CEO Turnover Research Articles

FANOVA taikymas kompanijų su dažnu ir retu generalinio direktoriaus pasikeitimu palyginimui

The aim of this study was to analyze the data from the Nasdaq Baltic listed companies’ financial statements and to estimate if the CEO changes have a significant influence on the financial performance: profitability, indebtedness and stock price. Data was collected and financial ratios were computed for 34 companies during 2006 to 2021 (2008 to 2022 for stock prices). The companies were divided into 3 groups: ones that had no CEO changes over the period; those that had 1 or 2 and those with 3 or more. Point-wise ANOVA, fANOVA and fMANOVA were conducted. Both point-wise and functional ANOVA indicated that there is a significant difference of at least one group from the others in terms of ROA and EBITDA margin. After conducting two-sample tests, the group with 3 or more CEO changes was identified as having a significantly higher EBITDA margin than the others. Furthermore, a significant positive relationship between the stock price and the CEO turnover was uncovered in the function-on-scalar regression results.

Incentive pay sensitivity to firm performance prior to anticipated CEO turnover

This study explores whether the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in firm performance depends on the CEO's likelihood of leaving the position. In a sample of 3180 US publicly-traded firms, we find that the sensitivity of bonus pay to firm performance is enhanced for a CEO who has reached retirement age. Further, we find that the sensitivity of bonus pay to firm performance is greater when there is evidence of a planned CEO turnover within a two-year window. We show that these findings are consistent with a principal-agent model in which firms who anticipate a greater likelihood of CEO departure find it advantageous to enhance the link between bonus pay and concurrent performance measures to compensate for the lowering of incentives that rely on the manager being employed long-term. The results provide a rationale for including bonus pay in the overall executive compensation package.

The Spillover Effect of Peer CEO Turnover on Real Earnings Management

ABSTRACT A growing literature provides evidence that peer considerations play a central role in shaping a firm’s behavior. This paper documents that the frequency of forced CEO turnovers by product market peer firms is negatively associated with a firm’s real earnings management. I find that the disciplinary role of forced CEO turnover explains the observed relation. These effects are stronger when firms are suspected to engage in real earnings management to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. I find some evidence that peers’ forced CEO turnovers reveal a link between real earnings management and subsequent operating failure. Overall, my findings suggest that observing product market peers’ forced CEO turnovers provides an informative signal to discipline a firm’s real earnings management behavior. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M12.

Managerial ability and firm value: A new perspective

Using a sample of U.S. firms over three decades, we examine whether the efficiency with which managers generate revenue has an impact on firm value. We find that managerial ability is positively related to firm value such that one standard deviation increase in ability is associated with a 5.7% increase in firm value relative to the mean level. Importantly, by exploiting exogenous CEO turnover, we establish causality between managerial ability and firm value. This relation is stronger in the presence of corporate governance mechanisms, such as institutional investors and financial analysts. We also document a reduction in value-destroying practices - such as earnings management - in firms with more efficient managers.

Do Firms Mimic Industry Leaders’ Accounting? Evidence from Financial Statement Comparability

ABSTRACT Following management theory on organizational legitimacy, we predict that managers mimic the accounting of industry-leading companies to gain legitimacy. Such demand for legitimacy is expected to be greater for new managers because stakeholders are more uncertain about the managers’ ability. Using a sample of CEO turnovers, we find that a firm increases financial statement comparability with industry leaders after the new CEO assumes office. This relation is stronger when (1) new managers lack executive experience at larger firms, are younger, or belong to an underrepresented group (i.e., are female or nonwhite); (2) networks that facilitate imitation are more intense, such as when firms and peers are located in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and when they share auditors or blockholders; and (3) firms’ operating environments are more volatile. These findings support the idea that CEOs’ demand for legitimacy leads to more comparable accounting. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Is your surname remunerative? Surname favorability and CEO compensation

We find that CEOs with more favorable surnames receive significantly higher compensation. The estimated effect of surname favorability is unique and incremental to the documented effects of various firm, board, and CEO characteristics. CEOs with French or German surnames receive significantly lower compensation after the French and German governments' opposition to the Iraq war. Surname favorability is not associated with corporate investments, disclosure policies, or firm performances. The results are more pronounced for professional (i.e., non-founder) or short-tenured CEOs and for firms with lower institutional ownership. Surname favorability reduces the likelihood of forced CEO turnover following poor stock performance but is not associated with a CEO's self-serving behaviors. Our results suggest that the effect of surname favorability is attributable to inefficient contracting by the board of directors. Our findings have implications for corporate stakeholders who have committed to the efficient contracting of CEO compensations.

