Chicago Council Research Articles

Soft power: From ethnic attraction to national attraction in sociological globalism

Abstract This paper explores the influence of ethnic relations in sociological globalism on the formulation process of a country’s soft power (i.e., national attraction). People migrate into a country, become an ethnic group, and experience sociological contact/interaction with other ethnic groups, through which they form more concrete and experiential attitudes toward each other. In turn, these attitudes affect their perceptions of other ethnic groups’ homeland countries. With soft power being defined as favorability toward a foreign country, this paper investigates the influence of ethnic relations in a three-predictor regression model of soft power—ethnic relations, between country relationship quality, and normative performance (i.e., reputation) of a country. In testing the model, this study uses secondary data consisting of U.S. national surveys including polls of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on perceptions of foreign countries and aggregate nation-level data. The findings show that ethnic relations has a sizable, significant influence on favorability, second to relationship quality, with normative performance having a weak, insignificant influence. This paper further discusses the findings’ implications for contemporary public diplomacy practice and theory and outlines directions for future study of ethnic relation’s influence on soft power in sociological globalism.

America's Global Role after Bush

The next American president's foreign policy will be conducted in the face of two main challenges. One is the legacy of George W. Bush: Iraq in particular, and a substantially weakened US strategic...

C4. Profs. John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, Letter to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Regarding the Cancellation of Their Talk on the Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5 August 2007.

"C4. Profs. John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, Letter to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Regarding the Cancellation of Their Talk on the Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5 August 2007.." Journal of Palestine Studies, 37(1), pp. 213–214

The United States and East Asia after Iraq

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government. The author thanks Steven Duke for research assistance, and Bernard Cole, Bonnie Glaser, James Schear, Colonel Michael Bell and Lieutenant-Colonel Jaime Laughrey for helpful comments. Notes 1. This article is based on three sets of sources. The first is discussions with Asian government officials and security experts over the last three years, including annual dialogues with Japanese, South Korean and Chinese experts and research trips to ten Asian countries. The second is a review of commentary from major Asian newspapers on the fifth anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, which provided a good overview of Asian concerns about US involvement in Iraq. The third is a review of recent public opinion polls, including 2006 studies by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2. 'U.S. image in Asia Deteriorating', Yomiuri Shimbun , 10 September 2006; ‘Survey: US Image Deteriorates in Asia’, Associated Press, 10 September 2006. 3. Other studies consulted include the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Poll, ‘America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas’, 13 June 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252; a BBC World Service/GlobeScan Poll, ‘Global Poll: Iran Seen Playing Negative Role’, 3 February 2006, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbc06-3/index.html; and a BBC World Service/GlobeScan Poll, 'World Public Says Iraq War Has Increased Global Terrorist Threat’, 28 February 2006, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll06-4.html. 4. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, The United States and the Rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 Multination Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2006), pp. 52, 57. 5. 85% in China, 84% in South Korea, 73% in Australia, 72% in Indonesia and 61% in the Philippines said that the Iraq War had increased the threat of terrorism. 44% of those surveyed in India felt the war had increased the threat of terrorism, while 18% felt the war had reduced terrorist threats. BBC World Service/GlobeScan Poll, ‘World Public Says Iraq War Has Increased Global Terrorist Threat’, p. 5. 6. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, The United States and the Rise of China and India , pp. 52, 57. 7. Ibid. , pp. 50–53. Proportions viewing the United States as playing a ‘very positive’ or 'somewhat positive' role in resolving Asian problems were 59% in China, 66% in India and 58% in South Korea. 8. The 600 Japanese troops deployed in Samara were assigned to reconstruction duties; South Korea's 3,500 troops made it the third largest contributor to the coalition. 9. See 'China in Asia: Chinese Influence, Asian Strategies, and U.S. Policy Responses', report of American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University conference, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/AEI-NDU_China_Seminars. 10. China's position is ambivalent: it officially opposes all military alliances, but supports the presence of US troops in Asia so long as they contribute to regional stability and are not aimed against China. 11. China's initiatives have been in the political and economic spheres. US commitments in Iraq may have increased North Korea's confidence that it could conduct a nuclear test without inciting US military retaliation. However, US willingness to invade Iraq likely reinforced North Korean fears of US military capabilities; North Korean official statements justifying its nuclear test emphasise the need to deter a possible US military attack. 12. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘U.S. Casualties in Iraq Rise Sharply’, Washington Post , 8 October 2006, p. A1. 13. Bill Gertz, ‘More Muscle, with Eye on China’, Washington Times , 20 April 2006. 14. Valiant Shield 2006 , http://www.pacom.mil/exercises/vs2006/index.shtml. 15. Julian E. Barnes, 'Army is Stretched Too Thin', Los Angeles Times , 15 December 2006. 16. Because combat is the crucible for evaluating officer performance, Iraq will also have a significant effect on the composition of the senior officer corps. Additional informationNotes on contributorsPhillip C. SaundersPhillip C. Saunders is Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University. This article was prepared for a Council on Foreign Relations/IISS Symposium on Iraq's Impact on the Future of US Foreign and Defence Policy, with generous support from Rita E. Hauser.

