Chinese Strategic Thinking Research Articles

Confucius’ Trap?

The rise of the People’s Republic of China has spurred research into whether this rising power will end up colliding with the United States, following a pattern that Graham Allison has called Thucydides’ Trap. However, some of these studies depart from the idea that the State is a unified actor and that conflict is inherent to the international system. In other words, China will behave in the same manner as all western powers on the international stage. This article will sustain that it is impossible to analyse and/or infer the potential conduct of the People’s Republic of China without grasping its over 2000-year’s cultural heritage. The legacy of Confucianism enjoyed a rebirth in the People’s Republic of China since the 1990s. In this sense, the theoretical tool of constructivism is used to study that legacy and its impact on Chinese strategic thinking, which is also linked to Chinese traditions and can be observed in the dynamics of Wéiqí: the weakening of the adversary in order to obtain greater territorial control. To that effect, we observe how investment, trade and cultural penetration by China into the world has evolved in the last few years.

Sino-Russian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security

What is the nature and impact of Sino-Russian alignment? What are the conditions under which each is likely to support the other militarily and with what type of support? To answer these questions, this article presents a novel alignment framework that best captures war fighting capabilities and how great powers align and determines the values of each indicator based on English, Chinese and Russian sources. I argue that China and Russia are significantly aligned and trending towards an even more extensive alignment relationship. However, the scope of their military alignment is limited to facilitating China’s challenge of US hegemony in Asia. Additionally, Russian support comes in the form of enhancing China’s independent combat capacity and potentially providing support functions in wartime but does not extend to direct involvement. These findings have implications for the literature on alignment, deterrence calculations and ourunderstanding of Russian and Chinese strategic thinking.

China’s 21st Century Maritime Strategy

Abstract In less than three decades, the People’s Liberation Army Navy developed from a minor coastal-defence force into the largest naval force in the world. China’s rapid rise in seapower has gained significant attention from established naval circles, academia, and the public. In their efforts to explain this development, analysts have often referred to 19th-century naval history, seeking to connect China’s maritime developments to the ideas of influential naval strategists like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. However, in doing so, these naval thinkers are often used to make a case about long-term developments or strategic implications regarding China’s alleged grand strategy. This paper seeks to turn this methodology around by solely focusing on the reflection of those naval theories—in their own right—against China’s maritime strategy. In doing so, it aims to historicise China’s 21st-century maritime strategy by testing to what extent it is reflected by the ideas of the navalists that are often presumed to influence Chinese strategic circles. It is argued that while on a grand-strategic level, Chinese strategic thinking seems to reflect the essence of Mahan’s seapower argument regarding its focus on the interconnectedness of maritime commerce and national power, a closer analysis reveals significant discrepancies in terms of both implementation and the broader strategic mindset regarding China’s geostrategic situation.

ASSURED RETALIATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of ‘no-first use of nuclear weapons’ and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.

Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan

Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy.

Geopolitical implications of China’s rise in Asia

PurposeThis introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.FindingsThis study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.Research limitations/implicationsMany Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.Originality/valueThe strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

Chinese strategic thinking. The fundamentals of the Chinese model of world governance

This article analyzes the connections between China’s foreign policy guidelines and traditional Chinese strategic thinking, where Confucian and Taoist conceptions provide guidelines for understanding the world views discussed in schools of international relations. The measures adopted by the Chinese authorities based on Chinese philosophical thought are also analyzed and linked in order to verify that their application is still valid and that the strategies and tactics that General Sunzi indicates in his book The Art of War or the teachings Taoist master Zhuangzi remain a practical guide for Chinese leaders in their geostrategic movements, understandable to the people and useful for maintaining harmony and unity.

IS CHINA PURSUING A ‘REGIONAL’ HEGEMONY? STRATEGIC SOURCES OF CHINA’SASSERTIVE-CUM-BENEVOLENT BEHAVIOUR

Purpose of the study: Besides analyzing multilateral fora and their importance for China’s ‘Asia Dream,’ this study celaborates on the strategic sources of China’s behavior in the Asia-Pacific and beyond and the strategic initiatives that it has taken to preserve and expand its influence. Methodology: This is a qualitative explanatory case study. The research is conducted using an embedded case study in which phenomena under investigation are analyzed at the individual, state, and system levels. Primary data in the form of speeches (mostly of President Xi Jinping) and white papers issued by the Chinese government are used. Main Findings: China’s contemporary behavior has not only made its foreign policy vital for the pursuance of its interests but has also been gauged by the regional states with a mix of skepticism and opportunism. On the one hand, China’s assertiveness is perceived as a threat by the regional and some extra-regional states, forcing them to pursue balancing and/or hedging strategies. On the other, they have capitalized upon Chinese-led multilateral initiatives to strengthen themselves by bringing their economies in alignment with that of China. The study deliberates the historical traditions of Tianxia and Neo-Confucianism and their impact on contemporary Chinese strategic thinking. The study finds that China's strategic behavior under President Xi Jinping has metamorphosed into an admix of assertiveness and benevolence carefully crafted to pursue its core interests – an aspiring benevolent ‘regional’ hegemon. Applications of this study: The study is useful for the students, scholars, and policy practitioners of International Relations and Area Studies, specifically those involved with China and the Asia Pacific. Novelty/Originality of this study: China has been accused of pursuing hegemonistic designs in the region and beyond. This study dissects this discourse while seeing whether those who are generating the discourse are benefitting from China’s overtures or not.

