Causal History Research Articles

The quantum gravity seeds for laws of nature

We discuss the challenges that the standard (Humean and non-Humean) accounts of laws face within the framework of quantum gravity where space and time may not be fundamental. This paper identifies core (meta)physical features that cut across a number of quantum gravity approaches and formalisms and that provide seeds for articulating updated conceptions that could account for QG laws not involving any spatio-temporal notions. To this aim, we will in particular highlight the constitutive roles of quantum entanglement, quantum transition amplitudes and quantum causal histories. These features also stress the fruitful overlap between quantum gravity and quantum information theory.

Preferences for AI Explanations Based on Cognitive Style and Socio-Cultural Factors

Designing AI systems with the capacity to explain their behaviour is paramount to enable human oversight, facilitate trust, promote acceptance of technology and, ultimately, empower users and improve their experience. There are, however, several challenges to explainable AI, one of which is the generation and selection of explanations from the causal history of a given event. Causal attribution, among other cognitive processes, has been found to be influenced by socio-cultural factors, which suggests that there could be systematic differences in preferences for AI explanations between communities of users according to their cognitive style and socio-cultural characteristics. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between preferences in the explanations provided by belief-desire-intention AI agents, cognitive style (holistic vs analytical), and socio-cultural factors, such as gender, education, social class, and political and religious beliefs. We found a relationship between explanation preference, cognitive style and various socio-cultural characteristics. Holistic cognitive style is associated with preference for goal explanations while analytic cognitive style is associated with preference for belief explanations. Socio-cultural variables that affect explanation preference are gender, religious beliefs, educational attainment, some fields of education, and political party affiliation.

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: what should dental surgeons know?

Child sexual abuse is defined as the involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or she does not fully understand or is unable to give informed consent to. Dental surgeons who work with children must be alert to signs and behaviors that can help diagnose abuse and criminalize the aggressor. Thus, the present study aimed to present a literature review regarding dental management in cases suggestive of child sexual abuse. According to the literature review, it was possible to identify that child sexual abuse is a silently underreported social issue, capable of causing physical and psychological harm to the victim. Suggestive injuries, preferably in the head and neck region, should be evaluated taking note of the causal history reported by the child and their guardian, if necessary, separately. In the assimilation of injuries resulting from sexually transmitted infections, testing and treatment must be included in care. The dental surgeon must be prepared to carry out compulsory notification under the risk of ethical, civil and criminal charges. The creation of public policies and the union of sectors that work directly with the child population must focus on education and children's understanding of the limits of access by third parties to their bodies, as well as support networks for the victim's mental and social restructuring.

Generative visual common sense: Testing analysis-by-synthesis on Mondrian-style image.

The well-known Mondrian-style images, aside from being aesthetically amusing, also reflect the core principles of human vision in their viewing experience. First, when we see a Mondrian-style image consisting only of a grid and primary colors, we may automatically interpret its causal history such that it was generated by recursively partitioning a blank scene. Second, the image we observe is open to many possible ways of partitioning, and their probabilities of dominating the interpretation can be captured by a probabilistic distribution. Moreover, the causal interpretation of a Mondrian-style image can emerge almost spontaneously, not being tailored to any specific task. Using Mondrian-style images as a case study, we demonstrate the generative nature of human vision by showing that a Bayesian model based upon an image-generation task can support a wide range of visual tasks with little retraining. Our model, learned from human-synthesized Mondrian-style images, could predict human performance in the perceptual complexity ranking, capture the transmission stability when images were iteratively passed among participants, and pass a visual Turing test. Our results collectively show that human vision is causal such that we interpret an image from the angle of how it was generated. The success of generalization with little retraining suggests that generative vision constitutes a type of common sense that supports a wide range of tasks of different natures. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Perpetrators’ and Victims’ Folk Explanations of Aggressive Behaviors and Desires for Apologies