From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites' Views on the Use of Military Force

AbstractIn this paper we present trends in US elites' opinions on the use of military force abroad in the period from the end of US military involvement in Vietnam in 1975 to 2004 during the 'war on terror.' With data from quadrennial surveys of US elites' foreign policy attitudes sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations since 1975, we ask whether elites have become more militaristic or whether such views have been a long term characteristic of US elites. We find support for the view of United States leaders as prone to the use of military might, even without the support of allies. Yet the findings also indicate that American elites have held this military view of reality for a long time.

Register levels of ethno-national purity: The ethnicization of language and community in Mauritius

Language is involved in processes of group identification in that it provides a focus for explicit discourses of identity and constitutes a field of less overt practices for creating groupness. Drawing on examples from Mauritian television broadcasting, this study traces the ethnicization of Mauritian Bhojpuri as a “Hindu language” through the hierarchization and subsuming of linguistic practices under larger language labels with ethno-national significance. Purist forms of Mauritian Bhojpuri that are locally perceived as “intermediate” registers between Hindi and Bhojpuri are used to represent Hindi as a language spoken in Mauritius, and at the same time to link Mauritian Bhojpuri ideologically to Hindu identity. This blurring of language boundaries serves a Hindu nationalist agenda in a diasporic location by establishing new links between linguistic forms and ethno-national values.Fieldwork in Mauritius was carried out in 1996 and 1997–1998 and was supported by the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the University of Chicago Council for Advanced Studies in Peace and International Cooperation (CASPIC). I would like to extend my sincere thanks to these institutions. Research in Mauritius was also facilitated by the University of Mauritius, where I would especially like to thank Vinesh Hookoomsing. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Second University of Chicago/University of Michigan (“Michicagoan”) Graduate Student Conference in Linguistic Anthropology and at the Working Group for Urban Sociolinguistics at New York University. My thanks go to the organizers and participants of these events, from whose comments I greatly benefited. I am also indebted to Lou Brown, Sara Friedman, Susan Gal, Vinesh Hookoomsing, Judith Irvine, Michael Silverstein, and two anonymous reviewers for Language in Society for their careful readings and helpful suggestions at different stages in the writing of this article. Of course, any mistakes are my own. Most of all, I am indebted to the many Mauritians without whose help and friendship my research would have been impossible.

