Chinese Grain Research Articles

Intestinal acariasis in Anhui Province.

The mites found in stored food and house comprise a large group of subclass Acari, belonging to the suborder Acardida of the order Acariformes. They can be found in dust and vacuum samples from floors, furniture, mattresses, Chinese herb al medicine, dry fruit, grain, flour, sugar, and bedding. These mites are nidico lous and feed on organic debris, including sloughed human skin, fungi, spilled food, pollen, etc. These mites are particularly prevalent in Chinese herbal medi cine, dry fruit, grain, flour, sugar, beds, though carpeted floors near beds or couches may also have large numbers. The most common species are Acarus siro, Ty rophagus putrescentiae, Dermatophagoides farinae, D. pteronyssinus, Glycyphagus domesticus, G. Ornatus, Carpoglyphus lactis and Tarsonemus granarius, etc. The viability of mites in storage is quite strong and they can invade and parasitize the intestines of humans[1-15]. They can cause pulmonary acariasis[16-25], urinary acariasis[26-33] and so on. The dejecta of mites is a quite strong allergen and can cause different allergic diseases[34-44]. Intestinal acariasis can be caused by some mites related to the way of diet intake and invading against intestinal mucosa, intestinal muscle [45-58]. The first report of intestinal acariasis caused by these mites was made by Hinman et al[45] (1934). From then on, all kinds of studies on the disease have been reported gradually. In order to make an epidemiological survey of intestinal acariasis the investigation of the disease was taken in so me areas of Anhui Province from 1989 to 1996.

Feeding china: a confident view

Lester R. Brown's recent argument, that large Chinese grain imports could drive world prices to dangerously high levels by the year 2030, is mistaken on three counts. First, Brown is badly mistaken to argue that China's own grain production will decline by 20% in the next three decades; the consensus among more careful analysts is that Chinese grain production will continue to increase. Second, Brown is wrong to characterize Chinese grain imports, when they do occur, as something to worry about; increased reliance on imports is going to be the best way for China to protect its rural environment and ensure continued income growth and improved nutrition for its population in the years ahead. Third, Brown is wrong to characterize international grain markets as incapable of servicing China's larger import needs; even if those needs should grow very large, real prices in international grain markets are likely to continue their long term trend of decline.

Science in China

Letters from: [ Chenjian Li ][1] [ T. C. Tso ][1] [ Howard L. Fields ][1] The editorial by Li Peng, premier of China ([5 July, p. 13][2]), gives a positive signal that the Chinese government finally realizes that it is time to replace the empty “ism” with science. Science is not merely a collection of utilitarian tools for planting rice, building highways, and so forth. The core spirit of science is to seek truths through unrelenting effort and utmost honesty and to uphold truths with courage and integrity. These are vital elements for all societies, especially for today's China. Science also teaches people to think independently, and to question and reason objectively. These two aspects are critical for preparing China to have a national common ground and for bringing a new kind of people into being, who have the vision, character, and capability to make China a good member of the global village. # {#article-title-2} Science is needed everywhere for economic development, especially for China, because of its huge population and limited arable land. Li Peng's editorial correctly identifies agriculture as the biggest problem. However, many experts believe that science and technology alone cannot solve China's agricultural problems ([1][3]); there is much debate about the world's grain supply and Chinese grain needs in 2030, when China's population is projected to reach 1.6 billion ([2][4]). China's agricultural problem is due mainly to the marketing system, policy, management, lack of infrastructure, and government's neglect of the farmer's interest. So far, it is not a production problem. Chinese farmers do not have ownership of the land they use. This situation results in low investment for land improvement and maintenance. Other issues—such as price control for grains, government grain procurement quotas, and grain movement restrictions—discourage farmers from producing more. At the same time, these factors encourage farmers to hold back grain stocks in their own households. Current Chinese government policy promoting “three highs” (high yield, high quality, and high efficiency) appears to be meeting short-term immediate demand, but in the long run, excessive use of agricultural chemicals and water and an increase in the crop index are likely to result in increased pollution, erosion, waste, and deterioration of natural resources. Agricultural education, research, and extension in China are mostly separated. Agricultural education is under the Ministry of Agriculture, independent from other higher education. Infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, is lacking. Government investment in agriculture amounted to only 1.3 percent of the total state investment in 1995 ([3][5]). Most significant, there is a critical water shortage in China. Moving water cannot meet total demand because the annual average water supply [650 billion cubic meters (bcm)] is much below the total potential demand ([4][6]). Where and how to find new water resources for agriculture, industry, and human needs is an urgent issue. We applaud the Chinese government's call to place a high priority on science, and an even higher priority on agriculture. Such a call can only be effective together with a call for policy changes. 1. 1.[↵][7] 1. T. C. Tso , Ed. in Agricultural Reform and Development in China (Ideals, Beltsville, MD, 1990), p. 405. 2. 2.[↵][8] Am. Assoc. Chinese Stud. Bull. 23, 429 (June 1996). [OpenUrl][9] 3. 3.[↵][10] The 1995 state investment on fixed capital totaled 1994.5 billion yuan (1 U.S. dollar = 8.3 yuan) of which agriculture received only 26.4 billion yuan. 4. 4.[↵][11] By 2030, the projected total agricultural water need is 900 bcm, of which 700 bcm would be for grain production alone. # {#article-title-3} Science requires the freedom to challenge ideas openly. If the Communist government of China wants partners, it should begin with its own intellectuals. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.273.5281.1477b [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.273.5271.13 [3]: #ref-1 [4]: #ref-2 [5]: #ref-3 [6]: #ref-4 [7]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1. in text" [8]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2. in text" [9]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DAm.%2BAssoc.%2BChinese%2BStud.%2BBull.%26rft.volume%253D23%26rft.spage%253D429%26rft.atitle%253DAM%2BASSOC%2BCHINESE%2BSTUD%2BBULL%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [10]: #xref-ref-3-1 "View reference 3. in text" [11]: #xref-ref-4-1 "View reference 4. in text"

