Civilian Nuclear Program Research Articles

Continuity and change in US–Iran relations: Analyzing the Iranian nuclear deal from Obama to Biden

AbstractIran's pursuit of a civilian nuclear program raises concerns over the potential security threat it poses to the United States and its Middle East allies. The US suspects that Tehran's lack of compliance with the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty signifies its intention to build atomic weapons. This article aims to examine the strategies implemented during the presidencies of Obama, Trump, and Biden to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arsenals. Employing a constructivist theory, the study examines how each administration constructed identities, perceptions, and norms regarding Iran, and how these shaped their diplomatic approaches. Drawing on a comprehensive data of primary and secondary sources, this research sheds light on the identities, perceptions, and power dynamics shaping US–Iran relations.

РУХ ПРОТИ ЯДЕРНОЇ ЕНЕРГЕТИКИ У США: ВІД АВАРІЇ НА ТРИ-МАЙЛ-АЙЛЕНД ДО ЧОРНОБИЛЬСЬКОЇ КАТАСТРОФИ

The purpose of the research is to highlight the formation and development of the movement against nuclear energy in the USA in the 1970s and 1980s. The research methodology is based on the principle of historicism and problem-chronological and complex approaches. We used the following methods: historical and systemic – in the process of considering the movement against nuclear energy in the USA as an integrated part of the social activity of the American public in the period of the 1970s – 1980s; historical-chronological – to identify features and changes in the dynamics of the movement against atomic energy; problem-genetic – in the study of the impact on the movement of key incidents in atomic energy; comparative – to establish common and different forms, character and activity of anti-nuclear power protest organizations in the USA. The scientific novelty of the article. For the first time in Ukrainian historiography, an attempt was made to investigate the origins of the movement against nuclear energy in the USA, its dynamics and key events as one of the largest social phenomena of the country in the 1970s and 1980s. In the example of the Three Mile Island station district, the development of protest organizations and the strategy of rallying American society in the conditions of a radiation incident is traced; the impact of the Chornobyl disaster on the activation of the movement against nuclear energy in the USA was revealed. The article also shows the impact of anti-nuclear public activism on the social and political sphere of the USA. Conclusions. An organized movement against nuclear energy emerged in the mid-1970s as opposition to the development of the U.S. civilian nuclear program. The Three Mile Island incident in March 1979 undermined social confidence in the industry, fueling anti-nuclear activism. The Chornobyl disaster in Ukraine on April 26, 1986, mobilized and consolidated the movement against nuclear energy in the United States, finally halting the development of the industry for more than 30 years.

Atoms for Peace in the 1950s: Lessons from the Spread of Nuclear Technology in the Early Cold War

Abstract The articles in this special issue shed light on the influence of the Eisenhower administration's “Atoms for Peace” proposal on the civilian nuclear programs of five European countries, including Italy and France, which were member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which were part of the USSR's Communist bloc; and Spain, which did not become a member of NATO until nearly three decades later. Based on detailed archival research, the articles analyze the commercial, scientific, practical, and cultural aspects of nascent nuclear research programs in these five countries. The authors demonstrate that all five acted early on to pursue peaceful nuclear activities for their own economic benefit.

Indo-US civilian nuclear deal: challenges and options for Pakistan

The strategic cooperation in terms of the Civilian Nuclear Deal between India and the US has facilitated both the states in terms of supply of nuclear energy, advancement in technology, regional nuclear symmetry, energy crisis, military arsenals and the development in the economic sector. With some mutually agreed terms under the instrument, India agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to keep a check and have access to India's civilian nuclear program. Moreover, the US will be allowed to build its companies of nuclear reactors in India, whereas India also promised to place all future thermal reactors under the supervision of the IAEA. Furthermore, the deal benefitted both India and the US on one side, while on the other side, it adversely affected Pakistan and disrupted the balance of power in South Asia. This article explores the drastic challenges that Pakistan faces and affects its nuclear status in the region. The method used for the research is qualitative, and data is analysed from secondary sources. Moreover, the study's objective attempts to interpret multiple options that could help the stakeholders overcome the challenges and restore the balance of power in the South Asian region.