Foreign Policy Gaps between Citizens and Leaders

Persistent gaps between the policy preferences of leaders and those of citizens are problematic from the point of view of democratic theory. Examination of the foreign policy preferences of samples of citizens and leaders from seven Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) surveys between 1974 and 1998 reveals many differences of 30, 40, and even 50 percentage points. Often a majority of the public has disagreed with a majority of leaders. Some of the same gaps have persisted over the full 24-year period of these surveys. The pattern of gaps is considerably more complicated than a simple difference in degree of commitment to internationalism. Citizens have generally put a higher priority than leaders on expanding domestic programs like Social Security, crime fighting, and health care, and have been more eager to cut foreign economic aid. But there have not been substantial gaps with respect to defense spending or military aid. More members of the public than leaders emphasize foreign policy goals related to protecting Americans' jobs and ensuring Americans' health and physical security (e.g., from terrorism, drugs, and epidemic diseases). Citizens have been more reluctant than leaders to use U.S. troops in most circumstances, but the opposite is true of situations involving Latin America. Citizens have been more willing to bomb than to commit troops, though not indiscriminately so, and many more citizens than leaders oppose selling weapons abroad. Fewer members of the public than leaders have favored most kinds of cooperative relationships with adversary countries. But more members of the public than leaders generally support the United Nations, and more favor multilateralism in general. About the same number of citizens as leaders have supported NATO. Some of these gaps may reflect lower levels of attention to foreign affairs and lower levels of information among the public than among leaders, but many of the gaps may instead reflect different values and interests. In cases where the public is ill-informed, persistent gaps suggest a failure of leaders to educate and persuade. Where public opinion is well-informed and deliberative, democratic theory would seem to call for responsiveness by policymakers.

Testing Foreign Policy Belief Structures of the American Public in the Post-Cold War Period: Gross Validations from Two National Surveys

The basic attitudinal structure underlying the American public's for eign policy preferences is assessed by using both exploratory and confir matory factor analyses on two major post-cold war surveys containing many similarly worded questions-by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CC, 10/94) and the Times Mirror Center (TM, 9/93). Although previous studies had stressed only two or three primary attitudinal fac tors and usually ignored factor intercorrelations, our exploratory analy ses of these data sets consistently yielded at least four distinct and readily interpretable factors, including two correlated "outward-focused" factors (Global Altruism and U.S. Global Interest), a U.S. Domestic issues factor bearing on foreign policy (e.g., jobs protection), and a Military Security factor. Building upon these results, confirmatory factor analyses using LISREL found that a four-factor model provided probabilistically close fits to both the CC and TM data sets and that accuracy of fits declined with various simpler models.

Internationalisme pragmatique : l'opinion américaine au milieu de la décennie 1990

Pragmatic Internationalism : American Public Opinion in the Mid-Nineties, by John E. Rielly According to some of the most important general conclusions from the latest quadrennial survey of American public and leadership opinion sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in late 1994, American public and leadership opinion can be summarized as reflecting a «pragmatic internationalism ». Approximately two thirds of the public and almost ail of the leaders still favor an active role for the United States in world affairs. Despite heightened emphasis on domestic concerns, United States results do not reflect a new isolationism. Almost half the public and leaders surveyed say the United States plays a more important role as a world leader today compared to ten years ago.

Foreign Guests at the Institute of International Relations in the 2nd half of 1990

The Institute of International Relations established close relations with the Austrian Institute for International Policy. Its director Prof. H. Neuholdl, who was in Prague on 9.-10.7. 1990, expressed interest in mutual cooperation in the form of a joint research project on Czechoslovak-Austrian relations and participated in a round table discussion on issues of cooperation between the two countries, on the German issue, Austrian foreign policy and European integration. On July 16, 1990, a meeting of researchers from the úMV and other Czechoslovak institutions took place. institution with a delegation of the American Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, led by the president of this institution, J. E. Rielly. After the introductory interpretation of MS. experts, which related to economic reform, the upcoming reprivatization and reconstruction of the Czech Republic. financial and price systems, followed by a discussion. On days 25.-27.7. 1990 the representative of the Association of the European Monetary Union H. Colligton was a guest of the úMV. He participated in a round table discussion on monetary issues. Prominent Soviet political scientist, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada AV USSR academician G. A. Arbatov stayed in Prague on 28.-30.7. 1990. During his visit, he was received by President V. Havel, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Dienstbier, Minister of Finance V. Klaus and Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the SL FS of Czechoslovakia Prof. V. Komárke. He then met in Bratislava with the chairman of the CSFR FS A. Dubček and other prominent Slovak political representatives and scientists. The discussion at the round table in the úMV focused on domestic political developments and foreign policy of the USSR, European integration and USSR-USA relations.

