Causal Ground Research Articles

Three theories of separation: Kelsen, Schmitt and Pashukanis and the historical development of the legal form

This article examines the different approaches to the relation between law, state and economy in the works of Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt and Evgeny Pashukanis. It begins with Kelsen’s depiction of law as a dynamic and ‘self-regulating’ system of norms, founded on his rejection of ‘dualist’ separations of state and law, before turning to Schmitt and Pashukanis’s respective critiques. For all their differences, both agree Kelsen ignores the historical basis of the law – for Schmitt, the sovereign power of ‘the political’, for Pashukanis, the social relations of commodity exchange. The article responds to these criticisms in a most un-Kelsenian manner, drawing upon historical sociological literature on early modern state formation to cast doubt on both Schmitt and Pashukanis’s historical accounts. It argues that the forms of political power and commodity exchange upon which Schmitt and Pashukanis’s theories rely were historically specific possibilities opened up by the same process of generalisation and depersonalisation of power relations that allowed for an autonomous ‘public’ system of legal norms. Thus, rather than the fixed causal ground for the development of modern law, ‘the political’ and exchange between equals exist in a relation of ‘difference-in-unity’ with the law. The article concludes that Kelsen’s notion of the Grundnorm is best explained as an attempt to capture the new possibilities and responsibilities opened up a normative system whose ultimate justification now lies only within itself.

The Ground Truth program: simulations as test beds for social science research methods

Social systems are uniquely complex and difficult to study, but understanding them is vital to solving the world’s problems. The Ground Truth program developed a new way of testing the research methods that attempt to understand and leverage the Human Domain and its associated complexities. The program developed simulations of social systems as virtual world test beds. Not only were these simulations able to produce data on future states of the system under various circumstances and scenarios, but their causal ground truth was also explicitly known. Research teams studied these virtual worlds, facilitating deep validation of causal inference, prediction, and prescription methods. The Ground Truth program model provides a way to test and validate research methods to an extent previously impossible, and to study the intricacies and interactions of different components of research.

Child Sexual Abuse in Pakistan: Using Evidence Based Social Ecological Model for Explanation and Policy Formulation.

Due to recent high profile media reported cases of child sexual abuse in Pakistan a serious public concern is observed with a strong punitive public demand rather than proactive and preventive approach as solution. Instead of reactive approach, it is needed to formulate a policy based on valid causal ground for solution of this problem. Purpose of this cross sectional study is to provide a causal ground based on evidence based social ecological model for holistic policy response for addressing issue of CSA. Using ICAST-R, equal number of male and female 274 university students were asked about experience of CSA, re-victimization, age at the time of CSA, perpetrators, disclosure patterns and social support after disclosure of CSA. On the basis of data, evidence based social ecological model was used for explanation of individual, family, societal and institutional factors related to CSA in Pakistan for formulation of effective prevention strategy. According to findings most frequent age at the time of CSA is between 6th to 18th year of age with 9th year as most frequently reported. Experience of CSA was reported more frequently by boys than girls. Peers were identified as highest reported perpetrators and majority of the perpetrators were known to the child. Instead of reactive and punitive approach towards issue of CSA it is needed to formulate a policy based on social ecological factors of society.

The Dialectical Illusion in Kant’s Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God

AbstractThe nature of Kant’s criticism of his pre-Critical ‘possibility proof’ for the existence of God, implicit in the account of the Transcendental Ideal in the Critique of Pure Reason, is still under dispute. Two issues are at stake: the error in the proof and diagnosis of the reason for committing it. I offer a new way to connect these issues. In contrast with accounts that locate the motivation for the error in reason’s interest in an unconditioned causal ground of all contingent existence, I argue that it lies in reason’s interest in another kind of unconditioned ground, collective unity. Unlike the conception of the former, that of the latter directly explains the problematic ontological assumption of the possibility proof, the existence of intelligible objects as the ground of possibility. I argue that such Platonic entities are assumed because they are amenable to the kind of unity prescribed by reason. However, since the interest in collective unity has a legitimate regulative use when applied to the systematic unity of nature, the conception of God entailed by the possibility proof is retained as a regulative idea of reason.

