Abstract
Phylogenetic systematics (the cladistic analysis of phylogenetic relationships) is not hypotheticodeductively structured (in the sense of a covering law model of scientific explanation). If it were, there would be no reason to call for total evidence, since that requirement is automatically satisfied in a deductively structured explanation. Instead, the appeal to the requirement of total evidence in phylogenetic systematics indicates that phylogenetic inference is inductively, or abductively, structured. The principle of total evidence has been invoked to render inductive inference an argument as strong as it can be, but for this to be the case the total evidence must also be relevant evidence, i.e., evidence 'of the right sort' relative to the state of affairs to be explained. Character congruence is a necessary condition for phylogenetic inference, but not also a sufficient condition. What is required in addition is the causal grounding of character statements in theories of inheritance, development and function.
Highlights
Introduction by Graham MacdonaldColumbia University Press, New York
If phylogenetic inference is hypothetico-deductively structured in the sense of the D‐N model of scientific explanation1, there is no requirement for total evidence
There would be no reason to call for total evidence, since that requirement is automatically satisfied in a deductively structured explanation, where the explanans logically entails the explanandum
Summary
‘An Introduction to the Logic of Phylogeny Reconstruction’ is how Gaffney (1979) titled his influential article in which he sketched a hypotheticodeductive approach to the cladistic analysis of phylogenetic relationships This title, resonated Popper’s (1959 [1992]) ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’. Many more references could be added to the above bibliography that documents the tenacity with which phylogenetic systematists (cladists) defend(ed) a hypothetico-deductive form of argumentation for their science. In retrospect, this tenacity, which continues to the present day, seems rather surprising (e.g., compare Kluge [1983: vii], who at that time “remained unconvinced of the relevance and importance” of Popper’s hypothetico-deductivism for systematics with Kluge [2005]). In contrast to Fitzhugh (1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2008), I propose to root the relevance of evidence in phylogenetic inference in congruence, and and more fundamentally in theories of inheritance, development, and function (the ‘proximate causes’ of Mayr, 1982)
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