Chinese Security Policy Research Articles

BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL ORDER

This study contributes to our understanding about Chinese security policy by providing insights into geopolitical upheavals caused by China's expanding global presence. This article discusses structural problems and geopolitical challenges brought on by the Chinese Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Paper claims that BRI may be legitimately understood as being more than merely a system of economic and military security. By promoting domestic stability and influencing countries outside of Asia, BRI really assists Chinese leaders in bridging internal and external challenges. The responsibility for helping to create a peaceful future still primarily rests with the West

Tracking Chinese Perceptions of Vietnam's Relations with China and the United States

executive summary: This article sheds light on trends in Chinese assessments of U.S.-Vietnam relations and security cooperation to discern patterns in the security dynamics between the three countries. main argument Since the turn of the century, Chinese foreign policy experts have consistently assessed that while there will always be certain tensions in the China-Vietnam relationship, economic and geopolitical realities prevent Vietnam from aligning against China or collaborating with the U.S. to any significant extent. Although some Chinese experts began to question the durability of China-Vietnam ties following Beijing's expansive nine-dash-line claim over much of the South China Sea in 2009 and a series of standoffs over disputed waters starting in May 2014, the general Chinese assessment that Vietnam will not work too closely with the U.S. to counter China continues to prevail. policy implications • The consistency of Chinese analysts' perceptions strongly suggests that China is unprepared for major and abrupt shifts in Vietnamese hedging in the future. Chinese elites likely view the predictability of U.S.-Vietnam relations as favorable to their government's foreign policy and military strategy. Thus, any significant change in Hanoi's security cooperation with Washington would surprise and rattle Beijing. • Although Vietnam is unlikely to oppose China outright, it is also unlikely to collaborate with Beijing on security issues. This dynamic appears irreversible, barring a wholesale revamping of Chinese security policy in the South China Sea that includes recognition of and respect for Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and territorial claims. • China is unlikely to disrupt regional peace and stability over closer U.S.-Vietnam cooperation. Therefore, raising the U.S.-Vietnam partnership from "comprehensive" to "strategic" in Vietnamese parlance, as has been discussed in the past, would be unlikely to register much reaction from Beijing.

Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China's Changing Strategy in Xinjiang

In 2017–18, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its domestic security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating the use of mass detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora networks. Commonly proposed explanations for this shift focus on domestic factors: ethnic unrest, minority policy, and regional leadership. The CCP's strategy changes in Xinjiang, however, were also likely catalyzed by changing perceptions of the threat posed by Uyghur contact with transnational Islamic militant groups in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and a corresponding increase in perceived domestic vulnerability. This threat shifted from theoretical risk to operational reality in 2014–16, and occurred alongside a revised assessment that China's Muslim population was more vulnerable to infiltration by jihadist networks than previously believed. Belief in the need to preventively inoculate an entire population from “infection” by these networks explains the timing of the change in repressive strategy, shift toward collective detention, heavy use of re-education, and attention paid to the Uyghur diaspora. It therefore helps explain specific aspects of the timing and nature of the CCP's strategy changes in Xinjiang. These findings have implications for the study of the connections between counterterrorism and domestic repression, as well as for authoritarian preventive repression and Chinese security policy at home and abroad.

Actions Speak Louder than Words: China’s Consultative Peacekeeping in Africa

Existing concepts (e.g. ‘non-interference’ and ‘pragmatism’) remain too vague to provide explanations for China’s increasingly assertive security policy. To avoid this pitfall, this article adopts a narrower focus on Chinese security policy towards Africa. It explores two contrasting cases, namely Sudan/South Sudan and Mali to demonstrate that China: a) pursues security engagement only after obtaining permission by relevant parties (UN; regional organizations; target state); b) favours peacekeeping (stability) over peacebuilding (arbitrary support for emerging regimes); c) strategically interweaves its economic goals and security policy strategy. The article thus re-conceptualizes China’s new security policy towards Africa as ‘consultative peacekeeping.’

Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence

<i>Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence</i>

China Turns to the Sea: Changes in the People's Liberation Army Navy Doctrine and Force Structure

As China's economy continues to expand, its policies and interests change and evolve. Today, Chinese economic and political interests span the globe from Africa to Latin America and the South Pacific. The country has grown more dependent on foreign energy sources in once marginal places such as Angola. Access to resources such as oil and natural gas are now at the forefront of Chinese security policy. While access to markets and regions where massive Chinese investment is occurring is equally important, these new challenges have led to some important changes in China's security and military posture, particularly its naval strategy. While diplomacy and economic power are still the most practical alternatives available to China to defend its interests, several Chinese military and civilian observers now openly discuss other alternatives, such as the eventuality of using military power to defend these interests. This is particularly visible in the People's Liberation Army Navy, where a more ambitious and confident maritime strategy is now being discussed.

Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics. Robert S. Ross

Previous articleNext article No AccessREVIEWSChinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics. Robert S. Ross Robert E. BedeskiRobert E. Bedeski Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 64July 2010 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/tcj.64.20749286 Views: 15Total views on this site © The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Dynamics of Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia and Implications for Regional Stability

This article examines the dynamics of Japanese and Chinese post–Cold War security policies in East Asia and assesses the implications for regional stability. To this end, the discussion explores elements in both countries' security policy behavior, and Sino‐Japanese relations that have a stabilizing and/or destabilizing impact on the region. The article argues that, on the whole, Japanese and Chinese security policies have contributed to more stability than instability. Although the security dilemma between Japan (and the United States) and China may have become more pronounced, the balance of power currently maintained may be assessed in positive terms for the region. In addition, Sino‐Japanese competition for influence has led to strengthening East Asian institution building and thereby fostered stability. While there is ground for cautious optimism regarding the future of Sino‐Japanese cooperation, mutual strategic distrust between Tokyo and Beijing will underpin the security dilemma and their competitive policies in the region.

Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969

Political Science QuarterlyVolume 118, Issue 1 p. 53-79 Do Nascent WMD Arsenals Deter? The Sino-Soviet Crisis of 1969 LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN, LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN is associate professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. His areas of specialization include Russian and Chinese security policies, Central Asia, WMD proliferation, and civil-military relations.Search for more papers by this author LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN, LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN is associate professor of strategic studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. His areas of specialization include Russian and Chinese security policies, Central Asia, WMD proliferation, and civil-military relations.Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 February 2013 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2003.tb00386.xCitations: 9 AboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume118, Issue1Spring 2003Pages 53-79 RelatedInformation

Xinjiang and China's security1

Central Asia occupies a growing role in Chinese security policy. However, an examination of China's Central Asian policies reveals that they are essentially external projections of Beijing's vital interest of internal security in neighboring Xinjiang. Accordingly, this paper examines Xinjiang's importance for China's overall security policies. Through this examination, it becomes clear that the Xinjiang problem very much resembles that of other discontented provinces within a multinational state with a continuing imperial vocation. China's problems in Xinjiang will continue, and have important repercussions for its domestic and foreign policies, and for other key issues like Taiwan.

Rocket poker over the hegemony in East Asia: Chinese security policy in the era of American missile defense plans

Since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty on December 13, 2001, China has come under pressure. The deployment of a tactical missile defense in Taiwan could possibly encourage the will for independence on that island. A strategic missile defense system would neutralize China's ability to respond to a nuclear attack from the US. One can expect China to react with a massive build-up of missiles and nuclear weapons. Nonetheless there is still room for negotiations to succeed.

Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and Chinese Security Policy

Some believe that the Internet is immune to regulation and is contributing to the demise of the state. Others see the same technology as facilitating surveillance on behalf of states and corporations. To help explore this debate further, this article examines the case of the Internet in China. China—a nondemocratic, authoritarian state—is a “hard case” for those who argue that the Internet cannot be controlled. Even while pushing for the expansion of new information technologies, mostly for economic reasons, China has attempted to maintain strict controls over the Internet. After summarizing the debate outlined above, a review of China's Internet security policies is conducted, and the ways in which prodemocracy activists have attempted to circumvent these policies is examined.

