China In Response Research Articles

Comment on “China's Transport Infrastructure Investment: Past, Present, and Future”

Comment on “China's Transport Infrastructure Investment: Past, Present, and Future”

The contribution of atmospheric deposition and forest harvesting to forest soil acidification in China since 1980

Soils below croplands and grasslands have acidified significantly in China since the 1980s in terms of pH decline in response to acid inputs caused by intensified fertilizer application and/or acid deposition. However, it is unclear what the rate is of pH decline of forest soils in China in response to enhanced acid deposition and wood production over the same period. We therefore gathered soil pH data from the Second National Soil Inventory of China and publications from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database in 1981–1985 and 2006–2010, respectively, to evaluate the long-term change of pH values in forest soils. We found that soil pH decreased on average by 0.36 units in the period 1981–1985 to 2006–2010., with most serious pH decline occurring in southwest China (0.63 pH units). The soil type with the strongest pH decline was the semi-Luvisol (0.44 pH units). The decrease in pH was significantly correlated with the acid input induced by atmospheric deposition and forest harvesting. On average, the contribution of atmospheric deposition to the total acid input was estimated at 84% whereas element uptake (due to forest wood growth and harvest) contributed 16% only. Atmospheric deposition is thus the major driver for the significant forest soil acidification across China.

China's Engagement Patterns towards North Korea

Analysis of China's response to North Korea's grave provocations confirms that China has been adjusting its policy toward North Korea, considering North Korea's stability and the likelihood of US military intervention while pursuing an engagement with North Korea. China has pursued soft engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been low and North Korea has been unstable, semi-hard engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been high and North Korea has been stable, and hard engagement when the likelihood of US military intervention has been low and North Korea has been stable. China has increased its pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize since North Korea's third nuclear test. However, this is merely hard engagement and cannot result in a fundamental change of China's policy toward North Korea. Unless China changes its strategic goal to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it will retain its engagement policies toward North Korea.

Influence of Rising Sea Level on Tidal Dynamics in the Bohai Sea

Li, Y. F.; Zhang, H.; Tang, C.; Zou, T., and Jiang, D. J., 2016. Influence of rising sea level on tidal dynamics in the Bohai Sea. Recent studies highlight that tidal propagation in shallow waters tends to be modified with mean sea level rise, intensifying coastal threats. This study aims to obtain a comprehensive insight into the changes in tidal regimes in the Bohai Sea of China in response to local mean sea level rise. To achieve this goal the hydrodynamic model ROMS, previously calibrated and validated for Bohai Sea, was applied, considering local sea level rise scenario of 0.5 m, 1 m, 2 m and 3 m in the future, respectively. The model results show that under sea level rise conditions the amplitude of the main semidiurnal (M2) constituent decreases in most areas except two areas where are around two amphidromic points, and changes in amplitude are not proportional to the level of sea level rise. However, compared results implied that it is necessary to consider the spatial-distribution of sea level-rise when predicting the effects of sea level rise in the future. The tidal wave also was distorted in the coastal zone, the changed wavelength made the amphidromic points move to deep water. Tidal current magnitude decreases with mean sea level rise, which could influence transport of sediment nearby coast of Bohai and Laizhou Bay.

Historical and projected emissions of HCFC-22 and HFC-410A from China's room air conditioning sector

Recent decades witnessed the increase in production and uses of HCFC-22 (chlorodifluoromethane, CHClF2) and its alternative, HFC-410A (a blend of difluoromethane and pentafluoroethane), in China in response to the booming of room air conditioners (RACs) for both domestic use and exports. HCFC-22 is an ozone-depleting substance under the Montreal Protocol, while both HCFC-22 and HFC-410A are greenhouse gases (GHGs). This study provides a most comprehensive consumption and emission inventory of refrigerants emissions (HCFC-22 and HFC-410A) from RAC sector during 1995–2014, for the first time. Our estimates show that HCFC-22 emissions increased from 0.7 Gg/yr in 1995 to 48.2 Gg/yr in 2014. The accumulative emissions contributed to global total HCFCs emissions by 4.4% (3.3%–6.1%) CFC-11-equivalent (CFC-11-eq) and 5.4% (4.1%–7.5%) CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) during 1995–2012. If left uncontrolled, accumulative emissions of HFC-410A will be12.4 (7.1–20.2) CO2-eq Pg during 2015–2050, which can offset the global climate benefits achieved by the Montreal Protocol. The HFC-410A emissions from China's RAC sector are estimated to be of importance to both global HFCs emissions and China's GHG emissions. Further, we probed the emission mitigation performances of the current 2014 North American Proposal scenario and a modified more ambitious scenario. The emissions of two mitigation scenarios are only 28% and 22% of the emissions without mitigation actions, respectively. This study is the first effort to map the transition of eliminated substance HCFC-22 and its alternative HFC-410A in RAC sector. Therefore, alternative chemicals should be scrutinized with cautions before they are promoted and applied.

СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО КИТАЯ И ВЕНЕСУЭЛЫ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Sino-Venezuelan relations have witnessed remarkable strengthening. This approach reflects China's commitment to enhance unity and cooperation with developing countries, to ensure national oil security and to expand markets. The fundamental feature of modern Sino-Venezuelan relations is China's growing economic influence on the Bolivarian Republic. Over the last 15 years, the PRC has managed to become the second largest trading partner of Venezuela and the largest creditor of Caracas. Venezuela needs China's financial support to develop social projects and thus to ensure domestic political stability. The intensification of economic relations between two countries promotes their cooperation in the international arena. Caracas is largely in tune with Beijing, when it comes to foreign policy issues. At the same time, China's proposals seem to be more restrained and sensible compared to Venezuela's radical foreign policy rhetoric. Therefore, Beijing is not ready to support Venezuela's anti-American initiatives despite the fact that China by no means advocates the American hegemony. Nevertheless, Venezuelan anti-American rhetoric, especially manifested during Hugo Chavez's rule, allows Beijing to assess the limits of Washington's tolerance. Beijing also expands arms sales to Caracas, which can be treated as China's response to the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and to the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. China's growing ties with Venezuela cause concerns in the United States, which for centuries have seen Latin America as its sphere of influence. Beijing doesn't want to provoke Washington in the region. The “triangular relationship” (involving the United States, China and Venezuela) requires China to adjust various foreign policy goals. The article attempts to examine objectives and to evaluate the achievements of the PRC's policy toward Venezuela. The author tries to explore possible implications of closer cooperation between the countries amid changes in the Venezuelan political balance.

Oil price crisis response: Capability assessment and key indicator identification

China has become the second largest oil consumer and oil importer since 2008. In the context of sustained highly frequent fluctuating oil price, China's oil price crisis response system has been seriously threatened. Twelve indicators of four domains called economic stability, political stability, oil import dependence, as well as oil consumption dependence are used to construct “OPCVI (Oil Price Crisis Vulnerability Index)” system, to estimate China's response capability of oil price crisis. MDEA (Multiplicative Data Envelopment Analysis) is used to identify the weights of each indicator and appraise the OPCVI values between 1993 and 2013. Results show that, oil consumption intensity, GDP(Gross Domestic Product) per capita and the ratio of oil import expenditure to GDP are the three key indicators for China's oil price crisis response capability. China's OPCVI became weak since 2000. This is mainly because that the contribution of positive indicators to OPCVI gradually reduced while the contributions of negative indicators increased. Additionally, the contributions of the key indicators of OPCVI are so concentrated and lack of flexibility that it can easily make China's oil price crisis response capability fall into a dangerous situation. Finally, policy recommendations for enhancing the oil price crisis response capability of China are given.

Producing and consuming China’s new urban space: State, market and society

The extant literature on urban China is preoccupied by concerns over the production and usage/consumption of urban space in relation to the dualistic state–market or state–society relation. This special issue presents a collection of carefully selected papers to counter-balance the skewed tendency observed in current urban China studies. We argue that the growth and spatiality of China’s new urbanism can be better understood by a critical analysis of how the state, market, and society interact in the processes of producing and consuming urban spaces in a rapidly changing global and local context. We propose that contemporary Chinese urban processes and experiences can be demonstrated holistically and realistically by placing due attention on both the production and consumption of China’s new urban spaces and the resulting contestations and contradictions. Our collective effort to examine how China’s state–market–society triad plays out in the production and consumption of urban spaces has yielded significant insights to advance ongoing enquiry in urbanising China in response to the advocacy for a decentring theorisation of the urban revolutions taking a perspective inclusive of the voices from the global south.

