1. IntroductionIn contemporary philosophy, the charge of is directed generally against any position that challenges canonical values of the tradition - namely, truth, objectivity, rationality. Tins paper explores the strategies proposed by two authors to escape or evade relativism: Richard Roity and Paul Feyerabend. These two approaches to the problem of relativism are better understood following Hilary Putnam's criticism. If Roity denies a kind of ultimate convergence of inquiry and Feyerabend supports the notion of incommensurability, then neither of them could admit the existence of rational discoiu'se outside their own community without falling into paradox or self-refutation.As we shall see, neither Roity nor Feyerabend claim to be relativists in this specific sense. Both promote an alternative vision that is summarized in Roity's ethnocentric position and Feyerabend's anthropological version. For Roity ethics will be the basis of research, while Feyerabend supports the idea that eveiy culture is potentially any other. Both authors assume that relativism is an epistemological position because it is associated with a certain way of understanding knowledge, truth and rationality. And to the extent that these authors discuss the relevance of these epistemic assumptions, both avoid the debate. Finally, I will present some problems with Rorty and Feyerabend's proposals.2. RortyAll that is solid melts into airThroughout lus work, Rorty straggled to dissociate his position from the charge of relativism. To illustrate his strategy, I have focused on two related arguments that explain why ethnocentric position is not relativism.The first argument enforces the idea that pragmatism distinguishes between things that are worth talking about and things that are not. Broadly speaking, it is worth talking about research practices here and now which commit citizens to anticipate and create a better future. That situated discursive practice is not justified by appealing to ultimate reasons as foundationalist philosophies (Platonic or Kantian) do. Let us see how the argument goes. In Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty writes:Traditional, Platonic, epistemologically-centered philosophy is the search ... for the way in which one can avoid the need for conversation and deliberation and simply tick off the way tilings are.!This traditional philosophy works against democratic practices, and it avoids participation, responsibility and commitment. In contrast, according to Rorty, pragmatism implies acceptance of conversational rales. A pragmatist makes alliances with the community, not with nature. Tins alliance is a shared creation, not an encounter with something fixed or discovered. Loyalty is read in tenus of loyalty to other human beings as William James wanted - that is, the challenge of partaking in human, fallible and contingent projects.On this view, the conversational and community shift is not committed to timeless instances that support them. In a nutshell, this situated feature of dialogue is taken by the critics as a sign of relativism. For these critics relativism means that eveiy belief is as good as any other. Is pragmatism a form of relativism? It depends. The ambiguity involves a confusion that Roily discloses: the critics ignore the pragmatic difference between philosophical theories and real theories. Once this distinction has been made, we must ask, what is the difference? Pragmatists like Dewey and James are relativists metaphilosophically: the choice between rival philosophical theories - e.g., Kant vs. Plato - is impracticable and futile. You may be Platonist or Kantian because nothing is won or lost in this second level of purely verbal dispute. These discrepancies are merely philosophical attempts to justify some element of practices with something external to them. However, Rorty argues, this foundation does not play any role in the actual functioning of the practice in question. …