At a time when the military metaphor has captured the field of sloganeering in Communist China and the writings of Mao Tse-tung are glorified as never before, it is tempting to describe China as embarking on a new war. Mao first advanced his ideas on in the early years of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The phrase was his capsule description of a situation in which defeat was unlikely but victory was remote. Understanding of the protracted nature of the was essential, Mao argued, to avoid either capitulation or premature optimism and to refute the theories of subjugation and quick victory.' The political mood that began to emerge in China in 1964 is similar in many ways to that encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the with Japan. The enemies and objectives of the present war are different of course, but there is the same realistic confrontation of current obstacles coupled with assertions of total victory in the distant future. This mood contrasts with both the heady optimism of the Great Leap Forward in 1957-60 and the uncertain pragmatism of the brief retrenchment in 1961-62. It defines the CCP's ultimate goals unequivocally and yet it forecasts decades and even centuries of struggle for the attainment of these goals. The psychological stance of the thus appears to be a general reorientation of CCP attitudes that will persist for some time to come. This conclusion is supported by analysis of the major policies pursued by the CCP during 1964, but it has been obscured by other developments in China's domestic and international position during the past year. The paradoxical fact is that China has scored some of its most dramatic successes in many years at the same time that it has been preparing for a prolonged and bitter struggle. These successes demand mention even though they conceal more basic trends within Communist China. The National Day celebrations in Peking on October 1, 1964, were predictably optimistic and self-congratulatory, but for the first time in several years there seemed to be real cause for celebration. Even before the announcements of Khrushchev's dismissal and the Chinese nuclear explosion later in the month, the Chinese leaders could look back with satisfaction on their best year since the middle nineteen-fifties. Continued improvements in the national economy were certainly one source of satisfaction. Although statistics remain scarce, partial figures released from time to time indicate moderate but steady gains in both agricultural and industrial production. The food supply has risen above the critical point, although food imports are still necessary, and rationing is now less severe than in the hard times
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