to refer to one's fellow human beings, indefinite neighbors, strangers, widows and orphans, and term 1 'Autre, often translated the other, to refer to what lies beyond totality that is one's own being, beyond what constitutes one's essence, a realm to which Other belongs. The world that one knows is called the le dit, because all things in that world are known through what is said about them, through our own thematization or conceptualization of them. The realm of other is called the saying, le dire, because we are aware of it only through what it says to us rather than through our thematization. As a totality, belong to world of said, having an essence that can be thematized, a being that can be conceptualized; for instance, thematized and conceptualized in science or in traditional philosophy. However, this is utterly devoid of any subjectivity. In response to this, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas embarks on a phenomenological journey, tracing subjectivity of I.4 As is case with any classical phenomenology, Levinas begins with mundane experiences of I, showing that acquires its unique identity, or its unicity, by separating or isolating itself from what is not itself in activity of enjoyment. It is in that one is aware of one's own happiness and unhappiness, thus aware of one's own ipseity. For Levinas, enjoyment . . . is (TI, 117) and isolation is structure of unicity of I. The phenomenology of allows Levinas to conclude that self sufficiency of enjoying measures egoism or ipseity of Ego and same. Enjoyment is a withdrawal into oneself, an involution (TI, 118). In enjoyment, see all things in terms of my own being because in it I am absolutely for myself (TI, 134). Yet, in very process of enjoying, come to be aware that am much more than my own enjoyment. …

AN APPROACH TO UNIFYING CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM ELECTRODYNAMICS

The foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) can find a consistent and exhaustive explanation in a new theoretical context. The "Approach" allows us to justify both classical and quantum electromagnetic phenomenology by using classical concepts. In this paper we review the bases of the attempt originating form the role that the transverse component of the Poynting vector plays in localising energy in the neighbourhood of an electromagnetic source and we analyse the quantum implications.

Dispersion Phenomena in Thermal Diffusion and Modelling of Thermogravitational Experiments in Porous Media

In a TIPM paper published in 1992, the authors presented a simple model of thermogravitational diffusion in packed columns (TPC). Though qualitatively in agreement with the experimental results, this model exhibited a systematic discrepancy with respect to the magnitude of the permeability of maximum separation in the TPC experiments. Here, the results of a re-examination of the classical phenomenology of irreversible thermodynamics in porous media, applied to TPC, are described. Through the interpretation of additional TPC experiments, we show that the effective thermal diffusion coefficient in TPC includes a dependency upon the fluid velocity. This dependency is consistent with a nonlinear extension of irreversible thermodynamics, and the model so amended accounts for a correct re-interpretation of the experiments.

Whole Earth Measurements

Let us take a very commonplace, often discussed and critical topic within our conversations regarding critical issues: Are we detecting a Greenhouse Effect, and related to this, is it exacerbated by i.e., human actions? At this occasion I suspect that most of you would be inclined to give a positive answer to both of these questions. But, if pushed philosophically, what would be the evidence, and well grounded would it be for such affirmations? Within scientific communities and associated scientifically informed circles, the answers have to be somewhat more ambiguous, particularly when rigorous questions concerning evidence are raised. Were scientific truth to be a matter of consensus-and some contemporary philosophers of science argue that scientific truth often turns out to be just that-then it is clear that there is beginning to be a kind of majoritarian consensus among many earth science practicioners that the temperature of the Earth, particularly of the oceans, is, indeed rising and that this is a crucial indicator for a possible Greenhouse Effect. Most of these scientists admit that the mean oceanic temperature has risen globally in the last several decades. But this generalization depends upon (a) accurate may be, not just for samples, but for the earth. A hot spot-for example the now four year old hot spot near New Guinea, which is part of the El Nino cycle-doesn't count by itself because it might be balanced by cold spots elsewhere. And the fact of the matter is that whole earth measurements are still rare and primitive in the simple sense that we simply don't have enough thermometers out. (b) Secondly, even if we have enough thermometers, a simply synchronic earth measurement over three decades is but a blip in the diachronic history of Ice Age cycles over the last tens of thousands of years. (c) Thirdly, even if we know that the Earth is now heating up, much ofthis is due to homogenic factors, such as CFCs, C02 increases, hydrocarbon burning, and the like? Is it the case, as Science magazine claimed in 1990, that 24% of greenhouse encouraging gases are of homogenic origin? As I have described the current debate it does not sound on the surface to be very philosophical, instead it seems empirical and thus within the domain of scientific discourse. However, in the way in which the story was cast, there lurk some deep epistemological issues which relate to my ironic first subtitle, how many phenomenologists does it take to detect a greenhouse effect? What I wish to do in this essay is to look both at classical phenomenology (Husserl in particular) and at Heideggerian hermeneutics regarding our theme, environmental phenomenology,' and show that both approaches are to be found wanting with respect to the Greenhouse Effect phenomenon. Then I wish to show a rather radically modified hermeneutic and phenomenological epistemology can address this problem. This modification entails two positive concepts, both of which, I will argue, are necessary for a phenomenological approach to issues: Technoscience, as a thoroughly technologically embodied science, as a necessary concept to get at presumed sub-perceptual entities, and Earth-as-Planet, as a necessary presupposition for dealing with earth measurements. Classical phenomenology, I argue, lacks the first of these concepts, and Heideggerian romanticism rejects the latter. Let us begin with a very simple phenomenological question: from what standpoint or perspective can the issue of earth be made? If, at base, our very knowledge is constituted by way of our bodies and through perception as both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty seem to contend, then what is claimed about earth measrurements becomes problematical in two senses: First, do we get a sufficiently encompassing perspective to talk about a earth? …

