Chance Situations Research Articles

THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL AS A CATEGORY OF THE ILLUSION OF THINKING

People often make mistakes evaluating their personal control over certain situations. It is the result of a normal functioning of cognitive system. The illusion of control is a cognitive bias. It is our tendency to believe that, or act as if, we can skillfully influence and control outcomes of chance events. The illusion of control occurs when individuals overestimate their personal influence over an outcome. The article provides a theoretical analysis of the concept of «the illusion of control» in cognitive psychology. Langer (1975) originally proposed that the illusion of control occurs because people confuse skills and chance situations. Langer found that people’s confidence in their chances of winning was influenced by many different factors—none of which actually had any effect on their chances of winning. Thompson et al. (1998) have presented a more comprehensive explanation of the illusion of control based on a control heuristic that can account for more of the findings. According to the control heuristic explanation, people use both connection and intention to judge their control. Because both can be present even when control is not, personal control is often overestimated. The illusion of control is affected by skill-related factors, success or failure emphasis, need or desire for the outcome, mood, intrusion of reality, power, and regulatory focus. The illusion of control consists of overestimating the influence that our behavior exerts over uncontrollable outcomes. The challenge for scientists is to research how individuals manage their use of illusory control across a variety of circumstances to find optimal effects.

Modeling and Predicting Cyber Hacking Breaches

Analyzing cyber incident information units is an essential approach for deepening our expertise in the evolution of the chance situation. This is an especially new study topic, and lots of research continue to be done. In this paper, we record a statistical evaluation of a breach incident records set similar to 12 years (2005–2017) of cyber hacking sports that encompass malware attacks. We display that, an evaluation of the findings stated withinside the literature, each hacking breach incident inter-arrival instances and breach sizes must be modeled through stochastic processes, instead of through distributions due to the fact they show off autocorrelations. Then, we recommend specific stochastic procedure fashions to, respectively, shape the inter-arrival instances and the breach sizes. We additionally display that those fashions can expect the inter-arrival instances and the breach sizes. In order to get deeper insights into the evolution of hacking breach incidents, we behaviour each qualitative and quantitative fashion analysis at the records set. We draw a fixed of cyber safety insights, together with that the chance of cyber hacks is certainly getting worse in phrases in their frequency, however now no longer in phrases of the value in their damage.

Abstract P-399: FUTILITY IN PEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT SARDJITO HOSPITAL, YOGYAKARTA, INDONESIA: A CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEY

Aims & Objectives: Decisions to withdraw or withhold potentially life-sustaining treatment are common in intensive care and precede the majority of deaths. We would like to know the number of futility in Pediatrics Intensive Care Unit (PICU) RSUP Dr. Sardjito, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Methods A prospective cross-sectional survey was carried out using a data collection registry. Patients between 1 month-18 years old who were admitted to PICU Sardjito hospital in 2016–2017 were included in this study. We use a descriptive analyze in this study. Results There were 519 patients admitted to PICU and 104 patients died in 2016, as well as 428 patients admitted and 96 patients died in 2017. In 2016 among all death cases, 37 patients (35.6 %) were considered futile cases which can be classified into 10 patients (27%) were “no chance situations”, 14 patients (37.8%) were “no purpose situations”, 12 patients (32.4%) were “unbearable conditions”, and 1 patient (2.7%) was “brainstem death condition”. There was a decrease number of futile cases in 2017, only 13 patients (13.5%) of futile cases in 2017 which can be classified into 1 patients (7.7) were “no chance situations”, 7 patients (53.8%) were “no purpose situations”, 4 patients (30.7%) were “unbearable conditions”, and 1 patients (7.7) were “persistent vegetative stage”. Conclusions There was a high number of futile cases, although it was decrease in the following year. “No purpose situation” is the most common.

