A Rortyian Dilemma of Conversation

Abstract

Richard Rorty in his enterprise to shun epistemology, cannot not have his share of inconsistency if he seriously considers a Davidsonian interpreter as one of his best allies to overcome problem of cultural differences. Charges of relativism have been addressed to Rorty. But as he says, the pragmatist, dominated by desire for solidarity, can only be criticized for taking his own community too seriously. He can only be criticized for ethnocentrism, not for relativism. To be ethnocentric is to divide human race into people to whom one must justify one's beliefs and others.1 Indeed charges of relativism are not sound. The puzzle in Rorty's philosophical views lies deeply somewhere else, namely in relation of conversation to ethnocentrism. I argue that they cannot be both true. Part 1 of my paper provides an account of what Rorty means by ethnocentrism and conversation. His ethnocentrism, I think, dies out in wake of his call for cosmopolitanism. In part 2,1 stress one of origins of Rorty's ethnocentrism. Here Davidson comes into picture. I argue that Rorty goes wrong in attributing ethnocentrism to Davidson: there is no truth in ethnocentrism.