CEO turnover, product market competition, and leverage policy

We study how CEO turnover, jointly with product market competition, affects firm leverage policy. About 18% of public nonfinancial US firms in Compustat experience significant switches in their long-term leverage policy every year. Without apparent changes in their operating fundamentals. We find that CEO turnover, especially external and forced turnover, explains shifts in long-term leverage policy. In addition, utilizing the product market fluidity measure and large import tariff changes, we find that, only when coinciding with intensified product market competition, external and forced CEO turnover is significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of firms leveraging up from zero to positive. Our evidence suggests that external and forced CEO turnover is an important vehicle for accomplishing changes in corporate policies necessitated by increases in product market competition.

Determinants and Effects of Hospital CEO turnover in Germany

Determinants and Effects of Hospital CEO turnover in Germany

Air quality and CEO cross–regional turnover ——The role of compensation or incentive

We investigate firms' strategies to cope with the brain drain effect induced by air pollution. We presume that firms located in more polluted areas need to compensate for unpleasant locations in order to attract new CEO talent. Empirically, we find that firms located in more polluted areas are more likely to provide higher compensation packages or promotion incentives for successor CEOs from less polluted areas. The results are robust to using regional thermal inversion as an instrument, a regression discontinuity design, using alternative measures for air pollution, and ruling out alternative explanations. Additionally, the results are more pronounced when CEOs come from relatively less polluted overseas regions and for firms that have more industry peers outside this province, and are located in a region with poorer geographic livability. Overall, this paper provides the complete picture of the relation between air pollution and CEO turnover.

Revitalizing Organizational Efficiency: Unpacking the Relationship between CEO Turnover, Research and Development, and Pay-Performance Sensitivities in the Financial Sector of Pakistan

This study examines the relationship between senior management turnover, wage structures, and organizational efficiency in the banking industry in Pakistan. Using secondary panel data from annual reports of commercial banks and multiple regression techniques, the study finds that pay-performance sensitivity, R&D investment, and firm age positively impact organizational efficiency. At the same time, higher expense ratios are negatively associated with efficiency. CEO turnover, duality, and board size have a relatively low impact on efficiency. This study provides valuable insights for managers and policymakers in the banking sector, highlighting key areas that should be prioritized to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and increase financial performance. By offering a roadmap for decision-makers to focus their efforts, this study provides a valuable framework for achieving tremendous success in the banking industry.

Inventor CEO and technology M&A

This study examines the effect of inventor CEO on firm's technology acquisition and finds robust evidence that CEOs with hands-on innovation experience are associated with more technology acquisition. We utilize plausibly exogenous CEO turnovers to address the causal effects of inventor CEOs on corporate financial strategy such as acquisition. The effect is more pronounced in firms which CEOs have stronger power or previous acquisition experience, firms with high ownership concentration or non-state-owned firms, firms in high-tech industry or with high product market competition. Our study further shows that inventor CEOs prefer cash payment in technology acquisition and achieve higher premiums. The acquirer's future innovation output has been significantly improved after acquisition. Overall, this study contributes to the emerging literature on executives's personal unique characteristics on corporate mergers and acquisitions.

Count on subordinate executives: Internal governance and innovation

We investigate the relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation. We hypothesize that internal governance stemming from the difference in expected employment horizons between a CEO and her subordinate executives improves a firm's innovation. Using the age difference between a CEO and her subordinate executives as the primary measure of internal governance, we find a strong positive relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation output, and scientific and economic values. We show that the positive relation is causal and robust based on empirical tests including exogenous variation in internal governance resulting from non-forced CEO turnovers. We further show that the relationship between internal governance and innovation is more pronounced when external governance is weaker and when subordinate executives are expected to have more influence on the board. Cross-sectional analysis shows that internal governance spurs innovation in younger firms, firms led by generalist CEOs, and when the likelihood of insider successions is higher.

Founder involvement in CEO turnover

AbstractWe study the role of a company founder in the internal governance of firms. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000–2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor‐performing founder‐CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover, having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreases the likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor‐performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.

PENGARUH LEVERAGE, UKURAN PERUSAHAAN, DAN PERGANTIAN CEO TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA PERUSAHAAN PERBANKAN

This study analyzes the effect of Leverage, Firm Size, and CEO Turnover on Earnings Management. This study took sample data from the financial reports and notes on the financial statements of banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period 2017-2021, with a total sample of 195 samples from 39 companies. Discretionary accruals with the Modified Jones Model measure earnings management variables. The analytical method used in this research is panel regression and uses the EViews analysis program. The study results show that the variables of leverage and CEO turnover have no effect on earnings management. Meanwhile, the firm size variable significantly negatively affects earnings management.

Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour

AbstractGiven that marriage transforms people, with wide‐ranging and long‐lasting impacts, we examine the role of CEOs' marital status on firms' cash holdings behaviour. Using a large sample of US‐listed firms, we find that single CEOs stockpile more cash than their married counterparts do. Our finding is robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics, CFO influence, tackling endogeneity concerns and using alternative measures of cash. Moreover, we show that exogenous CEO turnover resulting in appointments of single (married) CEOs increases (decreases) cash holdings. Additional results show that single‐CEO firms practise a more conservative payout policy and save more cash from operating and financing cash flows. Consistent with agency theory, single CEOs extract more compensation from the accumulated cash, leading to a lower value of cash holdings. External corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the relationship between single CEOs and cash holdings. Our results show that single‐CEO firms are more prone to agency problems.

Do prosocial CEOs promote innovation?

In this study, we find robust evidence that firms with prosocial CEOs invent more. Using exogenous CEO turnovers to establish causality, we find a significant increase in the number of patents, citations per patent, and patent value when a non-prosocial CEO is replaced by a prosocial CEO. We further show that prosocial CEOs spark innovation by attracting inventors to join. Finally, we find that the impact of prosocial CEOs on innovation is more pronounced in more innovative and less eco-friendly industries.

Analisis Pengaruh Ceo Turnover, Opini Audit dan Pertumbuhan Perusahaan terhadap Auditor Switching dengan Financial Distress sebagai Variabel Moderasi

Purpose: This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of CEO Turnover, Audit Opinion, Company Growth on auditor switching with financial distress as a Moderating Variable. Methodology/approach: The type of data used in this study is secondary data, in the form of financial reports and annual reports. The population in this study are all property and real estate companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2017-2021 period. Sample data were obtained by purposive sampling method with the features of voluntary auditor changes or under 6 years. So that the final number of samples obtained was 140 data. The data analysis technique used is logistic regression analysis. Results/findings: The research results show (1) CEO Turnover has a positive effect on auditor switching (2) Audit opinion has no effect on auditor switching (3) Company growth has no effect on auditor switching (4) Financial Distress has a positive effect on auditor switching (5) Financial Distress strengthens the influence CEO turnover on auditor switching (6) financial distress is not able to influence the effect of audit opinion on auditor switching (7) financial distress is not able to moderate the effect of company growth on auditor switching.

Deregulation and Board Policies: Evidence from Performance and Risk Exposure Measures Used in Bank CEO Turnover Decisions

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of banking deregulation on bank board policies—specifically, whether deregulation affects the performance and risk exposure measures used in bank CEO turnover decisions. Using the staggered adoption of interstate branching as our setting, we find that bank CEO turnover is more (less) sensitive to stock (accounting) performance after deregulation. We also find that deregulation is associated with a higher sensitivity of bank CEO turnover to the idiosyncratic component of tail risk. Moreover, such changes in turnover policies primarily exist in large banks and federally chartered banks, which are best positioned to exploit growth opportunities, and in banks that expand branch operations after deregulation. Our results indicate an increased emphasis on stock performance and tail risk in turnover decisions when growth opportunities are greater in the deregulated environment. The findings provide evidence that the information used in board decisions varies with features of the competitive environment.

CEO succession planning and market reactions to CEO turnover announcements

This study investigates how capital market investors assess CEO succession planning in the context of CEO turnover events. Conducting empirical tests using a manually collected sample of 676 CEO turnover cases, we find that CEO succession planning mitigates the negative association between CEO performance and market reactions to CEO turnover announcements. Further analyses reveal that our results are driven by firms with strong corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that CEO succession planning disclosure reduces investors’ concerns about firm performance in the event of CEO turnover.

Do generalist CEOs engage in more tax avoidance than specialist CEOs?

Existing research suggests that generalist CEOs, who possess managerial skills that are transferrable across firms and industries, are more able to bear downside risk than specialist CEOs with non-transferrable managerial expertise. In this paper, we examine whether generalist CEOs are better positioned to engage in risky tax avoidance strategies than specialist CEOs. Our empirical results support this prediction and show that firms with generalist CEOs tend to engage in more tax avoidance than those with specialist CEOs. Our identification strategy includes an instrumental variable method and a difference-in-differences test using CEO turnover as a quasi-natural experiment to correct for endogeneities. A battery of robustness checks and cross-sectional tests strengthens our findings. Taken together, our findings imply that general managerial skills of CEOs matter more for tax planning than do specific managerial skills.