Changing Attitudes Toward the West Bank in Jordan Michael Sharnoff (bio) A quarter of a century after King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank, and nearly two decades after the signature of the Wadi Arabah Peace Accord with Israel, Jordan’s western border has still not been fixed and the fate of the Palestinian refugees on the East Bank remains uncertain. —Tariq Mreyoud al-Tal1 This quote, expressed by Jordanian scholar Tariq Mreyoud al-Tal probably appears strange to most Westerners and perhaps even non-Jordanian Middle Easterners. Jordan’s boundaries in question refer to its relationship with the West Bank, a landlocked territory bordering Israel and Jordan and home to around 3 million Palestinian Arabs and half a million Israeli Jews. Jordan occupied this land during the 1948 war and subsequently annexed it in 1950. The West Bank became an integral part of Jordan until Israel conquered the land from Jordan during the 1967 war. Despite Israel’s occupation, Jordan continued to assert sovereignty claims on the West Bank until King Hussein severed all legal and administrative ties in 1988 in favor of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Today, Jordan, along with nearly the entire international community, regards the West Bank as an Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. The official position of the Hashemite Kingdom supports ending Israeli rule of the West Bank and establishing an independent Palestinian state [End Page 44] there, along with the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as its capital. However, despite Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank, the Hashemite monarchy’s stance obfuscates Jordan’s complex and historical, political, and legal relationship with this territory. Indeed, Jordan’s attitudes toward the West Bank have evolved, as explained by Adnan Abu-Odeh, former political advisor to both King Hussein and King Abdullah II, from an indivisible part of Jordan, to an occupied Jordanian land with Israel, to a territorial dispute with the PLO, and to an occupied Palestinian land.2 Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 and peace treaty with Israel in 1994 sought to affirm that Jordan is not Palestine, that Jordan would not become a substitute Palestinian homeland, and that the PLO was principally responsible to end the occupation and establish an independent state. This article aims to explain the changing attitudes toward the West Bank in Jordan from 1948 until the present. It will expand on Abu-Odeh’s remarks about the fluidity and evolving perceptions of Jordan’s attitude toward the West Bank and explain why some Jordanians espouse views toward the West Bank which challenge official Hashemite policy. In doing so, this article will demonstrate how Jordanian perceptions of the West Bank are influenced by Israeli and Palestinian politics and will assess how attitudes in opposition to official regime policy seek to defend the kingdom’s national security and protect the Palestinian people. Historical Context During World War I, the Allied Powers recognized Britain at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 to serve as the mandatory power in Palestine. The Allies endorsed the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine based on the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which would comprise land on both banks of the Jordan River. The League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations, sanctioned the British Mandate of Palestine in 1922, which remained in effect until 1948. However, in 1921, Britain severed three-fourths of the original Mandate to Abdullah I, son of Hussein bin Ali, Emir of Mecca, based on agreements signed with London before the start of the Great Arab Revolt (1916–1918) against the Ottoman Turks. This new Arab entity became known as Transjordan and comprised territory east of the Jordan River. Transjordan, which gained semi-independence in 1923 and full independence from Britain in 1946, [End Page 45] consisted of vast territory with sparsely populated cities such as Irbid, Salt, Karak, and Ma’an. The ruling Hashemite dynasty governed over a quarter of a million Bedouin and non-Bedouin Muslim Arabs, settled Christian Arabs, and small numbers of Armenian Christians, Druze Arabs, Muslim Circassians, and Muslim Chechens.3 Abdullah I had grand territorial ambitions that Transjordan alone could not satisfy. Coveting a...