War Causation Research Articles

Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation

Comparison of hegemonic stability theory, transition theory, long cycle theory, and power cycle theory places this assessment at the heart of the contemporary debate over the dynamic understanding of international relations. Pluralistic versus hegemonic assumptions provide the key organizing principle for this examination of embedded implications.

Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War

Charles B. Dew intends this short, stimulating work as a contribution both to the specialized historiography of secession and to the continuing popular debate over Civil War causation. Dew begins with the question posed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service about what “important issue” the war was fought over (correct answer: either “slavery” or “states rights”). He then reflects briefly on the conflict's contemporary reverberation, especially among southerners, for whom, as he notes with nice understatement, “the past . . . is far from dead.” The book's brevity—only eighty-one pages of narrative—will not satisfy all scholars; some may conclude that this gifted historian should have set his account of the secession commissioners within a fuller examination of Deep South disunionism or perhaps given us more insight into how the message they carried with them was variously received. But all readers will appreciate the perspicacity and eloquence with which Professor Dew has performed his allotted task. They may even feel relieved that such tasty revisionist fare can be digested with so little effort.

Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory

The relative ease of attack and defense-the offense-defense balance-is a widely used planatory concept in international politics, playing an important role in literatures ranging from war causation and alliance formation to the determinants of system structure, the importance of relative gains from cooperation, or the causes of World War I. Yet the concept of the balance itself remains radically underdeveloped theoretically, clouding the predictions of the numerous theories that rest upon it and undermining rigorous empirical work on the many hypotheses these theories imply. I address this problem by presenting and testing a systematic theory of the balance that emphasizes military strategic and tactical choices as its key determinants, by contrast with orthodox offense-defense theory's focus on technology. This new theory outperforms the orthodox view and has broad implications for international relations theory.

Gettysburg: The Second Day (review)

BOOK REVIEWS355 Pennsylvania to the Republican column because of the tariff campaign borders on common knowledge. Nevertheless, Huston constructs the account with great clarity, and he adds information about the precise timing and means for implementing the tariff issue. Further, the book has useful insights into the perceived tariff benefits for labor as well as business owners. Historiographically, Huston provides an excellent guide not only for the older dispute between Beardian Progressives and Revisionists, but also for the more current maze of republicanism, modernization , and even "Celtic fringe" theories of Civil War causation. Indeed, the last chapter qualifies as the best, most current Civil War historiographical essay available. John V. M ering University of Arizona Gettysburg: The Second Day. By Harry W. Pfanz. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. xxii, 601. $34.95.) In two ways, this book is reminiscent of Richard J. Sommers's Richmond Redeemed: The SiegeatPetersburg (1981). First, the title ofeach book is misleading. Sommers did not cover the entire siege, but only Grant's Fifth Offensive, which lasted less than a month. Similarly, Pfanz does not describe all the action on July 2 at Gettysburg, but concentrates exclusively on the Confederate attack against the Union left, thereby omitting the fighting on the Union right at Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Second, both authors demonstrate extraordinary knowledge about their subject. A friend of mine at the Army Command and General Staff College, Dr. Philip J. Brookes, has a knack for coining neologisms. One of his most recent is "overstanding," which goes beyond mere understanding . In regard to historians, it would connote an almost superhuman grasp of the details and issues surrounding an event. All historians overstand their subjects in the eyes of the lay public, but occasionally a historian achieves a degree of overstanding that truly impresses even experts in the field. Sommers did it, and so has Pfanz. Pfanz's overstanding of the Confederate attack and its repulse comes from a massiveresearch effort and an intensive study of the terrain. The 108 pages ofnotes and bibliography attest to his mastery for the relevant sources, and his career in the National Park Service—including ten years at Gettysburg—allowed him to examine the terrain in minute detail. In spite of Pfanz's magnificent scholarship, many questions about the battle at the tactical level remain unanswered. The book abounds with educated guesses, conjectures, and outright admissions that some things cannot be known. For instance, before maturing his plan for July 2, Lee sent three scouting parties to investigate the Union left. The area they 356CIVIL WAR HISTORY reconnoitered was a beehive of Union activity, yet the parties reported seeing only a few enemy cavalrymen. Not even Pfanz can explain how this happened. Still, despite such mysteries, the author's description ofthe fighting at the Devil's Den, Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and the slope of Cemetery Ridge is as complete as any historian could ever expect. It surpasses that of Edwin B. Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1968), which has long been the standard account. The latter devoted approximately 100 pages to these events; Pfanz exceeds this by 220 pages. Although quite detailed, the book is never tedious because of riveting anecdotes, sparkling writing style, and excellent analysis woven into the narrative. Pfanz offers astute interpretations concerning the leadership on both sides. He praises Meade for his "aggressive decision" (p. 54) to fight at Gettysburg even after part of his army had been defeated there on July 1, and for his generalship on July 2. Lee does not fare so well. He was overconfident, based his attack on faulty intelligence, and erred in not using Ewell's corps to strengthen the assaulting force. Hence, eleven Confederate brigades assailed twenty-two Union brigades. Longstreet said these eleven brigades did the finest three hours of fighting done by any troops anywhere—which may be true—but they should not have had to fight so well against such uneven odds. Moreover, in contrast to Meade's direct role in orchestrating the defense, Lee played an excessively passive role after giving the attack order. Both commanding generals...

