Newman, Marcel, and Personal Knowledge

Abstract

This article suggests that the religious epistemology of John Henry Newman can be enhanced if read through the philosophical lens of Gabriel Marcel. After briefly describing Newman’s epistemology as it appears in his most philosophically mature work, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, and with particular attention paid to the illative sense, the charge of relativism will be considered. The answer to this concern of relativism is found in embryo in the pages of the Grammar itself, when it highlights not only the personal nature of assent but also suggests a communal dimension. To make this point explicit, I suggest reading Newman’s epistemology through the lens of Marcel’s philosophy. While being akin to Newman in terms of what constitutes genuine knowledge and one’s attainment of it, Marcel provides a richer philosophical story as to why our knowing is both personal and communal. To this end, the Marcelian understanding of situated existence and testimony will be explored. In sum, a Marcelian optic helps to supplement Newman’s epistemology while not detracting from it.