Our remaining options for preventing a nuclear Iran

Fifty years ago the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), an international agreement that seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, went into effect. Under the NPT, all countries party to the treaty are permitted to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful activities, but countries without nuclear weapons are not permitted to divert those technologies to manufacture nuclear weapons. In 2003, it was determined that Iran had pursued nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian nuclear program, violating its NPT commitments. Unified international economic sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, resulting in the Iran Deal, formally termed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. The Iran deal placed additional limits beyond NPT restrictions, on materials and activities that could be diverted to developing a nuclear weapon, extending the time needed for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon from a few months to roughly a year. This changed when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and Iran announced the following year that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the deal. Lacking the added restrictions of the Iran deal, Iran has begun ramping up domestic nuclear activities, raising fears that they may pursue development of a nuclear weapon. The United States has several policy options available in seeking to forestall such an outcome. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of several of these options, including economic sanctions, counterproliferation military action, or return to the JCPOA or a similar diplomatic agreement. The return to a cooperative agreement such as the Iran deal, though made challenging by mutual distrust, is assessed to provide the best chance to prevent Iran from resuming a nuclear weapons program.

India and Russia: An Investigation of Relational Equations (1991-2020)

India’s relations with Russia has marked by ambiguity and uncertainty in the post-Cold War period. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an uncertainty in India’s foreign policy about the direction of its Russia policy. The nature of global politics and power equation structure had posed a serious challenge to the nation-states whether they would be closer to the leader of the unipolar world or not. India was not an exception. India had face a lot of problems and challenges in the early 1990s regarding searching for alternative ways in reviving its fall-downed economy and acceptance of globalization. Bilateral trade is relatively low, but Russia is India’s largest supplier of weapons. Both countries have strong strategic relations and military engagement. Moreover, Russia plays an important role in India’s civilian nuclear program. India-Russia relations are multi-dimensional and on some issues it is complicated. This paper intends to investigate the relational equations between New Delhi and Moscow critically.

From fragmentation to centralization in policymaking: An explanation for the expansion of China's civilian nuclear industry

AbstractSeveral countries have pursued nuclear programs for various reasons, including energy security, environmental benefits, and technological progress. China is no exception, having pursued civilian nuclear programs since the 1970s. Existing studies depict China's nuclear policymaking as a contested bureaucratic struggle based on fragmented authoritarianism. This study, however, reveals an increasingly centralizing tendency in China's nuclear policymaking since the mid‐2000s. The central government has begun to undergird China's transition to an exporting country of nuclear technology through many policy instruments, seeing its technology as a global brand. China's accelerated promotion of the nuclear sector based on such centralization contrasts with its neighboring governments' shift away from the top–down, government‐dominant mode of policymaking to a more pluralistic and deliberative one in the post‐Fukushima era.

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Proliferation “Danger Zone”

ABSTRACT Horizontal nuclear proliferation presents what is sometimes referred to as the “Nth country problem,” or identifying which state could be next to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear fuel cycle technologies can contribute to both nuclear power generation and weapons development. Consequently, observers often view civilian nuclear programs with suspicion even as research on nuclear latency and the technological inputs of proliferation has added nuance to these discussions. To contribute to this debate, I put forth a simple theoretical proposition: En route to developing a civilian nuclear infrastructure and mastering the fuel cycle, states pass through a proliferation “danger zone.” States with fuel cycle capabilities below a certain threshold will likely be unable to proliferate. States that pass through the “danger zone” without proliferating will be unlikely to do so in the future. I support this proposition by introducing preliminary analysis from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) Index, a new heuristic tool to complement political assessments of the connection between civilian nuclear energy development and nuclear weapons proliferation. I conclude with policy implications for contemporary Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Taken together, this article calls for increased policymaker interaction with historical cases and more sophisticated academic engagement with the nuclear fuel cycle.

‘When Pigs Fly’: Britain, Canada and Nuclear Exports to Israel, 1958-1974

ABSTRACTBritain and Canada, two major nuclear Cold War actors, refrained from establishing close nuclear ties with Israel from 1958 to 1974, despite Israel’s consistent interest in importing civilian nuclear technology. This was true both before and after the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970, even though the treaty allowed for the export of safeguarded nuclear reactors. In comparison, the other two leading nuclear exporters of the period, France and the United States, were much more involved in the initial stages of the Israeli nuclear programme, exporting research reactors to Israel in the 1950s. How did Britain and Canada view Israel’s military and civilian nuclear programme from 1958 to 1974? How did they form their nuclear export policy towards Israel and what considerations motivated them? This analysis examines these questions using archival material from British and Canadian archives.