War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings

Power cycle theory is a two-part theory of the dynamics of relative capability and the occurrence of major war. The relative capability of a state follows a particular non-linear pattern of evolution that is generalizable across the principal members of the state system. This capability also defines the state's systemic role. At four critical points on this curve, where change in the state's power position and international political role involve abrupt inversions in the dynamics, the probability of foreign policy misperception and over-reaction is increased and the state is more likely than at other times to trigger major war. Economic considerations underlie relative capability and affect the amplitude and periodicity of the power cycle. Differing central economic strategies that historically have contributed to the evolution of a state's power cycle are examined. Economic considerations also influence conflict probabilities directly within the critical interval. A discussion of further research involving the power cycle theory of war causation follows the examination of these economic underpinnings of the theory.

The Problem of War Causation

The Problem of War Causation

Mental Disease and War

IN a recent essay (Hibbert J., 37, 513; 1939) on mental disease as a factor in the causation of war, Dr. Olof Kinberg, professor of forensic psychiatry at the University of Stockholm, remarks that though it is growing increasingly clear that war as a means of solving social problems is utterly futile, for the remedy is worse than the disease, many large countries are seeking to imbue even their children with an admiration for war and to do all they can to represent it as the most glorious exposition of national greatness, while other countries are making every possible effort to avoid war, though they are compelled to build up enormous armaments. Prof. Kinberg discusses some of the psychological features of modern society which may help to explain this paradoxical state of affairs. He points out that in order to mould public opinion the ruler must transform private citizens into a psychological mass and keep them in that condition for a considerable time. The production of this mass is brought about by the Press and the radio being in the hands of the Government, the formation of a bulwark against criticism and the persecution and destruction of anyone who dares to entertain different opinions.

A Neglected Factor of War

WAR. Like other referential principles of social sciences of today, principle of causality is in a chaotic state. We use it all time as something definite and clear in its meaning, but as soon as we begin to analyze it, we find its meaning is neither definite, nor identical among various scholars. When we take a concrete problem and start to analyze its causes, this chaotic state becomes immediately apparent. The problem of causes of war illustrates this lack of precision. The existing literature on war causation reveals almost hopelessly muddled condition of our knowledge in this field, and in that of causality generally.' We find in this literature, first, an almost unbelievable diversity of causes set forth by different, and sometimes even by same, investigators. The causal factors evoked include: sunspots, climate, conjunctions of planets, and other cosmic factors; instincts of pugnacity, of war, of fighting, of herd, and of aggressiveness; overpopulation, underpopulation, high and low birth and mortality rates; universal law of struggle for existence, and other biological factors; fear, fight for freedom, relaxation from inhibitions imposed by civilization, sadism, lust for power, ostentation, vanity, and dozens of other psychological forces; a long list of economic, political, dynastic, religious, aesthetic, educational, and other social factors; diverse cultural conditions like the true and false culture, mores, and like; philosophical abstractions like Destiny, Providence, and so on; and finally, various wicked, greatand small-men and groups. This enormous diversity of causes is sufficient evidence of a lack of a real knowledge of problem. What would we say if such an agglomeration of diverse causes were listed,