Causal grounds for negative truths

Among truthmaker theorists it is generally thought that we are not able to use the entailment principle (i.e. the principle according to which truthmaking distributes across entailment) to ground negative truths. But these theorists usually only discuss truthmakers for truth-functional complexes, thereby overlooking the fact that there are non-truth-functional complexes whose truth values are not solely determined by the truth or falsity of their atomic propositions. And once we expand the class of truths that require their own bespoke truthmakers to also include these, there is no reason to exempt negative truths from grounding. For given that truthmaking is closed under entailment and every negative truths is entailed by some non-truth-functional complex or other, any resources rich enough to ground the truth of the latter will do the same job for the former.

Grading, gradients, degradation, grace

This article has two overarching and intertwined themes. The first is the social and semiotic mediation of “comparative grounds”—in particular, the way people come to understand, and alter, the relative intensity of entities and events. The second is the social and semiotic mediation of “causal grounds”—in particular, the way people come to understand, and alter, the sequencing of events, or the channeling of forces. Focusing on the multiple processes that mediate people’s understandings of landslides in a Mayan village in highland Guatemala, it shows the ways causal and comparative grounds relate to physical forces and phenomenological experience, as much as to communicative practices and social conventions. More generally, though less explicitly, this article is about four topics that underlie the Anthropocene: “gradients” (the way qualities vary in their intensity over space and time, and the ways such variations relate to causal processes), “grading” (the ways agents assess and alter such intensities, and experience and intervene in causal processes), “degradation” (the ways highly valuable variations in qualitative intensities are lowered or lost), and “grace” (the way agents work to maintain gradients, care for those whose lives have been degraded, and value those agents who work and care in such ways).

Pattern Cladistics and the ‘Realism–Antirealism Debate’ in the Philosophy of Biology

Despite the amount of work that has been produced on the subject over the years, the 'transformation of cladistics' is still a misunderstood episode in the history of comparative biology. Here, I analyze two outstanding, highly contrasting historiographic accounts on the matter, under the perspective of an influential dichotomy in the philosophy of science: the opposition between Scientific Realism and Empiricism. Placing special emphasis on the notion of 'causal grounding' of morphological characters (sensu Olivier Rieppel) in modern developmental biology's (mechanistic) theories, I arrive at the conclusion that a 'new transformation of cladistics' is philosophically plausible. This 'reformed' understanding of 'pattern cladistics' entails retaining the interpretation of cladograms as 'schemes of synapomorphies', but in association to construing cladogram nodes as 'developmental-genetic taxic homologies', instead of 'standard Darwinian ancestors'. The reinterpretation of pattern cladistics presented here additionally proposes to take Bas Van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' as a philosophical stance that could properly support such analysis of developmental-genetic data for systematic purposes. The latter suggestion is justified through a reappraisal of previous ideas developed by prominent pattern cladists (mainly, Colin Patterson), which concerned a scientifically efficient 'observable/non-observable distinction' linked to the conceptual pair 'ontogeny and phylogeny'. Finally, I argue that a robust articulation of Antirealist alternatives in systematics may provide a rational basis for its disciplinary separation from evolutionary biology, as well as for a critical reconsideration of the proper role of certain Scientific Realist positions, currently popular in comparative biology.

Hypothetico-deductivism in systematics: fact or fiction?

Phylogenetic systematics (the cladistic analysis of phylogenetic relationships) is not hypotheticodeductively structured (in the sense of a covering law model of scientific explanation). If it were, there would be no reason to call for total evidence, since that requirement is automatically satisfied in a deductively structured explanation. Instead, the appeal to the requirement of total evidence in phylogenetic systematics indicates that phylogenetic inference is inductively, or abductively, structured. The principle of total evidence has been invoked to render inductive inference an argument as strong as it can be, but for this to be the case the total evidence must also be relevant evidence, i.e., evidence 'of the right sort' relative to the state of affairs to be explained. Character congruence is a necessary condition for phylogenetic inference, but not also a sufficient condition. What is required in addition is the causal grounding of character statements in theories of inheritance, development and function.