Nuclear energy and nuclear-weapon potential: A historical analysis of Japan in the 1960s

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes Japan's development of civilian nuclear energy and its potential for developing nuclear weapons in the late 1960s. First, it examines two technological studies of Japan's nuclear fissionable material production capability: one sponsored by the Japanese government and the other sponsored by the US government. A comparative analysis of them reveals that the Japanese study did not investigate the full range of feasible measures toward Japan's nuclear armament. Further scrutiny of Japanese nuclear-energy development in relation to its policy-making structure at that time draws out the following arguments: (1) Japan's civilian nuclear program clearly contributed to its acquisition of a latent nuclear weapon potential; (2) Japan had not deliberately developed the latent capability, which reflected the lack of coordination among political actors; (3) Japan increased its dependence on the United States in the nuclear-power field, making its pursuit of nuclear weapons politically more difficult. This case study of Japan illustrates not only the intricate relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power, the development of nuclear-weapon potential, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the effects of the state’s nuclear-policy-making structure on its nuclear posture.

The peaceful atom comes to campus

Youthful idealism, institutional ambition, and Cold War sensibilities all helped shape the Michigan Memorial–Phoenix Project, the University of Michigan’s tribute to fallen World War II soldiers.

Iran and multinational enrichment in the Middle East

ABSTRACTAs implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs. While most of these programs involve contracts with foreign vendors to provide reactors and the low-enriched uranium to fuel them, some states may want to follow Iran’s example and develop their own uranium enrichment programs, giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. The authors assess the uranium enrichment capacity needed to fuel planned nuclear programs in the Middle East and support the idea of using the next decade to convert Iran’s Natanz national enrichment plant to a multinational one – in partnership with one or more of the international parties to the Iran nuclear deal and some of Iran’s neighbors. Such an arrangement could help maintain the transparency of Iran’s program after restrictions on it expire, thereby easing tensions between Iran and other regional powers. This confidence-building measure could create a political context within which other Middle Eastern states forgo acquiring their own national enrichment programs and begin a worldwide movement away from such programs in favor of more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangements.

Effects of Nuclear Technology Export Competition on Nuclear Nonproliferation

ABSTRACTWhile nuclear suppliers compete in markets, they simultaneously partner in other fields. This produces a delicate relationship between civilian nuclear programs and nuclear weapon proliferation. This study explores how export competition affects suppliers’ conditions of supply related to nuclear nonproliferation. We investigated three export cases (India, North Korea, and South Korea) and identified four effects that competition has on the conditions of supply related to nonproliferation. First, under highly competitive conditions, suppliers might hesitate to enforce the conditions of supply to avoid negotiation conflicts with recipients. Second, suppliers focus on politically and economically attractive recipients while mostly ignoring unattractive ones, perhaps allowing proliferation problems to fester out of view in marginal states. Third, suppliers can build consensus on the conditions of supply to avoid being the only party experiencing negotiation conflicts. Fourth, suppliers can constrain others from relaxing the conditions of supply to maintain economic benefits and nonproliferation norms. The first two effects accelerate proliferation while the last two promote nonproliferation. Although the extent of these effects can vary with changes in nonproliferation norms, they can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between nonproliferation and civilian nuclear programs.

The Linchpin to the Iran Deal's Future: Europe

The July 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran is not only a victory for diplomacy, but also very much a transatlantic success. The deal that hides its groundbreaking qualities in the non-descript title “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) represents the conclusion—and validation—of a process that three European states began in 2003. As a sign of transatlantic interdependence, U.S. opposition to engage Iran post-9/11 required the Europeans to begin a process that, ultimately, could only conclude with the United States at the table, which joined the talks alongside China and Russia in 2006. Throughout these years, the transatlantic alliance has been critical to driving the negotiation process forward, combining diplomatic and economic pressure with the right incentives to nudge Tehran toward accepting serious limitations on its purportedly civilian nuclear program. In other words, only because the United States and Europe worked so closely on this file could they rally the international support that was necessary to first isolate Iran and then successfully conclude the negotiations. However, transatlantic cooperation is likely to become more difficult going forward. The U.S. government faces continued domestic resistance to even accepting the limited cooperation this agreement stipulates with Iran, a 36-yearlong U.S. adversary. In this climate, it is questionable how much Washington can play a proactive role in implementing the JCPOA over the coming years. Europe—referring to the European Union and/or more specifically France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (also known as the E3/EU)—as the initiators of this process, may be less hampered by internal politics. Yet, they are absorbed

Nuclear Security in Asia: Problems and Challenges

The importance of nuclear security in Asia needs to be focused upon in view of the emerging challenges of nuclear proliferation, growing nuclear arsenals, expanding civilian nuclear energy programmes, weak export controls, zones of domestic instability and terrorism in several regions within the continent. This article focuses on the factors that pose potential risks to nuclear security in Asia. It emphasises the prevailing factors endangering the security of nuclear and radiological materials in Asia. The article stresses the need to strengthen nuclear security in Asia and reinforce effective nuclear security worldwide.