Deterrence and Co‑operation in the South China Sea

This article explores the impact of the Spratly Islands dispute on security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. It is argued that the dispute reflects and promotes the emergence of a regional order combining deterrence with consultation and limited co-operation. The balance of power between China, Southeast Asia, and the United States promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence. Within this structure, the approaches of China and Southeast Asia to diplomacy and international law allow for the development of a regional dialogue and a code of conduct based on consultation and co-operation on non-controversial issues. Consequently, the seeds of an order are emerging in the South China Sea that combines the extremes of deterrence and co-operation. Introduction The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are located at the intersection of the security spheres of China and Southeast Asia. As such, the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over this area is not merely a difference of opinion on rights to territory and maritime space. It brings to the fore incompatibilities between the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to ensure peace and stability in their regional environment. The implications of this dispute for the development of mechanisms of deterrence and co-operation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia have tended to be overlooked in the scholarly debate. The Spratly dispute is treated as a peripheral, yet potentially explosive, aspect of Sino--Southeast Asian relations. It is regarded as a product rather than a determinant of their security practices. [1] The Spratlys have been a sore point in the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian claimant states for decades . The dispute oscillates between conflict and co-operation without reaching the stage of crisis or resolution. [2] This protracted stalemate suggests that the dispute is at the fringes of the security agendas of China and Southeast Asia, compared with more pressing security concerns such as the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s and the Taiwan problem. At the same time, the nationalist overtones inherent in the justifications of territorial and maritime claims, coupled with a continuous military build-up in the Spratly area, suggests that the dispute will at some point wreak havoc on peace in the South China Sea. The problem with the dominant approaches to the study of the Spratly dispute is the tendency to overlook the fact that, in the 1990s, it has turned into an arena where the compatibility of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia were tested. During the Cold War, Chinese security policies were directed against the subregional environment of Northeast Asia. By contrast, most of the countries of Southeast Asia formulated their security outlook within the confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the increasing importance of the maritime resources of the South China Sea, and the allowances for extensive maritime zones in international law, have made China and Southeast Asia increasingly important variables in each other's security equations. This article argues that the Spratly dispute has profound implications for regional peace and stability because it promotes the development of a new order in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian states. [3] By bringing representatives of contending security practices together around an issue of conflict, the Spratly dispute has changed the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. The dispute highlights differences in the approach of the two entities to the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law. As the contending parties attempt to find solutions to the problems coming to the fore, the seeds of a new order emerge, representing a compromise between the security practices employed by China and Southeast Asia. …

Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War

1. Realism and International Relations After the Cold War, by Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein2. Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict Over Scarce Resources, by Randall L. Schweller3. The Political Economy of Realism, by Jonathan Kirshner4. Realism Structural Liberalism, and the Western Order, by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberr5. Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War, by Michael Mastanduno6. Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy, by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels7. Realism and Russian Strategy after the Collapse of the USSR, by Neil MacFarlane8. Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period, by Alastair Iain Johnston9. Realism and Regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies During and After the Cold War, by Joseph M. Grieco10. Realism and Reconciliation: France, Germany, and the European Union, by Michael Loriaux11. Neorealism Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European Strategies, by Mark Kramer12. Does Unipolarity Have A Future?, by Ethan B. Kapstein

Threat Perception and Chinese Security Policy after the Cold War

Threat Perception and Chinese Security Policy after the Cold War

The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security

Japanese Security Policy in North East Asia, T. Akaha Chinese Security Policy in Northeast Asia, F. Wang Australian Security Policy in Northeast Asia, D. Alves Russian Security Policy in Northeast Asia, A. Bogaturov Russia's Policy Towards the Two Koreas, S. Joo US-Northeast Asian Security Relations - From Bilateralism to Multilateralism, E. Olsen US Security Policy for Northeast Asia - Handmaiden of Export Promotion, T. Wilborn Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and US Policy, L. Grinter North Korea's Nuclear Issue and Its Impact on Northeast Asian Security, S.Cheon Basic Issues in the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula, T.Kwak.

China and the world: new directions in Chinese foreign relations

Part 1 Theory and practice: China and the world in theory and practice, Samuel S. Kim domestic sources of Chinese foreign policy, David Backman anti-imperialism in Chinese foreign policy, Edward Friedman. Part 2 Interactions: Sino-American relations - testing the limits of discord, Steven I. Levine China and Russia - new beginnings, Lowell Dittmer Japan and Europe in Chinese foreign relations, Donald W. Klein China and the Third World in the changing world order, S.S. Kim. Part 3 Policies and issues: force and diplomacy - Chinese security policy in the post-Cold War era, Paul H.B. Godwin interdependence in China's foreign economic relations, Thomas W. Robinson human rights in Chinese foreign policy, James D. Seymour China and the multilateral economic institutions, William R. Feeney. Part 4 Prospects: the future of Chinese foreign policy, Allen S. Whiting.