Organ reform at South Bend

A conference-concert festival ‘Reformations and the Organ, 1517–2017’, held on 10 to 13 September 2017 at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, explored the organ, from the historical models used by European and American reformer-builders to the completed instruments and associated repertories and sound-worlds. Organized by Craig Cramer and Annette Richards in conjunction with the Westfield Center for Historical Keyboard Studies, this event celebrated the inauguration in 2017 of organ-builder Paul Fritts & Co.’s op.37 in South Bend, with two masterclasses by Christophe Mantoux, nine recitals on four different organs, a harpsichord and a fortepiano, six pairs of paper sessions, and a final discussion. The concerts and papers were of very high quality. In the keynote address, Kerala Snyder applied the multiple meanings of the word ‘reformation’ to 19 stages in the history of the organ going back from the Fritts op.37 to Martin Luther’s Reformation of 1517. The stages included the Holtkamps at the Universities of Notre Dame and Yale, initially valued but later white elephants; the Von Beckerath tracker with slider chests on which Bach’s ‘Neumeister’ chorales discovered at Yale were premiered; and the Yale Taylor & Boody organ of 2007. She then surveyed a series of American organs on European models—at Wellesley by Fisk (1981), at Oberlin by Brombaugh (1981), at Cornell by Yokota (2011), at Eastman by GOArt/Yokota (2008)—before moving to the Gothenburg GOArt/Yokota (2000), and then organs in Hamburg by Schnitger (1693), Ahrend (1993) and Hans Henny Jahnn (1930). This last instrument led Snyder to discuss Jahnn’s (d.1959) role in the German organ reform movement and early music revival. His Ugrino press made Baroque organ works available in the 1920s (and its Buxtehude edition would later be transferred to Broude and continued by Snyder). Snyder’s reverse chronology highlighted the problems builders confronted in unique and even chance situations.

Rensdyrjægere på farten – Opholdssteder fra senistid i Østjylland

Rensdyrjægere på farten – Opholdssteder fra senistid i Østjylland

Forcing your luck: Goal-striving behavior in chance situations.

Previous research suggests that desired end-states (i.e., goals) initiate a set of motivational processes supporting goal-attainment. For example, motivational intensity (e.g., effort investment) increases as distance to the goal decreases. The present studies investigate whether this goal-gradient can also be observed in chance determined situations, situations in which there is a desired end-state (i.e., winning) but in which increased effort investment does not support goal-attainment. Three studies provide consistent evidence for the goal-gradient in chance determined situations. We show that participants (in the lab and in a TV game show) invest more effort into goal-directed behavior the closer they get to the end of the game. The moderation of expectancy and value was, however, modest. Interestingly, participants’ self-reports suggest that their dynamic changes in behavior were unintentional and perceived as non-instrumental. Findings are related to theories of goal pursuit and illusory control, and contrasted to the principle of resource conservation, according to which such behavior should not occur.

The illusion of control: A Bayesian perspective

In the absence of an objective contingency, psychological studies have shown that people nevertheless attribute outcomes to their own actions. Thus, by wrongly inferring control in chance situations people appear to hold false beliefs concerning their agency, and are said to succumb to an illusion of control (IoC). In the current article, we challenge traditional conceptualizations of the illusion by examining the thesis that the IoC reflects rational and adaptive decision making. Firstly, we propose that the IoC is a by-product of a rational uncertain judgment (“the likelihood that I have control over a particular outcome”). We adopt a Bayesian perspective to demonstrate that, given their past experience, people should be prone to ascribing skill to chance outcomes in certain situations where objectively control does not exist. Moreover, existing empirical evidence from the IoC literature is shown to support such an account. Secondly, from a decision-theoretic perspective, in many consequential situations, underestimating the chance of controlling a situation carries more costs than overestimating that chance. Thus, situations will arise in which people will incorrectly assign control to events in which outcomes result from chance, but the attribution is based on rational processes.

Just because we can, should we? A discussion of treatment withdrawal

Children's nurses are vocationally committed to promoting the health of children, relieving their suffering, enhancing their development, helping them to achieve a sense of worth and a confidence in their future. Supporting parents and medical colleagues while the decision is made to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment is one of the most difficult aspects of children's nursing practice. Current guidelines support the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment from children in brain death, permanent vegetative state, and no chance, no purpose or unbearable situations. Societal and professional attitudes to euthanasia and assisted suicide may be changing and this could lead to changes in legislation and guidelines. However, nurses must be clear about the differences: currently any measure, practice or treatment administered with the primary intention to cause death is not allowed. This is not the same as any measure, practice or treatment administered with the intent to relieve suffering and promote comfort, that can cause or hasten death.

Elementary School Students’ Intuitive Conceptions of Random Distribution

This research focuses on fourth-grade (9-year-old) students’ informal and intuitive conceptions of probability and distribution revealed as they worked through a sequence of tasks. These tasks were designed to study students’ spontaneous reasoning about distributions in different settings and their understanding of probability of various binomial random events that they explored with a set of physical chance mechanisms. The data were gathered from a pilot study with four students. We analyzed the interplay of reasoning about distribution and understanding of probability. The findings suggest that students’ qualitative descriptions of distributions could be developed into the quantification of probabilities through reasoning about data in chance situations.

