Chief Executive Officer Incentives Research Articles

Internal governance and corporate social responsibility performance

AbstractInternal governance is the process by which vice presidents (VPs) use their influence with the chief executive officer (CEO) to impact the firm's direction and policy. This study examines the effect of internal governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Based on a large sample of US firms and after controlling for various CEO incentives, corporate governance and other determinants of CSR performance, we find that more effective internal governance is associated with a better CSR performance. These results are robust to alternative internal governance and CSR measures, alternative samples and various approaches that mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Further analysis shows that the effect of internal governance on CSR performance is more pronounced when (a) the CEO is subject to more intensive monitoring, (b) VPs are more powerful, (c) firms experience less short‐term financial performance pressure and (d) they face stronger product market competition. This study advances our understanding of corporate governance's effect on CSR by showing the importance of internal governance.

The impact of accounting comparability on CEO incentive plans in an emerging economy: the moderating role of board independence

PurposeThe present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approachThe information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.FindingsThe results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.Originality/valueThe paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

What do nonprofit hospitals reward? An examination of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals.

Nonprofit hospital chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has received considerable attention in light of nonprofits’ tax-favored status as well as the high costs of hospital care. Past studies have found that hospital financial performance is a significant determinant of CEO pay but nonprofit performance, including quality and charity care, are not. Using post-ACA data, we re-examine whether a variety of hospital performance measures are important determinants of nonprofit hospital CEO compensation. We found mixed evidence with respect to the significance of the association between financial performance and uncompensated care and CEO compensation. Among the other nonprofit performance measures, patient satisfaction was significantly associated with CEO compensation, but other measures were not significant determinants of CEO compensation. Our results suggest nonprofit hospitals balance their financial health against their mission when setting CEO incentives. Additional policy targeting transparency in hospital CEO compensation may be warranted to help policymakers understand the specific factors used by hospital boards to incentivize CEOs.

Through the rhetoric art: CEO incentives in sustainability sensitive industries

Purpose This paper aims to explore the relationship between the readability of sustainability reports and chief executive officer (CEO) attributes, comprising monetary, non-monetary incentives and personal characteristics. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on an international sample of companies operating in sustainability-sensitive industries during 2016–2018. Findings The results prove that CEO monetary incentives, as well as CEO non-monetary incentives, negatively influence the readability of sustainability reports, revealed in a positive relationship with readability indexes, by providing reports with greater reading difficulty. Additionally, this study shows evidence about the relation of complementarity between these incentives. Other CEO characteristics have no significant effect on the readability of sustainability reports. Originality/value This research sheds the light on the role of CEO incentives in obfuscating sustainability information to portray the company, operating in sustainability-sensitive industries, in a favorable image.

CEO dominance and firm innovation effort

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether innovation effort is lower for firms exhibiting signs of higher chief executive officer (CEO) dominance and whether such CEOs can be incentivized to pursue risky ventures such as innovation projects in line with shareholder's interests that are geared toward the long-term growth of the firm.Design/methodology/approachThe paper utilizes panel data of US publicly listed companies (2007–2016) to address the influence of CEO dominance on firm innovation effort and the moderating effects of incentives in this relationship through ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique is also employed to address possible endogeneity. As a robustness check, further analysis is conducted utilizing an alternative proxy for CEO incentive as well as Tobit analysis (with panel-level random effects).FindingsResults from both OLS and Tobit estimations offer two key findings. First, there is a significantly negative relationship between CEO pay slice and firm research and development (R&D) intensity. Second, the interaction effect of CEO incentives and CEO dominance is significant and positive.Research limitations/implicationsWhen provided with the right incentives, such as those that reward long-term performance, dominant CEOs can be incentivized to go after risky ventures like innovation projects that are crucial to promoting the long-term growth of the firm.Originality/valueThis paper utilizes R&D instead of patent outputs as proxies for innovation where the former enables studying R&D efforts for more recent periods compared to prior studies that utilize patent data.

Audit firm tenure and perceived audit quality: evidence from CEO incentive contracts

PurposeThis paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure.Design/methodology/approachThe paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables.FindingsAuditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications.Research limitations/implicationsThe inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Liet al., 2010).Practical implicationsCompensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations.Originality/valueThis study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance).

Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data

Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures

Does Independent Advice to the Board Affect CEO Compensation?

AbstractThis article investigates the role external advice plays in the board’s determination of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We show that CEO incentive pay increases with the degree of compensation consultant independence using a quasi-natural experiment provided by the creation of an independent consultant after separation from an affiliated consultant. Specifically, switching to an independent consultant significantly increases the pay–performance sensitivity and relative performance evaluation of CEO contracts. Despite the benefits of independent advice, independent consultants may not be hired due to the influence of powerful CEOs or because boards already possess adequate expertise.

