The papers published in this book are the result of a workshop organized by the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sport (BMLVS) and the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) and held at the “Peace Castle Schlaining” in Austria in November 2012. The volume is supposed to analyze the Austrian Security Strategy (Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie, or ÖSS) from 2011, placing it in the context of Austria's role as a “neutral” country in European and global security.The book is divided into three parts: The first part analyzes the Austrian government's current concept of security, the second traces the role Austria plays in European and global security policy, and the third tries to draw conclusions and develop strategies for the Austrian armed forces to take part in international peace missions under the lead of the European Union (EU). The book thus focuses both on theoretical aspects and on practical applications of the issues discussed during the workshop.The analysis of ÖSS 2011 in the first part is critical overall. The authors of the three essays in this part share the view that the Austrian concept of security is far too broad to be a suitable basis for a security strategy. Or, as Franz Kernic puts it in his essay: “The further the concept of security is taken, the more it loses its profile and conciseness” (p. 24). One possibility, as Carola Bielfeldt suggests, would have been to take the ÖSS as a “framework” for the planning and activities of several Austrian ministries. The resulting security strategy would have affected not only the Ministry of Defense (military) but also the Ministry of the Interior (police, security forces). However, she maintains that such an approach would have been misleading because ministries are prone to invoke “threats to security” that are actually political or administrative problems and have nothing to do with national “security.” Such abuses are especially common when discussion about a security strategy and actual threat scenarios is kept secret. As Bielfeldt states, the political considerations and background information a country's policymakers use when deciding whether to participate in global security missions such as humanitarian efforts and United Nations “peace missions” are not effectively or sufficiently communicated to the public, and thus news about accessory phenomena such as “waves of refugees” and “terrorism” are unsettling and produce insecurity. The third disadvantage of the ÖSS, as both Bielfeldt and Klaus Heidegger argue, is that it gives short shrift to “humanitarian” issues like development aid. In their view, “civilian” services and administration should be integrated in a new Austrian security strategy.The essays about Austria's role in global security policy consider how the small Central European country can make an important contribution to these efforts. Werner Wintersteiner argues that a meaningful “Austrian trademark” must be established for a “peace policy” that can be broadly applied. The role of the Austrian armed forces and the BMLVS in international crisis management is discussed by Reinhard Trischak and Anton Resch: Small countries like Austria, they maintain, can gain a valuable role in such operations by focusing on specific aspects of humanitarian and peace missions. Past missions, as Trischak and Resch suggest, have shown Austria adept in developing concepts for the “protection of civilians” and the training of military units of other states for humanitarian missions. Thus, the wisest course would be to concentrate on these tasks. Helmut Kramer contends that Austria should also intensify its efforts in humanitarian aid and civilian crisis prevention.How these concepts might be implemented via foreign deployments by the EU is taken up in the third part of the book. According to Johann Frank, a new security strategy should focus not only on national but on European issues and should include military as well as concrete political guidelines for a broad security policy of all ministries and not just the BMLVS. Thomas Roithner analyzes the foreign assignments of the EU. Even though the EU wants to and must be able to conduct such (military) assignments, the EU and Austria, Roithner insists, need fewer military forces and more civilian capabilities, insofar as most of the present “threats” can be answered with “civilian” measures and the military forces needed for foreign assignments could be much smaller than those existing today. Bernadette Knauder and Elias Bierdel support this approach by recommending civilian-military cooperation and extension of civilian capabilities within the EU. Hermann Lattacher claims that the EU is already a major player in “peace policymaking” because its civilian capabilities exceed its military potential by far. Thus, the change proposed by Roithner is unnecessary, and foreign assignments conducted by the EU are just additional (but necessary) measures.The book concludes with suggestions from the perspective of peacemaking, summarizing the results of the workshop and the published essays. The aim, as the editors indicate, is to provide guidance and help to develop a more effective security strategy for the future.In highlighting key aspects of Austrian security policy, Wieviel Sicherheit braucht der Friede? provides a lucid analysis of the weaknesses and advantages of the 2011 strategy. Even though the book was published in early 2013, several months before ÖSS 2013 was approved by the Austrian National Council in July 2013, the recommendations are still valid. The concept of security remains a broad one, and military aspects are still the major element. Further analysis and measures will be necessary to redefine Austria's role in global security policy, and publications like this will help in that effort.