The Illusion of Linearity: Expanding the Evidence towards Probabilistic Reasoning.

Previous research has shown that – due to the extensive attention spent to proportional reasoning in mathematics education – many students have a strong tendency to apply linear or proportional models anywhere, even in situations where they are not applicable. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the ‘illusion of linearity’. For example, in geometry it is known that many students believe that if the sides of a figure are doubled, the area is doubled too. In this article, the empirical evidence for this phenomenon is expanded to the domain of probabilistic reasoning. First, we elaborate on the notion of chance and provide some reasons for expecting the over generalization of linear models in the domain of probability too. Afterwards, a number of well-known and less-known probabilistic misconceptions are described and analysed, showing that they have one remarkable characteristic in common: they can be interpreted in terms oft he improper application of linear relations. Finally, we report on an empirical investigation aimed at identifying the ability of 10th and12th grade students to compare the probabilities of two binomial chance situations. It appears that before instruction in probability, students have a good capability of comparing two events qualitatively, but at the same time they incorrectly quantify this qualitative insight as if the variables in the problem were linked by a linear relationship. Remarkably, these errors persist after instruction in probability. The potential of this study for improving the teaching and learning of probability, as well as suggestions for further research, are discussed.

Illusions of Control

Illusions of control are common even in purely chance situations. They are particularly likely to occur in settings that are characterized by personal involvement, familiarity, foreknowledge of the desired outcome, and a focus on success. Person-based factors that affect illusions of control include depressive mood and need for control. One explanation of illusory control is that it is due to a control heuristic that is used to estimate control by assessing the factors of intentionality and connection to the outcome. Motivational influences on illusory control and consequences of overestimating one s control are also covered.

Real and Illusory Control Over Exposure to HIV in College Students and Gay Men1

Reasons for unsafe sex were examined using an illusions of control framework. Heterosexual college students (N= 301) and gay men (N= 248) were surveyed regarding perceived control over exposure to HIV, of vulnerability to HIV, use of illusory control in chance situations, and real and illusory strategies for protection against HIV. As predicted, the use of illusory control in chance situations was associated with more illusory HIV protection in both samples. Illusory protection strategies were associated with feeling less vulnerable to HIV which was mediated by perceptions of control over exposure to HIV. Suggestions for intervention include providing information about the illusory nature of some protective strategies and a focus on failing to protect oneself from STDs.

A note on the effects of an unobstructed view on cage choices in farmed foxes

Farmed adult female silver foxes ( Vulpes vulpes) ( n=8) and blue foxes ( Alopex lagopus) ( n=8) were given the option of a cage with an open view and a cage with a partly obstructed view in a 14-day choice test. Silver foxes spent 61±16% and blue foxes 68±18% of their daily time in the cage with the open view. This percentage of time differed significantly from the chance situation (i.e., 50% in both cages) in blue foxes ( P<0.05), but not in silver foxes ( P>0.05). Silver foxes spent 67±13%, 81±10% and 65±7% of their active time, and blue foxes 68±9%, 73±15% and 66±10% of their active time in the cage with the open view in the early hours, during the work-day and in the evening, respectively (difference from 50%: P<0.05 for all comparisons). Furthermore, blue foxes spent 73±27% ( P=0.08) and silver foxes 80±21% ( P<0.05) of their resting time in the cage with the open view during the work-day. Blue foxes also spent much of the early hours resting in the cage with the open view. Neither species preferred the cage with the obstructed view to the cage with the open view at any time. Although the preferences were non-exclusive, the present results confirm earlier findings that obstructing the view affects foxes' choices.

Effects of personality, cognitive, and situational variables on risk taking behavior

This study examined the effects of individual difference and situation on risk taking behavior. In Experiment 1, 115 undergraduates completed a questionnaire of personality (sensation seeking, optimism, etc.) and their risk taking behavior, risk perception, and anxiety in eight situations: personal, social, gain-loss, and loss situations. Results indicated an effect of personality on risk taking behavior in personal gain-loss situations (sports and life event), which was mediated by perceived risk controllability. In Experiment 2, 137 undergraduates completed a questionnaire of personality, cognitive variables (risk perception, own competence, and perceived cost and benefit), and risk taking behavior in personal gain-loss situations (sports, life event, and gambling). Results of covariance structure analysis showed that perceived risk controllability affected the relationship between the variables. For instance, risk significance and perceived cost and benefit mediated the effect of 'controllability with skills' on risk taking behavior in the controllable situation (e.g., sports). Similarly, competence and risk perception mediated the effect of 'uncontrollable luck factors' in the chance situation (e.g., life event).