After an aggressive interaction, perpetrators most want to offer apologies when they have unintentionally harmed another person and victims most want to receive an apology when another person intentionally harmed them. Perpetrators and victims also explain aggressive behaviors differently—perpetrators often explain their own aggressive behaviors by referring to beliefs they considered that led to their behaviors (i.e., “belief” explanations), whereas victims explain perpetrators’ behaviors by referring to background factors that do not mention the perpetrators’ mental deliberations (i.e., “causal history explanations”). Putting these ideas together, the current Registered Report had participants recall either a time they intentionally harmed another person or a time when they were intentionally harmed by another person. Participants then rated several characteristics of the recalled behavior, explained why the behavior occurred, and reported their desire for an apology. As predicted, we found that perpetrators who gave “belief” explanations wanted to give an apology much less than participants who gave “causal history explanations.” However, and inconsistent with our predictions, victims’ desire to receive an apology was similar regardless of how they explained the perpetrators’ behaviors. These findings underscore how perpetrators’ explanations can emphasize (or de-emphasize) the deliberateness of their harmful behaviors and how these explanations are related to their desire to make amends.

An inexplicably good argument for causal finitism

Causal finitism, the view that the causal history of any event must be finite, has garnered much philosophical interest recently—especially because of its applicability to the Kalām cosmological argument. The most prominent argument for causal finitism is the Grim Reaper argument, which attempts to show that, if infinite causal histories are possible, then other paradoxical states of affairs must also be possible. However, this style of argument has been criticized on the grounds of (i) relying on controversial modal principles, and (ii) providing a false diagnosis of the paradoxes involved. In this paper, I develop a new kind of Grim Reaper argument immune to these criticisms. I show that, by using insights from the literature on time travel, causal finitists should instead argue that infinite causal histories are problematically inexplicable, as they entail the possibility of unexplained foiling mechanisms. The fruits of this paper are that (i) a novel supporting argument for the Kalām is developed, and (ii) along the way of building this argument, it is shown that the literatures on time travel and causal finitism are deeply and intimately connected.

Natralization without associationist reduction: a brief rebuttal to Yoshimi

AbstractYoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that such details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) and dynamical systems theory applied to the mind (DST) are both associationisms - that is, empiricist theories that derive the principles of thought from the causal history of the organism/system. On this basis, I put forward a new aspect of the old argument by noting that ANNs & DST are the causal bases of the phenomena of passive synthesis, whereas the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) and the symbolic computational theory of mind (CTM) are the causal bases of the phenomena of active synthesis. If the phenomena of active synthesis are not distinct in kind from and are thus reducible to those of passive synthesis, psychologism results. Yoshimi’s program, insofar as it denies this fundamental phenomenological distinction, is revealed to be the true anti-pluralist program, by essentially denying the causal efficacy of the mechanistic foundations of active synthesis by referring phenomenology exclusively to associationism for its causal foundation.

Causal Unfoldings and Disjunctive Causes

In the simplest form of event structure, a prime event structure, an event is associated with a unique causal history, its prime cause. However, it is quite common for an event to have disjunctive causes in that it can be enabled by any one of multiple sets of causes. Sometimes the sets of causes may be mutually exclusive, inconsistent one with another, and sometimes not, in which case they coexist consistently and constitute parallel causes of the event. The established model of general event structures can model parallel causes. On occasion however such a model abstracts too far away from the precise causal histories of events to be directly useful. For example, sometimes one needs to associate probabilities with different, possibly coexisting, causal histories of a common event. Ideally, the causal histories of a general event structure would correspond to the configurations of its causal unfolding to a prime event structure; and the causal unfolding would arise as a right adjoint to the embedding of prime in general event structures. But there is no such adjunction. However, a slight extension of prime event structures remedies this defect and provides a causal unfolding as a universal construction. Prime event structures are extended with an equivalence relation in order to dissociate the two roles, that of an event and its enabling; in effect, prime causes are labelled by a disjunctive event, an equivalence class of its prime causes. With this enrichment a suitable causal unfolding appears as a pseudo right adjoint. The adjunction relies critically on the central and subtle notion of extremal causal realisation as an embodiment of causal history. Finally, we explore subcategories which support parallel causes as well the key operations needed in developing probabilistic distributed strategies with parallel causes.

Causal History, Statistical Relevance, and Explanatory Power

AbstractIn discussions of the power of causal explanations, one often finds a commitment to two premises. The first is that, all else being equal, a causal explanation is powerful to the extent that it cites the full causal history of why the effect occurred. The second is that, all else being equal, causal explanations are powerful to the extent that the occurrence of a cause allows us to predict the occurrence of its effect. This article proves a representation theorem showing that there is a unique family of functions measuring a causal explanation’s power that satisfies these two premises.