From dust to dust: Quaternary wind erosion of the Mu Us Desert and Loess Plateau, China

The Ordos Basin of China encompasses the Mu Us Desert in the northwest and the Chinese Loess Plateau to the south and east. The boundary between the mostly internally drained Mu Us Desert and fluvially incised Loess Plateau is an erosional escarpment, up to 400 m in relief, composed of Quaternary loess. Linear ridges, with lengths of ∼10 2 –10 3 m, are formed in Cretaceous- Quaternary strata throughout the basin. Ridge orientations are generally parallel to near-surface wind vectors in the Ordos Basin during modern winter and spring dust storms. Our observations suggest that the Loess Plateau previously extended farther to the north and west of its modern windward escarpment margin and has been partially reworked by eolian processes. The linear topography, Mu Us Desert internal drainage, and escarpment retreat are all attributed to wind erosion, the aerial extent of which expanded southeastward in China in response to Quaternary amplification of Northern Hemisphere glaciation.

The Political Economy of State Capitalism and Shadow Banking in China

The Xi-Li administration faces the dual challenge of managing state capitalism and shadow banking as China enters a phase of more moderate economic growth. During China's first three decades of reform, private sector development occurred in parallel with prioritization of state-owned enterprises in strategic industries, and growth surged. This pattern of state capitalism rested on an unarticulated bifurcated financing arrangement whereby the formal banking system primarily served public enterprises, while private businesses relied primarily on informal finance. However, China's response to global financial crisis disrupted the preceding equilibrium of financial dualism under state capitalism. Unprecedented expansion of bank lending after 2008 created opportunities for a host of state economic — actors including SOEs, state banks, and local governments — to expand their participation in off-balance sheet activities.

Potential overwintering boundary and voltinism changes in the brown planthopper, Nilaparvata lugens, in China in response to global warming

The brown planthopper Nilaparvata lugens (Stal) is a major rice insect pest in China and other Asian countries. This study assessed a potential northward shift in the overwintering boundaries and changes in the overwintering areas and voltinism of this planthopper species in China in response to global warming. Temperature data generated by 15 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) from 2010 to 2099 were employed to analyze the planthopper’s overwintering boundaries and overwintering areas in conjunction with three Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Planthopper voltinism from 1961 to 2050 was analyzed in scenario A2 using degree-day models with projections from the regional circulation model (RCM) Providing Regional Climates for Impacts Studies (PRECIS). In both analyses, 1961–1990 served as the baseline period. Both the intermittent and constant overwintering boundaries were projected to shift northward; these shifts were more pronounced during later time periods and in scenarios A2 and A1B. The intermittent overwintering area was modeled to increase by 11, 24 and 44 %, and the constant overwintering area, by 66, 206 and 477 %, during the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s, respectively. Planthopper voltinism will increase by <0.5, 0.5–1.0 and 1.0–1.4 generations in northern, central and southern China, respectively, in 2021–2050. Our results suggest that the brown planthopper will overwinter in a much larger region and will produce more generations under future climate warming scenarios. As a result, the planthopper will exert an even greater threat to China’s rice production in the future.

The Core Conclusions and Interpretation of Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released the Working Group II contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report (WGII AR5) IPCC Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability in March 2014. This paper introduces and interprets this report, making well organization of the main conclusions, analyzing the new enlightenment to China's response to climate change. WGII AR5 focuses on the assessment and management of climate change risks. According to the latest scientific literature and evidences, this report elaborates climate change's broader impacts on water resource, food production, and other natural and human social systems since 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). Via the assessment of different areas, regions, and key risks in the future, the report indicates the risk level of climate change faced with the globe under different temperature rise; aiming at risk management, the report emphasizes the significance of promoting and establishing the sustainable development society with recovery capacity through adaptation and mitigation of climate change. As an important scientific basis for international community to recognize and cope with climate change, the publication of IPCC AR5 one after another will have a significant influence on Durban Platform negotiations on post-2020 international climate regime which have been in a difficult stage, and the 2014 United Nations climate change summit [IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Impact Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press].

The Ebola threat: China's response to the West African epidemic and national development of prevention and control policies and infrastructure.