Do CEO incentives and characteristics influence corporate social responsibility (CSR) and vice versa? A literature review

PurposeThis paper aims to analyze whether chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and characteristics (e.g. CEO power, CEO tenure) are linked with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and vice versa.Design/methodology/approachBased on upper echelons theory, the author conducts a structured literature review and evaluates 84 empirical-quantitative studies on CEO and CSR variables.FindingsWhile the majority of the included studies analyzed the CEO-CSR link, there are indicators for a bidirectional relationship. Moreover, prior research has focused on CEO incentives, especially compensation contracts, and on the US capital market. A major research gap relates to CEO characteristics, e.g. CEO values, education and experience.Research limitations/implicationsHeterogeneous CEO and CSR variables and endogeneity concerns lower the validity of recent studies. Future research is encouraged to implement dynamic regression models, increase CSR and CEO proxies and focus on international samples with country-specific effects.Practical implicationsAs CEO activities can have a major impact on CSR activities, the author recommends firms to search for opportunities to make their CSR strategy more comprehensive by their stakeholder communication, thus providing deeper insights into their CSR performance in line with stakeholders’ interests.Originality/valueThe paper is the first literature review on the interaction between CEO and CSR so far. The author explains the main CEO and CSR variables that have been included in research, stresses the limitations of the studies and gives useful recommendations for future research, practice and regulators.

Does CEO power moderate the link between ESG performance and financial performance?

PurposeBased on stakeholder and upper echelons theory, this study aims to analyze whether the link between environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and financial performance is moderated by chief executive officer (CEO) power.Design/methodology/approachListed corporations with reference to the German two-tier system (HDAX and SDAX) for the business years 2010-2018 (775 firm-year observations) have been included. Fixed effects panel regression analysis was conducted to analyze the link between ESG performance (in total and its three pillars) and financial performance (ROA), with special reference to the interaction of a CEO power index.FindingsWhile ESG performance has a positive impact on financial performance, the link is more pronounced by CEO power. Thus, in line with prior research on the one-tier system, CEO incentives can positively contribute to the CSR-business case in the German two-tier system. The results remain constant after conducting several robustness checks.Originality/valueA key contribution to the empirical CSR literature can be stated, as the moderating role of CEO power in the ESG–financial performance link is rather neglected in prior studies. Thus, corporate governance and sustainability should be classified as interactive aspects for the business case of a successful stakeholder management.

The use of nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus compensation

AbstractResearch Question/IssueIn this study, we explore the relationship between the use of nonfinancial performance measures in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus plans and CEO power, moderated by compensation committee monitoring. Furthermore, we investigate whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures is associated with higher CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a sample of FTSE 350 firms during the period 2007–2013, we find that CEO power is significantly negatively related to the propensity of using nonfinancial performance measures. This negative relationship, however, is moderated by higher levels of compensation committee monitoring. We also find that firms combining nonfinancial and financial performance measures in CEO bonus plans tend to have stronger CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns than firms using financial measures alone. Thus, our results suggest that boards of directors adopting nonfinancial performance measures are able to better align CEO incentives with shareholder interests. We find similar results when using the weight of nonfinancial performance measures in the bonus plan in our analyses.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study empirically supports the managerial power theory whereby powerful CEOs influence the choice of performance measures in their bonus plans. However, effective compensation committees are found to attenuate the influence of powerful CEOs and to better align their interests with those of shareholders. Our result of stronger bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns for firms combining nonfinancial with financial performance measures implies that the informativeness of these measures enhances the firm's ability to tie CEO bonus compensation to shareholder wealth.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study offers insights to members of boards of directors, especially compensation committee members, who are interested in improving the design of executive incentive contracts to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Furthermore, the findings inform regulators about the importance of alternative performance measures in pay‐performance sensitivity and may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure.

REWARD CULTURE AND BANKS’ PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS

This paper explores the relationship between banks’ “reward culture” and banks’ performance and risk during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Reward culture is defined as a result-oriented culture influenced through the incentives structure. Reward culture reflects three dimensions: (i) Chief Executive Officer incentives; (ii) Vice Presidents’ incentives; and (iii) employee incentives. A reward culture score represents the common factor in incentives across all employee levels. I find strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship between reward culture and bank returns and risk. Classifying banks into high, average, and low reward culture groups in the pre-crisis year 2006, I find that during the crisis period, banks within both the high and low reward culture groups performed worse, and were more risky than banks within the average reward culture group. The findings are consistent with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard associated with incentive misalignment when incentives are too low or too high.

CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation

AbstractUsing scaled wealth‐performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross‐sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long‐term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three‐stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options‐based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long‐term economic benefits.