Perpetrators’ folk explanations of their regretted and justified aggressive behaviors

ABSTRACT When people explain why they behaved aggressively, they can refer to their thought process that led to their aggressive behavior – so-called reason explanations – or to other factors that preceded their thought process – so-called causal history of reasons explanations. People’s choice of what mode of explanation they give might be affected by whether they want to distance themselves (or not) from their past aggressive behaviors. To test these ideas, participants in the current study (N = 429) either recalled an aggressive behavior they regret or an aggressive behavior they believe was justified. Participants then explained why they behaved aggressively. Mostly, people gave reason explanations for their aggressive behaviors, which is consistent with past research on how people explain intentional behaviors. Further, and as predicted, participants who explained behaviors they believe were justified gave (relatively) more reason explanations and participants who explained behaviors they regretted gave (relatively) more causal history of reasons explanations. These findings are consistent with the idea that participants adjust their explanations to either provide a rationale for, or to distance themselves from, their past aggressive behaviors.

The causal structure of Frankfurt‐ and PAP‐style cases

AbstractFrankfurt‐style cases suggest that an agent's moral responsibility for an action supervenes on the causal history of that action—at least when epistemic considerations are held constant. However, PAP‐style cases suggest that moral responsibility does not supervene on causal history, for judgments concerning an agent's responsibility for an action are also sensitive to the presence of alternative—and causally idle—possibilities. I appeal to the causal modeling tradition and the definitions of actual causation that derive therefrom in an attempt to resolve this contradiction. I show that even the weakest definitions of actual causation proposed in the literature establish that some PAP‐style cases constitute genuine counterexamples to the supervenience thesis. I consider several responses to these counterexamples on behalf of the defenders of supervenience and show that they fail. Our best current thinking on causation thus appears to be inconsistent with an intuitive and widely held claim concerning the nature of moral responsibility.

Truth within Reason

It can be seen as a mark against a belief that its causal history be disconnected from the truth. And that idea fits well with the view that discovering that a belief’s causal history is so disconnected itself diminishes its normative status. But this latter view can also be held independently: believing that your belief was influenced by irrelevant factors might be seen as problematic even should it not be seen as in general a mark against a belief that it be caused in one way or another. I pursue a more radical rejection of the role of truth in an adequate understanding of the normative status of belief. If a belief can be perfectly good independently of its connection to the truth, then perhaps it can be perfectly good even for an agent who knows that it is not causally determined by the truth.

Nietzsche's Last Will

Nietzsche's Last Will

Strindberg's Representation of Anxiety in The Father: Between Naturalistic Determinism and Existential Indeterminism

Strindberg's Representation of Anxiety in <i>The Father</i>: Between Naturalistic Determinism and Existential Indeterminism

Perpetrators', Victims', and Witnesses' Folk Explanations of Aggressive Behaviors.

Unsurprisingly, victims and perpetrators often view aggressive behaviors differently. The current study examined whether victims, perpetrators, and witnesses also explained aggressive behaviors differently. The current study included 408 participants who recalled a time when they harmed another person (i.e., perpetrator memory), when another person harmed them (i.e., victim memory), and when they witnessed an aggressive behavior (i.e., witness memory). Replicating past research, participants rated their recalled aggressive behaviors from the victim perspective as being more harmful and less justified than they did for their recalled behaviors from the perpetrator perspective. When examining their explanations for the behaviors, participants most often explained their own aggressive behaviors by referring to their mental deliberations that led to their behavior (i.e., reason explanations). In comparison, they referred to background causal factors (i.e., causal history of reasons explanations)-such as personality traits, demographic factors, cultural norms, etc.-more when explaining others' aggressive behaviors, especially when the explanation was from the victim perspective. These findings show the subtleties in how people communicate about their aggressive interactions: When communicating about their own aggressive behaviors, people use modes of explanations that portray their behaviors as sensible, and when communicating about a time when another person behaved aggressively towards them, people use modes of explanations that omit the thought processes that led to those behaviors.