There is growing concern in West Africa about the spread of the Ebola hemorrhagic fever virus. With the increasing global public health risk, a coordinated international response is necessary. The Chinese government is prepared to work in collaboration with West African countries to assist in the containment and control of the epidemic through the contribution of medical expertise and mobile laboratory testing teams. Nationally, China is implementing prevention programs in major cities and provinces, the distribution of Ebola test kits, and the deployment of a new national Ebola research laboratory.

The Potential Impact of Preventive HIV Vaccines in China: Results and Benefits of a Multi-Province Modeling Collaboration.

China’s commitment to implementing established and emerging HIV/AIDS prevention and control strategies has led to substantial gains in terms of access to antiretroviral treatment and prevention services, but the evolving and multifaceted HIV/AIDS epidemic in China highlights the challenges of maintaining that response. This study presents modeling results exploring the potential impact of HIV vaccines in the Chinese context at varying efficacy and coverage rates, while further exploring the potential implications of vaccination programs aimed at reaching populations at highest risk of HIV infection. A preventive HIV vaccine would add a powerful tool to China’s response, even if not 100% efficacious or available to the full population.

The Abe Effect on South Korea’s Trade Policy

Prime Minister Shinzo's decision to enter talks on the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been a game changer in the competition over Asia Pacific free trade agreements (FTAs). His move helped to create a space for multilateral, mega-FTA competition before South Korea could fully prepare and implement its FTA predicated on bilateral deals. In this article, I provide an overview of South Korea's evolving strategies toward FTAs and explore how it has responded to the Abe effect. My focus is on two challenges for South Korea in participating in the TPP: US geopolitical pressure once Japan entered negotiations, and the de facto FTA negotiations with Japan under the TPP. Dealing with Japan is an especially tall order given the troubled history of South Korea-Japan economic and political relations. KEYWORDS: Korea-Japan relations, TPP, Shinzo, strategy, security-economy nexus.WHEN ABE SHINZO RETURNED TO POWER IN DECEMBER 2012, FEW people expected that Japan-South Korea relations would hit their lowest mark since diplomatic relations between them were restored in 1965. Instead of celebrating joint accomplishments of the past five decades, the two sides attempted to improve their severely strained relations, which included failure to hold a oneon- one summit meeting since took office. History conflicts emanating from Abe's historical revisionism in regard to imperialism and colonialism have been the primary source of political strains. While South Korea's president Park Geun-hye has demanded a more explicit apology from Japan on the history issues, such as the Imperial Army's enslavement of so-called comfort women, in Japan a view is gaining strength that it has apologized enough. Increasing enmity is reflected in public opinion surveys, such as one by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO in spring 2014. It found that nearly 70 percent of South Koreans have a negative image of Japan, while 66 percent of Japanese have an unfavorable image of Korea (East Asia Institute 2014). This trend will most likely continue throughout 2015 because, as John Delury's article in this volume argues, the odds of genuine reconciliation between and Park are very low.Abe's return to power has also made an economic impact. The best example is his decision to enter TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) negotiations on March 15, 2013, significantly affecting South Korea's trade strategy that sought middle-power leadership as a of regional and transregional free trade agreement (FTA) networks. Abe's decision means that Japan supports the TPP, the US initiative in regional trade architecture, and helps to enhance the TPP's credibility and viability as a mega-regional trade agreement within the US coalition-building strategy (Terada 2013). Abe's move prompted China's response to accelerate the pace of devising alternative FTA networks. And it created strategic dilemmas for South Korea. Because the United States, together with Japan, has taken the initiative in forging regional trade networks through the TPP while China is counterbalancing it, the FTA game is now about creating (or multilateralizing) a regional or megaregional FTA. This is a blow to South Korea's FTA hub strategy predicated on bilateral FTAs with the major economies.My article explores how South Korea has responded to the challenges caused by the major economic powers. After providing an overview of South Korea's evolving strategies toward FTAs as an FTA latecomer, I examine the country's policy toward the TPP. I then analyze the Abe effect on South Korea's global strategy. The new dilemmas facing South Korea on TPP participation are twofold. It felt strong US geopolitical pressure once Japan entered the negotiations. But should South Korea enter the FTA negotiations, it would have to deal with a difficult Japan.The Rise of South Korea in the FTA GameFTAs and the Hub Strategy in East AsiaEast Asian countries embarked on FTA initiatives in response to economic globalization, the Asian financial crisis, and competitive regionalism. …