Decarbonizing the Boardroom? Aligning Electric Utility Executive Compensation With Climate Change Incentives

Despite the drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the Trump administration, the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing renewable energy technology (RET) deployment. Although electrical power utilities are required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do so. In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for aligning utility executive compensation with such policies. First, an overview is provided on chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the GHG emissions of utilities. The relationship between GHG emissions, renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the largest electric utilities in Michigan. The results show that the regulated utility market is not consistently rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach incentivizing RETs adoption and an approach encouraging GHG emissions have deficiencies. A combined approach is then analyzed that results in a compensation equation allowing for utility executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation. The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.

Decarbonizing the boardroom? Aligning electric utility executive compensation with climate change incentives

Despite the drastic reversal of decarbonization effort by the Trump administration, the majority of U.S. states continue policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing renewable energy technology (RET) deployment. Although electrical power utilities are required and/or encouraged to comply with these policies, their executives lack direct incentives to do so. In this study, a novel incentive mechanism is evaluated for aligning utility executive compensation with such policies. First, an overview is provided on chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the GHG emissions of utilities. The relationship between GHG emissions, renewable energy diversification, and CEO pay is examined using the case study of three of the largest electric utilities in Michigan. The results show that the regulated utility market is not consistently rewarding CEOs with higher compensation for decreasing GHG emissions and that both an approach incentivizing RETs adoption and an approach encouraging GHG emissions have deficiencies. A combined approach is then analyzed that results in a compensation equation allowing for utility executives to receive incentive pay for reducing overall emissions and increasing renewable generation. The results indicate that by careful calibration of the proposed incentive equations the harmful effects of emissions can be prevented through CEO incentive pay.

Board Expertise and Executive Incentives

We investigate how board expertise affects chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and firm value. The CEO engages in a sequence of tasks: first acquiring information to evaluate a potential project, then reporting his or her assessment of the project to the board, and finally implementing the project if it is adopted. We demonstrate that the CEO receives higher compensation when the board agrees with the CEO on the assessment of the project. Board expertise leads to (weakly) better investment decisions and helps motivate the CEO's evaluation effort; however, it may induce underreporting and reduce the CEO's incentives to properly implement the project. Consequently, if motivating the CEO to evaluate projects is the major concern (e.g., innovative industries), board expertise exhibits an overall positive effect on firm value; however, if motivating the CEO to implement projects is the major concern (e.g., mature industries), board expertise can harm firm value. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

Internal Versus External Earnings per Share Goals and CEO Incentives

We examine differences in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) achievement of earnings per share (EPS) goals set separately through analyst forecasts and firm bonus plans. Having different goals for the same performance metric enables us to assess their relative importance in incentivizing CEOs. We find CEOs frequently achieve analyst forecasts, but rarely achieve bonus goals exceeding the forecast. Despite lower compensation risk accompanying easier goals, we also find that bonus goals set below forecasts are associated with greater pay, suggesting the use of easier goals to compensate CEOs while maintaining the appearance of pay-for-performance. The results highlight the importance of considering both sets of performance goals simultaneously when evaluating their incentive effects.

CEO Incentives, Relationship Lending, and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing

We investigate how lending relationships attenuate the conflict of interest between creditors and shareholders that arises from chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts. We find that lending relationships mitigate the influence of CEO risk‐taking incentives on loan spreads, especially for informationally opaque firms. In addition, lending relationships attenuate the impact of CEO risk‐taking incentives on maturity and collateral requirements. This article highlights the importance of bank monitoring through lending relationships to mitigate managerial risk‐shifting activities that arise from equity incentives.

Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt

We use firm and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics motivated by optimal contracting theory to estimate optimal CEO relative debt-equity incentive ratios. Equity values rise as firms adjust CEO incentive ratios toward their predicted optimums, whether that increases or decreases the relative incentive ratio. Debt values rise as firms adjust ratios upward and do not fall as they adjust them downward. Our predicted optimums explain changes in equity and debt values better than a model in which firms simply match CEO inside debt-equity ratios to firm debt-equity ratios. The results suggest important cross-sectional differences in firms’ optimal inside debt policies.

The Effect Of Chief Executive Officers Turnover On International Financial Reporting Standards Reconciliation

We investigate the impact of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) changes on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reconciliation. Since January 1st, 2011 all Korean listed companies are required to adopt IFRS in their separate and consolidated accounts. To aid investors in evaluating corporate performance over time, the companies must restate the K-GAAP financial statements for 2010 under IFRS. We find that negative IFRS reconciliation is more frequent for firms with CEO turnover in 2011. The result suggests that new CEOs have an incentive to report lower earnings through IFRS reconciliation for the purpose of big bath. Additionally, in order to examine whether new CEOs incentive of the negative IFRS reconciliation is existed in different corporate governance levels, we classify the companies into strong and weak corporate governance. From the test, we find that their incentive of negative IFRS reconciliation is disappeared (existed) in the companies with strong (weak) corporate governance. This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by providing valuable information of the CEO incentive regarding IFRS reconciliation. We believe that our empirical evidence will be helpful to market participants when they make a business decisions in case of CEO turnover.