Science in China

Letters from: [ Chenjian Li ][1] [ T. C. Tso ][1] [ Howard L. Fields ][1] The editorial by Li Peng, premier of China ([5 July, p. 13][2]), gives a positive signal that the Chinese government finally realizes that it is time to replace the empty “ism” with science. Science is not merely a collection of utilitarian tools for planting rice, building highways, and so forth. The core spirit of science is to seek truths through unrelenting effort and utmost honesty and to uphold truths with courage and integrity. These are vital elements for all societies, especially for today's China. Science also teaches people to think independently, and to question and reason objectively. These two aspects are critical for preparing China to have a national common ground and for bringing a new kind of people into being, who have the vision, character, and capability to make China a good member of the global village. # {#article-title-2} Science is needed everywhere for economic development, especially for China, because of its huge population and limited arable land. Li Peng's editorial correctly identifies agriculture as the biggest problem. However, many experts believe that science and technology alone cannot solve China's agricultural problems ([1][3]); there is much debate about the world's grain supply and Chinese grain needs in 2030, when China's population is projected to reach 1.6 billion ([2][4]). China's agricultural problem is due mainly to the marketing system, policy, management, lack of infrastructure, and government's neglect of the farmer's interest. So far, it is not a production problem. Chinese farmers do not have ownership of the land they use. This situation results in low investment for land improvement and maintenance. Other issues—such as price control for grains, government grain procurement quotas, and grain movement restrictions—discourage farmers from producing more. At the same time, these factors encourage farmers to hold back grain stocks in their own households. Current Chinese government policy promoting “three highs” (high yield, high quality, and high efficiency) appears to be meeting short-term immediate demand, but in the long run, excessive use of agricultural chemicals and water and an increase in the crop index are likely to result in increased pollution, erosion, waste, and deterioration of natural resources. Agricultural education, research, and extension in China are mostly separated. Agricultural education is under the Ministry of Agriculture, independent from other higher education. Infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, is lacking. Government investment in agriculture amounted to only 1.3 percent of the total state investment in 1995 ([3][5]). Most significant, there is a critical water shortage in China. Moving water cannot meet total demand because the annual average water supply [650 billion cubic meters (bcm)] is much below the total potential demand ([4][6]). Where and how to find new water resources for agriculture, industry, and human needs is an urgent issue. We applaud the Chinese government's call to place a high priority on science, and an even higher priority on agriculture. Such a call can only be effective together with a call for policy changes. 1. 1.[↵][7] 1. T. C. Tso , Ed. in Agricultural Reform and Development in China (Ideals, Beltsville, MD, 1990), p. 405. 2. 2.[↵][8] Am. Assoc. Chinese Stud. Bull. 23, 429 (June 1996). [OpenUrl][9] 3. 3.[↵][10] The 1995 state investment on fixed capital totaled 1994.5 billion yuan (1 U.S. dollar = 8.3 yuan) of which agriculture received only 26.4 billion yuan. 4. 4.[↵][11] By 2030, the projected total agricultural water need is 900 bcm, of which 700 bcm would be for grain production alone. # {#article-title-3} Science requires the freedom to challenge ideas openly. If the Communist government of China wants partners, it should begin with its own intellectuals. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.273.5281.1477b [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.273.5271.13 [3]: #ref-1 [4]: #ref-2 [5]: #ref-3 [6]: #ref-4 [7]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [8]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text [9]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DAm.%2BAssoc.%2BChinese%2BStud.%2BBull.%26rft.volume%253D23%26rft.spage%253D429%26rft.atitle%253DAM%2BASSOC%2BCHINESE%2BSTUD%2BBULL%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [10]: #xref-ref-3-1 View reference 3. in text [11]: #xref-ref-4-1 View reference 4. in text