Gregory C. Allen: Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security February 2019

Gregory C. Allen: Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security February 2019

Chinese strategic thinking on competitive conflict: insights from Yin-Yang harmony cognition

PurposeGrounded in Yijing, the wellspring of Chinese philosophies, this research aims to propose a novel interpretation of the indigenous Yin-Yang harmony cognitive framework, and to elaborate on how to use it as a meta-theorising tool to characterise the conflicting yet complementary dynamics of strategy, commonly seen as the prominent feature of Chinese strategic thinking.Design/methodology/approachUsing the Yin-Yang harmony approach (i.e. Yin as the endogenous factors and Yang the exogenous factors), the authors first put forward eight paradoxical situations facing Chinese organisations as per the changing paradigm of Yijing. Then the authors use the thick description model as a roadmap to identify three evolving trajectories in Chinese higher education (HE) system. Finally, they raise four strategic propositions regarding how competing HE institutes handle the conflicting yet complementary dynamics in China.FindingsResults show that the main strategic choices used by two different types of higher education institutes to cope with the current high-level uncertainty and competition could be described in terms of the two “Qian” and “Li” strategic situations, respectively. More details are discussed in the four propositions.Research limitations/implicationsThis research brings potentially valuable implications for global regulators, policymakers, providers and other stakeholders through better understanding of HE-related issues, as well as certain distinct conceptual complexities in terms of developing strategies in China. It implies potentially significant differences in cognition between East and West, and illustrates what may be their workings.Originality/valueThis indigenous eight-dimensional paradigm demonstrates the conflicting yet complementary dynamic gestalt of organisational strategic choices that may only be realised in Chinese terms, and that cannot be elucidated by theories purely derived from Western experience. It thus can foster the transfer of understanding between the East and West and open a new chapter for future research.

Thinking about Change: American Theorizing and Chinese Reasoning on World Politics

This essay addresses conceptions of change in two influential U.S. theories of international relations (power-transition theory and leadership long-cycle theory), and their resonance with Chinese predilections in thinking about and coping with change. We examine both convergences and distinctions between American IR theorizing and Chinese understanding on three key questions concerning change in world politics: (1) who is the key agent of change? (2) why does change take place? And (3) how does change happen in history? We highlight the bimodal feature of Chinese strategic thinking of how to make a change in world politics. We suggest that Chinese leaders respond to pressures stemming from both their domestic and international environment. They tend to be more risk-acceptant when facing a deteriorating situation and more inclined to pursue a moderate approach when facing a benign environment. External actors, especially the United States, will play an important role in shaping China's choices.

The Vulnerability of Rising Powers: The Logic Behind China's Low Military Transparency

ABSTRACTScholars and officials persistently criticize China for low transparency in its military affairs. Why does Beijing exacerbate the asymmetric information problem, even though this theoretically increases the likelihood of conflict? I offer an explanation, the vulnerability hypothesis, for why rising powers are likely to reject military transparency and the conditions under which this may change. By evaluating over 100 authoritative Chinese sources, I identify four threads of Chinese strategic thinking consistent with the vulnerability hypothesis: the United States is inherently dangerous as a declining hegemon, transparency heightens the risk of war during power transitions, transparency grants operational advantages to the opponent, and only the strong can leverage transparency to enhance deterrence. These findings have implications for power transition theory and US–China military relations.

Guanxi, Weiqi and Chinese Strategic Thinking

In their perceptions and preferences of Guanxi, the Chinese follow a relational way of thinking, which is in stark contrast to the American generic way of thinking. This difference lies in how Chinese and Americans behave in playing board games and engaging with others in real life. The game of Weiqi signifies the Chinese way of gaming, whereas the game of Chess denotes the Western way of gaming. Chinese strategic thinking is relational and best exemplified in the way that the Chinese perceive and deal with various Guanxi in the game of Weiqi. The Chinese prefer to define their strategic goals in relative terms, employ a combination of various means to achieve good and stable Guanxi with other countries without defining any of them, or being defined by any of them, as an enemy. The Chinese also tend to favor a flexible foreign strategy with contingent adaptation as its principle, a favorable balance of shi as its linchpin, and such shortcomings as nearsightedness, greediness and impatience as its taboos.