Reasons-Responsiveness and the Challenge of Irrelevance

AbstractCarolina Sartorio has criticized the reasons-responsiveness theory of freedom for being inconsistent with the actual-sequence view motivated by the Frankfurt-style cases. Specifically, reasons-responsiveness conceived as a modal property does not pertain to the actual sequence of the agent's action and thereby it is irrelevant to the agent's freedom and moral responsibility. Call this the challenge of irrelevance. In this article, I present this challenge in a new way that overcomes certain limitations of Sartorio's argument. I argue that the root of the challenge is that reasons-responsiveness as an unmanifested modal property seems to be nonexplanatory for the agent's action. I show that reasons-responsiveness theorists will confront this challenge even if they do not endorse the actual-sequence view. Finally, I deflate this challenge with David Lewis's model of causal explanation, showing that reasons-responsiveness is explanatory in virtue of providing information about the causal history of the agent's action.

A tale of two cities: emotion and reason in the formation of moral judgement and possible metaethical implications.

The project of naturalizing ethics has multiple contributions, from cognitive and moral psychology to primatology, neuroscience or evolutionary theory. One of the strategies for naturalizing ethics has been to argue that moral norms and values can be explained away if we focus on their causal history, if it is possible to offer both an ultimate and proximate causal explanation for them. In this article, I will focus on the contribution of cognitive and moral psychology as a way of offering a proximate causal explanation for moral judgments. I am mostly interested in understanding to what extent these cognitive and psychological questions have some bearing in the fields of ethics and meta-ethics. Does this research programme put at stake the contention that ethics is a manifestation of human rationality? Is it true that finding the cognitive underpinnings of some of our moral judgments vindicates some meta-ethical position, namely some kind of reductionist naturalism? In the end, I will argue that even if scientific disciplines such as cognitive psychology give us a naturalized picture of the moral agent, there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself.

Upaya United Nations Women (UN Women) dalam Menangani Diskriminasi terhadap Perempuan di Afghanistan

United Nations Women (UN Women) struggles to restore the rights of women in Afghanistan who have been discriminated against in all fields, particularly on health, social, education, politics, and even the economy. The basic causes of this discrimination are the long causal history of the Afghanistan regimes that went south, the lack of knowledge of applicable laws, the existence of cultural traditions that are still inherent among the Afghanistan people, lack of education, extreme ideology and its law which tends to not defend women. Therefore, UN Women strives so that Afghanistan women can be seen and treated the same as men. This change is expected to be applied in every field, where women can participate in politics, can get education by studying at school, can receive good health insurance, and so on. UN Women's efforts are absolutely necessary to support women in Afghanistan to regain their rights and advance the status of women in Afghanistan, and able to make positive changes for all women in Afghanistan.

Nilai-nilai Intelektual dalam Mite Pangeran Samudro di Gunung Kemukus Sragen Jawa Tengah

Not many people know about the causal history of phenomenology other than tautologies, which raises more questions than helps find such answers. One of these phenomena is the existence of the myth of Prince Samudro on Mount Kemukus, Sragen. To find out the intellectual values or messages in the myth of Prince Samudro, the method used is the Levi Strauss structural approach and a combination of historical explanation, Verstehen method, conflict theory, and Lyotard’s critique of thought. Research on the myth covers several aspects of life, including intellectual mythology, moral values, norms, teachings, philosophy, mandate, functions, and benefits. In this study, the researcher takes one of the aspects above, namely the intellectual values in the myth of Prince Samudro on Mount Kemukus. This study finds that in the mythical story of Prince Samudro on Mount Kemukus, there is a historical mystery that invites pros and cons. On the one hand, pilgrimage procedures must be done in earnest. But, on the other hand, have to do sex ritual. The story is made subtly, full of symbols or often called gedhong literature.&#x0D; Keywords: myth; structural approach; intellectual value

Causal fundamentality

I present an argument for causal fundamentality, understood as the thesis that the causal history of every being, whose existence has a causal explanation, includes some uncaused beings. I argue that this thesis is a consequence of an actualist account of metaphysical modality whose novelty lies in its hybrid dispositional-essentialist foundation. I argue that my modal theory is extensionally correct and minimalistic. Its range of metaphysical necessities and possibilities is just as wide as needed to capture the pre-theoretical notion of modality. Moreover, my theory is immune from the necessitism of standard essentialist accounts of modality and addresses the challenge of global possibilities facing dispositionalist modal theories thanks to its essentialist component.