Civilian Nuclear Development in the Arabian Peninsula: Prestige, Energy, and Iran

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia seem likely to become the first Arab states to develop fully functioning civilian nuclear programmes. Their motivations stem from considerations of prestige and identity, energy concerns, and as an answer to the threat emanating from Iran. This article considers their particular motivations, aims, and obstacles, and the potential, or lack thereof, for a shift from a civilian to a military programme. Although Iran's nuclear pursuit is probably the primary impetus, it is not the only one, and any conclusion to the Iranian question is not likely to reverse such endeavours.

Securing China's Weapon-Usable Nuclear Materials

This article describes the status of China's military and civilian nuclear programs, fissile material production and associated nuclear facilities, and the Chinese nuclear experts and officials’ perspectives on the nuclear terrorism threat. It gives details of China's nuclear security practices, attitudes, and regulations, as well as identifying areas of concern. The article recommends ways to strengthen China's nuclear material protection, control, and accounting systems and suggests opportunities for increased international cooperation.

Examining relationship between nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power development

This paper attempts to examine the relationship between nuclear weapons proliferation and civilian nuclear power development based on the history of Atoms for Peace Initiative. To investigate the relationship, a database was established by compiling information on a country's civilian nuclear power development and various national capabilities and situational factors. The results of correlation analysis indicated that the initial motivation to develop civilian nuclear power could be mostly dual purpose. However, for a civilian nuclear power program to be ultimately successful, the study finds the role of nuclear nonproliferation very important. The analysis indicated that the presence of nuclear weapons in a country and serious interest in nuclear weapons have a negative effect on the civilian nuclear power program. The study showed the importance of state level commitment to nuclear nonproliferation for the success of civilian nuclear power development. NPT ratification and IAEA safeguards were very important factors in the success of civilian nuclear power development. In addition, for a country's civilian nuclear power development to be successful, the country needs to possess strong economic capability and be well connected to the world economic market through international trade. Mature level of democracy and presence of nuclear technological capabilities were also found to be important for the success of civilian nuclear power program.

Nuclear chromosomes: The national security implications of a French nuclear exit

The French political consensus supports both civilian and military nuclear programs as part of a national identity that presupposes France’s global influence. It is technically possible for the French government to maintain its nuclear deterrent force as it is today without a civilian nuclear power industry; the channels of production of weapons and their delivery systems are distinct from those used for the power industry. Because many aspects of the civilian and military nuclear programs have been intertwined for decades, however, the end of financing for civilian nuclear research projects would increase the cost of maintaining the nuclear arsenal. And in France, the link between the civilian and military nuclear sectors is far more than a budgetary matter. From its beginnings after World War II, the French nuclear effort has occupied an exalted position in the country’s national identity. In fact, one could reasonably argue that it would take a reimagining of that identity, and a reconsideration of France’s nuclear deterrent, before a French exit from civilian nuclear power could become a serious possibility.

Managing the Uranium-233 Stockpile of the United States

The United States produced about 2 tons of uranium-233, a weapons-useable fissile material, as part of its military and civilian nuclear program. Of that, 1.55 tons was separated at costs estimated to be between $5.5 and $11 billion. Of the 1.55 tons, approximately 96 kg of uranium-233 may be unaccounted for. There are also varying site-specific estimates suggesting that material control and accountability of the U.S. uranium-233 inventory needs to be more stringent. About 428 kg of uranium-233 is stored at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), in Tennessee at Building 3019, a 69-year-old structure which DOE describes as the “oldest operating nuclear facility in the World” and one that does not meet current safeguards and security requirements. Currently, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) goal for disposition of the 428 kg is 2018, more than 20 years after significant environmental, safety, and security vulnerabilities were first officially acknowledged. To meet this goal, DOE plans to waive its own waste acceptance criteria to allow direct shallow land disposal of a large portion of the uranium-233 by August 2014. Granting a disposal waiver sets a bad precedent for international safeguards and standards for the disposal of reprocessed wastes containing high concentrations of fissile materials.