Correlation between Evaluation of Another Person's Behavior and Choice of Response in a Chance Situation

Research in the 1970s produced further knowledge regarding the correlation between what a child perceives as provocation (attack) by another child and the response the child chooses. Repeatedly we have found that an aggressive response is very likely when the behavior of the initiator is considered aggressive [1]. Underlying the significance of what Dodge, Murphy, & Buchsbaum [2] learned in this context is the actual intention of a person causing certain negative consequences, whether identified as such or as something else. Results of Dodge and co-workers' research confirmed the hypothesis that an aggressive response by a child who was attacked was determined by the child's perception of the intention of the initiator, not by the actual intention of that person.

Drawing Familiar or Unfamiliar Cards: Stimulus Familiarity, Chance Orientation, and the Illusion of Control

This study examined a condition under which the effect of stimulus familiarity on the illusion of control is suppressed. According to Langer, stimulus familiarity induces a skill orientation even in a chance situation. However, this effect is postulated to obtain only as long as the person's focus of attention remains on the stimulus familiarity. When the focus of attention turns toward the chance elements in the situation, the illusion of control should disappear Subjects participated in a wagering session with an experimenter by picking a card out of a shuffled pack. The cards either were normal looking (familiar cards) or had a striking "Egyptian" look (unfamiliar cards). As predicted, people wagered more money when playing with the familiar cards unless they had to evaluate their probability of winning before placing their bet.

Risk-taking in games of chance and skill: Informational and affective influences on choice behavior.

Three studies to pinpoint the underlying dynamics related to risk-taking in skilled and chance situations are presented. Study 1 is an attempt to demonstrate that cognitive and motivational theories of risk-taking must be combined to account for individual differences in skilled situations. Studies 2 and 3 show that the effect for uncertainty orientation generalizes to chance situations.

Prediction and postdiction preferences in guessing

AbstractIn three studies, it is shown that most subjects when asked to guess the outcome of an uncertain event (a die toss, the sex of a child, the winner of a match) will prefer to do so before the event. This holds regardless of consequences of the guess, or of variations in waiting time from the guess being made to the outcome being known. In a chance situation, a guess‐first preference may be partly explained by a ‘magical control’ hypothesis, but the preference persists in situations where such influences are less thinkable (sex of a child, die thrown by another person). When asked how prediction and postdiction guesses differ, most subjects agree that predictions are most exciting, and that postdiction failures cause more discomfort than prediction failures. Such differences are interpreted as due to the relative amount of perceived internal and external uncertainty in the task at hand. It is speculated that internal uncertainty is felt most acceptable when matched by a corresponding external uncertainty, and most aversive when contrasted to an externally established fact.

Studies in subjective probability IV: probabilities, confidence, and luck

Probably because of formal advantages, probabilities are often regarded as more basic than other dimensions of attitudes towards uncertain events (beliefs, confidences, doubts, statements of hope and fear, good and bad luck etc.). In a series of experiments, some of these concepts were empirically compared by asking students to give their views on a variety of uncertain events, ranging from future examinations to lotteries. Confidence turned out to be closely related to perceived chance, but very imperfectly to the subjective probability of the event in question, except when all outcomes are judged equally due to chance. Judgments of good and bad luck were still more independent of the probabilities involved, even in a chance situation, It is concluded that subjective probability plays a secondary role in assessments of confidence as well as of luck, and is poorly suited as a common measure of the varieties of subjective uncertainty. A final experiment suggests the subjective and statistical conceptions of uncertainty to have partially opposing connotations. “An uncertain future” seems to be subjectively interpreted as an open future, restricted possibilities of prediction.

Locus of control and the denial of anxiety.

Houston (1972) noted, although internal and external locus of control subjects reported the same amount of anxiety in stressful skill and chance situations, internal subjects actually manifested more physiological arousal. He interpreted this finding as evidence for the use of denial among internal subjects. We argue that methodological problems preclude this conclusion, and a modification of Houston's experiment was designed to test the idea that internal subjects do not interpret their arousal as anxiety because their arousal facilitates performance, while defensive external subjects interpret their arousal as anxiety because it hinders performance. Results did not confirm Houston's (1972) findings of significant differences in heart rate between internal and external subjects (30 men and 30 women) under stress. Although internal subjects performed significantly better than defensive external subjects in the non-stressful skill condition, the hypothesized relationships between facilitating anxiety, debilitating anxiety, physiological arousal, and performance on a skillful task did not hold.