China’s Perceptions of and Responses to Abe’s Foreign Policy

Over the past two years since Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo came to power, the bilateral relationship between China and has been deteriorating steadily. China's perception of Abe's foreign policy orientation has been very negative. At the same time, China's response to it has also been very tough and assertive. At least four factors may account for China's attitude and behavior: China's rise, domestic politics, historical memory, and leadership personality. KEYWORDS: China, Japan, Sino-Japanese relations, East Asia security.ABE SHINZO CAME TO POWER AS JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE second time in December 2012 and was reelected in 2014. His expected tenure of office (2012-2018) coincides with a great political transition in China, as Xi Jinping became the new secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in late 2012. His tenure of office as the Chinese president is from 2013 to 2023. Both men became top leaders amid rising tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship, marked by the Japanese government's declaration of nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in September 2012, which drew a strong reaction from China. Abe is well-known for his nationalist and conservative tendencies, and Xi is also widely regarded as a political strongman (Denyer 2015). It is probably not a coincidence that since their coming to power, Sino-Japanese relations have steadily deteriorated, perhaps reaching the lowest point since their normalization in 1972. As a sign of how badly the relationship has declined, Xi did not meet Abe for nearly two years, until the Beijing Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2014.What accounts for this steady deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations? I attempt to answer this question by focusing on China's perception of, and response to, Abe's foreign policy orientation since Abe came to power in late 2012. My analysis is mainly based on official Chinese policy statements, official mass media coverage (especially by Xinhua News Agency), and academic publications, especially those by China's experts. I do not make use of Chinese netizens' opinion of Abe's foreign policy.Strategic Ambition vs. Strategic AnxietyWhat is the main goal and motive of Abe's foreign policy orientation? Chinese officials rarely comment on this subject, and Chinese analysts so far have not reached a consensus on it. Most researchers and official news agency commentators emphasize the of Japanese politicians like Abe, namely, to make a country in international affairs.Those Chinese analysts who stress strategic ambition as the main goal of Abe's foreign policy argue that in the context of a changing East Asian geopolitical landscape, has been increasingly articulating a desire to become a country with a military not constitutionally barred from war and an active alliance policy (Jiang 2012). To become a normal country, including becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is the most important goal of Abe's foreign policy. To this group of the Chinese researchers, Abe's policy, to some extent, is the continuation of Japan's search for the status of a political great power since the 1980s. is nowadays widely regarded as a declining power, and Abe is searching for great power status in the world by using the theme Japan is back.Interestingly, Henry Kissinger made a similar comment in his new book on world order:As at other pivotal moments in its history, is moving toward a redefinition of its broader role in international order, sure to have far-reaching consequences in its region and beyond. Searching for a new role, it will assess once again, carefully, unsentimentally, and unobtrusively, the balance of material and psychological forces in light of the rise of China, Korean developments, and their impact on Japan's security. It will examine the utility and record of the American alliance and its considerable success in serving wideranging mutual interests; it will also consider America's withdrawal from three military conflicts. …

Greater temporal changes of sediment microbial community than its waterborne counterpart in Tengchong hot springs, Yunnan Province, China.

Temporal variation in geochemistry can cause changes in microbial community structure and diversity. Here we studied temporal changes of microbial communities in Tengchong hot springs of Yunnan Province, China in response to geochemical variations by using microbial and geochemical data collected in January, June and August of 2011. Greater temporal variations were observed in individual taxa than at the whole community structure level. Water and sediment communities exhibited different temporal variation patterns. Water communities were largely stable across three sampling times and dominated by similar microbial lineages: Hydrogenobaculum in moderate-temperature acidic springs, Sulfolobus in high-temperature acidic springs, and Hydrogenobacter in high-temperature circumneutral to alkaline springs. Sediment communities were more diverse and responsive to changing physicochemical conditions. Most of the sediment communities in January and June were similar to those in waters. However, the August sediment community was more diverse and contained more anaerobic heterotrophs than the January and June: Desulfurella and Acidicaldus in moderate-temperature acidic springs, Ignisphaera and Desulfurococcus in high-temperature acidic springs, the candidate division OP1 and Fervidobacterium in alkaline springs, and Thermus and GAL35 in neutral springs. Temporal variations in physicochemical parameters including temperature, pH, and dissolved organic carbon may have triggered the observed microbial community shifts.