The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders

The recent renaissance of interest in public opinion and foreign policy has generated a vigorous debate about the dimensions that characterize foreign policy attitudes. This paper assesses a scheme that emerged from Wittkopf's analyses of the Chicago Council on Foreign Policy surveys. Two dimensions (militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism) are crossed to create four types: hard-liners (support MI, oppose CI), internationalists (support both-MI and CI), isolationists (oppose both MI and CI), and accommodationists (oppose MI, support CI). After developing scales for MI and CI, the scheme is tested with data from nationwide surveys of opinion leaders undertaken in 1976 (N = 2,282), 1980 (N = 2,502), and 1984 (N = 2,515). The MI/CI scheme is tested-and strongly supported-by examining the pattern of responses by hard-liners, internationalists, isolationists, and accommodationists to a broad range of questions from the three surveys of opinion leaders. The background attributes and other political attitudes associated with the four types are then examined. Correlations are strong for ideology and party; moderate for occupation; and weak for gender, age, education, travel, and military service. The conclusion raises some questions about the isolationist category and speculates about the broader implications of the findings.

Elites and Masses: Another Look at Attitudes toward America's World Role

The post-Vietnam breakdown of the presumed foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years has become a touchstone of American foreign policy analyses during the past decade. Diachronic analysis of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations' quadrennial public opinion surveys demonstrates the persistence of a belief system among the mass public defined by two distinct attitude dimensions, cooperative and militant internationalism. Elite attitudes after 1978 are somewhat less easily characterized but still reflect elements of “selective internationalism.” When the mass and elite samples are pooled, elites are consistently found in higher proportions than masses in the internationalist and accommodationist quadrants of the attitude clusters defined by the militant and cooperative internationalism dimensions. The mass public, on the other hand, is more evenly distributed among the four categories, with a consistently higher proportion in the hardline and isolationist quadrants. Ideology and partisanship predict to Americans' foreign policy beliefs, but differences between elites and masses inhere in the occupancy of opinion-making roles. Those attentive to foreign and public affairs are shown to hold elite-like foreign policy attitudes.

On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence

A reconceptualization of Holsti and Rosenau's three-headed eagle is proposed which locates the categories of Americans' foreign policy beliefs they posit along two empirically derived attitude dimensions described as cooperative and militant internationalism. The reconceptualization incorporates differences between unilateralist and multilateralist preferences, argued by Holsti and Rosenau to presage a fourth head on the eagle. Drawing on the quadrennial foreign policy surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the hypothesized emergence of unilateralist and multilateralist preferences is probed empirically, and comparisons across time and between elites and masses are made based on the typology of Americans' foreign policy beliefs derived from the two internationalism dimensions, as described by the labels accommodationists, hardliners, internationalists, and isolationists.

Beyond Consensus: The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy

charles w. kegley jr is Professor of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, where he is chairman of the Department of Government and International Studies, eucene r. wittkopf is Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. Among their co-authored works are American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (2nd ed; 1982) and World Politics: Trend and Transformation (1981). This paper is based in part on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant ses-8o 14984. The data analysed were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (icpsr) and by Newsweek magazine via The Gallup Organization Inc and were gathered under the sponsorship of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Newsweek. Neither the National Science Foundation, nor the original sponsors and collectors of the data, nor the icpsr bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations reported here.

