Along with Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 and Harry Truman's tangles with Douglas MacArthur during Korean War, George B. McClellan s problematic career as general during Civil War is frequently held up as one of great episodes of tension, if not crisis, in history of American civil-military relations. (1) In 1987, British scholar Brian Holden Reid published an essay in journal titled General McClellan and Politicians, in which he provided an insightful and compelling discussion of events and forces that shaped McClellan's dealings with Washington during his tenure in command. (2) In decades since appearance of Reid's essay, though, rich body of literature has appeared on both Civil War and subject of civil-military relations. It seems worthwhile to revisit subject of Reid's essay and consider what insight outpouring of recent theoretical literature on civil-military relations may offer on how we think about McClellan's dealings with Washington during his time in command. By far most famous and influential concept in field of civil-military relations is one Samuel Huntington advocated in his landmark work Soldier and State. This concept, which Huntington labeled civilian control, has become so ubiquitous that political scientist Eliot A. Cohen has labeled it normal theory of civil-military relations. The essence of objective civilian control is recognition of autonomous military professionalism, Huntington declared, professionalizing military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral ... ready to carry out wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within state.... antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics, he added, notion fundamentally out of place in society in which division of labor has been carried to point where there emerges distinct class of specialists in management of violence. In conduct of war, Huntington advocated clear division of responsibility between political leader, whose job is to define broader policy ends for which wars are fought, and military man, whose job is to manage military means provided for achieving those ends. (3) In truth, Huntington simply gave label to concept that had informed attitudes toward civil-military relations for as long as militaries had been viewed as distinct from other governmental institutions. Huntington was correct, though, in his observation that appeal of idea received decided boost from increased specialization of labor that accompanied market and industrial revolutions of nineteenth century and gave rise to concept of professionalism in various fields. As historian John Shy noted, during nineteenth century, the modern military profession emerged in Western societies, with rationalized recruitment, education, promotion, retirement, staff systems--all features of separate, specialized of technicians, increasingly distinct from civilian world. Among forces that both drove and reflected development was prominence enjoyed by writings of Baron Antoine Henri Jomini. Jomini's effort to indentify and articulate principles to guide priesthood of technicians in conduct of war, writes Shy, fostered mindset that anticipated Huntington's concept of objective control by giving this emergent profession ... prestige of science as well as rationale for professional claim to autonomy.... lesson was clear: government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave him free to wage war according to scientific principles. (4) Yet, as Carl von Clausewitz noted, war is an activity whose inherent complexities make it exceedingly problematic to establish hard and fast principles for how it is to be conducted. This is especially case in relationship between military and political leaders, for war is, Clausewitz observed, never an isolated act separate from politics but rather a true political instrument, continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. …