China's Military Mercantilism

ABSTRACT: The People's Republic is a great power in search of a grand strategy. China's maritime adventurism reflects the fragmentation of foreign policy, and the coupling of commercial interests with military force. Without effective statecraft, PLA planning could all too easily become national policy. Creative US initiatives would help to salve historical grievances and reconcile China's disruptive ambitions with the world order. ********** The future of global security will be largely determined by China's response to the established international order. In recent years E nationalist rhetoric, revisionist maritime borders and regular confrontation has undermined the party line of a rise, and threatens to inveigle US forces. Why does China menace its neighbors at sea, and what should the United States do about it? Most arguments concerning the role of China in the international system can be reduced to two broad theoretical perspectives. The first view is liberal institutionalist: China might indulge in populist nationalism, but is not historically expansionist. It remains committed to a peaceful rise within the current international framework. The second view is generally realist: China is bent on the aggressive accumulation of wealth, power and natural resources in a quest for regional hegemony--a return to the Middle Kingdom. This article will advance a third argument: China has identified a path to national greatness without yet comprehending what the destination might look like. In the absence of a comprehensive national strategy or theoretical philosophy, military and mercantilist imperatives are unduly influencing Chinese statecraft at sea. This trend points to the disproportionate weight of state-owned enterprises and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in the execution of foreign policy. Chinese ambitions are often served by increasing chaos and the erosion of international norms. But this course is unnecessarily dangerous, threatening to isolate potential allies, alienate Taiwan, and even trigger armed conflict with Japan. This course would enmesh the United States and cripple the global economy, potentially unleashing chaos within China. The Chinese will determine their own destiny, but Washington should encourage Beijing to consolidate, not diminish the existing international system. This article will outline ways in which the United States could work with Australia and Japan towards this end by promoting international law, managing local conflict and reducing regional tensions. The Liberal Institutionalist Argument Liberal institutionalists are confident the existing order can accommodate rising powers without recourse to violence. According to John Ikenberry the contemporary system is open, integrated, and rule-based; with strong political foundations, meaning China is not compelled to overthrow the United States in order to realize national greatness. Moreover, nuclear weapons have made war among great powers unlikely. Today's world order is hard to overturn and easy to join. (1) China's interest in adhering to international norms is based on three main principles: 1. The open market--China has generated enormous wealth from free trade, 2. The multilateral character of global institutions, which diffuse hegemony and can adapt to reflect evolution in the international order, and 3. The resilience of established rules and norms, which encourage unprecedented co-operation and shared authority. Zheng Bijian generally endorses each of these points, noting other emerging nations have plundered their way to power by exploiting overseas resources through invasion, colonization, expansion, or even large-scale wars of aggression. He writes (in 2005) that China's emergence has been driven by capital, technology, and resources acquired through peaceful means, in accordance with the policies of Deng Xiaoping. …

Problems and prospects: China's response to wrongful convictions

This article describes the difficulties involved in the implementation criminal justice reforms. These difficulties are caused by deep flaws that affect how China responds to wrongful convictions and that dampen the prospect for their prevention or remedy. Through new case studies, it critically examines the difficulties associated with the implementation of mechanisms for preventing or remedying such convictions, both before and after the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC (2012 CPL). It further proceeds to further analyze deep flaws in China's justice system, indicating that the prime reasons for the constant failure of justice reforms is due more to institutional practices than to attitudinal or cultural practices in China. It finally concludes by suggesting that, in order to mend the major flaws and fill the implementation gap between law and practice, authorities should learn from China's past and from relevant overseas experience to better prevent wrongful convictions.

China's Responses to External Pressures on its WMD-related Exports after 2004: reactive and proactive

China, although a member of most of the international non-proliferation and multilateral export control regimes and having a law-based comprehensive export control system, has not fully complied with its non-proliferation obligations, which is evidenced by not only the US's sanctions on some Chinese entities for their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related exports but also some external disclosures in this regard. Faced with these external pressures, China's responses have been both reactive and proactive. The rationale for China's mixed responses can be attributed to its security interest in preventing nuclear terrorism, geopolitical interests in South Asia, economic interests in procuring oil supplies, high-tech imports and missile export markets, in addition to its status interest in building a ‘responsible great power’ identity in the international community.