The Art of Doubting

Merleau-Ponty's essay, Doubt,1 appeared in December 1945, the same year he published his Phenomenology Perception, which would become classic manifesto phenomenology, and collaborated with Jean-Paul Same to found Les Temps Modernes. While the ostensible aim Merleau-Ponty's essay is an examination Cezanne's painting, it is no less thumbnail sketch his own philosophy as developed in Phenomenology Perception. Given that Merleau-Ponty seeks in Cezanne an artistic parallel to his own philosophical ruminations, our caution should be alerted; as Sabine Cotte noted while Curator France's National Museums, theories are contradictory enough to enable one to justify anything.2 But, while there is the danger that Merleau-Ponty finds in Cezanne only what he has put there, it must also be mentioned that Merleau-Ponty's examination continues to influence art historians and interpreters Cezanne.3 It might be claimed, in fact, that the very malleability Cezanne's work has its parallel in Merleau-Ponty, whose Phenomenology one early critic labeled a philosophy ambiguity.4 To stick with only one ambiguity at time, I will leave aside the question how Merleau-Ponty's examination Cezanne relates to that other interpreters,5 and instead focus on the positive characterization he offers Cezanne and its parallels with his own philosophy. I will begin by discussing the explicit themes Merleau-Ponty's essay, namely (a) the importance Cezanne's return to and (b) the relation the artist's life to the meaning his work, particularly as these themes elucidate the nature the peculiar to Cezanne. In the second part this essay, I will explore the significance this for understanding Merleau-Ponty's own work and especially his relation to Jean-Paul Sartre. Giacometti, Sartre's paradigm artist, also manifests doubt. But, I will argue, the doubt shared by Giacometti and Sartre differs significantly from that Merleau-Ponty and Cezanne, and it is within the space this difference that we can distinguish Merleau-Ponty's brand existential phenomenology from Sartre's existentialism.6 Metaphysical Doubt As the title his essay indicates, MerleauPonty is interested in Cezanne's doubt, that is, in his uncertainty, his lack self-confidence, the struggle and tension his life. When Cezanne first made his decision to become painter, this lack self-confidence prevented him from asking his father to send him to Paris. When he finally did embark on his career, chastised by his childhood friend Zola for his instability, his weakness, and his indecision (CD, 14/60), his attempts met with complete critical rejection. Described as a kind madman who paints in delirium tremens,7 an artist with diseased eyes,8 and but lamentable failure,9 critics wrote that of all known juries, none could even in dream entertain the possibility accepting any pictures this painter.10 And in fact the government, art authorities, and the public all cried out for the refusal donated to the Musee du Luxembourg, and later transferred to the Louvre,11 which contained several Cezannes, calling it collection rubbish which publicly dishonors French art.12 In the face such criticism, it is perhaps no surprise that Cezanne himself came to wonder if the novelty his painting were nothing more than an accident his body stemming from trouble with his eyes (CD, 13/59).13 But Cezanne's anxiety ran deeper than doubt about his painting ability. He often said he found life terrifying, while his fear death drove him to create will at the age forty-six and to begin practicing religion in his fifties. As he grew older, he detached himself more and more from those who admired his work, would motion from distance for friends not to approach him, avoided new situations, and relied on the established habits his life solitude. …