China's national-security overhaul

In establishing a new National Security Commission, President Xi Jinping has created a single forum for the consideration of all of China's security concerns, both external and internal. Though still a work in progress, it will assess China's national-security concerns comprehensively, including the full spectrum of security threats, and institutionalise Chinese strategic thinking for the first time.

Book Review: China Unveiled: Insights into Chinese Strategic Thinking by Jayadeva Ranade

Book Review: <i>China Unveiled: Insights into Chinese Strategic Thinking</i> by Jayadeva Ranade

The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878–1900

In 1878, Britain developed the first systematic intelligence collection and analysis of China by a Western nation. Undertaken in response to intelligence failure and military defeat, the British Army in India established an intelligence section in Beijing using small numbers of Chinese-speaking British military officers. Their reports reveal their struggles to understand a culture and government radically different than their own and express a strong respect for Chinese military capabilities. The intelligence reports produced are a unique window into British history, intelligence practices and Chinese strategic thinking.

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia

This article argues that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from “economics in command” to “security in command.” The article concludes with a prediction that “A coordinated approach to combining alliances and quasi-alliances exclusive of China with multilateralism inclusive of it will best test China's intentions during this decade.”

The fundamentals-based strategy: the dominant strategy for Chinese firms in a new era

The external environment of Chinese businesses made a fundamental shift around 2000/2001. This change would necessitate a corresponding change in growth strategies. A holistically framed concept of 'niche' strategy or the 'fundamentals based strategy', however, appears to be or will be the dominant growth strategy for Chinese firms in this changed environment. The fundamentals based strategy advocated in this paper is not only rooted in the classic Chinese strategy thinking but also supported by the practices of an increased number of Chinese firms. The main contributions of this paper include: 1) proposing a holistic concept of the niche strategy or the fundamentals based strategy as an enterprise growth strategy; 2) incorporating Chinese classic strategic thinking; 3) integrating Chinese cases to explicate this model; 4) positing that this strategy is effective for latecomers with resource disadvantage. We also propose future research directions.

Cognitive mapping of chief executive officers' minds: confronting Chinese global competitiveness

In Western philosophy on epistemology, there has long been the traditional divide between what is a priori vs. a posteriori. This is taken as the starting point for a conceptual framing of an empirically grounded inquiry into the minds of Indian chief executive officer (CEOs) about Chinese strategic thinking. The objective of this a posteriori experimentation is to cross culturally map Indian CEOs' knowledge – broadly defined as understandings, doubts, responses, surprises, concerns, beliefs and values, when they are put face-to-face with rapidly rising Chinese competitive pressures. To provide the focus of inquiry, the author uses the precepts of the 2,500 years old Art of War by Sun Tzu as experimental parameterisation of knowledge concerning Chinese competitive, strategic thinking. From the results of experimentation, the first and main author then produces a cognitive map that yields intriguing insights to the mental state of CEOs' knowing and concerning about Chinese strategy.

Cognitive strategy from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms

PurposeThe Romance of the Three Kingdoms (RTK) is probably the most popular classical novel in Chinese literature. Of more than 1,000 characters in this extensive, three‐volume novel, Kong Ming in RTK is widely seen by the Chinese as the most remarkable strategist. This paper attempts to develop a cognitive schema of Kong Ming on strategy.Design/methodology/approachFirst, the paper reviews broadly the traditionally, four most popular novels within the Chinese classical literature: The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Water Margin, Journey to the West and A Dream of the Red Mansions. After emphasizing the role of the RTK in influencing Chinese strategic thinking, the paper utilizes the methods of textual analyses in research. Focusing on a specific episode of global strategy making and taking (Chapter 38), the methodology is explained.FindingsFrom textual analysis, the paper presents as its finding a schematically linear, cognitive structure of the strategy process. It also presents the central role of the “Counselor of Strategy” in Chinese strategy making process. From this research, a Kong Ming‐grounded, cognitive model of strategy process is developed. If the RTK (more than say, any MBA program) continues to influence Chinese strategy processes, then fast strategic decision making (as exemplified in our analyses) may be one of the pivotal reasons for the equally fast rise of the Chinese economy in our global economic landscape.Originality/valueKong Ming (or Zhuge Liang) had been hailed by the Chinese with such lofty epithets such as the “Divine Strategist”. His exploits during the declining Han dynasty and emergence of the Three Kingdoms of Wei, Shu and Wu (220‐280 CE) are still cited by the Chinese people in their daily conversations on strategy. In this paper, we draw lessons for CEOs through a Kong Ming‐grounded model for strategy.