The Poverty of Taxonomic Characters

The theory and practice of contemporary comparative biology and phylogeny reconstruction (systematics) emphasizes algorithmic aspects but neglects a concern for the evidence. The character data used in systematics to formulate hypotheses of relationships in many ways constitute a black box, subject to uncritical assessment and social influence. Concerned that such a state of affairs leaves systematics and the phylogenetic theories it generates severely underdetermined, we investigate the nature of the criteria of homology and their application to character conceptualization in the context of transformationist and generative paradigms. Noting the potential for indeterminacy in character conceptualization, we conclude that character congruence (the coherence of character statements) relative to a hierarchy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction. Specifically, it is insufficient due to the lack of causal grounding of character hypotheses. Conceptualizing characters as homeostatic property cluster natural kinds is in accordance with the empirical practice of systematists. It also accounts for the lack of sharpness in character conceptualization, yet requires character identification and re-identification to be tied to causal processes.

Rejecting "the given" in systematics.

How morphology and systematics come together through morphological analysis, homology hypotheses and phylogenetic analysis is a topic of continuing debate. Some contemporary approaches reject biological evaluation of morphological characters and fall back on an atheoretical and putatively objective (but, in fact, phenetic) approach that defers to the test of congruence for homology assessment. We note persistent trends toward an uncritical empiricism (where evidence is believed to be immediately "given" in putatively theory-free observation) and instrumentalism (where hypotheses of primary homology become mere instruments with little or no empirical foundation for choosing among competing phylogenetic hypotheses). We suggest that this situation is partly a consequence of the fact that the test of congruence and the related concept of total evidence have been inappropriately tied to a Popperian philosophy in modern systematics. Total evidence is a classical principle of inductive inference and does not imply a deductive test of homology. The test of congruence by itself is based philosophically on a coherence theory of truth (coherentism in epistemology), which is unconcerned with empirical foundation. We therefore argue that coherence of character statements (congruence of characters) is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to support or refute hypotheses of homology or phylogenetic relationship. There should be at least some causal grounding for homology hypotheses beyond mere congruence. Such causal grounding may be achieved, for example, through empirical investigations of comparative anatomy, developmental biology, functional morphology and secondary structure.

The philosophy of total evidence and its relevance for phylogenetic inference

The test of congruence under total evidence as used in systematics has been tied to a Popperian philosophy of science, but is here shown to be related to the coherence theory of truth in metaphysics and thus to coherentism in epistemology. Since the test of congruence is coherentist, the contextual (theoretical) background of initial character conceptualization cannot be ignored as is suggested by some proponents of the total evidence approach. The relative merits of a total evidence approach versus conditional data set partitioning are considered, and whereas both have their merits and drawbacks, either approach requires causal grounding of character statements (statements of homology), at least approximately and defeasibly. The conclusion is that character congruence is a necessary, but not also a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction.

The language of systematics, and the philosophy of ‘total evidence’

This contribution analyses the primacy of classification over generalization, and the philosophy of total evidence that emerges from the relation of homology to character statements. Primary conjectures of homology are basic character statements, i.e. statements that predicate properties of organisms, properties that are instantiated by those organisms and/or their parts. Secondary conjectures of homology are embedded in a second‐level (metalinguistic) discourse that turns on the coherence or incoherence of those basic character statements relative to a hierarchy. The coherence or incoherence of character statements is a logical relation between statements, not a causal (historical) relation between organisms. The choice of the hypothesis of relationships that is supported by the largest set of coherent basic character statements is based on the empirical presupposition that the properties referred to by the set of coherent character statements are grounded in causally efficacious relations of inheritance and ontogeny, and co‐instantiated because they are inherited through common ancestry (Hennig's auxiliary principle). Unless that empirical presupposition is causally grounded, phylogeny reconstruction is of an inherently probabilistic nature, whether under parsimony or other models of analysis. The causal grounding of a coherent set of character statements typically seeks a link between character statements and causally efficacious generative mechanisms for morphological characters (as is defeasibly indicated by topology and connectivity), or secondary structure information for molecular characters.

Autobiography as Critque in Thoreau

Thoreau's Walden is often disregarded as a philosophical work in academic circles because of its literary form and paucity of formal argumentation. I demonstrate that Walden is a philosophical work by relating its method to Kant's in the Critique of Pure Reason, and I show that Walden's literary genre-autobiography as critique-is a function of the work's philosophical intent: to produce a philosophical instrument of lifeworldly experience. I ascribe to Thoreau a modified Kantian transcendental method by which he investigates the conditions of the possibility of life as such, making the transition from Kant's experience (Erfahrung) as the spatiotemporal and causal ground of the sciences to Dilthey's experience (Erlebnis) as including the category of life and autobiographical and historical consciousness. I highlight a number of passages where this philosophical substance of Walden becomes clear, and I appeal to the composition history of the work to reinforce the point.