The direct impact of the relocation of farm labour on Chinese grain production

The shift from collective to household-based farming and the move towards a market economy have increased the opportunity cost of grain production and caused a withdrawal of labour from grain farming in China. Since Chinese grain production is important to both China and the world, there are concerns about whether such a farm labour relocation will have a destructive impact on China's grain production. The previous production function studies ignored the effects of changes in labour quantity and quality on grain production. Using recently available sample survey data on Chinese farm households, this paper incorporates production function analysis with human capital analysis to examine the direct impact of the relocation of farm labour on China's grain production. It has found that the relocation of farm labour has not harmed the Chinese grain production in general, but its impact varies across regions with different factor endowments that affect the choice of farming technology.

Do Chinese farmers reinvest in grain production?

Grain production is affected by the relocation of farm household labour from on-farm to off-farm activities and by an increase in the investment in grain production as a result of increase in farm household income that occurs along with such a labour shift. This study uses a recent farm household survey data to examine whether Chinese grain households do reinvest in grain production. It has found that household income growth contributes to higher investment in grain production although a higher share of non-agricultural income has a negative effect. The authors' other research has found a negligible direct impact of farm to non-farm labour transfer on grain production. We may conclude that in the near future, the total impact (direct and indirect) of labour transfer from farm to non-farm production on grain output is expected to be positive. In the long run, in may become negative when more and more labour shifts out of grain production and marginal product of labour becomes positive.

REVIEWS*

Book reviewed in this article:Agarwal, B. (1994). A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia.DE BONO, E. (1994). Parallel Thinking.HAVINDEN, M. A. and COLLINS, E. J. T. (eds) (1995). Agriculture in the Industrial State. Reading: The University of ReadingLONGWORTH, J. W. and BROWN, C. G. (1995). Agribusiness Reform in China: The Case of WoolOECD (1995). The Chinese Grain and Oilseed Sectors: Major Changes Under Way.MELLOR, J. M. (ed) (1995). Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization.OKALI, C., SUMBERG, J. and FARRINGTON, J. (1994). Farmer Participatory Research: Rhetoric and Reality.SADOULET, E. and DE JANVRY, A. (1995). Quantitative Development Policy Analysis.

Feeding One Billion A Study on China's Grain Problem in the Twenty-First Century

The following article discusses many serious difficulties in Chinese grain production, such as shortage of arable land and water resources, over-supply of rural manpower, lack of funds, and low level of education, science, and technology. These difficulties result in a small scale of agricultural operation, high production costs, low agricultural profitability, and slow growth in grain output. After analyzing the international and domestic situation, the author argues that China cannot repeat the Japanese experience but should take the road of basic self-sufficiency and gradual increase of import. The author shows that it is possible for China to avoid rapid shrinking of arable land in the course of industrialization and to maintain the stability of grain acreage over the long term, thus enabling domestic supply to basically satisfy the grain demand of 1.6 billion people in the twenty-first century. Finally, the article provides a projection of grain output and demand in China in the years 2000, 2...

China's grain imports: an empirical study

China is a major importer of grains, primarily wheat. However, the relative importance of economic and policy factors underlying the increase in imports into this centrally planned, but reforming, economy is not that well understood. An econometric model is developed to analyze Chinese grain import behaviour over the past three decades and assess the relative importance of respective import determinants. It is concluded that major factors influencing imports have been changes in state grain procurement policy (and associated aspects of China's grain distribution system), income-related improvements in diet (manifest primarily as a shift from inferior cereals and potatoes to wheat and rice rather than as feed-grain based increases in meat consumption), and shortfalls in domestic grain production.

