Abstract

The July 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran is not only a victory for diplomacy, but also very much a transatlantic success. The deal that hides its groundbreaking qualities in the non-descript title “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) represents the conclusion—and validation—of a process that three European states began in 2003. As a sign of transatlantic interdependence, U.S. opposition to engage Iran post-9/11 required the Europeans to begin a process that, ultimately, could only conclude with the United States at the table, which joined the talks alongside China and Russia in 2006. Throughout these years, the transatlantic alliance has been critical to driving the negotiation process forward, combining diplomatic and economic pressure with the right incentives to nudge Tehran toward accepting serious limitations on its purportedly civilian nuclear program. In other words, only because the United States and Europe worked so closely on this file could they rally the international support that was necessary to first isolate Iran and then successfully conclude the negotiations. However, transatlantic cooperation is likely to become more difficult going forward. The U.S. government faces continued domestic resistance to even accepting the limited cooperation this agreement stipulates with Iran, a 36-yearlong U.S. adversary. In this climate, it is questionable how much Washington can play a proactive role in implementing the JCPOA over the coming years. Europe—referring to the European Union and/or more specifically France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (also known as the E3/EU)—as the initiators of this process, may be less hampered by internal politics. Yet, they are absorbed

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