On the relationship between FAPAR and NDVI

The influence of pixel heterogeneity, background, atmospheric and bidirectional effects on the relationship between fraction of photosynthetically active radiation absorbed by the photosynthesizing tissue in a canopy (FAPAR) and normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) is investigated using a three-dimensional model of radiation transfer. Top of the canopy (TOC) NDVI and FAPAR increase with ground cover and plant leaf area. Their functional response to leaf orientation, solar zenith angle and atmospheric optical depth is similar. For instance, planophile canopies (mostly horizontal leaves) have a higher FAPAR and TOC NDVI than erectophile canopies (mostly erect leaves). However, FAPAR and TOC NDVI respond differently to other parameters such as soil reflectance and leaf optical properties. For example, an increase in soil reflectance increases FAPAR but decreases TOC NDVI. Atmospheric and bidirectional effects confound the interpretation of top of the atmosphere (TOA) NDVI. The transmissivity of NDVI, defined as the ratio TOA/TOC NDVI, decreases with increasing atmospheric turbidity and solar zenith angle. Sensing about the nadir directions under clear sky conditions and moderate solar incidence angles can result in transmissivities as high as 0.8. There are sufficient causal grounds for relating FAPAR to NDVI. The relationship is independent of pixel heterogeneity, parameterized here with ground cover, plant leaf area, and variations in leaf orientation and optical properties. On the other hand, the relationship is sensitive to background, atmospheric, and bidirectional effects. A simple linear model relating FAPAR to TOC NDVI is proposed, and its validity is discussed.

A proposed experiment on absorber theory

As distinct from conventional electrodynamics in which the advanced potential solution of Maxwell's equations is rejected on causal grounds, absorber theory allows the possibility of a mixture of advanced and retarded radiation, dependent on cosmological boundary conditions. In a recent experiment Partridge attempted to detect advanced effects by introducing a local absorber, but it was maintained by Pegg that, because a static absorber was used, only a null result was possible. The authors give the theory and a brief outline of an experiment which uses a time-asymmetric chopper absorber to alter the boundary conditions and thus the ratio of the advanced to retarded components in the mixture, provided this is non-zero initially, leading to possibly detectable effects.

The Temporal Pattern of Behaviour in Isolated Male Zebra Finches : Transition Analysis

AbstractA transition analysis has been carried out on the behaviour of single male zebra finches, isolated as far as possible from all varying environmental stimuli. As wide a variety of behaviour patterns as feasible was included and grouping of these was kept to a minimum. The dangers of grouping acts on functional rather than causal grounds are stressed. The method of analysis differs from most of those used previously in the following ways: 1. Data from different individuals are not massed for statistical treatment. This avoids a source of bias which makes it difficult to reach conclusions about the population as a whole. 2. Transitions between one act and itself are not considered. It is argued that models including such transitions have a strong arbitrary component and are predisposed to demonstrate merely that certain acts occur in bouts. A method is employed for calculating the expected frequencies of transitions which does not appear to have been used before in this field. It is based on a random model which excludes from consideration homogeneous transitions and any others which cannot occur because of environmental constraints. The analysis suggests that zebra finches show cycles of behaviour having active and inactive phases, with ingestion occurring mainly in the former and grooming in the latter. Song appears to be transitional between the two and to occur during periods when other tendencies are low, while stereotypes often follow such periods. Certain pairs of behaviours which occur frequently in sequence are discussed. In some cases one probably generates the peripheral state appropriate to the other and in others the pairing appears to have central causation. Triplet analysis on the massed data from all birds suggests that for most behaviours triplets of the form A-B-A are commoner than would be expected from the frequencies of the pairs A-B and B-A. It is suggested that factor analysis is not a very useful method for dealing with transition data. Detailed closer study of particular interactions, and of the temporal pattern of individual behaviours, are likely to prove more fruitful.