Comparative advantage and food grain imports in China

AbstractOne of the significant features of Chinese economic development in the 1980s was that grain imports increased sharply, while the whole economy experienced rapid growth and reform. This paper attempts to measure the domestic resources costs (DRC) of rice and wheat production in China (two of the most important grains in the Chinese grain sector) during the period 1981–87 and to examine the questions of whether, or to what extent, the level of comparative advantage in grain production can explain the performance of China's grain trade. Substantial comparative advantage in China's rice production and considerable comparative disadvantage in wheat production have been found by the measurement. These preliminary results suggest that the relative costs incurred by China's domestic grain sector were likely to have played some role in determining both the structure of its grain trade and its large scale of net wheat importation in the 1980s.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF AIR CUSHIONED VEHICLES IN OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

ABSTRACT On July 22, 1991, the Tuo Hai, a 46,500 ton Chinese grain carrier, collided with the Tenyo Maru, a 4,800 ton Japanese fish processing ship, off the coast of Washington State. The Tenyo Maru sank, creating an oil spill that cost upwards of $4 million (U.S.) to clean up. The incident initiated a joint response from the U.S. and Canadian governments. As part of this response, the Canadian Coast Guard mobilized an SRN-6 hovercraft. This air cushioned vehicle (ACV) provided logistical support to responders on both sides of the international boundary. The response operation along the Pacific Coast was extensive. Dense fog and the remote location of the impacted area provided formidable challenges to the cleanup effort. It was the mission scenario of the Canadian SRN-6 hovercraft to provide logistical support—as an experiment in ACV utility—to the organizations responding to this incident. Based on this experience, it can be argued that the hovercraft offers great potential value in responding to marine oil spills. Appropriate application of ACV technology can enhance oil spill response work, spill waste management, and incident surveillance. This paper discusses the contribution of the SRN-6 hovercraft to the Tenyo Maru response, briefly examines the use of another, very different hovercraft, during a response in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and reviews a new hovercraft design and discusses its potential contributions.

The effects of agricultural policies on the patterns of specialized grain production in China: An application of a quadratic spatial equilibrium model in the Chinese grain sector

Abstract A spatial equilibrium model of the Chinese grain sector has been constructed for 26 regions. The model is calibrated to the overall supply‐demand balance in 1985. It is used to test the implications of the dominant policy instruments which have been applied to the grain sector, namely forced procurement and low procurement prices. Comparing these separately and together against the alternative of freely competitive inter‐regional trade reveals the effectiveness of forced procurement in extracting a surplus from agriculture; this is magnified when indirect taxation of grain supply is applied simultaneously.

Economic Reforms in the People's Republic of China

The emphasis in this paper is primarily on rural economic reforms. Industrial reforms are treated quite briefly. The primary reason for this allocation is that the agricultural reforms have been much more sweeping than the industrial reforms and have had more striking consequences. Another reason, of course, is that China remains a primarily rural country, with 80% of the population living in rural areas. A final reason is that there has been much trial and error in urban and indus-

Chinese Grain Production: An Interpretation of the Data

By 1975, after a period of widely divergent estimates for Chinese grain production, a consensus appeared to be emerging. Consider, for example, the estimates that were published at the time (in million tons):Not only was there a consensus, but it was widely assumed that the figures were consistent with those published in the late 1950s. Since then, evidence has been accumulating that the definition of grain has changed and that not all of the figures released in any given year conform to the definition commonly used at the time. We will review the changes in the definition of grain and present our interpretation of the data that have been released in the past 20 years.

Recent Chinese Grain Figures

The grain output in China in 1974 was not only, as Robert Michael Field noted in The China Quarterly No. 65, “ far larger than output claimed for any previous year ” ; it was also far larger than the estimates made by most western economists concerned with China. Such observers, believing that agricultural production in China was “ stagnating,” had estimated Chinese grain output for 1974 as being between 255 and 259 million tons. Peking's announcement that 1974 grain output was 274-9 million tons thus set up a contradiction: either those western economists had been far off the mark in their extrapolations of growth or the Chinese figure was somehow misleading. Field opts for the second explanation.

Chinese Grain Production: Questions raised by the Swamy-Burki series

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