Anatomy of a Counter-Bar Association: The Chicago Council of Lawyers

There have been few successful attempts in the history of the organized bar since 1870 to establish alternative bar groups that challenge the dominance of the large comprehensive local and state bar associations over the representation of lawyers' interests. Founded in 1969, a product of the social ferment of the 1960s, the Chicago Council of Lawyers provides an example of one such attempt. This paper examines the conditions under which a reform-oriented counter-bar association is likely to arise, the factors that permitted its successful establishment in Chicago, and the functions it serves within the legal profession as an alternative to the Chicago Bar Association.While the violence surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago may have sparked the formation of an alternative bar association, it was intraprofessional matters that deeply concerned the founders of the Council particularly the performance of the organized bar in providing legal services to the poor and in improving the quality of the judiciary. Within the legal profession itself there was also a striking disjunction between the age of the leadership of the bar and of the numerous young lawyers who flooded in-to the bar in the 1960s. Preexisting networks of young activist lawyers greatly facilitated organizational formation.As a reformist group with a small and relatively homogeneous membership, and lacking strong ties to powerful institutions, the Council can afford to take strong stances on controversial issues. By aggressively supporting positions at odds with those of the more established bar associations, and thus providing the media, the public, and legislators with an alternative viewpoint, the Council contributes to shattering the myth of a unified profession and to the demystification of professional authority.

Anatomy of a Counter-Bar Association: The Chicago Council of Lawyers

There have been few successful attempts in the history of the organized bar since 1870 to establish alternative bar groups that challenge the dominance of the large comprehensive local and state bar associations over the representation of lawyers' interests. Founded in 1969, a product of the social ferment of the 1960s, the Chicago Council of Lawyers provides an example of one such attempt. This paper examines the conditions under which a reform-oriented counter-bar association is likely to arise, the factors that permitted its successful establishment in Chicago, and the functions it serves within the legal profession as an alternative to the Chicago Bar Association.While the violence surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago may have sparked the formation of an alternative bar association, it was intraprofessional matters that deeply concerned the founders of the Council particularly the performance of the organized bar in providing legal services to the poor and in improving the quality of the judiciary. Within the legal profession itself there was also a striking disjunction between the age of the leadership of the bar and of the numerous young lawyers who flooded in-to the bar in the 1960s. Preexisting networks of young activist lawyers greatly facilitated organizational formation.As a reformist group with a small and relatively homogeneous membership, and lacking strong ties to powerful institutions, the Council can afford to take strong stances on controversial issues. By aggressively supporting positions at odds with those of the more established bar associations, and thus providing the media, the public, and legislators with an alternative viewpoint, the Council contributes to shattering the myth of a unified profession and to the demystification of professional authority.

American public opinion and U. S. foreign policy 1975. John E. Rielly, President, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, ed. Chicago: Council on Foreign Relations (116 So. Michigan Ave.), 1975, 29 p. $1.50

American public opinion and U. S. foreign policy 1975. John E. Rielly, President, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, ed. Chicago: Council on Foreign Relations (116 So. Michigan Ave.), 1975, 29 p. $1.50

Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Volume I, Correspondence With Winston S. Churchill And Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House; distrib. by Chicago Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc.,

Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Volume I, Correspondence With Winston S. Churchill And Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House; distrib. by Chicago Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc.,

American Dental Association Annual Meeting in Chicago—Council On Dental Therapeutics—Bureau of Public Relations—Committee on Legislation—Council on Dental Health—A.D.A. Junior Memberships at July 31, 1944—National Board of Dental Examiners

American Dental Association Annual Meeting in Chicago—Council On Dental Therapeutics—Bureau of Public Relations—Committee on Legislation—Council on Dental Health—A.D.A. Junior Memberships at July 31, 1944—National Board of Dental Examiners

Research Memorandum on Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression

Journal Article Research Memorandum on Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression Get access Research Memorandum on Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression. By R. Clyde White, Professor of Social Economics, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, and Mary K. White, Statistician, Chicago Council of Social Agencies. Bulletin 38. Paper. Price, $1.00. Pp. 173. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937. Physical Therapy, Volume 18, Issue 2, February 1938, Page 109, https://doi.org/10.1093/ptj/18.2.109b Published: 01 March 1938